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Abstract
This thesis addresses the concepts of rights and freedoms of citizens to cultural 
expression and democratic information in political and economic communities. It 
directly engages with the problematic of defending citizens' rights to communication as 
a cultural right and a social right. These arguments are founded in a fear of cultural 
imperialism, a defence of national cultures and an advocacy of cultural diversity within 
a “European culture”. This author is confident that the notion of culture, and cultural 
objectives will be challenged repeatedly at every round of World Trade Organisation 
negotiations. This thesis takes the view that the annexation o f audiovisual products and 
services is therefore a temporary solution.
This thesis prefers to address broadcasting policy and audiovisual services policy from a 
trade and human rights perspective. It argues that an awareness of human rights in 18lh 
century Ireland developed firstly as a by-product of trade with America within the 
public sphere of market activity. Research suggests that issues of trade autonomy are 
key aspects of communities’ demands for citizenship and a separate nationhood. It 
appears that in Ireland's case, ethnic cultural claims developed later. In adopting this 
premise, this thesis rejects the view that citizenship demands were predominantly linked 
with an Irish cultural nationalism. This creed is often the rationale behind the defence of 
‘cultural rights’ in relation to media and public service broadcasting. I argue that human 
rights demands arising from restrictive market practices are voiced in the market and 
trading community but take on the mantel of a defence of cultural hegemony and a call 
for separateness in citizenship when in actuality, the basis of their demand for rights is 
autonomy and independence in commercial and trading policy.
This thesis examines the years 1982 -  2002 and the policy strategies of Ireland in 
relation to Audiovisual Services, and the EU Common Commercial policy that frames 
their input into multi-lateral trade rounds in the GATT / World Trade Organisation 
forum. This research addresses the options at Ireland’s disposal in order to protect 
national autonomy over its audiovisual policy, and national citizens’ rights to 
communication, knowledge and information.
Findings demonstrate that Ireland has made little effort to restrict market access to 
foreign market dominance in audiovisual product beyond the EU minimum. Irish 
governments regularly choose free trade over the protection of national rights, 
inevitably argued from a cultural basis. This is because, while television might be seen 
as politically and democratically important, it is not as economically important as the 
new media industries related to information technology that are beginning to replace 
agriculture as the mainstay of Ireland’s economic trade.
This thesis concludes that as a small Member State in the European Union, the level of 
sovereignty that Ireland retains over its audiovisual policy diverges from popular 
convictions that posit EU member states retain national autonomy in the area of EU 
audiovisual policy.
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Introduction
0.1 Thesis Statement
This thesis addresses the issues of citizenship and the public sphere, and analyses Irish 
and European audiovisual policy from the perspective o f human rights in trade.
The thesis operates on the premise that Ireland’s audiovisual policy is affected by 
Ireland’s trade policy. This in turn is shaped by the EU Common Commercial Policy 
that feeds into the negotiating forum of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as 
regulated by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
This thesis argues that although citizenship has tended to be associated with the 
parameters and cultural history of the nation state, 21st century citizenship within the 
European Union must move beyond dogmatic adherence to cultural rights and the 
defence of national culture on the occasions when audiovisual policy is contested within 
trade fora such as the WTO. The culture versus economic arguments surrounding 
media policy raised within inter-governmental institutions cause nothing more than 
impasse and damage international, particularly trans-Atlantic, relations.
I also challenge those who suggest that the EC’s internal democratic structure allows for 
national sovereignty and control over national broadcasting matters (Ward 2001). For 
example, Ward argues that the European Commission has always emphasised that "the 
philosophy of public service broadcasting is something that lies outside the competition 
rules and the strict terms o f the European treaty". Ward maintains that the European 
Commission always defers to the interpretation of public service broadcasting as given 
by the European Court of Justice in the context of the Treaty, and thus it aims to 
“circumvent any direct involvement in defining, either the remit o f public service 
broadcasters or the nature of funding that these broadcasters receive"(2001:85). 
Fundamentally, Ward argues that "The Commission recognised it was the Member 
States who retained the prerogative to define a service of general interest and the 
functions and obligations which the particular service should pursue". (p88)
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I posit rather that Ireland is not as autonomous vis a vis the European Commission in 
this policy sphere, as Ward would like to believe. In the absence o f national autonomy, 
and rather with an increase in ‘reactive’ policy making within small EU member states 
like Ireland, Ward’s thesis is, I argue, untenable. This means that the national 
government’s willingness to protect its national culture is limited. Within these limits, 
in the case of Ireland, I argue that it could have, but did not, opt for greater protection of 
its national culture vis a vis the quantity o f foreign imports broadcast. This researcher’s 
position concurs with Hamelink (1995) and Corcoran (2001) who both suggest that the 
nation state has in recent times given away large amounts of power to transnational 
corporations and multi-national institutions, over which they have little control.
Put simply, one of the arguments o f this thesis posits that while paying lipservice to the 
democratic needs of its citizens, overall Irish government policy in the last forty years 
has been to favour boosting trade as a primary and dominant policy, particularly with 
America. It will be shown how this tactic has historical roots in the 18th century trade of 
Ireland with the rebelling American colony, when ruled by colonial power Great 
Britain. This suggestion that trade is favoured over democratic rights appears to concur 
with Feintuck’s (1999) concept o f countries engaging in “competitive de-regulation”. 
This is a modem situation where countries dash to attract international media business 
investment, and risk democratic values and norms for their citizens in the process.
'Competitive deregulation' according to Humphreys (1996, 1997a) quoted in Feintuck 
(1999) means, "running the risk of sacrificing national regulation for diversity and 
pluralism in favour of perceived economic benefits attaching to the growth of nationally 
based media empires" (Feintuck 1999:164). Feintuck says in this situation: countries 
and / or national governments "must engage in difficult cost / benefit analyses, 
considering the potential economic benefits of hosting major media players and setting 
these against ideals of pluralism and diversity in the domestic media."
However, this is not a new idea. Barbrook (1992) in his examination of Irish media 
policy since the inception of the Irish state, suggested that since the 1960s, Ireland has 
prioritized economic growth to stem emigration, over diversity and pluralism and 
cultural protectionism. Barbrook suggests that once the Irish economy was opened up to 
the outside world, foreign direct investment, and the open European market, protection
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of national cultural identity took a back seat. He concludes "Because of European 
integration, the protection of the national culture has ceased to be a major aim of the 
broadcasting policies of the Southern Irish state". (p224)
This thesis also argues that an awareness for human rights, and the rights to separate 
nationhood arose first within the public sphere o f the marketplace in Ireland’s ports and 
trade fairs. This awareness of human rights -  in the context of trade, trading rights, and 
a demand for independence from Britain in the sector of trade and commercial policy -  
was subsequently followed, this thesis argues, by a notion of cultural difference vis a vis 
Britain which led to the Act of Union 1800, and later a separate Irish nation in 1922. In 
adopting this position, this thesis therefore rejects the view that citizenship demands 
were always and first linked with an Irish cultural nationalism. This dogma is often the 
rationale behind the defence of ‘cultural rights’ in relation to media and broadcasting 
and public service broadcasting, as advocated by Corcoran (2001), Venturelli (1998) 
and MD Higgins (1995, 1999). Instead, this research provides evidence to support my 
hypothesis that trade shapes and determines the nature of citizenship.
While the claims for separate nationhood in the 19th century were often led by the 
arguments justifying a distinct and independent nation because o f a distinct and separate 
culture, I argue that the basis of the demands for cultural sovereignty lay in the desire 
for commercial sovereignty with external traders. I argue that demands for separate 
culturally defined nations in the late 18th / early 19th centuries were couched in terms of 
cultural nationalism and cultural difference, yet were a thin disguise for real demands 
for independence in trade and commercial policy. Human rights in 18th century Ireland 
(vis a vis Great Britain) developed initially as a by-product o f trade with America 
within the public sphere of port and market activity. This argument is developed in 
chapter four of the present thesis.
With reference to the present day, I present the case that while it might appear 
democratically and culturally desirable to safeguard national culture, and national 
cultural expression, evidence suggests that again, these are thinly disguised arguments 
for securing trade and commercial benefits for national industries. For a country without 
a strong national industrial base, Ireland -  it is argued -  effectively protects the trade 
rights of the foreign industries located here.
%
There exists a tendency towards defence of national audiovisual policy through an 
emotional or ‘affective’ defence of national culture against cultural imperialism and the 
effects of globalised trade. (See MD Higgins (1995), Corcoran (2001), O Tuathaigh 
(1984), O Tuathaigh, Gageby et al. (1979), Herbert Schiller (1969, 1998), the European 
Parliament (2000), UNESCO (1980), Council of Europe (2000), the European 
Federation of Film Directors, and other representatives of ‘the cultural industries’ in 
Europe for the presentation of the case against ‘cultural imperialism’). This defence is 
often articulated as a defence of citizens’ “cultural rights” in the public sphere. This 
thesis presents the case that the idea of “cultural rights” is bound up with the notion of a 
sovereign nation, nationhood and a national homogenous culture. This has roots in the 
18th and 19th centuries, when nation states were in a process of evolution. The element 
of national citizenship was often taken to be illustrative o f a cultural similarity in 
background or heritage or religion or custom. Citizens were culturally akin.
I challenge two aspects of this most frequently employed defence. Firstly I dispute the 
continued sovereign status of the nation state in the area of audiovisual policy, 
(particularly in the case of a small state with low inhabitant numbers such as Ireland, 
low levels of population being the key to voting weight within the European Union). 
Secondly, ‘cultural rights’ formerly referred to the members of a culturally similar 
group, that made up the members of the nation. Within the spread of multi-cultural 
societies throughout Europe -  and Ireland is only just beginning this experience having 
taken first steps towards integrating culturally ethnic foreigners in recent economically 
buoyant years - the argument for cultural rights is unclear. Are the rights of that citizen 
protected because he is culturally similar, or culturally diverse? This thesis operates on 
the assumption that cultural defence of audiovisual services in the WTO will be 
routinely contested, because liberalisation of industries is a continual demand.
0.2 Purpose
In order to avoid this melee, I propose to defend human rights of the public sphere 
within trade rules. Therefore, this thesis proposes an alternative approach to media 
policy that is from the perspective of trade policy rather than cultural or social policy.
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As an alternative solution to an uneasy status quo between the EU and more liberal 
members of the WTO, I make two suggestions. Firstly, I propose a re-definition of 
‘property’ as information, knowledge, or those materials in whatever form that allow 
the formulation of independent opinion (books, press, TV, internet, radio.) Secondly, I 
propose that protection o f citizens’ rights to freedom of information, expression and 
communication should not be defended as part of a national cultural or social policy. 
Instead, these citizen’s rights ought to be enforced as an aspect of trade and commercial 
policy, either nationally defined within the global marketplace, or globally enforced 
through a global institution with legal powers. It is this author’s opinion that citizens’ 
rights to freedoms of information, expression and communication would ideally be 
protected in a global trading marketplace as a form of individual trading rights to 
property. This approach differs considerably from that of Raboy (2002) and Hamelink 
(1995), who both maintain that the best way of re-aligning audiovisual policy which is 
being determined within the trade forum of the WTO is through the organisation and 
robust intervention by representatives o f a global civil society in ‘information society’ 
discussions.
0.3 Topic
The topic of this thesis is citizenship, the public sphere, and human rights, and their 
relationship with trade in global markets.
The theme of citizen and citizenship will be addressed according to citizenship at the 
levels of national, European Union, post-national and global citizenship. It is o f value to 
observe Ireland, as actor and representative of its national citizens within the EU 
decision-making forum. Within the greater arena of the WTO, it is the European 
Commission which negotiates on behalf of the EU member states and their citizens, 
once the Member States have agreed to a common negotiating position. Ireland inputs 
into this process, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the individual personality of 
the Minister responsible.
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The democratic public sphere is understood to cover all aspects of consultation of the 
public and public opinion, rights of the public sphere, and rights to expression or 
reception within that sphere. Raymond Williams (in Sparks 1993) made a distinction 
between the right to expression and the right to access the means of expression. For 
Williams, both the (negative) right to express, and the (positive) right to receive via 
government support need to be guaranteed in a ‘truly democratic system of 
communication’ (Williams quoted in Sparks 1993:81), though exactly how is left vague 
and unanswered by Williams. This distinction between the right to express and the right 
to receive continues to be a key issue in current discussion.
In addition, media theorists suggest highly nuanced versions of the right to access and 
participate in the public sphere, and the right to receive audiovisual content of certain 
types. While communication theorists emphasise either the right of access or the right to 
express, others focus on the rights to the provision of goods and services, interpreting 
certain forms of content as social goods, that should be guaranteed reception as part of a 
public service in the overall social policy of a government. The right to receive implies 
duties o f the ‘other’ to supply and provide -  whether that be governments o f nation 
states, international organisations, or media corporations. Within the section (Chapter 3) 
detailing the issues o f democratic communication and citizens’ rights in the public 
sphere, this researcher examines the themes of equality / inequality; access / restricted 
access; inclusion / exclusion; and freedoms / liberties relating to expression and 
communication.
The question o f markets, trade and marketplaces is the backdrop for the concepts and 
theories surrounding citizenship, the public sphere and human rights. Historically, I 
sketch the inter-related trade history o f Ireland, Britain and America in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, and show the extent to which trading in the marketplace raised the issue of, 
and created the demand for human rights. Further, these rights gained such an 
importance within the trading marketplaces that they were respected and policed as 
‘trading rights’. Some of these protected fair pricing (of bread, for example), and a 
softening o f unforgiving market rules, or the corruption o f these by opportunistic 
traders.
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This leads me to the main problematic of my research - the development of European 
citizenship and how this is affected by the global trade in audiovisual services. 
Audiovisual services are deemed democratically important, for political participation 
and ruling. They are also declared to be socially important because they are capable of 
contributing to social cohesion as well as culturally important because they express and 
reflect a cultural group.
What is an ‘audiovisual service’ and how is it defined? Audiovisual services are a 
disputed category of the UN Classification list (CPC), the standard definitional format 
used by the World Trade Organisation. There does not exist one common definition of 
‘audiovisual services’. While the WTO Secretariat uses the UN categorisation, they 
privately admit that audiovisual services within the WTO has a ‘classification problem’. 
There is an implicit need for a revision of the category in light of technological 
advances, yet until then, each WTO member can define ‘audiovisual services’ in 
however traditional or futuristic manner it wishes.
Trade in audiovisual services in global marketplaces carries implications for everyone’s 
ability to receive and express, information, news, analysis, and opinion necessary for 
involved citizenship of a national community or a community of EU member states 
(now augmented from 15 to 25 members on 16 April 2003 with the Declaration of 
Athens).
This thesis mainly relates to audiovisual ‘television broadcasting’ services, although 
arguments put forward in favour of ‘cultural industries’ also relate to film and television 
production, distribution and projection in cinemas. Irish national legislation avoids 
references that might imply Internet legislation.
0.4 The topic in relation to landmark and related studies
There are those who suggest citizenship is related to nationality (French Constitution, 
Herder, Hegel) or cultural similarity (Wolfe Tone, United Irishmen) or cultural heritage 
(Burke, Williams, Marshall) or political involvement (Aristotle, Habermas). I diverge
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from the paradigm that suggests citizenship is to be regarded as national and cultural 
(and hence requires a strong national cultural public broadcasting service (e.g. Corcoran 
2001).
My view is that citizenship may be conceptualised as post-national, as proposed by 
Hobsbawm (1992); Habermas (1995); Ferry (2000); Kearney (1997); Dahlgren (1995)); 
Gamham (1990); Closa (1996); Weiler (1995, 1997, 1999 ); Schlesinger (1997) and 
Murdock and Golding (1989) among others. Further, I relate to a European citizenship 
which is rooted in a shared political culture of the EC as proposed by Habermas (1995).
Other studies suggest citizenship is related primarily to the quality of communication 
between its members -see Habermas (1989), Murdock (1989), Gamham (1990), 
Habermas (1994), Closa (1996), Calabrese & Borchert (1996), Venturelli (1998a) and 
Ward (2001). They often conclude that any post-national EU citizenship will therefore 
require singular or plural democratic spheres. Landmark studies relating to the area of 
citizenship and the national or European public sphere include Habermas (1994). Recent 
related studies on the area of European Union citizenship and the EU public sphere 
pertinent to this study include those by Collins (1994), Kaitatzi - Whitlock (1996), 
Venturelli (1998a), and Ward (2001).
The conceptualisation of Irish citizenship was an issue that concerned Burke and Wolfe 
Tone in the late 18th century, while recent theorists considering the issues of Irish or 
Irish-European citizenship include Kearney (1988) and Higgins and Kiberd (2002). 
Kearney (1988) gives a useful expansion of his vision of a federal Europe of the 
Regions, but he does not touch on any aspect of media or broadcasting, and limits his 
focus to poetry and literature. This literary cultural focus is also to be found in Higgins 
and Kiberd (2002).
Citizenship and human rights was the concern of TH Marshall (1950). His work 
detailed the development of human rights -  from political, to civil, to social. Others, 
particularly in the media communication field, advocate strengthening ‘cultural rights’ 
with relation to the public sphere (Venturelli 1998a, 1998b; Corcoran 2001) This 
researcher views this prospect as inherently problematic.
R
There are three reasons for this. Firstly, defending ‘cultural rights’ in the sphere of EU 
and WTO policy-broking is regarded as a risky and contentious battlefield, particularly 
when there is no commonly held definition of ‘culture’, nor for that matter, audiovisual 
services. Secondly, there is no common ‘European culture’ to defend, the notion 
remaining vague, undefined and contested. Thirdly, there has always been a faint 
disregard for the importance of cultural, social and economic rights in comparison for 
strongly asserted and protected civil and political rights, although some (Higgins) 
declare that all rights are indivisible and equal in importance. The danger inherent in 
defining media policy as ‘cultural’ is that of annexing it, literally and metaphorically in 
economic trade agreements.
Recent debate among theorists has diverged to defending another form of rights -  
‘communication rights’. The ‘right to communicate’ was defined as ‘a new concept’ by 
a UNESCO commission for the study of communication problems (Unesco / MacBride 
1980). This was specified as providing “the right to be informed, the right to inform, the 
right to privacy, the right to participate in public communication - all elements of a new 
concept, the right to communicate” (Hamelink 1999:82). However, the concept had 
been raised years earlier by Jean d’Arcy (1969).
The UNESCO definition of the ‘right to communicate’ was allegedly based on Article 
19 of the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights providing for Freedom of expression 
and opinion, and interpreted by UNESCO as the ‘right to communicate’ and the ‘right 
to have access to communication channels’. (Hamelink 1999 detailing MacBride 
Report). Hamelink (1995, 1998, 1999) was among the first to pinpoint the WTO as the 
locus of communication policy, and has since prepared a new Draft Declaration on the 
right to communicate (March 2003) within the forum of the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS) ongoing in Geneva. Raboy (1998) recommends a global 
framework for communications policy that is directed by civil society groups and NGOs 
involved in media and communication projects worldwide. Many such groups are 
presently involved with the CRIS Campaign for Communications Rights in the 
Information Society, in preparation for the Geneva WSIS summit due to take place in 
December 2003.
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In relation to the relevant theorists -  what previous attempts were made at what I am 
attempting?
This thesis examines Irish media policy in the international context, not Irish media
policy in exclusively national and territorial terms. Barbrook (1992) suggests that the
irrevocable moment of change for Ireland was its integration into the western economy.
"Once the economy was integrated within the Western European and global 
marketplace, the Catholic nationalist culture of Southern Ireland could no longer 
be protected from foreign 'pagan' influences." (1992:224).
He identifies this date as late 1960s / early 1970s with Ireland’s integration into the EU 
community.
This thesis locates Irish media policy within the global context, and will examine not 
only what is traditionally recognised as ‘media | communications policy’, but more 
importantly, ‘trade policy’ and where it impacts on broadcasting -  in the WTO trade 
category o f ‘audiovisual services’.
In the area of Irish broadcasting policy subjected to external influences, Horgan (2001), 
Barbrook (1992), Trappel (1991) and Brants & Siune (Siune and Truetzschler 1992) 
have all previously written on Ireland’s particular broadcasting political and legislative 
landscape of peculiarities. A common conclusion is that Ireland is too ‘small’ in EU 
terms to exercise much diplomatic or political weight, and therefore is mainly in the 
position o f ‘reacting’ to Brussels initiatives. Lake’s theory (1988, quoted in Setser 
1997) suggests that in trade negotiations, the measure of a nation’s power is the size of 
its market for imports, and a closely related statistic, its share of total world trade.
The research evidence locates the axis of power in EU media policy making, not in 
Brussels as is usually assumed, but in Geneva, at the World Trade Organisation, and 
within the network of ambassadors and diplomats from the Member States attending 
critical and ill-reported meetings within the World Trade Organisation between WTO 
members, EC officials, and the Permanent Representatives of Member States posted in 
Geneva. EU and national media policy is driven by the trade in ‘audiovisual services’, 
one of the services for which the WTO sets regulation. This thesis clearly demonstrates
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that the development of national audiovisual broadcasting policy has origins outside this 
State.
Authors who have previously addressed the specific issues of GATS and global trade in 
audiovisual services include Galperin (1999), Hindley (1999), Wheeler (2000), 
Freedman (2002), Raboy (2002) and Setser (1997).
Some of these studies examine the tension between EU and American ambitions for 
liberal free trade in the audiovisual sector. Many, however, have specific and exclusive 
reference to Canada, using the comparison of their particular North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the USA. Both Raboy and Corcoran approach media 
issues from a Canadian perspective, where the input of public opinion in the 
formulation of Canadian broadcasting policy is enforced in statutes, and high quotas 
(60% for public service broadcasting channels) ensure secure support for the public 
service broadcaster.
While it is useful to draw comparisons between the Canadian example and the European 
battle vis a vis American exports in the audiovisual field, Canada struck an unusual and 
risk-laden agreement with the US, which is unlikely to be mimicked by the EU within 
the forum of the WTO.
Article 2005, Paragraph 1, of the US-Canadian Free Trade Agreement (1989), states 
that "cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this agreement", although in 
the following paragraph of the same article, a party is allowed to take retaliatory 
measures "of equivalent commercial effect" in response to cultural protectionism 
policies. (Galperin 1999:631) While the US condemned Canada's cultural 
protectionism, Canada remarked that "if you agree to permit commercial retaliation 
against cultural subsidies, then you have agreed to define culture as a commodity" 
(Galperin 1999:631 citing Mosco, 1990:49).
This thesis clarifies the relationship between Ireland and the World Trade Organisation 
with a view to the foreign trade factors resulting from the strong location of foreign 
subsidiaries in this country, many -  like Microsoft and IBM -  American, and 
manufacturing, outsourcing and trading within the ‘new’ audiovisual services’ 
industries. ‘New’ audiovisual services are viewed by American industry in particular to
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include or overlap with telecommunications and software services, while traditional 
audiovisual producers do not take the view that there should exist a distinction between 
‘old’ and ‘new’ audiovisual services.
Notwithstanding the authors who address the issues of trade in audiovisual services, it is 
more often approached as a political issue, and as such has been addressed by many 
political organisations such as the European Commission, European Parliament, 
Council of Europe, and WTO members’ governments.
Many NGO organisations that petition the debate (such as European Audiovisual 
Observatory, European Broadcasting Union (EBU), and lobby groups for Europe’s film 
industry advocate a cautious treatment of cultural industries in GATS. The most 
frequently proposed suggestion by those is that audiovisual services or ‘the cultural 
industries’ should be excluded from WTO rules. (The distinction this author makes here 
with regard to these seemingly two diverse categories is a question of framing. Those 
arguing for the protection of broadcasting, film and other audiovisual information from 
a cultural position will often label these forms as the products o f cultural industries such 
as the independent television and film production industries. These identical forms will 
find a tendency in this thesis to be referred to as audiovisual services, because this is the 
usual manner o f referring to television programmes, films and videos within the 
European Communities Directorate for Culture, the department with responsibility for 
Broadcasting within the Irish government, and within the negotiations on GATS within 
the World Trade organisation.) The argument is that the WTO should not be regulating 
trade in cultural services, particularly those with the potential to enhance democracy. 
This is the central tenet of the International Network for Cultural Diversity (2002). They 
argue that the WTO is not the proper arena to facilitate trade in cultural goods and 
services, and suggest that another forum should be established for this purpose, run by 
‘cultural’ personnel not focused on liberalisation. This proposal, while supported in 
theory by many (Canada’s Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International 
Trade (SAGIT) for instance), is not, in practice, possible. WTO representatives 
confirmed to this author that since 1994 there was no possibility of extracting a sector of 
services from the GATT agreement. Therefore, there is no present possibility of 
negotiating trade in cultural goods and services in another forum. It could then be
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concluded that solutions countering the free liberalisation of communications policy 
must be found and exercised within the current dominant trade environment.
0.5 Focus
The focus of this thesis is on the policies, strategies and action plans that were proposed, 
advised, recommended (but jettisoned) or adopted by the Irish government between the 
years 1982 -  2002. In particular, my interest lies in analysing the orientations and 
approaches taken by the Irish departments with responsibility for trade, enterprise, 
culture, communications, or telecommunications (these department titles changed 
frequently over the period under examination) in response to policy initiatives and 
proposals originating from the European Commission in Brussels (especially from the 
Directorate General Trade, Directorate General Competition, and Directorate General 
Culture).
This research initially proposed to assess the activities of the ‘government’ of Ireland. 
However, while undertaking primary research, it became clear that in certain 
departments, on certain issues, the opinion o f the ‘government’ was reliant on one or 
two well-regarded individuals, often civil servants of long-standing. It could be posited 
that on occasion, critical policy courses of action were made by the civil servant with 
responsibility for the portfolio. This practice appears to be less in evidence in latter 
years, and more frequent in the early 1970s and 1980s. Nowadays, the opinion and 
advice of consultants on policy direction is more apparent. This may compensate for the 
tendency to lose in-house expertise gained by civil servants working in a single area 
over a long period when they are forcibly re-located every few years.
The policies I focus on cover the areas of international trade policy, audiovisual policy, 
television broadcasting policy (public service and digital terrestrial), and cultural policy 
in so far as it relates to broadcasting. The other type of policies analysed are those put in 
place to support the growing audiovisual industry both in Ireland and the EU, allowed 
under WTO regulations for cultural objectives. These include the means of providing 
indirect and direct support to the audiovisual industry sectors of production, distribution 
and exhibition using tax incentives, repayable loans, or the licence fee.
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Specifically, this means that this thesis analyses policy determined by the WTO in co­
decision with the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, and by the Irish 
government. The broad parameters of the study encompass WTO liberal trade rules 
relating to audiovisual services; EC DG Competition rules on ‘State Aid’ relating to 
public service broadcasters; EC Treaty declarations on culture and public service 
broadcasting and EC DG Culture and national support measures for the audiovisual 
industry, both European-wide and nationally-contained.
From the inception of GATS in 1995, the trade rules encompass ‘commitments’; 
regulations on ‘national treatment’; and ‘exemptions’ from national treatment. The 
keenest issues under discussion are the implications of free and liberal trade on the 
audiovisual industry, economy, and culture in European member states; the cultural 
objectives of the European audiovisual industry; and the support which that national or 
European industry receives that might be in direct opposition to free and fair trade. One 
of the pressing issues in the new Doha Round is the manner in which elements of the 
category of audiovisual services are technologically ‘converging’ onto e-commerce and 
telecommunications services. These services are subject to free and liberal trade.
The European Commission has no specific competence or remit to make policy for 
culture, although Treaty Declarations relating to the support of culture are expected to 
be taken into account in policy orientations. Therefore, while European political 
personalities profess the coherence and blossoming of a European cultural identity, this 
remains decisively an area o f policy left to the member states. This is the status quo 
position as is currently put forward by the EU member states to the WTO.
On broadcasting and audiovisual issues, the EC regulates the European market in cross- 
border trade in audiovisual product and services through the EC Directive (1989) 
Television Without Frontiers. Within this Directive, Articles 4 and 5 specify a minimum 
of 50% European on-screen content (although participant countries given MEDIA Plus 
support within this European audiovisual sphere include Cyprus, Malta, Central and 
Eastern European countries, EFTA members, and Turkey).1
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However, these regulations are not policed by the EC. Broadcasting policy is another 
area where increasingly, matters of regulation or the adoption o f more stringent rules is 
a matter for the member states. On this matter, I agree with Ward (2001). The quota 
system is identified by commercial broadcasters as an unfair restriction o f access to the 
European market, and denounced by Ward as representing the key problem in the EC 
audiovisual regulation landscape. For commercial broadcasters, DG Competition and 
liberal WTO members such as USA, Japan, Brazil (all of whom have an interest in 
flooding the EU market with their native audiovisual products), the system of quotas, 
state aid for cultural objectives, the EC MEDIA finance programme and licence fee 
funding represent obstacles to fair trade, or non-tariff trade barriers.
In response to the liberal market orientation of DG Competition towards public service 
broadcasters the EU member states and their supporters drafted and inserted a 
Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty on Public Service Broadcasting. This was followed 
by a Council Resolution on Public Service Broadcasting. Ireland’s input and response to 
the issue of public service broadcasting, and national responsibility for its policy 
relating to the definition, remit and funding of public service broadcasters using direct 
or indirect methods is explored in this thesis. For many European public service 
broadcasters, the democratic right of citizens to expression and reflection of their 
cultural identity was the key issue at stake in the funding dispute raised by DG 
Competition.
Irish Minister Higgins was a key figure in this European debate. In 1995, Higgins 
became minister for a new department of Culture, Arts and the Gaeltacht, and a more 
coherent and focused approach became identifiable on the value of broadcasting policy 
for cultural and national identity formation and for the objectives of nation-building and 
forming a cohesive identity. In the succeeding government, Minister for Arts, Gaeltacht 
Heritage and the Islands Sile De Valera was seen to grapple less decisively than her 
predecessor with the policy direction establishing digital terrestrial television services in 
Ireland. No explicit national policy saw the light of day, and the field was left open for 
an international operator of digital satellite services to gain first mover advantage in the 
new market (Sky).
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Nonetheless, Minister De Valera’s spirited defense of national autonomy with regard to 
the right of her department to determine the public service broadcasters’ licence fee is 
deserving of study, as it represents one of her more active moments as minister. EU 
member states, in theory, maintain the right to fund, support and finance their 
audiovisual industries, in so far as it does not distort fair competition.
For Ireland, the issues relating to trade in audiovisual services became politically 
important from 1995 onwards. Up until then, audiovisual trade was not economically 
relevant. This thesis examines Ireland’s trade policy from the early 1980s, when 
agricultural products were the principal industrial sector. According to Setser (1997), 
political scientists argue that "a nation's trade policy reflects the overall composition of 
social interests in the economy". Therefore, "If one understands which economic 
interests have gained economic strength (for example, domestic vs. international sector 
preferences) one knows which have gained political power and in turn how policy is 
likely to change". (1997:27)
In Ireland’s case, agriculture was overtaken only in the last few years by software, 
pharmaceuticals and information technology services, and trade policy shifted to favour 
the import / export in those sectors. It is possible that this shift has already or will in the 
future damage the status of aid to audiovisual services as viewed by the present 
government.
0.6 Research Questions
This research seeks to find an alternative to ‘cultural rights’ and ‘social rights’ defence 
of communication rights. It aims to determine the nature of citizenship communication 
bonds between citizens in a pan-European political and economic community, that does 
not have a strong unified cultural identity; and in policy terms, seeks to integrate 
citizens’ rights within the locus of the market sphere where audiovisual products and 
services are traded.
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So, therefore this researcher addressed the present scenario, focusing on the national 
state of Ireland acting within the multi-national policymaking arena of the EU and as an 
actor within the global trading environment.
The following conceptual questions are related to the ideas and themes in previous and 
current work developed by authors on the concepts o f citizenship, citizen, identity, and 
culture of a community or society. These ideas and arguments are fully developed in 
Chapters 1 and 2. In Chapter 3, concepts and ideas on the themes o f rights -  to equality, 
access, and rights to issues o f communication are addressed.
Citizenship was the first issue that divided authors. Some took an exclusively national 
stance on the concept, while others looked to the burgeoning problem of pan-European 
citizenship, and what implications that had for a citizenship that took the form of 
something that was unlike the national type we are so accustomed to. Others employed 
a broader perspective, looking at the coming of an era when citizenship, and citizens 
would be globally connected and of one community or society.
The concept of citizen was similarly disputed. Theorists differed in the role and status of 
a citizen. Some said political and civic only, while others maintained that a citizen 
exercised a cultural part of a cultural community. A citizen could also merely play an 
economic part in the life of the community -  and indeed, this was their original role 
when citizens were listed as tax-payers on the tax register of the economic community.
This argument develops further: to what then is a citizen attached? Is there any notion of 
identification with a political national state, leading perhaps to a sense of patriotic 
(political) destiny with that territory? Alternatively, or possibly in tandem, the identity 
of a citizen is developed according to the traditions and cultural customs of a 
community. This scenario could lead to the fervour of nationalism or a sense of ethnic 
superiority over other (different) cultures. Historically, cultural nationalistic identity -  
related to a distinct cultural hegemony - does not breed tolerance. The EU therefore 
faces a dilemma -  in what way will it create bonds between its citizens -  now in 25 
countries, with 22 distinct languages, and each with its own sense of unique culture? 
Chapter 2 addresses the post-national and European citizenship debate.
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In relation to the concepts introduced above, and one EU member state in particular, this 
project sought to examine the relationship between Ireland, its citizens, and the EU on a 
political and cultural level as displayed in policy discussions or proposals, and their 
outcomes.
Firstly, this research examined the conceptual origins of modem French, American and 
Irish citizenship, rights and liberties. Empirical investigation then sought to determine 
the similarities or differences in approaches towards citizenship rights evident in policy 
discussed at national Irish, and EU levels. In relation to the theme of cultural 
citizenship, and an identity of citizens with their country of heritage, this research aimed 
to identify how Irish ‘cultural identity’ is represented and framed in policy discussions 
both at the national sphere, and vis a vis ‘other’ diverse nations (and their cultures).
Working on the premise that the traditional roots of American citizenship were liberal 
and individual, while those European countries like France that were awakening from a 
feudal past embraced a protectionist social model o f citizenship, the Irish model of 
citizenship is defined also as liberal. An examination of 18th and 19th century Irish 
history shows that Ireland’s trade relations with America while under restrictive 
colonial rule by Great Britain played a key factor in the development of the Irish 
citizenship model. Consequently, it was interesting to attempt to identify how policy 
practices and proposals today and in the recent past relate to American (liberal 
individual), European / French (feudal protectionist), or Irish (liberal) traditions? For 
example, what conceptions of citizenship and theories were utilised by those in 
government, articulating on behalf o f Irish citizens? Did differences exist between 
Ireland and other EU nations on policy? Or rather, were there similarities in their 
approaches? And if either of these situations were the case, is there a historical or 
conceptual rationale for this?
Also to be taken into consideration are regular changes in Irish government over the 
period under examination (1982-2002). It became clear that these effected radical 
diversity in approach, both towards the inter-govemmental decision-making process, 
and towards what some regard as the State’s duty to protect its citizens’ rights. 
Conceptually, this research sought to identify the different citizenship models that 
successive governments employed. What were the main differences between the
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principal policy models used by successive governments? (i.e. from Jim Mitchell to Sile 
de Valera). Empirically, the research aimed to identify the moments of change when 
Ireland’s citizenship altered, or when the nature of the model of its citizenship 
metamorphosised -  either through deliberate actions taken autonomously, or through 
the actions o f other states or the EU.
If, as appears to be the case, that Ireland’s citizenship is on occasion not determined 
through deliberate choice, what actions have been taken by Ireland to protect its 
citizens’ rights, and how have these been articulated vis a vis other more powerful 
nations?
On the question of rights and the defence or protection of liberties, much depended on 
the type of community that those in power wished to see flourish. Again there is a 
distinction: on the one hand, a political and economic community that seeks to protect 
the political and economic rights of the individuals within that community. 
Alternatively, a political and culturally homogenous community will seek to protect the 
infringement of the political rights of those members belonging to an agreed cultural 
heritage. Opinion is divided as to whether citizenship is fundamentally political-cultural 
or political-economic.
Examination of Irish history led this researcher to view economic independence as the 
starting point for a separate Irish cultural nation. Therefore, concentrating on the key 
issue of independence in trade policy and its relevance for sovereign nation state 
citizenship, this research sought to discover the modem day relationship between Irish 
autonomy in trade and the protection of its citizens’ human rights, and identify possible 
consequences for modem Irish citizenship. Empirically, research sought to determine 
the extent to which Ireland is independent in its trade policy, since gaining 
independence in foreign commercial policy from Great Britain in 1782.
Trade became a key issue in the development o f this thesis, particularly because the 
present author became aware o f the over-riding importance o f trade negotiations for 
communication policies. The focus shifted from examination o f Ireland in negotiations 
with the EU, towards Ireland and its trade interests, and their impact on national 
communication policies. Often, communication policies are classified as cultural policy
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(although some authors suggest they should be classed as social policies). In either case, 
it is indisputable that trade policy impacts on communication policies -  whether these 
are described as cultural, social, or audiovisual policy is dependent on the author. As a 
result, empirical research sought to determine the extent to which Ireland, ostensibly a 
nation state with a national culture, is autonomous in its policy decisions on trade, 
culture, and what is familiarly known as trade of cultural goods and services (i.e. the 
genre of cultural trade). From this, it is possible to assess the extent o f Ireland’s 
sovereignty in its cultural, social, commercial or audiovisual policy. Put simply, to what 
degree is Ireland sovereign over its communications policy?
Communication policy is a term often used but not defined by communication theorists. 
Hamelink suggests that communication is not about more and more information 
distribution, but rather ‘social dialogue’. He uses the term ‘communication societies’ 
not ‘information societies’, and pinpointing the subsequent challenge as that o f learning 
‘the art of the social dialogue’. What does this mean ? Essentially, he espouses ‘the art 
of conversation’, or ‘dialogical communication’, which he defines as ‘the capacity to 
listen, to be silent, to suspend judgement, to critically investigate our own assumptions, 
to ask reflexive questions and to be open to change’. In many societies, this is achieved 
through social interaction rather than information acquiring.
The MacBride Commission (UNESCO 1976) produced a series of recommendations, 
one of which focused on communication policies. In its dialogue on communication 
policies, the recommendation states: “Recognition of its (communication) potential 
warrants the formulation by all nations, and particularly developing countries, o f 
comprehensive communication policies linked to overall social, cultural, economic and 
political goals. Such policies should be based on inter-ministerial and inter-disciplinary 
consultations with broad public participation. The object must be to utilise the unique 
capacities of each form of communication, from interpersonal and traditional to the 
most modem, to make men and societies aware of their rights, harmonise unity in 
diversity, and foster the growth of individuals and communities within the wider frame 
of national development in an interdependent world” (International Commission for the 
Study o f Communication Problems, UNESCO 1980, Recommendations 28 and 29, 
p259-60 quoted in Golding and Harris 1999:75)
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Hamelink notes that the recommendation advocates ‘comprehensive’ national 
communication policies, but this objective has largely not been implemented in the 
recommended way. In many countries it is possible to find “various forms of partial 
policy-making with relevance to communication. One may find such implicit 
communication policies in industrial policies, technology policies, or even cultural 
policies”, (ibid, 1999:75)
The over-riding impression is that communication policies are held by Hamelink to be a 
central part of public-policy making, and that in an era of commercial deregulation of 
the broadcasting and telecommunication sector, governments tended to withdraw from 
non-essential public policy-making and state monopolies of essential services 
(broadcasting monopolies that could restrict pluralism of information sources; public 
utilities like gas and electricity and telephone services). But for Hamelink, 
‘communication policy is understood as public policy’, (ibid p75)
On the other hand, ‘cultural policy’ is differentiated from ‘communication policy’. 
Cultural policy (quoting MacBride Commission recommendations, p80) is viewed to 
encompass film, television and radio. National cultural policies according to MacBride 
“should foster cultural identity and creativity, and involve the media in these tasks. Such 
policies should also contain guide-lines for safeguarding national cultural development 
while promoting knowledge of other cultures. It is in relation to others that each culture 
enhances its own identity”. According to this, policy relating to broadcasting and film is 
classified as a cultural policy.
For the purposes of this thesis, communication policy is the umbrella term for policies, 
laws or regulations that are planned or enacted which may facilitate the art o f two-way 
communication. In Ireland’s case, there are a number of departments that oversee 
various areas or instruments that can facilitate communication between national 
citizens, and internationally. For this reason, this research addresses aspects of policy 
that are within the remit of the government departments with responsibility for cultural, 
commercial, audiovisual or telecommunications policies. Those departments should 
naturally take into account Article 45 o f the Irish Constitution (Directive Principles of 
Social Policy) in addition to the Article 40 to Freedom of expression.
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Communication’s relationship with citizenship is central to democracy, and citizens’ 
democratic involvement. Following from a review of theorists on the public sphere, 
media and communication on “ideal” citizenship and associated rights and freedoms 
related to the public sphere, this research project sought to determine the relative 
importance of the public sphere and democratic rights to communication compared to 
other issues of governance for Irish policy makers. Since audiovisual services are 
increasingly a trade concern, this research aimed to determine the nature of trading 
rights, and in what ways trade in audiovisual products and services with American, EU, 
or foreign nations assisted or hindered the acquisition of Irish human rights. Empirical 
questions focused on enquiring how the nation protects its public broadcasting. A key 
question for this research then was what trade rights are in operation today and how do 
they protect national citizenship or national cultural identity?
On the issue of democratic participation and involvement by citizens or citizens’ 
representatives, empirical questions addressed in this research centred on the seeking 
and use of public opinion by the Irish government. For example, what were the modes 
of consultation employed by the Irish government in devising audiovisual or 
broadcasting policy? What form did public opinion take in inputting into the political 
public sphere? And, in taking account of non-governmental advice, who were the main 
policy actors? In essence, this research sought to determine the extent of input by 
stakeholders in Irish civil society to secure communication rights under discussion by 
EU policymakers.
0.7 Findings and Conclusions
Conceptually, this thesis subscribes to citizenship which is a political and economic and 
civil status within a community, but this research does not subscribe to the requisite that 
that community is necessarily cultural and national.
This research suggests that surrounding the conceptual issues of citizenship and rights: 
Ireland’s citizenship is anti-colonial, of an American vs. British model, rather than of 
the citizenship type of French-European extraction. This thesis also suggests that 
expression of nationalism and national citizenship in Ireland first surfaced as an 
awareness and demand for trading rights and autonomous trade policy.
? ?
The empirical research evidence brought to light in this thesis suggests that:
(i) Ireland has limited sovereignty over its cultural policy for the promotion of a 
cultural and national aspect of citizenship, and it is not overall government 
priority.
As a Member State of the EU, Ireland operates ineffectual sovereignty over the 
audiovisual policy arena. The findings strongly undermine the supposition made by 
authors like Ward (2001) and Barbrook (1992) who argue that national member states 
retain sovereignty over the cultural / audiovisual arena. This researcher concludes that 
Ireland reacts to European Commission policy initiatives, although it has the potential to 
be a leader in the EU.
It would appear that in the case o f making, developing and implementing policy on 
audiovisual services and their liberalisation, it is the Department of Enterprise, Trade 
and Employment that leads the way, closely aligned with the Department o f Finance, 
with the Department o f Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands being left trailing 
behind in negotiations and discussions revolving around ‘cultural industries’ and the 
trade liberalisation therein. The Department of Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands, 
when it takes a nominal and belated interest in affairs that are likely to affect its policies 
at the WTO level finds itself in the position of beating on the door of the Department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment in the attempt to be kept informed of any relevant 
developments. Too often, it appears, these pleas for information and integration in 
discussions fall on deaf ears. The Department of Public Enterprise also plays a forceful 
influence and sometimes, decisive role in the policy process, in particular with relation 
to the manner of legislating for digital television.
This research shows that the European Commission usually initiates policy changes or 
new policies, and request reaction from Member States and other bodies via public 
consultation. However, the D/AHGI publicly expressed reservations that initiative for 
audiovisual and related policy (for example, competition policy, trade policy) rests with 
the Commission, but off the record admitted that this is the situation. Kaitatzi - 
Whitlock (1996) argues that media regulation cannot be an exclusively national affair.
To mediate nationally would ignore both transfrontier broadcasts and the European 
Union ‘audiovisual space’.
Research shows that Ireland can be influential in directing the agenda when the 
Commission is weak, especially whilst holding the tenure of presidency of the European 
Union. This has been the case in the past, illustrated for example by the Irish initiative 
to devise a protocol on public service broadcasting proposed by then Minister for Arts, 
Culture and the Gaeltacht, Michael D. Higgins.
When policy is debated in Ministerial Council meetings, there is often such a desire to 
reach consensus that Ireland hasn't often pushed an agenda for audiovisual, because it 
has other priorities that are more important to get deals on. (For example, agriculture 
and food interests take priority among the indigenous industries, and high-tech 
Information Communication Technology (ICT) are where trade interests predominantly 
lie amongst the foreign industrial companies located here). Ireland was described as 
being relatively ‘small fry’ in relation to other EU countries when debating EU 
proposals.
The national Irish stance on issues is also affected by the Weighting o f Votes in the 
Council. As indicated by civil servants within the Department o f Public Enterprise, 
Council can out-vote small states. Ireland would not be resolute about an issue, unless 
they were secure that firstly it was an issue of national importance, and secondly, they 
had the backing of other states. From a political perspective it doesn’t happen very 
often. Council doesn’t like to back a country into a comer. Everyone at Council 
meetings makes a huge effort to compromise. The over-riding rationale is, according to 
the Department of Public Enterprise, “If they’re going to outvote us, we’ll get the 
political kudos of agreement with other Member States”. A predominant response 
within Irish government departments was the acknowledgement that EC Directives are 
largely the result of political horsetrading. Within the EU Council of Ministers, the 
over-riding motivation is to create consensus and reach agreement between members.
The department’s of Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands’ way of dealing with the 
European Commission (in relation to, for example, the EU Directive Television without
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Frontiers) is to “forcefully express our national interests in the revision debate and make 
effective alliances with other Member States.” (D/AHGI 2, interview, Dublin)
As a member of the global multi-national trading system, Ireland’s economic 
development strategy has been based on ‘open’ economy and FDI flow. The success of 
this strategy, the Celtic Tiger, represented a changing industrial structure, structural 
composition of inward FDI, and included significant ICT investment, but not media or 
content based. However, in WTO negotiations until the present Doha Round, Ireland 
has consistently prioritised the negotiation of favourable agriculture and textiles deals 
over other economic sectors or social interests (and other high tech sectors). It remains 
to be seen whether this entrenched trend will be challenged by other modem sectoral 
interests o f growing economic import in the next Doha Millenium Round Audiovisual 
services (depending on the way this is re-interpreted at the next Round, as sought by the 
US, this could cover software, e-content, internet TV services and so on) could play a 
more prominent role in Ireland’s negotiating priorities in the future, but this has to be 
balanced with the sympathetic manner in which the Irish mral community is held by 
Government. For the Irish government, the agricultural interests represent a strong tie 
with Irish cultural heritage, a concern that will not be dismissed without grave 
consideration.
1998 Irish Trade policy statements are determined by expectations of and preparation 
for a neo-liberal global trade zone. In this preparatory phase, the department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment are looking forward to the ‘complete elimination of 
subsidies’. Ireland’s position with regard to future trade in ‘new audiovisual services’ 
reflects interests o f large ICT firms and sectors, especially Microsoft and IBM. The first 
point of negotiation on the part of Ireland within WTO negotiations is in meetings in 
Geneva attended by the Irish Trade representative, posted from the department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment. Evidence suggests that in discussion groups on 
audiovisual services, the Irish trade representative put forward the proposal of IBM 
relating to the definition or re-definition of telecommunications and Internet services 
(software).
(ii) Ireland is a non-actor in multi-lateral policy-making decisions relating to the 
‘traditional’ audiovisual sector.
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Ireland’s input to the public sphere o f decision making within the EU has potential, yet 
is limited to date. It was suggested by officials within the department of Arts, Heritage, 
Gaeltacht and the Islands that Irish policy has been reactive rather than pro-active to 
Brussels' innovations. Siune & Truetzshler (1992) confirm this claim. An exception to 
this pattern over the last two decades is the leading role played by former Minister 
Higgins during his position as Minister for Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht.
(iii) Competence of Ireland’s funding for the state-assisted ‘traditional’ 
audiovisual industry is curtailed by the European Commission, DG 
Competition
Strong wishes expressed by the Irish department o f Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the 
Islands relating to the retention o f ‘exclusive’ or ‘sole’ competency of public 
broadcasting funding policies, remits or financial aids were rejected by European 
Commission DG Competition. Thus the 1998 Resolution on Public Service 
Broadcasting made by Member States reiterates the 1997 Protocol annexed to the 
Amsterdam Treaty on public service broadcasting systems.
This finding is in direct opposition to claims made by Ward (2001) that firstly, the EC 
does not use a blanket application of competition policy to regulate audiovisual 
broadcasting policy; secondly, that Member States are not ‘disempowered’ in the 
television regulation sphere; and thirdly, that the EC does not involve itself in the 
definition or funding of national public service broadcasters.
The OECD favours audiovisual regulation by competition policy. In reports by the 
OECD (1996) in recent years it recommended that competition policy should play a 
greater role in the regulation of audiovisual content. However, the assurance of media 
pluralism, and plurality of information sources (Ward, 2001) is not an EU competency 
or objective as provided for in the Treaties. Successive studies on attempts at 
establishing a EC Directive on Pluralism in the media show that it has failed (Kaitatzi- 
Whitlock 1996).
Is Ireland a sovereign State over its national ‘cultural’ or ‘audiovisual’ policy ?
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Ward (2001) suggests EU Member states are sovereign on broadcasting issues of 
national concern, apart from that which is governed by the EC authority in competition 
policy. This effectively covers everything, since the objective of the European Union is 
to operate a single EU market.
(iv) The political public sphere by way of citizen input to political decision 
making is restricted
Despite the dominant ‘national’ focus o f the Department of AHGI, the results of this 
examination illustrate that the level of interest shown by the Irish indigenous industry 
(independent producers, broadcasters, etc.) in negotiations surrounding the liberalisation 
of Audiovisual Services by the members o f the World Trade Organization is to all 
intents and purposes, non-existent. The head of the Audiovisual Federation and the 
Telecoms Council at IBEC admitted that “GATS is not something that engages our 
members’ imaginations”. The members of IBEC’s Audiovisual Federation comprise 
Irish-based members of the film and television industries.
Similarly, the Director o f the singular audiovisual lobby in Ireland -  Film Makers 
Ireland -  regretted that resources were not available to cover or track GATS. Even in 
Forfas, the central advisory policy bureau for national industry development, there is no 
time for GATS (until the last minute), yet it does not warrant the allocation o f a 
specialist on either WTO matters, or the Audiovisual Industry.
This reseach shows Irish citizens’ input to public sphere of public policy making on the 
realm of international trade in information audiovisual services is virtually nil. Irish 
policy-makers do not go out of their way to seek public opinion input.
Kaitatzi-Whitlock (1996) agrees citizens’ interests are ignored or not present. Habermas 
(1995) hopes for the possible emergence of pan-European spheres, but thinks citizens’ 
democratic input is presently boxed into national, not European wide, units.
Public consultation on policy-making regarding the Irish public sphere and effects that 
trade of audiovisual products and services might have on it, is poor. GATS (WTO rules 
regulating services) has not been debated by the Oireachtas Committee on Foreign
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Affairs, presumably because they are of the opinion that the issue is not of concern, or 
that the Government is handling it suitably.
According to a official from the Department of Public Enterprise, government policy 
these days is very much reliant on consultants reports, which are obviously required 
from time to time because the department faced with a policy issue often would not 
possess the required expertise. Consultants reports are the mantra of government these 
days. One department commissions one consultant report, another department 
commissions another consultant report, and then there might be a consultants’ report 
commissioned to report on the first consultant’s report.
The department of Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands has initiated consultations 
for feedback from non-governmental organisations only in the last seven or eight years. 
Prior to that, it was declared that consultations were ‘not fashionable’. There was in 
addition no significant audiovisual industry in Ireland, and no strong lobby. Now, when 
the department wishes to consult (regarding, for example the hows and wherefores of 
the introduction of digital terrestrial television in Ireland), points of view and varied 
opinions are sought by the department from broadcasters RTE, TV3 and TG4; the 
Commission formerly known as IRTC, as well as Ireland’s only film and television 
producers lobby, FilmMakers Ireland.
In comparison to the apparent French model o f policy consultation, there is little or no 
public debate. Regarding European Union proposals and Green Papers, and WTO 
negotiations, the department receives comments and petitions in addition from 
broadcaster unions EBU and producers’ unions FERA. RTE does not lobby at European 
Union level -  they leave it to EBU, the European union o f broadcasters, to do it for 
them.
The department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment consulted mainly industries 
during 2002, in association with the government agency Forfas. Specifically, the 
agency’s research focused on the trade barriers currently experienced by industry and 
companies trading in a range of products and services. With the aim of consulting 
industries based in and operating out of Ireland, it is hoped that the Irish negotiation 
strategy for the next Doha Millenium trade round could be formulated. The industry
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workshops identified as worthy of consultation were: Electronics & Engineering; Agri- 
Business; Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals; Computer Services & Software; Audiovisual 
Services industry and the Clothing & Textile sector. This research discovered that the 
feedback was poor. From 5000 letters sent out to companies by the end of 2001, only 25 
companies replied, none o f which were from the telecommunications or audiovisual 
sector.
In previous trade negotiations, other sectoral interests (namely, agriculture and textiles) 
above all were protected. A department official from the department of Public 
Enterprise suggested that Ireland (still) “does not have a huge strategic interest in 
Audiovisual or Broadcasting”. Ireland does however have a ‘huge strategic interest’ in 
trade in ‘Computer Services and Software’. A Forfas trade representative remarked that 
this sector represents an enormous market for growth for Ireland’s IT manufacturing 
base.
0.8 Research Methods
The principal methods employed were firstly, the gathering o f documentation from a 
variety o f Irish government departments concerned with policy strategies, regulation or 
support of audiovisual industries, and policy actions relating to trade in audiovisual 
services. The principal departments petitioned were the Departments of Arts, Heritage, 
Gaeltacht and the Islands; the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 
(Market Access Unit, E-business Unit); the Department of Public Enterprise 
(Telecommunications Regulation unit), and the Department of Foreign Affairs (EU 
Affairs section).
Secondly, potential interviewees, i.e. key policy players, were identified through 
informal discussions with the main Irish government departments, and personal contacts 
within the European Union arena, as well as the examination of the Administration 
Yearbook for personnel from years past. It was intended that semi-structured interviews 
would involve the participation of a representative selection of those key actors 
currently and previously involved in the policy process during the past twenty years 
from Irish government, EU institutions (European Commission and European
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Parliament), and World Trade Organisation counsellors and members’ representatives. 
Additionally, interviews were sought with non-governmental lobby organisations that 
contributed the civic, public or industrial aspect to the policy debate. The research 
methods employed, and the problems encountered -  and how these were overcome - are 
detailed fully in Appendix A of this thesis.
0.9 Thesis structure and chapter outlines
This thesis is structured into three parts, and subdivided into chapters. For the purposes 
o f clarity and coherence, the structure allows for the inter-twining of conceptual issues 
and empirical evidence. This researcher takes the position that when complex 
conceptual issues, theories or ideas require lucidity, it is preferable to integrate at that 
point concrete evidence that points to an unequivocal conclusion. Therefore, the reader 
is alerted to a thesis structure that, on key occasions, allows real-life examples to follow 
on from complex philosophical concepts, for illustrative purposes.
Part one is a review of the literature, theories and concepts surrounding citizen, culture, 
the nation state, citizenship and the public sphere, and rights and liberties of 
communication.
Part two addresses the historical situation of the public spheres developing within Irish 
markets and fairs in the 18th century with the introduction of liberal principles. The 
thesis argues that demands for human rights first developed as a result o f unfair trading 
impositions, and were economically founded. The central issue of ‘trade autonomy’ 
becomes the key to sovereign citizenship.
In Part three -  the empirical research chapters -  research on Irish trade policy in 
relation to audiovisual and broadcasting matters is detailed and assessed. This part of 
the thesis also details the manner of protecting human rights in the global marketplace 
using WTO trade rules.
Part One addresses the approaches towards culture, citizenship and communication. In 
Chapter 1, the research opens with a review of the literature and examines the dominant 
theories and concepts surrounding citizenship, culture and the nation state. Chapter 1 
ends with a brief history of Ireland’s approach towards media policy and the manner in
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which the role of the media was shaped to assist the development of a national cultural 
psyche. The period of 1916 to the 1960s was a particularly heavily state-controlled era 
o f nation building. Media, Irish and national were the dominant ethos.
At this stage too, the concepts and ideas surrounding European citizenship are 
introduced. In Chapter 2 this researcher prefers to align herself with a form of 
citizenship that is not yet fully conceptualised, a form of which is beyond the nation 
state. The current theorists’ perspectives on post-national citizenship are reviewed. In 
this chapter too, the models of citizenship that focus on the political or civic nature of 
citizenship are discussed.
Chapter 3 introduces the arguments for citizens’ rights to communication and the public 
sphere. Communication analysts who apply citizenship and rights criteria to the 
communication public sphere activity often focus on the issues of equality, access and 
inclusion. Citizenship in these terms, and with regard to communication and expression 
in civic democracies is outlined.
Examples of differing approaches towards citizenship and the citizens of the public 
sphere is given in detail -  research reveals the right o f input o f public opinion in a 
comparative manner between Ireland, France and the USA. Chapter 3 then discusses 
the specific solutions to citizens’ rights to the public realm, as put forward by 
communication theorists and sociologists. These centrally comprise of the right to 
express, the right to communicate, and the right to cultural diversity. In this section I 
critically assess the conceptualisation and defence of audiovisual services as a cultural 
and social right. Are they valid and justified with respect to a vigorous defence of a 
European culture? In this section, I examine the classification and defence of media - 
information, broadcasting, audiovisual service as a cultural right and a social right. 
What is the reasoning behind the argument for protection of cultural and / or social 
rights? What is the foundation of attempts to protect media in this way?
This leads me on to the main arguments put forward, based on fear of cultural 
imperialism, defence of national cultures and advocacy o f cultural diversity. Their 
arguments are examined from the perspective of ‘European culture’. Does it exist? 
Where does it exist? What are its defining characteristics? What makes it distinctively
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different to ‘the other’s’ North American, Australian or British culture? How does a 
culture define the nature of citizenship within that cultural grouping? Usually, and in 
historical patterns, citizenship was followed by an invention or assimilation of a 
particular culture (and primarily territorially based on border outlines in 18th and 19th 
centuries).
If a European culture exists, as it is claimed by many politicians, how is this represented 
in media and television? How is the European audio-visual model defined? And if a 
European culture exists, how is it protected in terms of rights and who protects these 
rights? To what extent, for example, does Ireland defend and protect European culture? 
And what o f France, staunch defender of ‘cultural rights’, and fierce enemy of ‘cultural 
imperialism’? It appears that France is keen to protect its own culture, nationally 
defined. France likes to appear to defend European culture, particularly when French 
culture is under threat.
Irish government civil servants vouch for the similarity in thinking between the French 
and Irish, particularly on audiovisual and agricultural matters. What then o f the 
combined forces o f Ireland and France together, protecting European culture from 
foreign imports? Evidence deriving from this research project proves my hypothesis that 
it is actually the European audiovisual industry that France and Ireland wish to protect. 
Interviewees admit that it is actually an independent national trade and commercial 
policy they wish to protect. In reality, it’s really economic and trading rights -  not 
national culture, or European culture -  that is their primary priority.
This returns to my original premise -  that human rights deriving from restrictive market 
practices are voiced in the market and trading community (in the present day, the WTO) 
but take on the mantel o f defence of cultural hegemony and a call for separateness in 
citizenship when in actuality, the basis of their demand for rights is autonomy and 
independence in commercial and trading policy.
Part Two, comprising of chapters 4 and 5, examines human rights in the public spheres 
of markets. In these chapters I firstly cast an eye back to the historical trading situation 
of Ireland in the 18lh and 19th centuries, and I subsequently examine research evidence 
in the light of public opinion on the issues of separate Irish nationhood and trade
autonomy. These chapters establish the relationship between markets and human rights 
from an historical perspective that I propose could be re-applied to the modem day. 
Referring to documentation and interview transcripts, Irish and European broadcasting 
policy is analysed from a trade and human rights perspective, and Ireland’s autonomy of 
trade policy with relation to audiovisual services (including broadcasting) is critically 
assessed.
Part Three follows from the theories of rights protection set out in Chapter 3 by 
examining the practical provisions in legislative texts, and the practicalities which allow 
the national state to fulfil its ‘duty’, as some might argue, to protect its national citizens’ 
rights. Chapter 6 undertakes an historical analysis of Irish trade policy on audiovisual 
and broadcasting services from 1982 -  2002, as an actor within the EU and WTO 
negotiations.
Chapter 7 follows on with an examination of the modem processes at Ireland’s disposal 
for the protection and safeguarding of national citizens’ rights, through marketplace 
rules. In this section I detail the WTO provision for ‘No Commitments’ to liberalised 
trade for the audiovisual sector, and the provision for ‘Exemptions to Most Favoured 
Nation’ status for the audiovisual sector which means effectively that the EU can 
reserve its MEDIA funding programme for European producers, and Ireland can retain 
its tax incentive scheme Section 481 (formerly Section 35). This tax-break for films is 
presently (September 2003) under threat of non-renewal beyond its present expiry date 
by the Irish Minister for Finance.
The various arguments for and against quotas (for European production on-screen time) 
and direct subsidies are also detailed. These provisions have always created heated 
political debate. Quotas and subsidies are often labelled ‘state aid’, and strictly 
disallowed under WTO rules under normal circumstances. The audiovisual sector is 
however allowed to avail of ‘state aid for cultural objectives’.
I follow with a description of the variety of state aid allowed by Ireland to its 
audiovisual producers. The state aid takes the form of either indirect aid (soft loans, tax 
incentives) or direct funding (public service broadcasting licence fee, subsidies).
However, because o f the strong opposition against all state aid (led by USA, Japan, EC 
DG Competition) Ireland was in a position in 1998 defending its national right to 
control the issue of the public service licence fee vis a vis the European Commission. 
Then Minister of AHGI, de Valera, did not accept that the licence fee was a state aid, 
and thus subject to rules o f financial transparency. This debate between DG 
Competition and D/AHGI over the wording of a 1998 EC Council Resolution on Public 
Service Broadcasting, and its funding, is indicative o f the degree of cultural sovereignty 
which Ireland retains.
The last part of this section summarises the discussion over the issues of cultural 
imperialism, cultural diversity and cultural specificity. I make a summary o f the 
‘solutions’ presently in operation -  successful to a greater or lesser degree -  that amount 
to direct funding, indirect aid, a licence fee deliverable to an audiovisual channel for the 
whole editorial selection they transmit, and all state aid that is given for cultural 
objectives (i.e. audiovisual production).
Research evidence appears to prove my hypothesis that governments above all wish to 
protect national industry, and the economic and trading rights of foreign nations more 
than national or European culture.
The final chapter 8 draws conclusions, and puts forward a proposal for an alternative 
approach towards safeguarding citizens’ rights to the public sphere, which is based on 
theories o f human rights in trading communities, otherwise classed as trading rights.
I ask: what is wrong with the current approach? It appears that in the policy arenas of 
Brussels and Geneva, during the political pressure exerted within the European 
Commission and the WTO, the present solutions are deficient. Why? The notion of 
culture, and cultural objectives will always be challenged, and challenged repeatedly, at 
every round of negotiations. The effective annexation of audiovisual products and 
services is a temporary solution. They are presently protected using ‘Exemptions from 
liberalised trade’, but exemptions are designed to expire after five years. At best, the EC 
can hope for a maintenance of the unstable and likely to be contested status quo.
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What is required is a more stable and permanent solution to this returning debacle. At 
this point, I examine the proposals which have been put forward by a diverse range of 
pro-culture lobbies or organisations. These range from a retraction of the category of 
‘audiovisual services’ from WTO trade rules, to a new cultural trade instrument that 
would be administered by the UN. I assess the likelihood of success of the suggestions 
put forward so far.
This thesis ends with a proposal for an alternative approach to this policy problematic 
that is based on theories of human rights in trading communities, otherwise classed as 
trading rights.
I S
PART I:
CITIZENSHIP. CULTURE AND COM M UNICATION
Chapter 1 .
Theories, concepts and approaches to Culture and Citizenship
This thesis challenges the national or national identity model of citizenship, through a 
conceptual critique of authors with particular specialism on the Irish question, or 
elements o f identity claimed to be ‘representatively Irish’. I argue that conceptually, 
citizenship that is related to the territorial boundaries of the nation state and the 
eulogised ‘identity’ of the Irish people attributed to national citizenship is no longer 
tenable.
The nationalism of Ireland that led to a cultural mythological picture of ‘Irish 
identity’ -  yet to be redefined by Irish media ministers -  and a political and economic 
independence o f sorts ties the citizens to the nation state. I question the professed 
sovereignty of this nation state with regard to its ability to allow the expression and 
reinvention of its ‘national identity’. So, first I will show the flaws in the argument that 
persists in disseminating or holding on to images of ‘traditional’ Irish identity.
To support this, the empirical evidence in later chapters suggests that any 
assertion that the nation of Ireland is authoritatively in control with relation to its media 
policy is a fallacy. My research on policy formulation with regard to media and 
‘cultural industries’ policy determined multi-nationally within the EU community of 
member states and the GATT / World Trade Organisation forum indicates that Ireland 
has to date given no priority to the protection of its ‘unique cultural identity’, but rather 
has sought to protect other more economically and industrially critical industries. 
Policymakers in government often suggest that Irish national media should ideally 
express and nurture an image o f ‘Irish identity’, although this is generally unspecified or 
defined in tangible detail. Empirically, I demonstrate that policymaking over the past 
twenty years indicates that in practice Ireland is either not in a position to protect that 
identity or expression thereof, if it were to be ever precisely defined, nor is it generally 
government priority.
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This chapter focuses on a review of the literature examining the national or cultural 
model of citizenship. In the first part, this researcher aims to present the previous and 
current work on the concepts of citizenship, identity, and culture.
1.1 National Citizenship
The traditional argument is that citizenship is tied to the nation state (an idea espoused 
by, Rousseau, Herder, Hegel, Burke, Marshall (1950), and Rizman (2000). This idea has 
been generally accepted since 1791 when citizenship was linked to national territory for 
the first time by the French Constitution (according to McBride (2000) and Hobsbawm
(1992)).
Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762), the ‘textbook’ of the French revolution regards the 
State as a contract in which individuals surrender none of their natural rights, but rather 
agree for the protection of them. Habermas (1995:258) pinpoints the concept of 
citizenship as developing from Rousseau’s notion of self-determination, essentially - 
determining one’s own laws. However, Rousseauean Republicanism went further by 
suggesting that an individual’s purpose and loyalty should be to the State. Herder later 
(1784-91) went even beyond that definition, adding to Rousseau’s theory of the State 
that a community must be o f historical origin, united by a common language (see also 
Burke on the nature of Englishness). Hegel expanded on historical unity and developed 
the ideology of nationalism.
For Rousseau, rights derived from the State (‘national rights’), not as Locke believed 
from Nature (‘natural rights’). Locke in addition understood that the singular purpose of 
the State was the protection of each individual’s rights. Some, like Hegel and Herder in 
the 19th century believed rights were bestowed by organic nations. In the 21st century, 
some oligarchies maintain rights are a Western notion and therefore, not applicable to 
their culture.
Two key theorists examined for this research - German philosopher Jurgen Habermas 
(1989, 1994, 1995) and sociologist T H Marshall (1950) - diverge radically on their 
views of citizenship in relation to national communities.
M
Marshall appears to be influenced by Rousseau’s statement that rights derive from the 
constitutional state, and combines this approach with a tinge of German philosophical 
nationalism (and Burke’s earlier version of same). Marshall draws on Hegel’s definition 
of citizenship of a nation. Marshall’s focus on citizenship is exclusively tied to notions 
of membership of a national community. His introduction states "the citizenship whose 
history I wish to trace is, by definition, national" (Marshall, 1950:12). Marshall defines 
citizenship as citizenship of a nation state, of a common civilisation and heritage. It is 
accepted that national citizenship’s evolution involved geographical fusion -from  feudal 
society to medieval towns to national citizenship, and functional separation of 
institutions such as Parliament and courts (1950:12).
Marshall’s focus is on citizenship within the context of the post-war British nation state. 
Marshall’s insistence on the protection o f citizens by common law, however, is an 
indication of his focus on Britain and the uniquely English tradition. For Marshall, 
"Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members o f a community" 
(1950:28). A citizen is a ‘full member of the society’, citizenship being equal to ‘full 
membership of a community’. (1950:8) That community for Marshall is the national 
society, of the territorial nation state, Great Britain.
In the arena of State obligations to provide social services, Marshall suggested that the 
ideal level of equality of status would always be moving forward. The state might find it 
difficult to sustain the entire population at a ‘civilised’ level of resources, income, and 
services. In this case, Marshall takes a lead from Rousseau, and states, "It follows that 
individual rights must be subordinated to national plans". (1950:58) Marshall argues 
that,
“The obligation of the State is towards society as a whole...instead of to 
individual citizens. The maintenance of a fair balance between these collective 
and individual elements in social rights is a matter of vital importance to the 
democratic socialist State.” (Marshall 1950:59)
Therefore, Marshall focuses not only on a national state, but also a social-democratic 
state, of which there were many in the 1940s and 1950s.
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Marshall is criticised by this researcher for limiting his exploration of the possibilities of 
citizenship in a broader context than the social-democratic model fixed within the 
national state. Habermas (1989) charts the development of citizenship in a selection of 
European states -  France and Germany, as well as Britain. In their exposition of the 
historical roots o f citizenship both authors focus on Britain as the setting for an 
examination of the model of development of citizens rights and the public sphere.
It is important to appreciate that Britain was a unique case, unlike either America or 
Europe, for several sociological reasons: it was not ravaged by the Napoleonic / 
Robespierre wars on its own soil, which left the way open for the Industrial Revolution. 
It was the Empire of Trade, the sweatshop of the world; it had long lost its feudal 
system, it had economic prosperity and there was not the same ‘frustration’ that could 
lead to the overthrow of a social order. There was also not the same chasm of inequality 
between the rich and the poor, and it was relatively culturally homogenous and unified.
Habermas disputes Marshall’s national citizenship criteria in a 1995 article on ‘National 
identity and the future of the EU \ Habermas argues that conceptually, citizenship was 
never tied to national identity. He correctly argues that this is a Hegelian concept that 
came to the fore after many Continental wars (like the Seven Years War) had bruised 
national pride.
According to Habermas (1995), the history of the term ‘nation’ developed from ‘natio’
meaning, like ‘gens’ and ‘populus’, pre-politically organised tribes and peoples. Kant
also defined ‘nation’ (gens) as " that group which recognizes itself as being gathered
together in a society due to common descent" (1995:258).
"In this classic usage, therefore, nations are communities o f people of the same 
descent, who are integrated geographically, in the form of settlements or 
neighbourhoods, and culturally by their common language, customs, and 
traditions, but who are not yet politically integrated in the form of state 
organization". (Habermas 1995: 258)
This argument disputes the French Republican integration of Constitutional political 
state with the inhabitants within the French territorial boundaries. While conceding that 
‘nation’ since the French revolution and the birth o f democracy is taken to mean a 
nation of citizens, with the right to political self-determination, Habermas argues that in
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its proper meaning, ‘nation’ can only represent ‘a nation o f citizens’. ‘Nation’ is nothing 
more than territorial soil, without citizens who participate actively in the ruling o f the 
democratic state (1995: 258). He explains that while the term 'nation' started out as 
designating a pre-political entity, it is now something that is supposed to play a 
constitutive role in defining the political identity of the citizen within a democratic 
polity.
While Rousseau emphasised the importance of the ‘general will’, Rousseau’s 
Republicanism assumed the wisest in society are able to decide the best course of action 
at least for the good of the majority, if this does not reflect the will of all its members. 
For Habermas, a nation of citizens derives its identity from the praxis (i.e. practice, 
participation) o f citizens in political ruling, not from some common ethnic and cultural 
properties (1995: 258). The criterion of common heritage for citizenship is unsuitable 
for the modem age. Citizenship, in the opinion of this researcher, needs to be redefined 
in the modem context of an international community, a global economy, trans-national 
legislation and universal communication systems.
These key authors promote different models of citizenship and integration. The model 
inspiring Habermas is built on political praxis, and integration through discussion and 
communication. The model suggested by Marshall is defined by both the status of 
citizenship in addition to the rights imbued in that status. Marshall’s citizen acquires 
rights via struggle within a national context, whereas Habermas’ citizen communicates 
politically within an international context.
1.2 The Cultural Republican model
While Habermas promotes communication flows as an effective promoter of solidarity, 
Marshall argues that community solidarity in Great Britain during the wars of the early 
20th century had its roots in the 18th century bond of patriotic nationalism deriving from 
the birth of the modem nation state. Marshall omits to blame patriotic nationalism for 
being the root cause of many of the wars of the same period. Marshall conceptualises of 
a cultural republican model of citizenship. Marshall aligns himself with the definition of 
citizenship as full membership of a ‘national’ community of common historical culture
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and heritage. This was an idea originating with the birth of Republicanism aided by 
‘patriotic nationalism’.
Nationalism fuelled the formation of culturally and ethnically homogenous states, 
helped by the mass communication of literary works o f historians and romantic 
writings. However, as ideologies, both Republicanism and Nationalism requires a 
considerable amount of self-sacrifice, to the point of death - one’s own and others - in 
the service of one’s community, country or ‘nation’. Habermas views nationalism as a 
Republican motivation to fight and die for the national territory that usually leads to the 
emergence of the Nation. Without the usual violence associated with nationalism 
however, the republican citizenship model can recommend “loyalty to the community 
demonstrated by a willingness to sacrifice personal gains to advance its interests” 
(Habermas 1989: 277). Habermas highlights some dangers o f nationalism. Because it is 
a form of collective (national) consciousness, essentially constructed and spread only 
via the channels o f modem mass communication it is open to manipulation by political 
elites. It played an important role in the French Revolution’s conceptualization of 
citizenship, glorified in the literary works of historians and romantic writers (as was 
similarly the case in Ireland). Romanticism, the movement, took over from 
Enlightenment rationalism in the late 1770s, choosing to emphasise instead the 
emotional aspects of humanity, and thus playing a part in the development o f a cultural 
identity.
Yet for Habermas, nationalism ( 1995:257) is not related to political enfranchisement. It 
grew with the birth of the nation state, and first light o f democracy, but was not related 
to rights acquisitions. This researcher concurs with Habermas’ opinion.
When citizenship is tied up with a nationalist community, this generally places to the 
fore the cultural dimension of citizenship, and the fixed ideology (see Kearney) of a 
common culture or cultural identity. Marshall (1950), Corcoran (2001) and Millar
(2000) all recommend a cultural republican citizenship model closely linked to 
nationality within national boundaries.
Modem communication theorist Corcoran, also recommends national cultural 
citizenship for its value to the national community. He argues that a healthy culture
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supports individual liberties; each individual is respectful of the other; individuals are 
bonded in commonality and shared-ness, and are willing to make sacrifices for the 
other. A common culture, he argues, can foster civic responsibility by all for others. 
These 'common bonds' help foster high levels of solidarity and a willingness to make 
sacrifices for fellow citizens. Unrealistically, I think, Corcoran argues "A common 
culture holds the disparate elements of society together in many ways, not least by 
fostering a willingness among citizens for the mutual accommodations and sacrifices 
necessary for a functioning democracy" (2001:21).
This researcher finds Corcoran’s idealism problematic on two aspects. First, I disagree 
that culture is common within a society. Societies comprise o f a community of different 
institutions, different backgrounds, and different upbringings. Second, I do not concur 
that the ‘culture’ in its institutionalized forms, should decree civil sacrifice. This can be 
taken to extremes, and Corcoran doesn’t put any limits on this. As Habermas notes, in 
its most extreme version, this can mean personal death.
Arguments positing the cultural aspect of citizenship, and allowing the cultural elements 
of history to take precedence over political and economic elements represent for this 
author, in this thesis, a republican model of citizenship. The republican model of 
citizenship (Millar, Young Irelanders of 19th century, Rousseau, Malby, Babeuf, 
Maréchal) also emphasises common ownership o f property; it lives by a redistributive 
ethos; and is akin to the system of collective property ownership and cultivation of the 
feudal or Indian American system.
Habermas’ view is a little different from that of the present author: Habermas views 
‘republican’ citizenship to be exclusively with relation to political self-determination. In 
this interpretation, the republican meaning of citizenship involves the problem of 
societal self-organisation. At its core are the political rights of participation and 
communication (Habermas 1994:25). ‘Republican citizenship’ for Habermas derives 
from writings by Gawert, Kant and Rousseau. According to Gawert, citizenship is "the 
legal institution via which the individual member of a nation takes part as an active 
agent in the concrete nexus of state actions" (quoted in ibid, 1994:261). Kant’s 
viewpoint on citizenship was that "legislation can only issue from the concurring and 
unified will of everyone, to the extent that each decides the same about all and that all 
decide the same about each..." (p260). In addition, both Rousseau and Kant instead
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defined 'popular sovereignty' as "the transformation of authoritarian into self-legislated 
power’.
In conclusion this researcher employs the term republican citizenship as that meaning 
self-determination, within national territorial boundaries, demanding o f personal 
sacrifice, common ownership of resources and a dominance of the cultural aspect.
1.3 Culture and Identity
Some writers argue that citizenship is cultural as well as political, meaning belonging to 
a particular cultural heritage in addition to a political and economic sovereign 
community (for example, Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen in 1770s until Act of 
Union in 1800, Burke writing in the late 1700’s, Rudolf Rizman (2000); Gibbons
(1998); Williams (1990)).
However, it is widely acknowledged that linking citizenship to national cultural 
identity can lead dangerously close to associating citizenship with nationalism, and an 
exclusionary attitude that can result in xenophobia and racism. According to Habermas, 
citizenship is limited not according to national identity but according to a historically 
defined cultural identity (Habermas 1995:227). Hobsbawm views increased racial 
violence and the trend towards disturbingly high levels of right-wing party support as “a 
defensive fundamentalist reaction against the decline of the nation state and the 
continual cultural flux of modernity” (1992).
By the 19th century, Herder claimed that the ‘spirit of the nation’ was alive and 
represented in the national culture. Montesquieu also spoke of the ‘esprit’ of a nation. 
And according to McLoughlin (1999), Burke also conceived o f an identifiable distinct 
Irish national culture in the 18th and early 19th century that represented the ‘spirit o f the 
nation’. Williams (1981:11) analyses the use and development o f the word ‘culture’, 
and maintains that a distinctive phase of development was its usage in the late 18th 
century in English and German to define "the 'spirit' which informed the 'whole way of 
life' of a distinct people". Herder first used ‘cultures’ in plural form between 1784 -  
1791 in order to distinguish from any singular sense o f ‘civilisation’.
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Whelan (1996:60) argues that the United Irishmen only tentatively represented 
the ideology o f 19th century Romanticism in Ireland. Others (Hampsher-Monk (1992)) 
maintain that it was Burke who was the harbinger of Romanticism. Burke underlined 
the irrational ties that connected citizens. However, the ideas of Montesquieu (whose 
principal work was not yet written in Burke’s lifetime), and its ties with a ‘national’ 
culture were strongly motivating. Montesquieu developed a theory that each nation has 
an ‘esprit’ or character, which is represented in national ‘laws’. L ’esprit is represented 
by the climate, geography, diet, customs and particular nature of that nation. The United 
Irishmen realised that the natural progression in Montesquieu thought from national 
‘esprit’ to national ‘les lois' (laws) did not happen in Ireland. Ireland was the odd one 
out in the European Enlightenment. Ireland, it was deemed, possessed a national 
‘character’. This character invariably embodied the Catholic tradition -  protected in 
media policy against criticism until the 1980’s in Ireland, according to Barbrook (1992). 
(see Kearney on Celtic Revivalist tradition of culture). However, this esprit was not 
represented in the national lois because the Catholic population was excluded from 
political power.
Because the mass of these disenfranchised Catholics had received no education (partly 
as a result of the Penal laws, repealed in 1778), the task of the United Irishmen was to 
politicise popular culture and through this, stimulate public opinion which would in turn 
force change to les lois. The ideology of European Romanticism helped in the 
fabrication of a national (cultural) identity.
1.4 What defines the culture?
By defining ‘culture’ as being the ‘whole way of life’ and ‘the spirit of a people’, 
Williams (1990) also subscribes to that national relationship with culture and citizenship 
as drawn by Montesquieu, Burke, Herder and Hegel. He outlines how in the 19th c. the 
word ‘culture’ was used in comparative anthropological and sociological terms to 
describe a "whole and distinctive way of life" (1981:11). This gave birth to attempting 
to identify the 'determining elements' that produces distinctive cultures. However, 
Williams shows how in late 20th c. work, culture is seen as "the signifying system 
through which necessarily a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and 
explored." (p i3) Thus, sociology of culture is 'necessarily and centrally concerned with
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manifest cultural practices and production' (p i4). From his sociological viewpoint, 
culture is everyday. Venturelli (1998b) classifies culture as being nationalist, modernist, 
or postmodernist, and views the cultural problem of the Information Society to be 
framed as "the question o f expression".
For Anthony Smith, Herder and Hegel, language is the decisive element in any culture. 
Douglas Hyde (founder of the Gaelic League and later President of Ireland) defined 
Irish national identity on the inaugural broadcast of Dublin 2RN radio as identifiable by 
its language:
“A nation is not made by Act of Parliament nor Treaty. A nation is made first of 
all by its language, if it has one, by its music, songs, games and customs. We 
desire to especially emphasise what we have derived from our Gaelic ancestors.” 
(Gorham 1967:23)
As noted by Rex Cathcart, “the Ulster writer Richard Hayward believed that the regular 
transmission of a song or a play in the national language would be a powerful factor in 
the creation of a national being” (Cathcart 1984:42).
Initially in any case, the protection of “Irish national identity” was to be fought on the 
frontiers o f language, and one language only. The English language represented firstly a 
political dominance, and secondly a cultural invasion -  combine them both (in 
broadcasting), and BBC radio represented a form o f “propaganda in a foreign tongue”. 
(Postmaster General JJ Walsh, quoted in Gorham (1967:13))
In seeking to promote the Irish language above others, organisations such as the 
Language Freedom Movement charged Radio Eireann with bias. They claimed that Irish 
culture and Gaelic culture were not identical, and thus Radio Eireann was in breach of 
obligations to be impartial in treatment of language. (Fisher 1978:30)
Since 1794 in France successive governments have attempted to use the French 
language as a vector for the construction of national identity. Full political and civil 
rights were only granted to Jews in 1791 on the condition that they ‘convert’ to the 
French language, replacing their use of Yiddish and other traditional customs.
Corcoran (2001 ) sees culture as being defined not by language specifically, but rather 
by common institutions orienting the people towards a common view. Corcoran 
suggests that national culture depicted on national public service broadcasting helps to
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achieve a good civic society of a common culture. Corcoran’s model -  national culture 
on the national public service broadcaster - is epitomised by Canada’s view of 
broadcasting as “a public service essential to the maintenance and enhancement of 
national identity and cultural sovereignty” as defined in the 1991 Broadcasting Act and 
also by early attempts at legislating Irish broadcasting services to serve the cultural 
national model of identity.
The irony is that it is incredibly difficult to define, let alone agree on what constitutes a 
‘national culture’, a ‘cultural heritage’, or specifically an ‘Irish culture’. Eileen Kane 
defines culture as “the common, learned way of life shared by members of a society; not 
only society’s arts and sciences, but also laws, political organisations, patterns of child- 
raising, methods of making and using tools, ways of resolving disputes; in short, all its 
shared patterns and content of ideas, values and behaviours... Culture is a short-hand for 
living which provides our (each) particular society’s answers to the questions which 
face every man universally.” (quoted in O Tuathaigh 1984:97-98)
The situation of the future has been described as a global post-modernistic cultural 
identity. Smith (1990) quoted in (McQuail 1994:116) describes this as “a culture tied to 
no place or period... .contextless, a true melange of disparate components drawn from 
everywhere and nowhere, borne upon the channels of the global telecommunications 
system. Widely diffused in space, a global culture is cut off from any past....it has no 
history”. It has no values either, notes McQuail, apart from those that esteem a Western 
form of capitalism, individualism, consumerism, hedonism and commercialism.
1.5 Cultural Identity
For Hegel, the democratic and economic ‘state’ was identical to the nation. Herder, 
Hegel and Burke all conceptualised a nation to be rooted historically with a 
characteristic and distinctive common cultural heritage, shared by the community of 
people, the volk. It was Herder in the late 18th century who first coined the notion of 
‘cultures’, yet Herder was not an Enlightenment thinker.
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According to Kearney (1997), Hegelian nationalism, and linkage of the state 
with the nation, and iced on top with a common cultural historical heritage was not an 
Irish Celtic concept. Gibbons (1998) suggests that Enlightenment universalism usually 
wipes out notions of national culture and nationalism, although he points to the United 
Irishmen who argued that Enlightenment universalism and Irish nationalism were 
compatible. The Young Ireland 19th c. argument was that Ireland is culturally different, 
therefore entitled to separate nationhood status from Britain. They held that diversity in 
culture required separation in a sovereign nation state. Much of this Romanticist 
rhetoric was put forward after the Act of Union in 1800, a key turning point for the 
nature of the frame in which Irish rights were shaped. This thesis posits that the cultural 
diversity argument helped lead to national sovereignty and laws, yet was not the 
initiator.
Yet, McBride (2000:170) suggests that the United Irishmen and Irish radicalism in the
18th c. were largely responsible for cultural production (and a cultural revival) in the
late 18th century - from ballads to publications of Gaelic magazines. The United
Irishmen Society revived and promoted Irish culture, history and heritage, through Irish
language and music revivals, song, symbols and images. The literature featured Irish
antiquities, music and language, and the first republicans were involved in the revival of
Irish music, and promoted the study o f the Irish language. The Northern Star and The
Press, and the republican songbook Paddy’s Resource (1795) all have poems and songs
in them that glorified Ireland's history and culture as well as its martial traditions ( see
also Yeats and Celtic Revival in Kearney (1997)). However, he suggests that
"The United Irishmen were interested less in recovering the particular features of 
the Gaelic past, than in demonstrating that it met universal standards of civility, 
refinement and politeness. What is missing from these declarations is the 
nineteenth century argument, so central to Young Ireland propaganda, that 
Ireland's right to separate nationhood was grounded in cultural difference". 
(McBride 2000:171)
The United Irishmen sought inspiration from Paine and Locke and the French 
Revolution, not from Burke. Wolfe Tone was the most prominent member of the radical 
‘United Irishmen’ group, and most in tune with the rise of European Enlightenment 
principles flourishing on the continent. He and the United Irishmen Society sought to 
repudiate a divisive Irish past, break the connection with England, identified as the 
source of Ireland’s political woes, and adopt and embrace with enthusiasm the
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universalism and modernity of the forces of Enlightenment -  in direct opposition to the 
theory of Burke.
Their mentor, if one can be identified, was Thomas Paine. While "Locke was still cited 
as the orthodox exponent of contractual government, his writings were now reread in 
the light of Paine’s democratic convictions. Paine's citizens reserved the right to remodel 
their government as they saw fit. " (McBride 2000) Ideologically, the United Irishmen 
sought to educate their labourer readership with the “principles of popular sovereignty, 
with conceptions of natural and civil rights, universal suffrage and representative 
government, and with the American and French constitutions." (ibid, 2000:176)
The ambition of the United Irishmen and their leader, Wolfe Tone -  and it was 
principally this group that sought to create public outcry and force reform -  was to 
combine the Enlightenment spirit of ‘universalism’ with the Romanticist concept of a 
cultural nationalism, in order to infiltrate Ireland and the body politic with the new 
ideals, wisdom and truth from the Continent.
The solution to oppressive colonial rule as viewed by the United Irishmen was to firstly, 
reform the Irish people by adopting a cultural nationalist position (relating, for example, 
cultural rights to national identity). Secondly, the United Irishmen sought to reform 
Irish laws and the system of government to include and represent Catholics and their 
heritage of traditions (effectively, imbuing the Irish Catholics with civil and political 
rights).
In a manner similar to that of the United Irishmen employing press and pamphlets, 
when radio broadcasting commenced in Ireland, radio was to be the vehicle by which 
the most salient elements of Irish cultural heritage (language, music, singing and games) 
would be brought back from the brink of extinction. When in 1922, the new Irish Free 
State considered a request from the Marconi company to operate a broadcasting service, 
and to sell the necessary receiving equipment, the initial offer was that Marconi would 
provide “an efficient and adequate programme of music, speech, songs and news” 
(Cathcart 1984:40). However, a Special Committee of the Dail reviewing the control of 
content recommended instead that, rather than be used for entertainment, radio should 
be utilised as “an instrument of popular education...ministering commercial and
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cultural progress” (1984:40). The final report of the Broadcasting Committee of the Dail 
in 1924 considered that the Irish broadcast service should be the servant of education, 
agriculture and identity, offering Irish and foreign language lessons and educational 
discussions on a variety of historical and practical subjects. Yet, less than 0.5% of 
listeners stayed tuned to Irish language broadcasts. By the 1950s, the audience was just
0.1%. Despite the Irish language programmes, and a service that had become, according 
to president William Cosgrave a “vehicle for Irish Ireland propaganda” (Gorham 
1967:6), many listeners preferred to listen to BBC, American Forces Radio, Radio 
Luxembourg or other European broadcasts.
1.6 European cultural identity
In the case of the European Union and their drive to promote a European cultural 
identity within the context of economic and political unification, Anderson (1983) 
doubts if this “imagined community”, promoted for political reasons, will take any root. 
While there exists a strong belief that national European cultural identities may be 
undermined and displaced through the importation of North American media products 
(and thus should be prevented), it is suggested that cultural transnationalisation within 
the boundaries of Europe would help the political unification project (and thus should 
be encouraged). This seeming contradiction fails to take account of the unlikelihood of 
such an effort. Intra-European national identity must first overcome as many different 
languages as Member States in the EU, while American media product is produced in 
one o f the most widely spoken languages of the world.
A precise and common definition of what ‘European culture’ amounts to remains 
unspecified -  other than the suggestion that there exists European unity in a complex 
union of a diversity of cultures, languages and history. Some suggest that the singular 
common thread of European Union cultures lies in their common Christian heritage and 
tradition. Current debate within the political actors involved in developing a European 
constitution is split over the need or requirement to include a reference to ‘God’ in the 
text. Therefore, not all Europeans agree that Christianity represents a common European 
element.
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Like Schlesinger (1997) and Habermas (1995), I do not subscribe to the notion of a 
‘common European culture’ on which a European citizenship can be based. Schlesinger 
argues that this rhetoric is unfounded, while Habermas argues that this is a notion that 
should stay in the European medieval middle ages. In addition, it is unrealistic to 
assume that the idea of a ‘national culture’ and all the associated concepts of bonds, 
community, citizenship and sovereignty which are associated with the idea of a national 
culture can be simply transposed to the wider European level in the hope that a 
‘common European culture’ will be generated.
1.7 Historical identity
The United Irishmen were strongly led by Enlightenment thought, and wished to throw 
off the restrictive shackles o f British tradition. Burke, although a stalwart supporter of 
tradition and custom could see that modifications were required by an authoritarian 
empire, for example, restraining its immoral policies and admitting Catholics into the 
Irish citizenry. Burke worked hard to defend the rights of Catholics to enter and 
participate in citizenship in Ireland, but he was not in favour of an Enlightenment style 
full enfranchisement of universal man, according to Hampsher-Monk (1987, 1992), 
unlike Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen.
Burke focused instead not on the religion of the Irish and their eligibility for citizenship 
(as was Wolfe Tone’s argument), but on their organic and historical cultural ties. 
Burke’s concept of citizens in community rested on moral ties, national historical bonds 
forged over centuries, and republican duty to your country. These were the bonds of 
Burke’s community of citizens. Yet “Burke always resisted the extension o f the 
franchise to the lower classes, arguing that the corruption and disorder occasioned by 
elections were grounds for restricting it. " (Hampsher-Monk 1987:18) Distinct from the 
United Irishmen’s Enlightenment vision, Burke (like Marshall) represented tradition: 
“culture is an organic unity and its civilisation a national heritage”.
In broadcasting terms, however, when the Irish national radio station faced a dwindling 
listenership for traditional Irish music in 1934, 2RN’s new director Dr. TJ Kieman 
argued that:
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“Merely to be traditional is not to be national, certainly not to be constructively 
national. ...The old is good, but it is not good to live entirely on the old. Irish 
broadcasting has an important function in stimulating an interest in all kinds of 
music” (Cathcart 1984:44)
His intentions to revamp the music agenda went against the previous Government 
policy that had condemned foreign advertisements utilising jazz music.
While Burke thought citizens were bonded through tradition and heritage, Marshall also 
saw the bonds of citizenship being formed both politically and culturally: politically 
through the combined struggle for the attainment o f citizenship rights.
"Citizenship requires a bond ....a direct sense of community membership based 
on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of free 
men endowed with rights and protected by common law. Its growth is stimulated 
both by the struggle to win those rights and by their enjoyment when won." 
(1950:41)
In this remark, Marshall presents his utopian sentiment of allegiance within a 
community - combining a Hegelian notion of national heritage with a resolute belief in 
the British institutional tradition of common law. (Burke also favoured common law -  it 
resonated of tradition and heritage).
This bond was particularly strong in the 18th century - which saw the birth o f modem 
civil rights - and of modem national consciousness. Marshall is linking the bond of 
belonging to a community with the birth of nationhood. This researcher questions 
whether this is still a legitimate modem concept, and what then o f a post-national 
community bond such as that required of the European Community?
However, he also realised that the expectations o f citizens to what they are legitimately 
entitled to is a constantly moving forward target, which the State may never come close 
to achieving. Subsequently, the bond of citizenship is constantly changing, as is the 
definition.
Cullen (1972) also suggests that bonds of citizenship can be developed through 
common grievances against authority, and Whelan (1996) suggests that bonds of 
community in Ireland were forged through awareness of rights repression (through
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penal persecution), and culturally through the medium of songs and literature telling 
history of the national land, soil and heritage.
In Ireland, common hatred of the repression o f rights and the imposition o f Church 
tithes drew people of all classes together in a common bond. McBride argues that the 
United Irishmen’s agenda was to break the ancien regime and colonial ties of deference 
and allegiance by the fanners, shopkeepers, artisans and mechanics to Great Britain, in a 
manner similar to the American colonists. In this way, the United Irishmen sought to 
break the traditional bonds of subservience to Great Britain, and construct a new way of 
integrating the populace.
The colonially oppressed in Ireland also called for a redistribution of the land, for the 
people of Ireland. Property and land was a major issue for the common peasants in 
Ireland, where many families survived on sub-letting small plots from landlords o f the 
great estates. The land had been confiscated by the British, and settled with Protestant 
planters, while rights to practice their Catholicism and continue generations on the land 
had been taken away. The Irish suffered greatly under the Penal Laws, much of the 
discontent being centered on the issue of the misappropriation o f the land.
Marshall draws a distinction between citizenship bonds, and social ties. One is political 
and civil, the other is class-based. Social ties (1950:98) may be classified as being based 
either on difference or similarity. Similarity unites most obviously through the 
recognition o f a common interest. Similarity suggests groups, such as nationalities, 
social class, occupational associations or age groups.
Marshall argues that the force that unites a social class is 'consciousness of kind'. 'Kind' 
is "simply that particular sort of similarity which builds social classes and not trade 
unions, literary societies, political parties or county associations." Identity is also ‘that 
what you are not’. It is clear any sense of similarity within a group implies a 
consciousness o f difference from those not o f the group (1950:99).
It is interesting that Marshall writing in 1950 believed community bonds should be
closer-knit than a nation state could ever allow:
"But the national community is too large and remote to command this kind of 
loyalty and to make it a continual driving force. That is why many people think
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that the solution of our problem lies in the development of more limited 
loyalties, to the local community and especially the working group.” (Marshall, 
1950:80)
He also professes that “nationality .is not like a profession or an income or a belief, 
detachable in thought from the whole personality.” (Ibid, p i00)
It is the belief of the present author that the bonds of community can be physically or 
psychologically stretched, but what is more decisive for bonding is the level and relative 
access to that level at which a community makes decisions for others and rules itself.
1.8 The Media in the Construction o f Identity
For Whelan (1996), the 18th century in Ireland witnessed the construction of a national 
identity that had not been conceived of in all its aspects until then. A national identity 
was constructed artificially, and publicised nationally. The movement of Romanticism 
helped this construction: these theories encouraged notions of ‘cultural identity’. To 
foster this construction, Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen used pamphleteering 
extensively.
The foundation of the Irish state, argues Kearney (1997) was shaped by Yeats and a 
Celtic Revival ideal promulgated by Wolfe Tone. This Irish ‘national’ tradition that they 
spoke, sang and wrote about relied much on pre-colonial pagan Celtic myths of the 
motherland, represented by a mythical figure, Cathleen Ni Houlihan. Anderson’s 
(1987) conceptualisation of ‘nation’ as an ‘imagined’ limited, sovereign, community 
has much in common with Kearney’s elaboration of the use of ‘myth’ employed by 
Irish Celtic Revivalists. Much of the mythology employed by these writers focused on 
stories of heroic republican self-sacrifice, for the nation, according to Kearney. 
Kearney’s alternative is a transformative ‘utopia’ o f recreating identity in flux: he cites 
Kavanagh, Joyce and Beckett as masters of this concept.
Smith (1980) maintains that the emergence o f the newspaper in 1848 came at a time 
when the idea of establishing a homogenous “nationhood” was taking shape within the 
consciousness of the entire populations and within class structures. Each nationalist 
movement in Europe began, and gained strength with their own newspapers. Each
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newspaper represented the ideas of a political party seeking to gain control. Thus the 
Liberals, Radicals and Agrarians and any other party that gained the power of a 
newspaper mouthpiece also cornered first mover advantage in the political landscape 
(Anthony Smith, 1980: 11). All newspapers, he notes, expressed this view of the 
coming nationhood.
Hardt (1979) in McQuail (1994) has also highlighted the perceived integrative stimulant 
o f the newspaper in the 19th and early 20th century. The various functions of the press as 
assigned to it by German theorists ranged from “binding society together, giving 
leadership to the public, helping to establish the ‘public sphere’, providing for the 
exchange of ideas between leaders and masses, satisfying needs for information, 
providing society with a mirror of itself, and acting as the ‘conscience of society’”. 
(Hardt 1979 in McQuail 1994:73)
The bond of citizenship was particularly strong in the Romanticist period o f the 19th 
century - which saw the birth of modem civil rights and of modem national 
consciousness in many countries.
The seeds of 20th century British (national) war efforts were planted in the development 
in the 18th century patriotic songs like “God Save the Queen” and “Rule Britannia”, 
along with the popular and parliamentary political agitation. Not only songs, but also 
the distribution of information via political journalism, newspapers, public meetings, 
and propaganda campaigns contributed to a growing national consciousness (Marshall 
1950:41) that developed easily enough into patriotic nationalism.
The identity and culture of Catholicism at that time was the strongest uniting emblem, 
with which the excluded Catholics could identify, and Catholicism also represented 
traditional Irish nationhood and the Irish culture that permeated Irish life in that era. At 
the time that Yeats and Wolfe Tone were popularising propaganda myths of the Irish 
motherland, and a non-sectarian Irish tradition, other writers such as Beckett and Joyce 
-  the “cosmopolitan elite” says Kearney -  either had ‘no identity’ or recreated their own 
personal identity by mixing Irish with foreign. MD Higgins & Kiberd (2002) diverge 
from this view, arguing that it was the artists in exile, like Beckett and Joyce, who 
eulogised ancient rural myths, and thus gave birth to the ideals of Irish nationalism,
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while they were abroad and in exile. They suggest that nationality is bom in exile by 
and through these authors being forced into exile due to censorship.
Corcoran posits that the most important diffusion methods of a 'common culture' (that is
based on geographical territories, a common language, shared experiences, memories
and hopes....) are via institutions (like 'cultural structures' in government, media,
schools, trade unions, churches, legal systems and so on.). This is how best to diffuse a
common culture throughout society, argues Corcoran, as distinct from the present
author, who recommends the media, and face-to-face encounters and events.
Cultures, Corcoran states,
"tend to be territorially concentrated and based on a shared language and 
history...Cultures provide their members with a meaningful way of life across a 
full range of human activities and involve shared values, memories and 
orientations to the future. They are societal in so far as they are embodied in 
common institutions, in government structures, media, schools, trade unions, 
churches, legal systems and so on. These institutions underpin a culture's 
survival by diffusing a common culture throughout society. "(2001:19)
This researcher argues that each of these institutions may differ from one to the other, 
and that it is incorrect to suggest that everyone in a nation state subscribes to, or attends 
the same common institutions. This may have been the situation in the past, but with 
multi-cultural societies, this is not the case.
In post-revolutionary America, the free ex-colonists had difficulties finding solutions to
their immediate problem of forging unity among a multitude o f states. Where previously
there had been a mother Empire, following the Declaration of Independence it was their
primary task to determine whether a sentiment of allegiance be better forged through
alliance to a small state, or a large federal nation. This was the issue of the articles and
letters of the republic between Federalist and anti-Federalist literature :
'The ratification debates consisted, in large measure, o f a controversy over which 
institutional, social, and psychological conditions were best able to promote a 
sentiment of allegiance and, hence, the disinterestedness and willingness to 
abide by the laws of one's state, which can fairly be described as civic virtue.' 
(Sinopoli 1992:6)
Essentially post Revolutionary America was in debate about the conceptions o f person 
and citizen, and 'the psychological ties that bind a people to their government and rulers 
to their constitutional and legal duties' (Sinopoli, 1992:6). Unlike Europe, America
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retained its sense of Christian (Puritan) values, whereas European philosophers 
(Rousseau) during the French Revolution were determined to overthrow the Christian 
hierarchy and Christianity and replace it with unlimited belief in Humanism. Religion 
(even religious diversity) in America was believed to be one check against the 
disintegration of the community, and during the course of the Revolution when 
dissenting ministers had fought together in a common cause, religion had been a gelling 
force. The new European Constitution (2003) is now unlikely to mention Christianity, 
or any reference to God. More secular countries have succeeded in creating a more 
general reference instead to Europe’s ‘cultural, religious and humanist inheritance’. 
(Irish Times, 5/09/03)
1.9 Nationhood is cultural and national
Both Herder and Hegel also conceived of a nation as homogenous in language, culture 
and history.
The cultural purity of the Irish nationals was a concept taken up by the nationalist 
Young Irelanders, who followed on from Tone after the unsuccessful 1798 Rebellion at 
which the United Irishmen were defeated. For the Young Irelanders, the Irish nation 
was an organic entity bonded by a common language (McBride 2000: 172). The Young 
Ireland 19th century argument was that Ireland was culturally different, therefore 
entitled to separate nationhood status from Britain. They held that diversity in culture 
required separation in a sovereign nation state. Much of these Romanticist rhetoric was 
put forward after the Act o f Union in 1800, a key turning point for the nature of the 
frame in which Irish rights were shaped. Therein, the argument for cultural diversity 
supports the striving for national sovereignty and laws.
Daniel O’Connell (“The Liberator”) was the man whose campaign resulted in Catholic 
emancipation in 1829, and paved the way for the idea of ‘Catholic culture’ as 
representing ‘Irish culture’, the ‘Irish nation’ and ‘Irish nationhood’ -  from which the 
concept and battle cry o f ‘Irish cultural nationalism’ developed.
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1.10 Constructing identity through broadcasting in Ireland (1922 
-  2 0 0 2 )
JB Thompson (1993) in McQuail (1994) argues that the processes o f modernisation 
meant that the traditions and cultures of a community were no longer passed on 
primarily through the oral tradition of storytelling, but increasingly through the media. 
In this sense, the emerging broadcasting service was employed to form a hegemonic 
dominant consensus within new nation states based on geographical boundaries. A new 
nation needs the cement of a national ideology to bridge the gap between classes and 
cultural divides.
Those subscribing to the centripetal force of media argue that the cohesive force of 
media are endowed with the capacity to unite diverse elements and even different 
cultures within a single society, providing a common set of values and assisting in the 
formation o f a shared identity. This centripetal media force is associated with the ideals 
of order, control, unity, assimilation and cohesion (when viewed positively). Members 
of the Chicago School in the US believed media could have a positive influence in the 
assimilation of immigrants into their new nation (Clark 1969, in McQuail 1994: 73) 
while the role of media to forge a new post-colonial national identity was emphasised in 
early literature on the process of ‘modernisation’ according to Pye (1963 in McQuail:
Given the condition o f the state o f Ireland even in 1960 -  “still a comparatively young 
state, bom in violence and immediately afterwards tom by civil war, with a continuing 
internal security threat, an unsolved problem as regards Northern Ireland, economically 
underdeveloped and sociologically unsettled...’’(Fisher, 1978:26) it is hardly surprising 
that any medium which could transmit a centrally controlled yet widely diffused 
unifying message was eagerly employed.
Hegemonic ideology was a concept first developed by Gramsci in the 1960s / 1970s, 
and later developed by Raymond Williams. Hegemonic ideology transmits cultural 
traditions and specifications under the guise of constancy backed by the weight of 
history to the population often through mass media institutions. Hegemonic ideology is 
said to be successful if it connects with the community’s subconscious and mobilises 
them to change or indeed, to remain stationary. (See Stevenson 1995:17) While the
57
appearance is given that the national culture and heritage is age-old, the criteria of these 
traditions and heritage are continually being re-sketched and re-defined according to the 
goals as determined by the manipulative ruling group, whilst being presented as fixed 
and ancestral.
The functionalist theory of media and society attributes hegemonic powers to mass 
media, when they are consciously employed to integrate society. Functionalist theory 
claims have much to do with maintaining social order, promoting continuity of culture 
and values, managing tension and integrating individuals. Media have a stabilising 
effect of maintaining the status quo, and drawing support for it and its associated 
cultural and social values. Functionalism maintains, not changes society. This idea is 
reinforced by the types of programmes promoting national identity broadcast by the 
early BBC -  events which would, according to Cardiff and Scannell (1987) “restore the 
currency of older cultural traditions and to re-establish their purchase on the heart and 
imagination o f the public” (1987:159). These televised events, revisited year after year, 
themselves became integrated into the national identity under construction, while the 
BBC in so broadcasting wrapped itself in the robes of a national institution.
Katz and Dayan (1986 in McQuail:81) note that major social events which gamer wide 
and diverse audiences can assist greatly in the drawing together of otherwise separate 
and atomised communities. In the Irish context this idea could be applied to events such 
as the RTE television coverage of the visit o f President Kennedy to Ireland and the 
opening of the Second Vatican Council under Pope John XXIII in the 1960s.
In the early 20th century, media was seen as potentially unifying and integrative -  what 
McQuail calls the functionalist theory of media and society. By now, as we come into 
the early 21st century, new media is coming to be seen as either positively centrifugal (if 
one refers to governments investing in bringing about a new information society) or as 
negatively centrifugal (if you hold the opinion that the new information technologies 
will create a society of have’s and have-not’s). In a negative interpretation o f media’s 
centrifugal force, it is believed media can effect notions of dispersion, fragmentation, 
isolation, loss of values and vulnerability.
When radio broadcasting was being introduced in societies in the 1920s, its potential as 
a weapon of integration was seized upon by national governments. Many “nation­
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states” as we now know them were at the time only just coming into existence. The idea 
o f uniting a disparate audience o f regional, tribal and ethnic loyalties into one collective 
nation, with a shared, if fabricated cultural identity was very attractive to the governing 
powers. The radio was to be the tool with which a national identity would be forged, 
and its direction would be a State affair. Dail Eireann held the opinion that an Irish 
broadcasting service could both help to foster an Irish identity and simultaneously 
discourage the listening to foreign (especially British) broadcast services. Douglas Hyde 
defined the ‘national culture’ in 1926 as “the heritage of the Os and the Macs” derived 
from “one of the oldest civilisations in Europe”. (O’Tuathaigh 1984: 98)
Since the 1926 Wireless Telegraphy Act, legislation governing Irish broadcasting 
services elements that highlight the notion o f promoting the national identity has 
remained constant, while the elements that are deemed to constitute Irish national 
identity have been in constant flux.
The 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act requires that broadcasting should “respect the 
national aims” with regard to the Irish language and national culture (Section 17). 
Specifically, Section 17 states the Authority’s “general duty with respect to national 
aims” and “in performing its functions, the Authority shall bear constantly in mind the 
national aims of restoring the Irish language and preserving and developing the national 
culture and shall endeavour to promote these aims”. (Fisher 1978: 26)
In 1961 the RTE Broadcasting Authority interpreted this as meaning the “provision of a 
programme” which “would have a distinctively Irish quality”, reflecting “traditional 
Irish values” (RTE Annual report 1960-61 quoted in Fisher, 1978), while a decade later 
in 1971 the Authority saw its role as assisting “the development o f a deeper 
appreciation of the intrinsic value of Irish language, history and tradition, the 
development of a better public consciousness of national identity...” (1973 
Broadcasting Authority).
The Report of the Broadcast Review Committee (1974) listed specific cultural attributes 
which were to be reflected in a broadcasting service which would be “essentially Irish in 
content and character” and which “in particular encourages and fosters the Irish 
language”. These cultural specificities o f Irish culture included the religious beliefs and 
traditions, work and recreation styles, local and regional community festivals, and
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traditional variety in entertainment, musical and literary talent of the inhabitants of 
Ireland as well as the two spoken languages in use in Ireland (O’Tuathaigh: 98).
As Irish political affiliations and responsibility for political circumstances began to 
change -  firstly with the reporting of political problems in the North, and later with the 
discussion and prospects of joining the European Economic Community -  so too did the 
manner in which the national broadcaster reflected Ireland’s changing identity. RTE 
was party to the process of re-constructing and reflecting a new, more modem identity. 
The 1974 Final Report published by the Broadcasting Review Committee recommended 
that content as regards the Irish broadcasting system should be a balanced service of 
information, enlightenment and entertainment essentially Irish in character, and 
contribute positively to the cultural, social and economic fabric of Ireland.
These recommendations were brought into legislation in the 1976 Broadcasting Act, 
taking into account Ireland’s 1975 joining of the European Union, and respecting 
democracy in the midst o f political upheavals in the North o f Ireland. Thus, RTE was to 
“uphold the democratic values enshrined in the Constitution, especially those relating to 
rightful liberty of expression” . Whilst reiterating its duty to Irish culture and language, 
RTE was also to help public awareness about the other cultures and communities both 
within the whole of Ireland and the EEC, thus promoting peace and understanding. 
(1976 Broadcasting Act, in Fisher 1978:43)
Thus, as the political environment changed, so too did Ireland’s perceived identity, and 
this was duly expected to be reflected in the dominant audiovisual media.
Labour’s belief (during the 1982-1987 period) was that broadcasting should be public 
service driven, with an enhanced commitment to facilitate ‘community broadcasting’ in 
the locality. This concept centred on local ownership and use of the local radio 
broadcasting stations.
At the time when minister for Communications Jim Mitchell was attempting with 
difficulty to legally establish commercial broadcasting, “The Labour party at that 
period, believed that broadcasting should be owned by the people, used for the people, 
and for the good o f the people, and there would be neighbourhood discourse and all
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these wonderful things...It was a typical Michael D. Higgins philosophy of ‘everyone 
getting involved in radio at the local level’ and conversing wonderfully at the local 
level” . (Interview, D/AHGI 4, PO Communications, Dublin)
The Labour party was at that time intent on developing a policy for local and 
‘community’ broadcasting. This was not viewed by the government department as a 
realistic aim or viable in the long term -  they queried the commercial viability of the 
project, and projected listenership numbers: who would listen to it? How would it be 
sustained? How would it generate revenue? For how long will local shops in a coverage 
area of 3 to 6 miles keep advertising after the initial novelty has worn off?
At that period, only six local radio stations -  and these were mainly broadcasting from 
urban centres -  were viewed to be commercially viable in the economic climate o f the 
early 1980s, some operating at the very margins. In addition, broadcasting legislation 
proposals arising from the previous government and consultations were heavy with 
public service obligations. It was believed (by Fine Gael Jim Mitchell, and Fianna Fail 
Ray Burke) that Labour’s commitment to the public service ethic acted as the principal 
block to the legal establishment of commercial broadcasting during the 1982-87 period.
After years of Fine Gael / Labour disputes on the subject, the new Fianna Fail 
government came in and promised to resolve the issue swiftly. The programme for 
government vowed to “sort out the mess that had been prevailing for the previous five 
or six years” (Interview, D/AHGI 4, P.O. Communications, Dublin). There was a 
deliberate intention on the part of the department of Communications headed by 
Minister Burke (1987-1991) to avoid all references to terms such as ‘national’, ‘local’, 
‘community’ or ‘neighbourhood’ broadcasting. It was decided that the Bill should only 
make reference to ‘sound broadcasting’ because “we had had such interminable rows 
within the previous government about the concepts of local, and regional, and 
community broadcasting. And they just raised hackles. So, if you don’t call it anything 
(specific), it leaves everything open. And you avoid what we figured would be these 
interminable rows”. (Interview, D/AHGI 4, Dublin)
Minister Higgins (Labour) took up office in the Fianna Fail (Taoiseach Albert 
Reynolds) / Labour coalition government of 1992-1995. When Albert Reynolds 
resigned in December 1994, Higgins was re-appointed in the new Fine Gael / Labour
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government coalition inaugurated in February 1995 led by Taoiseach John Bruton (FG). 
Higgins’ term of office as Minister of his own creation, a new department of the Arts, 
Culture and the Gaeltacht, ran from 1993 -  1997.
Minister Higgins’ thinking on broadcasting issues was derived from a cultural not 
economic perspective: his model for broadcasting was a “citizenship model with a 
public service broadcasting message, not a market paradigm with a commodification 
message. It was an uphill battle all the time”. (Interview, MD Higgins, Dublin)
While fighting political battles at home, 1992 had seen the EU Maastricht Treaty 
enshrine ‘Culture’ as an area of EC concern. This acknowledges the importance of 
European cultures, and recommends that they ‘should be taken into account’ in the 
overall schema of policy deliberation. However, the European Commission takes the 
view that without a strong reference to culture in the founding Treaties, and a 
subsequent mandate for the area, the Commission will do nothing. Higgins is of the 
opinion that the weak position of culture within the founding treaties of the European 
Union is due to three reasons: firstly, European nations were extremely sensitive to the 
abuse of culture for fascisistic purposes after the Second World War. Secondly, because 
culture is so closely associated with education, the insistence on Member State 
subsidiarity becomes a factor. And thirdly, culture like human rights, has traditionally, 
been the responsibility of the Council of Europe. According to Higgins, “there is no 
semblance of a cultural policy” held in the European Commission. It is advanced by 
Higgins that the relative weakness o f culture, and the Commissioner for Culture within 
the College of Commissioners and the European Commission is “because culture is 
unimportant. Those driving European integration are not interested in culture. They are 
interested in consumption, and consumer culture”. He remarks that “Europe has sold the 
pass repeatedly on cultural issues”, with the Commissioner for Culture representing the 
weakest possible Directorate-General within the College of Commissioners.
Within the debate for European integration and the construction of a European identity 
to which Europeans will subscribe, the notion of fostering common bonding via 
audiovisual events of national importance -  social or sporting -  remains a key issue of 
much debate in the modem situation of pay-per-view sports events. Some deemed of 
supranational importance like the Olympics and Soccer World Cup have been enshrined
6?
within EU law to remain freely available, so that they remain available and accessible to
Following Higgins, Minister Sile de Valera (1997 -  2002) was appointed Minister of 
the renamed Department of Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands in a Fianna Fail / 
Progressive Democrat government led by Taoiseach Bertie Ahem (FF) in July 1997.
She is remembered for prevarication on introducing the necessary legislation designed 
to facilitate the establishment o f nationally available Digital Terrestrial Television 
(DTT) in Ireland.
The national public broadcaster RTE first petitioned the FG / Labour government for a 
sum of IR£40 million (later revised to IR£80 million) with their plan for a national 
Digital Terrestrial Television service in September 1996. Throughout the following five 
years, RTE highlighted the issue of relevance for Irish national digital content, and the 
uniquely ‘national’ geographical coverage that their proposal presented. Their concerns 
focused on the need to retain “some sense of Irish identity” in programming offered via 
digital transmission:
“Irish national interests and the requirements of the Irish public dictate that 
digital video broadcasting is too important in its impact on cultural and 
economic activity to be left to international market forces. Ireland’s national 
interest requires that it control its own digital platforms, thus enabling it to 
develop the distinct culture of its society. Ireland must act now - National policy 
and national legislation are urgent requirements. If we believe that Irish views 
and Irish voices are to have a place in the digital landscape, if we are committed 
to Irish culture as a rich strand in the fabric of our future, we must do what is 
needed to ensure that the new digital technology will carry Irish content, and 
that Ireland will have a controlling influence on the communications media in 
this country in the next century.” (RTE Digital Television and the Information 
Society: an implementation strategy, 1997, p7)
The view of the Department of AHGI was that traditionally, it held responsibility for the 
cultural and quality levels of broadcasting content for Irish based services across all 
platforms. Their position, highlighting the cultural and access issues o f digital terrestrial 
delivery, was outlined in July 1998:
“D/AHGI consider that from a cultural perspective, it is desirable that 
centralised control be exercised over the overall programming mix that will be provided 
over DTT...This control over content raises questions however over the capability of 
DTT to compete with cable, MMDS and satellite, and as a consequence, the 
attractiveness of investing in DTT. Because of this control requirement, the D/AHGI do
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not wish the Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation (ODTR) to select 
the DTT operator as that Office has no expertise in relation to the cultural 
considerations which must be brought to bear on the selection”. (Position paper of D/ 
AHGI, July 1998)
For this reason, the D/AHGI wanted to see a joint venture company created, with RTE 
as the minority partner to run the DTT transmission network, which would result, they 
hoped, in maximising Irish content on digital services. In addition, of all the modes of 
delivery of digital television, DTT was the only option that could guarantee universal 
accessibility to all geographical areas of the country, including rural areas. DTT 
represented the singular universal access medium -  “anyone in the country can access it 
without paying a subscription to a cable, MMDS or a satellite company”.
In public, the approach of D/ AHGI was in line with RTE’s proposal o f a new 
regulatory structure that would oversee the introduction of DTT in Ireland, and have 
responsibility for the supervision of content of digital services over all platforms. For 
the other departments, this seemed to be an inordinately lengthy and time-consuming 
process, with the result that DTT would start late, other entrants would already be 
prominent in the marketplace, and DTT would lose its attractiveness. In private, D/ 
AHGI was “not convinced that DTT will flourish”, and did not wish to precipitate the 
closure of analogue services. (D/AHGI comments for discussion, July 1998)
The departments of Public Enterprise (D/ PE); Finance (D/ F); Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment (D/ENT-EMP) as well as the ODTR took the view that a new approach in 
line with European trends of convergence between the telecommunications, media and 
information technology sectors was called for. Broadly, this called for a ‘light touch’ 
regulatory environment, with no additional cultural content obligations on the DTT 
operator, other than a stipulation that Irish services (RTE 1, Network 2, TnaG and TV3) 
should be carried on all platforms on a free-to-air basis. Other than this, D/PE argued 
that the operator should be entitled to “enjoy commercial freedom in constructing the 
remainder of the programme package”. (D/PE Summary view on Digital Television, 
July 1998)
These departments were influenced by the NERA / Smith report on “ The future delivery 
of television services in Ireland’ commissioned from economic consultants by the 
ODTR. The NERA / Smith report favoured a regulatory approach along similar lines to
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the EC Convergence Green Paper launched by Commissioner Bangemann (DG 
Information Society and Telecommunications) in late 1996. This Green Paper was the 
focus of considerable consultation and public hearings throughout 1998 at the time 
when Minister de Valera was considering her approach to digital television legislation, 
and UK digital television was on the point of launch (May 1998).
Minister de Valera had aimed to have legislation for the regulation of digital television 
in place by mid 1998. Draft texts of the Broadcasting Bill 1999 (published 27 May 
1999) eventually emerged as the Broadcasting Act o f2001. However, the slow progress 
meant that by February 2002, Sky was so well advanced that Irish DTT was “unlikely to 
be given the go ahead” (D/PE civil servant, interview, Dublin)
After ten years of waiting for Irish legislation, and five years of intra-govemmental 
discussions, inaction on the part of Minister de Valera allowed Sky to gain the precious 
foothold in the Irish digital market that meant there was no assurance nor obligation on 
the principal digital provider for the transmission of Irish national TV services, nor for 
the assurance of broadcasting of Irish content.
Summary
In this chapter, I have outlined that the roots o f cultural republican nationalism lay with 
the ancien regime-French revolutionary model. However, according to Whelan, Ireland 
was not representative of the ancien regime (whereas, Burke did see it as part of that 
tradition). Whelan (Whelan 1996) argues that Ireland was rather a British colony, with 
problems deriving from the rule of the British Empire, much like those experienced by 
America (Whelan 1996:56). This present author agrees with Whelan. Ireland’s 
citizenship is anti-colonial, of an American-British model, rather than of the citizenship 
type of French-European extraction. Citizenship has been inextricably tied up with the 
birth or emergence of a nation state (see Hobsbawm 1992) since the 19th century- and 
in Ireland’s case this was no exception. Ireland differed markedly however with the 
European citizenship movements that overthrew direct Monarchy in a social and 
political revolution. This thesis argues that the example of Ireland is not like the 
European citizenship tradition for a number of reasons. In particular, Ireland’s history is 
so closely tied with that of Great Britain, that it’s attempt for independence from
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colonial repression is more akin to the American colonists’ desire for the same freedom 
and demand for sovereign rights from Britain.
This author’s opinion is that Ireland’s tradition of citizenship is anti-colonial (and 
incomplete) as opposed to France’s tradition o f anti-monarchy and socially 
revolutionary.
This author criticises Marshall for his exclusive reference to a community within the 
boundaries of the territorial nation state. When Marshall speaks of the nature of 
citizenship as meaning a ‘full member of a community’, he refers to a human 
community, a community o f ‘social heritage’ and a ‘national’ community (as did Burke, 
adherent to traditional heritage). This needs to be set in context. In direct opposition to 
the ‘enemy’ of Hitler and Nazism, Marshall writing in 1950s Britain was seeking to 
reaffirm the primacy and centrality of the national territory, the nation state, Great 
Britain, and the British citizen. This thesis is not based on a ‘national’ conceptualisation 
of citizenship. Geographical Western territories in the 21st century are so culturally 
diverse, it seems untenable in this day to put forth a concept of citizen ship as belonging 
to a singular historical cultural heritage. These ‘traditions’ o f nationhood were so often 
in reality fabricated and artificially constructed, and in many cases are the factious root 
of obscene wars, that this author prefers to speak of a political community, and an 
economic community wherein the basis of citizenship is ideally active.
Marshall himself admits the problem of ‘nationality’ indivisible from the person:
"When two foreigners meet in peaceful conversation, their attitudes are greatly 
affected by their different nationalities, and this is a difference of which they are 
both conscious. And yet the relationship is entirely personal, the nationality 
expressing itself through the individual it has created. They meet as the 
products, not as the representatives, of their environing social groups. But when 
two enemy foreigners meet in time of war, each sees within and behind the man 
who confronts him the image of the group which he represents. It is a meeting of 
two conflicting interests, two fragments o f personalities, two points on the 
perimeters of two vastly greater wholes.” (p 101)
The problems for the present author with Marshall’s insistence on definition of 
community membership as derivative of national membership are plain.
Firstly there is the issue o f those non-nationals who are tainted as non-citizens, with all 
the associated inequality, exclusion, and prejudices. Habermas, haunted by the ghost of 
German fascism is particularly mindful o f these concerns.
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Secondly, sentiments of 'community membership' and 'common heritage' had no effect 
on redressing the problems of social inequality or class structure because o f the lack of 
political enfranchisement by the masses of working people enlisted for their patriotic 
support.
And finally, nationalism does not create citizenship (in Habermasian terms of political 
enfranchisement and active participation), yet nationalism does create war. An 
increasing number of theorists -  ‘cultural pluralists’ -  argue that citizenship must take 
account of the differences between regions of cultural difference and groups o f cultural 
particularity. Cultural pluralists advocate that different allowances and cultural rights 
should be made for culturally diverse groups such as Aboriginals, Hispanics, women, 
religious minorities and so on. But critics say that if groups are encouraged to look 
inward and focus on their 'difference' then the commonality and community that 
citizenship hopes to achieve will be undermined. (Kymlikca and Norman 1995:304)
Respect for cultural differences and special consideration for cultural minorities 
are rights sought by those who consider citizenship to be not merely a legal definition of 
status, but a question of cultural identity. This belief system has roots in the 18th century 
nationalism that accompanied the birth o f the French Republic and the twinning of 
citizenship with nation membership.
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C h a p t e r  2 .
C i t i z e n s h i p  b e y o n d  t h e  N a t i o n  S t a t e
2.1 The demise o f the nation state
Habermas (1994) states that the classic form of the nation-state is presently 
disintegrating. However, if Europe were to become a European Union (a multilingual 
loose federation of semi-sovereign states of different nations), he argues that the nation­
states would continue to exert a strong structural force.
Nonetheless, nation-states constitute a problem to the European Union because their 
democratic processes so far have only functioned within national borders. So far, the 
political public sphere is fragmented into national units. The role o f the citizen has so 
far only been institutionalised at the level of the nation-state, so citizens have no 
effective means of debating European decisions and influencing the decision-making 
processes. (Corcoran’s institutions are implicitly national). There is no European public 
opinion or public sphere.
Laffan et al (2000: 31) describe the ‘reconfiguration’ of the nation state rather than a 
loss or a ‘hollowing-out’ o f nation state power. Similarly, Calabrese and Burgelman
(1999) suggest the demise of the nation state is exaggerated. Laffan et al do not 
subscribe to the notion of the EU as a ‘post-national environment’.
Corcoran asserts that the nation state has become a law taker not a law maker, but it has
been the nation states’ own choice (Hamelink, Ward, Raboy agree). Corcoran asks if
‘cultural rights of nation states’ need to be protected in the future, seeing as
“Nation states, now more law takers than law makers, have become brokers of 
agreements articulated in supra-national agencies which have become the real 
sites o f policy-making: WTO, ITU, OECD, G-7, WIPO. The main players are 
giant corporations.” (Corcoran 2001:26)
He concurs that there is a loss of national policymaking power, and asks who is 
principally responsible? Corcoran accords with Ward (and Hamelink and Raboy as well 
as this researcher) that it is the nation state itself, through the actions of national 
governments. It is the governments of nation states that are giving away unprecedented
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power of governance on a range of supra-national agencies that have no democratic
accountability. Raboy agrees:
"Nation states are trading away what remains of their diminishing sovereignty 
for a new role as brokers of international agreements on behalf of their client 
national corporations". (Raboy 1998:68)
Calabrese and Borchert (1996) asserts that simply because the state's role is limited does 
not mean it should abandon communication policies. These authors put the onus on 
responsible government, for creating and cultivating competent citizens, and for 
guaranteeing a democratic civil society by sticking by a minimal set o f obligations 
regarding a social policy of communication. Raboy (1998) also dismisses the 
assumption that globalisation and the disintegration of national sovereignty represents 
the end of public policy approaches to media and communications.
This researcher’s criticism is that Calabrese & Borchert propose communication 
policies should be treated as social policies of weakened states, which are acting on 
behalf of multinational corporations. How does he envisage that this will happen? 
Calabrese and Borchert acknowledge that the notion that the state has a responsibility 
for securing certain “social” or positive rights of citizenship is under serious attack 
today. However, if citizenship is to develop at an EU level, then the EC would require 
authority to enact social policy, a sector over which it currently does not exercise 
competency.
Hamelink (1998:72) adds that ‘it should surprise no-one’ that as the economic 
importance of communications trade grew, it meant that communication politics has 
shifted to the increasingly important WTO trade forum. Since 1995, new policies 
decided in the fora of the ITU, WTO and OECD are forming the basis for the new 
global regulatory framework in communications. (Raboy 1998, 2002)
Private US telecom operators argue that in a free competitive and perfectly functioning 
telephone market the onus should be on the government to create a social policy with 
regard to telecommunication services, rather than on them to be held responsible for 
ensuring universality of access dependent on need.
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Is the democratic potential o f communication affected or not by the mode of ownership 
of the infrastructure? Does the nature o f the ownership of (e.g. the Internet's 
components) determine the public or non-publicness of its communication or discourse? 
In a later chapter, this thesis will discuss the philosophical theories of property, and the 
relationship between property ownership and citizenship.
2.2 Post-nationalists
Those who conceive of citizenship in terms other than purely national, for example, 
Hobsbawn (1992), Habermas (1995), Ferry (2000), Kearney (1997), Dahlgren (1995), 
Gamham (1990), Closa (1996), Weiler (1995, 1997, 1999), Schlesinger (1997) and 
Murdock & Golding (1989) all suggest a revision o f Marshall’s national cultural focus. 
Raboy (1998, 2002) and Hamelink (1995) focus on the global context, arguing that 
communication systems are being privatised and regulated on the global trade scale. For 
Hamelink, "Democracy cannot stop at the local border. Citizenship cannot be limited to 
a nationality, a state" (Hamelink 1995:146). People are citizens both o f their state, and 
the world.
The European integration project was promoted and conceived as a means of 
overcoming the irrational and dangerous tendencies o f nationalism. Taming nationalism 
remains central to the discourse on European integration, because as President 
Mitterand o f France argued, "nationalism means war." (EP Plenary, 17 /0 1/95 quoted in 
(Laffan, O'Donnell et al. 2000:18)
Viroli (1995) in McBride (2000) differentiates between patriotism and nationalism. 
While patriots fought ‘to strengthen or invoke love of the political institutions and the 
way of life that sustain the common liberty of a people', nationalists were concerned 
with the threat posed by 'cultural contamination'. Patriotism, unlike nationalism, is 
primarily concerned with political liberty and the necessary legal and constitutional 
framework that preserves it.
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2.3 Global citizenship debate
The option of some form of global citizenship is considered by Falk (1994). Falk 
outlines four ‘global citizen types’ and offers four reasons for the validity of citizenship 
beyond the nation state and the move towards a global political community.
According to Habermas (1995:279), the idea of a global or ‘world public sphere’ was 
first raised by Kant within the context of the French revolution -  an idea that Habermas 
argues “today could become a political reality for the first time with the new forms of 
global communication. Although we are still far from achieving it, the arrival of world 
citizenship is no longer merely a phantom”.
Raboy (1998) identifies the need for global media policy, and seeks to develop a global 
framework for democratic media and encourages input from a global civil society.
Because global communication environments have displaced national models of 
communication regulation, new transnational policy is needed in order to serve the 
global public interest. This creates a new challenge for policy development. This 
researcher agrees with Raboy that policy is largely beyond the control of any one 
government (1998:66).
Hamelink concurs with Raboy’s approach - he says, “today’s key institution for world 
communication is the World Trade Organisation” (Hamelink 1998:73). This (WTO) 
forum he suggests therefore should be the major focus for all those citizens' groups and 
civil coalitions concerned about quality, access, availability and affordability of 
information services.
He also argues (1995:132) that in order for people to empower themselves in the arena 
o f world communication, against the global privatization of communication systems, a 
global dimension to the formation of a global cultural space is required. This will 
require the ‘revolt of civil society’. Yet, Hamelink admits that the notion of civil society 
still remains tied to the notion of the nation-state. Hamelink argues for a notion of civil 
society that goes beyond national borders, reflecting the powerlessness of individual 
states to cope with global problems. He calls for a global civil society.
71
Hamelink and Raboy are very much singing to the same hymn-sheet on the issue of 
WTO, global media regulation, and a responsive and responsible global civil society.
Raboy's main questions are, firstly, what type of global 'society' is sought? And 
secondly, what forms o f media regulation are appropriate?
His basis premise is that the global media environment is a public resource to be 
organised and regulated in the public interest, which gives legitimacy to global public 
intervention.
"Broadening access will require appropriate transnational regulatory 
mechanisms, as well as mechanisms for a more equitable distribution of global 
commercial benefits. There is a need for the international appropriation of some 
air and space for the distribution outside the country of origin" (Raboy, 1998: 
67)
To develop a global framework for democratic media is a political project, maintains 
Raboy. It is a political project to create democratic debate, and afterwards create a 
permanent democratic forum for developing global media policy. As yet, there is no 
appropriate global public forum in which to discuss global media regulation, but the 
CRIS (Communication Rights in the Information Society) campaign is aiming to input 
into the Geneva WSIS conference in 2003. Raboy recommends global citizenship 
should be formed through public debate that takes place in international fora like 
UNESCO and ITU, and involve groups beyond solely the participation of Member 
States’s governments.
2.4 Collective Identity
Herder, Hegel and Burke commonly understood a nation to be rooted historically with a 
characteristic and distinctive common cultural heritage, shared by the community of 
people, the volk. Corcoran emphasises the common-ness of culture - a common 
language, a common identity, a set of collective memories all help to create a strong 
sense of common membership to a society (Corcoran 2001).
On the other hand, Dahlgren (1995) examines the concept of ‘civil society’ rather than a 
national society, marked by participation by the public. Schlesinger (1997) argues that
11
cultural identity is not equal to national identity. National identity for Schlesinger is just 
one form of a collective identity. Habermas (1995) echoes Schlesinger: both argue that 
to be a national is not identical to being a citizen. Unlike Hegel and Herder, Habermas 
argues that a unified political culture does not need to be based on all citizens sharing 
the same language or same ethnic or cultural origins, as the US and Swiss multicultural 
societies demonstrate.
Habermas recommends collective ‘weal’ could be co-ordinated through dedication to a 
Constitution in Europe ( ‘constitutional patriotism’). Habermas (1994) is satisfied that a 
political culture can serve as the fundamental common denominator for a constitutional 
patriotism. The first written Constitution was that in America in 1776, drawn from the 
inherited British constitutional tradition e.g. Magna Carta of 1215, Petition of Right of 
1628, the Bill of Rights of 1689. Continental nationalism developed following defeat in 
territorial war. The aim of the American Constitution was primarily to limit the power 
lust and tyrannical acquisitiveness of bad rulers. This contrasted with the aims of the 
French Constitution, which was to invest sovereignty in the people and claim France as 
a nation.
JB Thompson argues that communities derived knowledge of their past and heritage 
through “mediated symbolic forms”. He maintains that this affects one's sense of 
belonging to a collective identity - now “we feel ourselves to belong to groups and 
communities which are constituted in part through the media” (JB Thompson 1995: 35) 
rather than through oral traditions as before.
Habermas also confirms that the integration of communities can only be successful 
through communication and public dialogue. ("The ideal of the public sphere calls for 
social integration to be based on rational-critical discourse". (Quoted in Calhoun 
1992:29)) Communication in this context means not merely sharing what people already 
think or know but also a process of potential transformation in which reason is 
advanced by debate itself.
This researcher holds the opinion that debate about citizenship should be distinct from 
debates on culture. The identity of each citizen holding citizenship of a nation is not 
necessarily of a ‘common culture’. Hamelink (1999) also suggests that not all members 
of a collective community share the same culture.
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The challenge in a time when many authors agree - Habermas (1995), Corcoran (2001), 
Kearney (1997), Dahlgren (1995), Weiler (1995), Closa (1996), Falk (1994) that the 
nation state’s ability to regulate for its own national territory is withering, is to attempt 
to define ‘community’ rather than a futile attempt to either retreat to the ‘national and 
cultural’ comer (complete with a redistributive national welfare system model, as 
posited by Marshall (1950) or Calabrese & Burgelman (1999)) or an even more 
unsteady attempt at defining the ‘common European culture’ (as argued by Habermas
(1995)) and maintaining the existence o f one. Dahlgren (1995:36) agrees that 
“Community as such has become a highly problematic notion in the contemporary 
world.” This thesis subscribes to the notion of a citizenship within a political and 
economic, democratic market community that is transnational and multinational, even 
global.
2.5 The European citizenship debate
According to Hyland, Loftus et al. (1995), the debate on EU citizenship started between 
member states in 1975, although EU citizenship was only introduced in the Maastricht 
Treaty.
Habermas wonders if the European concept is so nation-state driven that the 
possibilities for collective political action across national borders is in question, as is the 
“consciousness of an obligation toward the European common-weal” (p266). Can there 
ever be such a thing as 'European citizenship’?
Shaw (Shaw 1997, 1998) agrees that if the EU now represents a form of (emergent) 
‘polity’ (if not a state) then it must have a membership and a relationship to the ‘people’ 
who are its members (Shaw 1998:295). However, like Habermas, she acknowledges 
that EU citizenship remains dependent on national citizenship, and citizen membership 
of one of the member states. EU citizenship is dependent upon definitions of nationality 
determined at national level. It complements and does not replace national citizenship 
(Shaw 1998:298).
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Some authors and the EU governments are attempting to conceptualise of a citizenship 
within a boundary delineated by the sum of all EU territories, shared by all EU citizens 
co-temporarily with distinct nation state citizenship. The European debate on 
citizenship authors and ideas include Habermas’s pan- EU public sphere, pan-EU 
political parties, and allegiance to a Constitution; Closa’s constitutional fundamental 
rights and Kearney’s conceptualisation o f federal regions o f Europe.
In an attempt to move beyond Marshallian allegiance to a cultural nationalism, 
Habermas, Hyland and Closa recommend a movement towards constitutional 
patriotism. Habermas favours patriotism to a constitution and constitutionally enshrined 
rights, by which any future Federal Republic o f European States would be rooted in a 
supranational shared political culture of the European Community sustained by pan- 
European public spheres. Habermas’ idea of a European constitutional patriotism would 
have to grow out o f 'different interpretations of the same universalist rights and 
constitutional principles which are marked by the context of different national histories'. 
This researcher estimates that the interpretations may be difficult to match -  even today, 
different European nations have very different ideas o f what constitutes ’citizenship' as 
highlighted by Tsagarousianou (1998).
Both Ward (2001) and Closa (1996) argue that the EU has not made much inroad with 
pan-EU citizenship, and are regressing to the sphere of the national both in terms of 
rights (Closa 1996) and regulation of media systems that are not trans-frontier (Ward 
2001). Closa argues that the EU defends nationally based forms of rights rather than 
developing new systems of rights. Currently, EU rights are linked primarily to 
nationality (explicitly, a citizen o f a Member State nation), and secondarily to the 
functioning and promotion of the internal market (implicitly, a citizen o f the EU 
economic common market). Maastricht Treaty Articles 8a-8e set out in detail the 
principal rights associated with Union citizenship, but there is no further reference to 
duties, and this aspect of EU citizenship (i.e. how individuals are constituted as 
sovereign within a given polity) remains as yet wholly obscure.
As outlined above, Habermas subscribes to citizenship as an active participating 
member of a politically controlled state rather than membership of a geographically 
defined community. According to Habermas’ belief-system, EU citizenship erroneously
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therefore links citizenship to national identity. Instead, he suggests (1995) the EU 
should look forward to a new potential of supra-national political decision-making held 
together through enfranchised democratic participation. The problem as he sees it lies in 
the reliance and definition of membership upon national criteria -  issues are discussed 
with an eye to national interests while possibilities for collective political participation 
at the level of the intra-state are few. He suggests (Habermas 1994:32) that in the future, 
differentiation could occur in a European culture between a common political culture 
and the branching national traditions of art, literature or philosophy. The cultural elites 
and the mass media would have an important role to play here. This researcher accepts 
this as a useful solution.
Habermas, Closa and Ward recommend the development of European public sphere as 
the cornerstone for any further developments of a European social contract involving 
citizenship rights. Only in a pan-European public sphere can notions of public good be 
discussed and the democratic will of the people be known (Closa 1996:15). Habermas 
proposes a public sphere facilitated by media institutions that are so internally 
democratised that they would have a mechanism to ensure wider democratic access and 
prevent concentration of ownership and scale of their organisation (in Calhoun 
1992:28). Yet, Venturelli (1998) and Calhoun (1992) criticise Habermas for his inability 
to specify as to how the internal organisation of such a public sphere might be realised 
in terms of policies promoted by the social institutions of advanced capitalism. 
(Calhoun 1992: 29, 38). Calhoun (1992:36) notes that several other writers argue for the 
notion o f multiple, sometimes overlapping public spheres between which should exist a 
field of communication flow. Dahlgren suggests that both public sphere and civil 
society need to be employed together.
Ward (2001) however argues that EU citizenship does not exist principally because 
Europeans don’t care to discuss EU related news, and there is a lack of discursive 
communicative structures that make political community possible. Ward concludes that 
there is a democratic deficit amongst EU citizens principally because of the lack of 
communication between Europeans. Habermas (1995) suggests that the lack of intra- 
European communication is due to the fact that national public spheres are culturally 
isolated from each other within the EU.
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Ward (2001) argues that in broadcasting policy formulation for trans-frontier 
broadcasting the EU has moved away from an early 1982 (Hahn MEP) notion of a 
trans-European public sphere and pan-European television channel and reverted to old 
ideas of leaving broadcasting matters to national governments (including, he maintains, 
the definition and funding of their own broadcasting systems).
However, the evidence of this thesis’ research on policy formulation by the EU and 
their member states, and Ireland’s role in this process demonstrates that Ward’s position 
on the sovereignty of national governments of small states is not valid with respect to 
Ireland.
Yet there are others that fail to consider the need for a common European public sphere 
(Corcoran 2001). In my view, if television is to remain a national affair, then we can’t 
expect any such form of a pan-European citizenship, or European cultural rights to take 
hold, in the manner in which Corcoran suggests, where citizens are bonded and willing 
to have civic responsibility.
2.6 Political and Economic Citizenship
2.6.1 Political Civic communitarian Model
For Habermas, citizenship is inherently associated with the political community, 
participation in public life, the discussion of news and public affairs. Habermas 
emphasises the neo-Aristotelian, civic humanist political community and the action of 
citizens forming part of a democracy. According to the civic communitarian model, 
politically active individuals in any community are eligible citizens, without restriction 
to a national identity as is suggested by Marshall.
The civic communitarian model that this thesis subscribes to is inspired by Aristotle and 
his concepts of public debate and collective deliberation; Dahlgren’s argument that 
participation in society is the essence of citizenship, and JS Mill’s ideas on public 
debate as well as Corcoran and Sinopoli.
Habermas (1995:261) draws on the tradition of political philosophy of Aristotle. 
Citizenship in this model is membership in a self-determining ethical community. This
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model defines an essential component of citizen capacity as participation in self-rule: 
this is the essence o f freedom.
He holds that the communitarian model creates single persons in pursuit collectively of 
their particular interests in a shared praxis (p262). The republican model is thus 
dependent on citizens' activity, and the institutions of constitutional freedom are only 
worth as much as a population makes o f them.
Burke’s ideal of a civil social man is also in the tradition of a communitarian vision of 
citizenship as put forward by Aristotle, Habermas, Marshall, Sinopoli, and Corcoran.
2.6.2 Liberal Economic Citizenship Model
Another conceptualisation of citizenship is nothing to do with national cultural identity, 
or civic praxis, but on the payment of taxes to the economic state.
Habermas argues the economic dimension of the birth of the nation state. The 
development of the modem state was necessary for the development of trade -  the 
bureaucracy necessary for the imposition and collection of taxes to fund expansion into 
foreign markets needed to be centralised. Thus the Treasury was the focus o f the town, 
and the modem nation was merely a state based on taxation, argues Habermas. 
(Habermas 1989:17)
Habermas argues that the modem nation began to take over from the town as locus of 
administration and power with the rise o f mercantilist capitalism. The development of 
the modem state was necessary for the development of trade -  the bureaucracy 
necessary for the imposition and collection of taxes to fund expansion into foreign 
markets needed to be centralised.
Some assume that ‘national identity’ came into being as a result of industrialization and 
the formation of nation states. This does not seem a wholly appropriate or applicable 
theory for Ireland, since it did not experience mass industrialisation of its economy, and 
additionally it appears that a national identity was in the midst of construction before 
the outright demand for separate nationhood from Britain. Thus, according to the
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present author, trade growth pushed human rights, and, according to Habermas, it 
initiated the development of the modem state. Therefore a national citizen is just one 
member of the nation, who pays his taxes, or is on the tax register. The economic 
contribution of the person to the state is the over-riding factor of citizenship according 
to this premise, and cultural nationalism had little to do with gaining autonomy or 
individual rights. This researcher aligns with Habermas over Marshall -  it is apparent 
that rights were not linked to national identity citizenship, or the state, but rather 
taxation and trade forced the issue o f citizenship.
Habermas’ thesis (Habermas 1995:257) is that nation states provided the conditions for 
capitalism to develop, providing also the infrastructure for central administration, and 
the legal framework for free individual and free collective action. The nation state also 
encouraged cultural and ethnic homogeneity. On the back of this, since the late 18th 
century and the French revolution, democratization of government occurred. Both 
nation state and democracy were bom out of the French Revolution. Culturally, both 
have been growing in the shadow o f nationalism.
Habermas views liberal citizens (Habermas 1995:261) as those who are keen to secure 
rights, ensure equal treatment and influence decision-makers. Citizens of a liberal model 
are private persons who bring their pre-political interests to bear in relation to the state 
apparatus, according to Habermas.
‘Participation’ in rule for its own sake is not valued, and in this sense, differs from 
communitarian citizenship.
Marshall writes on the rights associated with liberal economic citizenship: civil and 
political rights. Civil rights are those “rights necessary for individual freedom - liberty 
of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to 
conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice”( 1950:10). Civil rights gave all men the 
capacity in turn to earn, save, acquire property through purchase or tenancy, and thus to 
enjoy whatever political rights were attached to these economic achievements.
Political rights are those that give the "right to participate in the exercise of political 
power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the 
members of such a body" (Ibid p20). In the 19th century capitalist society, political
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rights were a secondary product o f civil rights - it was the privilege of a limited 
economic class. The 20th centuiy abandoned this rule, and attached political rights 
directly and independently to citizenship via the Act o f 1918. Political enfranchisement 
of women was also introduced.
Calabrese and Borchert (1996) take the view that National Information Infrastructure 
(Nil) could spawn future divisions according to economic class. They argue that one 
possible future for this technology is stratification along class lines, with the "new class" 
enjoying increased democratic opportunities at the expense of the majority of the 
population: the new ‘class system’ is separated as information rich from information 
poor. They propose the Nil should be inserted into a wider framework of US social 
policy.
Yet, one of the reasons liberalism could not accept republicanism was because of the 
republican insistence on social redistribution -the use of one man’s productivity or 
talent for the aggregate benefit. The central tenet of republican proportionate equality, 
social equality and redistributive equality was a key reason why liberals had to reject 
republicanism.
In response, the republicans took the stance that liberalism lauded ‘economic man’, he 
who maximises his private interests, and does little else to serve the community. 
Economic man is an anathema to Aristotle and classic republican views because it is 
their opinion that well-developed citizenship only results from participation in the polis, 
or political arena. Tocqueville noted that liberalism fosters an ‘atomistic’ view of self 
with regard to the wider society. Citizens think "of themselves in isolation and imagine 
that their whole destiny is in their own hands" (Democracy by de Toqueville (1994:508) 
quoted in Sinopoli 1992:32).
Liberals argue that they respect the dignity of each individual, who should be free to 
pursue his autonomous opinion and incentives, granting like freedoms to others. 
Individualism and autonomy are the hallmarks of a liberal community. The liberalist 
equality of freedom translates as no individual should be subject to coercion or use by 
another (especially by the state) for others’ benefit. This foundational principle is 
phrased in the American Constitution by “The state shall not pass laws that would 
abridge... personal liberties”.
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No one person should be made to be subjected to another’s conception of the general 
good. In fact, liberals do not believe any one concept of the general good could gain 
agreement from all the members o f the political community. Brittan (1989:28) puts 
forward the solution o f a free market in ideas because “The point is that no one person 
or group, or committee, or ‘establishment’ can be trusted to make a superior choice.”
Why is the difference so stark between French republican and American liberal history? 
It could be argued that the difference between the prevalent French Republican 
collective community vis a vis the American liberal, individual, entrepreneurial social 
model lies with 18th and 19th century use and distribution of land. The particular land 
and property rights employed by the communities gave naissance to the particular form 
of citizenship -  collective land rights and a redistributive social model in France, and 
individual entrepreneurship, and an essentially private model in America.
Thus far the EU has pursued a liberal model of citizenship, based on rights that facilitate 
the economic growth of capitalist development. However, it is also still tied to the 
national cultural republican model of national cultural identities and allegiances and 
rights, since there is no common allegiance as yet to a European political state. There is 
evidence to suggest that citizens of the EU are in truth citizens o f nation states linked by 
a common currency, the Euro, or the trans-national market that the Euro aims to 
consolidate.
Habermas draws attention to the ‘system integration’ (1995:265) of economy and 
administration at the supra-national level based on the five freedoms of the common 
market, which as yet has not been complemented by coordination in other policy fields 
such as environment, fiscal, social policy, or education policy. While there is a push for 
political integration, political legitimacy thus far is only operative effectively at the 
level of the nation state.
2.7 Nationhood is civic institutional and territorial
McBride (2000:72) argues that Tone and his United Irishmen colleagues saw the Irish 
nation as civic and territorial only. According to his thesis, the United Irishmen did not
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perceive of the Irish nation as an ethnic and cultural entity (in the vein of Hegel or 
Burke -  both antithetical to the United Irishmen’s argument), but rather as a community 
of laws and institutions. He argues that citizenship in Ireland developed for economic 
and political reasons, but the cultural and social argument was added to reinforce their 
struggle against the British. (McBride, Whelan). I concur with their analysis.
For Viroli (1995, quoted in McBride 2000), the United Irishmen fought for 
patriotism as opposed to the Young Irelander’s nationalism. Patriotism, according to 
Viroli, encompasses hopes for political liberty and self-governance, as opposed to 
nationalists’ clamour for cultural purity, yet Habermas (1995:277) also suggests that 
citizenship be backed up by “a patriotic identity”.
2.8 What defines citizenship? Citizenship and communication
Dahlgren (1995) points out, that the nature of citizenship has metamorphosised over the 
centuries, and will probably change more over the future. Citizenship and its rights 
cannot be regarded as static -  whether it is seen as a cultural, legal, political, or civic 
identity. Further, e-democracy experiments by Tsagarousianou (1998) showed that even 
in the modem day, the concept of what constitutes ‘citizenship’ differs markedly 
between countries and the expectations of urban centres within diverse national cultures.
Communication is central to citizenship. This view is held by Ward (2001), Closa
(1996), Venturelli (1998), Gamham (1990), Calabrese & Borchert (1996), Murdock 
(1989), and Habermas (1989). These authors agree that citizenship rests and depends 
on excellent communication within communities, although the nature and scope of 
those communities may be in dispute between these same authors. Habermas (1989) 
also argues that communication binds a society, or holds a community together, while in 
a later article (1995), he argues that the ‘constructed collective consciousness’ that is 
known as nationalism spreads only via the channels of modem mass communication.
This researcher suggests that Habermas’ model of a deliberative democracy (Habermas 
1994:32) is an ideal. This model according to Habermas hinges on flows of 
communication, rather than "the people" of "the" community. Habermas argues that 
democracy hinges on communication flows.
"Citizenship can today only be enacted in the paradoxical sense o f compliance 
with the procedural rationality o f a political wi 11-formation, the more or less 
discursive character of which depends on the vitality o f the informal circuit of 
public communication". ((Habermas 1995:269)
Authors are in dispute however as to the best way of securing and facilitating excellent 
communication between citizens in a post-national community. Habermas (1995) 
argues that national public spheres are culturally isolated from each other within the EU.
Ward arrives at the conclusion that there is a democratic deficit amongst EU citizens 
principally because of the lack of communication between Europeans principally caused 
by disinterest. Habermas also posits that there is a growing gap between on the one 
hand, the opportunities for citizens to participate in policy-formation or alteration and 
on the other hand, being affected by policy instigation (1995:267). Habermas insists that 
“an interplay between institutionalized processes of opinion and will formation” is 
required (1995:32).
He suggests that communication networks of European-wide public spheres may yet 
emerge, networks that may form a favourable context both for new regional 
parliamentary bodies in the process of merging, and for a European Parliament 
furnished with greater competence.
I concur with Habermas (1995:264) that a European citizenship should be rooted in a 
supranationally shared political culture of the European Community, however Ward
(2001) argues that EU citizenship does not exist principally because Europeans don’t 
care to discuss EU related news, and there is a lack of discursive communicative 
structures that make political community possible.
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Chapter 3  
Citizenship and the Public Sphere: Rights, Liberties and 
Issues
In this chapter, this thesis examines the democratic issues surrounding citizenship and 
communication rights (or what are referred to as “rights of the public sphere”). The 
most important issues as identified by landmark and related theorists are classified 
along the following lines: firstly, the issues of equality (of persons, resources, and 
education), and inequality. Many theorists argue that inequality (of persons, resources 
and education) should be compensated by a right to receive from society that which will 
help to balance inequality.
Secondly, communication theorists writing on audiovisual policies adopted by 
governments or the EU identify the issue o f access (to media-transmitted information, 
and to the public sphere).
Finally, the issues of inclusion and exclusion relate to citizens’ input into the policy 
critiquing and policy-making process. This issue is examined in the light of research 
evidence detailing modem Irish, American and French approaches to the consultation of 
public opinion during the policy-making and policy-deliberation process.
In the second part of this chapter, freedoms and liberties relating to the subject o f 
communication are outlined. These are sub-divided according to the current state of 
debate -  between those who advocate the right to express (opinion), and those 
advocating the more encompassing right to communicate.
The chapter then follows with an examination of the present manner of arguing for 
citizens’ rights to expression and communication. The most prevalent paradigm at 
present argues that these two rights can be defended in World Trade Agreements as 
‘rights to cultural diversity’, or ‘cultural rights’. The warrants underpinning this 
argument are critically analysed.
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This thesis argues that fears of cultural imperialism fears, and insistence on the rights to 
cultural diversity disguise the underlying issue -  that of fear of imperialism of trade 
autonomy, and loss of trade revenue, ostensibly, for that nation state itself.
Theoretical concepts of media and communication theorists centre on questions such as:
1. How are rights to be protected?
2. Who protects rights? Is it the responsibility or duty of national governments, 
Constitutions or international regulations and law?
3. Why protect rights?
4. What rights are to be protected, and how are they to be articulated? Free speech? 
Freedom of opinion? Freedom of expression? Liberty of the press? Freedom of 
communication? Freedom of communication, speech, and opinion?
This present author seeks to distinguish the manner in which these rights are similar to, 
differ from, or are in opposition to economic rights, trade rights, civil rights, or rights to 
property.
In relation to the empirical research of this thesis, questions guiding this chapters’ 
discussion address:
1. What is the relative importance compared to other issues of governance, of the 
public sphere or democratic rights to communication issues for Irish policy 
makers?
2. What measures have been taken by Irish civil society representatives to secure 
Irish citizens’ rights in the EU sphere?
3. What were the modes o f consultation employed by the Irish government in 
devising audiovisual or broadcasting policy?
4. What form did public opinion take in inputting into the political public sphere?
5. What inputs have been made by stakeholders in Irish civil society to secure 
communication rights under discussion by EU decision-makers?
6. Who were the main policy actors?
7. And finally, how do policy practices or proposals today or in recent history 
relate to American (liberal), French-European (protectionist), or Irish (liberal) 
models of citizenship?
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3 . 1  Equality and Inequality
3.1.1 Equality o f persons
The sociologist TH Marshall (1950) was interested in citizenship and its impact on 
social inequality. In the landmark work, Citizenship and Social Class, he draws some 
general conclusions about the impact of citizenship on social inequality. For Marshall, 
there is an 'equality implicit in the concept of citizenship' (p30). Marshall’s hypothesis 
posits that there is a type of human equality in citizenship that is full membership o f a 
community.
Marshall is of the opinion that "Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full 
members o f a community" (p28) and "All who possess the status are equal with respect 
to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed" (1950:28-29).
For Marshall, equality of status, not income was the primary objective. American 
society is unique for championing social freedom, not social equality. Marshall’s 
hypothesis of basic human equality was not incompatible with economic inequality 
(Marshall 1950:77). Marshall’s system differed from socialism because it would 
preserve the essentials of the free market.
Citizenship therefore for Marshall amounts to the acquisition of rights to enable full 
participation in a common political community. Yet, in historical circumstances the 
demand for human rights and basic treatment vis a vis the oppressor, ruler or monarch 
was often a demand for firstly, equal treatment, before subsequently demanding full 
civil and political rights.
"It is clear (Marshall) was taking as the standard of civilised life the conditions 
regarded by his generation (i.e. 1950s post-war Britain) as appropriate to a 
gentleman. ...the claim of all to enjoy those conditions is a claim to be admitted 
to a share in the social heritage, which in turn means a claim to be accepted as 
full members o f the society, that is, as citizens" (Alfred Marshall in T.H. 
Marshall 1950:7)
Marshall’s ‘equality implicit in the concept of citizenship’ (1950:30) has resonance in 
Habermas’ insistence on the ‘equality o f common humanity’ where a citizen is one
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‘homme’ among many. Habermas’ ideal participatory public sphere is a normative 
objective, yet never implemented. Yet within its ‘institutional criteria’ lies the centrality 
of egalitarian participation in political discussion by all members of the public on 
concerns common to them (otherwise referred to as the communitarian model of 
citizenship).
Although both Habermas and Marshall utilise the criterion of ‘equality’ for their 
definitions of citizenship, the notion of ‘equality’ needs to be explicitly defined. 
Amartya Sen (1992) notes that it is difficult to come to agreement on what and how it is 
decided that parity or equality should be given out: equality of what? he asks, and how 
should equality be accurately judged?
Equality of humanity, which Habermas promotes, would seem to take its lead from the 
1787 French Declaration o f Human Rights, its uniqueness lying in its attempt to 
incorporate all men (though not women) into citizenship to some degree. Everyone 
should be able to expect that all will receive equal protection and respect, in his or her 
integrity as a unique individual, as a member of an ethnic or minority cultural group and 
as a citizen, i.e. as a member of a polity. Kant states, "legislation can only issue from the 
concurring and unified will of everyone, to the extent that each decides the same about 
all and that all decide the same about each..." (Habermas 1994:24). Thus, everyone can 
expect to be respected by everybody else as free and equal.
Unlike the 1776 American Declaration of Independence, which allowed only men of
certain property and religious criteria to choose American citizenship, the French
Revolutionary declaration aimed to be, from the outset, much more universal and
ecumenical. America was an influence on France taking the lead with a written
Constitution, but French deputies of the National Assembly wanted something more
universal than the American Declaration.
"As Duke Mathieu de Montmorency exhorted: “the Americans have set a great 
example in the new hemisphere; let us give one to the universe'" (Hunt 1996:15)
In its turn, the French Declaration came to influence America -  it was Eleanor 
Roosevelt in 1947 who proposed the change of wording from ‘natural rights’ to ‘human 
rights’, leading to the UN Declaration of ‘Human Rights’, though it is suggested that
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Paine was the first to utilise ‘human’ in his English translation of the Declaration des 
Droits de I 'Homme.
Habermas seems to suggest that humanity in democratic citizenship was the original 
aim of early 18th century German public spheres. The notion, later corrupted by 
capitalists, was to establish the ‘parity o f humanity’ and thus welcome every human 
being as a citizen. Human rights possess a spirit o f universalism -which all persons 
have in common in spite of their differences. Human rights emphasise humanity, a basic 
community o f human individuals. Regardless o f the particular society in which he lives, 
each individual retains his human rights. This right of equality amongst humans leads to 
a creed of human rights, though Marshall stipulates rights that are institutionalised 
within national constitutions (a model developed from Rousseau, Hegel, Herder). 
Fundamental or universal human rights must be capable of being extended to all persons 
regardless o f country of origin, class, colour, creed or sexual inclination. They are 
universal, and global, representing the ‘essential moral conditions that ought to be 
guaranteed to citizens in any social or political order’ (Bellamy 1993:44).
Fundamental rights are generally granted equally to citizens and non-citizens alike. 
Closa (1996) maintains human rights are granted to everybody within the territory of a 
state. But in the EU some civil rights, particularly the free movement of people have 
been elevated to the status of a ‘fundamental’ right.
Thomas Paine and the New World emphasised the equality of each individual, so much
so that it brought de Tocqueville to remark on America's liberalism as a 'natural
phenomenon', noting that
"The great advantage of the Americans is, that they have arrived at a state of 
democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; and that they are 
bom equal, instead of becoming so." (Democracy in America 1835, quoted in 
Hartz 1955).
Recall at this point that Thomas Paine and his Rights of Man were the great inspiration 
for Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen in the late 1700s. Add to that the revolutionary 
rhetoric of the uproar in France, and the Protestants in Ireland were facing a major Irish 
rebellion by 1798. Thomas Paine’s individual liberty was at odds with Burke’s 
insistence on tradition and custom, his advocacy of quiet, slow change and his
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determination that men's ties woven together over generations should not be dissolved 
overnight.
However, while debates over inclusion and exclusion of citizens were uniquely wide- 
ranging in France between 1789-92, opening the discussion to ponder on civil and 
political rights for women, Jews, Calvinists and other minorities in their land, 
Americans were much more intransigent to opening the discussion of citizenship rights 
to slaves or women, servants or property-less men.
America’s contribution to the notion of ‘equality’ rests in the ‘freedom of equality’ as 
championed by Thomas Paine and the New Society. America valued social freedom, 
not social equality. Social equality and equality of resources is a distinctly European 
tradition, some authors linking it to Babeuf and Marechal, who dreamed of a 
‘community o f wealth’ in post-feudal Europe.
It is technically correct to stress that real citizens in the 18th century were propertied, 
wealthy, educated, or clergy. American citizens were white, male, propertied, and 
practised the ‘correct’ religion. Post-Revolution, French citizens were to be both male 
and female - everyone was to be included. In 18th c. Ireland, citizens were Cromwellian 
Protestant planters and landowners. The point that must be emphasised however is in 
the nature of the debates over citizenship, over who should be included and what rights 
should be bestowed, between the New and the Old World.
A common thread between the French and American Revolutions was their declaration 
of the equality of rights o f persons. However, differences emerged in their respective 
debates on who belonged or could belong to the public sphere of civil society.
Although later abolished by the Jacobin Republic, the French 1791 Constitution first 
drew a distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizenry. Active citizenship entailed 
political rights, and passive citizenship allowed equality in non-political matters.
In France, the initial distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizenry proposed in a 
pamphlet by Abbe Sieyes in 1789 was influenced by Lockean associations between 
citizenship and individual property ownership. Sieyes accepted that in order for political 
office to be open to those with talent, not privilege, it was justifiable to request that such
8 9
talent must first be demonstrated by the ability to acquire property. Active citizens were 
to possess political rights -  they could vote and hold office, while passive citizens could 
enjoy civil rights, including equal protection under the law in matters of marriage, 
property, or religion. Passive citizens could not however participate directly in forming 
a government or exercising governmental authority. While the issue of a constitutional 
distinction between active and passive citizenship was viewed by some to be in direct 
opposition to the universalism of the Declaration, the notion was passed into 
Constitutional law until the idea was abolished completely in 1792.
However, unlike America, the French were open to discussing citizenship rights and 
total inclusion for all men, regardless o f colour, race, or religion. Unlike America, there 
were strong political associations of women in France who demanded better education 
and better protection of their property. America (in particular the Southern states that 
relied more heavily on the lucrative trade) came very late to the discussion of the 
abolition of slavery. Slavery was finally abolished in the French colonies in 1794, but it 
took the Americans until 1862-88 to do the same. In Ireland, Burke and the United 
Irishmen both pushed for the inclusion of Catholics into the citizenry -  there, it was an 
issue o f sex, religion, as well as wealth and property. Irish Catholics demanding 
citizenship clamoured for a restitution of their land and confiscated property.
3. 1. 2 Equality o f Resources
Marshall argued that systems of capitalism and social class are defined along lines of 
inequality. He asks how it was so that capitalism (a system of inequality) and 
citizenship (an attempt at encouraging equality amongst community members) grew and 
flourished simultaneously in England during the same historic period? For a time they 
were allies, not enemies, unlike in the 20th century.
Marshall’s aim is not for absolute equality. The aim is "to remove inequalities which 
cannot be regarded as legitimate, but the standard of legitimacy is different". It is 
possible that the inequalities permitted by the two halves of the movement (citizenship 
and economic systems) will not coincide (1950:77).
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He notes (ibid, p21) that remnants of inequality based on differences o f economic 
substance lingered on until 1949, though they have not gone away in 2003. Marshall 
argues that the more wealth is regarded as conclusive proof of merit, the more poverty is 
seen as evidence of failure. This is a representative modem neoliberal view o f society 
(Marshall 1950:32).
Locke’s theory of liberal rights centred on a theory of individual rights -  individual civil 
and individual political, in order that the freedom of individuals would not be violated 
by state repression. Classic liberalism (as defined by Beiner, 1995) is a type of political 
community which operates in the service o f individual identity, and there is a primacy 
of the individual over the group. However, Sabine (1951) argues that the liberal 
conception o f a free society was one that finds “a workable relationship between the 
common good and a multiplicity of private, sectional and class interests.” (Sabine G.H. 
1951:625) Liberalism can be regarded as broadly identical to the modem meaning of 
‘democracy’ wherein a liberal government seeks to respect and integrate not only the 
rights of individuals but also the rights of communities.
Civil rights were designed to compensate for social inequality that arose from a result of 
freedom replacing protection. Civil rights gave to each man the power to try and make 
a living independently, in the economic struggle. And they made it possible to deny him 
social protection on the basis that he was equipped with the means to protect himself. 
Only women and children were allowed social protection from charitable bodies, but in 
accepting this they renounced citizenship (1950:33).
Civil rights confer the 'legal capacity to strive for the things one would like to possess 
but do not guarantee the possession of any of them' (ibid, p35). For example, a property 
right is a right to acquire and protect property if you can get it, but it is not a right to 
possess property.
Civil property rights are currently associated with either the protection of intellectual 
property (in the form of patents, copyrights or trademarks and the payment of royalties), 
or in media studies, with the ownership of communication systems such as 
broadcasting, telecom, cable systems and whether they are privately or publicly owned.
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In such cases, property rights are owned by an individual -  which may also be a 
corporate entity classed as the same -  whose freedom the state should respect.
Trying to balance the right of the media to liberty o f expression (as articulated in US 
and Irish constitutions) with the right o f citizens to receive a widely representative range 
of views in the interests of democratic participation (as outlined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights) is a current dilemma. Media corporations actively 
defend against state impositions or restrictions by utilising the freedom of 
communication claim, often employed to further their own commercial enterprise, 
suggests Feintuck (1999:13) while simultaneously restricting the variety and nature of 
opinions represented. The problem with the positively stated and expressly defined 
freedoms of the American constitution, developed in response to the "perceived tyranny 
of the ancien regime in Europe" (ibid, p 181 ) is that increasingly they are being used 
against the pursuit o f common citizenship interests in mass communication by 
"corporate media giants [who] can utilise such rights much more effectively than the 
individual citizens for whom they were intended historically", (ibid, p i82)
Increasingly, the question is being asked whether media institutions enjoy greater or 
lesser protection o f their citizenship rights than individuals. Janowitz (1980), like 
Marshall before him argues for increased emphasis on citizen obligations, rather than 
the familiar insistence on protective legal rights. With this shifted focus, he argues, the 
quality o f a citizen would be determined according to the sense o f civic responsibility 
he gave to the community welfare. Thus, media organisations, like any other citizen 
would be subject to Marshall’s citizenship caveat: "If citizenship is invoked in the 
defence o f rights, the corresponding duties o f citizenship cannot be ignored”. (Marshall 
1977:9)
Marshall believed that a free market was not incompatible with communitarian 
redistributive rights, although they might lessen its competitiveness. He hoped that the 
expansion o f social rights could modify the capitalist system so as to bring about 
equality in the realm of both class distinctions and economic well-being. Marshall must 
have assumed that the modem industrial community would eventually stabilise. 
However, the conflict between the free market and measures to provide equality in the
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modem age is still raging. The development of the Information Society is beset with the 
problematic of a ‘digital divide’ in the 21st century.
Marshall stipulated that "measures designed to raise the general level of civilisation of 
the workers must not interfere with the freedom of the market. If they did, they might 
become indistinguishable from socialism” (1950: 80), but his focus was on the policies 
of Britain, with a social-democratic government in power.
He would have ‘deplored’ State interference if that would have meant defining a list of 
legal rights to which all men were entitled (Marshall 1950:8) although he readily 
admitted that "the preservation of economic inequalities has been made more difficult 
by the enrichment of the status of citizenship". There is less room for them, and there is 
more and more likelihood of their being challenged (Marshall 1950:77). Rights 
invested in the status o f citizenship (freedom, common law, national justice and so on) 
would obviously undermine social class inequalities and the injustice of the whole class 
system, based as it was inherently on inequality. Social rights o f the 20th century have 
imposed modifications on the capitalist class system, as they subordinate market price 
to social justice.
Marshall proposes the social right to a guaranteed minimum.
"The State guarantees a minimum supply o f certain essential goods and services 
(such as medical attention and supplies, shelter, and education) or a minimum 
money income available to be spent on essentials - as in the case of Old Age 
Pensions, insurance benefits, and family allowances." (1959:54)
His aim was to ensure that all citizens should attain at least to the prescribed minimum, 
either by their own resources or with assistance if they could not do it without (p54). 
Hence benefits were to be given to only those in real need.
Calabrese and Borchert (1996:262) agree that the intervention o f the welfare state is 
justified when citizens have basic needs that need to be met and fulfilled before they can 
realistically participate in society, and thus act as enlightened citizens. This has been 
always a major justification for publicly fimded education. They fervently adhere to 
Marshall’s social rights system, which provide the means required to secure access to
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the prevailing standard of living, and thus the full benefits of citizenship - this for 
Calabrese was a strengthening of the 'positive' concept of liberty.
Corcoran suggests that the public service broadcaster receiving public funds is justified 
in offsetting market failure in the audiovisual market. He argues that public funds are 
needed to re-dress the balance for citizenship needs (2001:30). This researcher agrees, 
but suggests that a new balance of programming should fit the bill - not information, 
education and entertainment about the nation state's common culture, as Corcoran 
proposes.
Corcoran argues that widespread market failure in broadcasting exists, but unlike 
Marshall, he argues that if the market fails, governments must step in. Marshall stated 
that the State would be responsible for granting those rights yet would have led "step by 
step, to acts of State interference which he would have deplored" (p8). Corcoran 
employs the principle of publicity developed by Emmanuel Kant which underlines the 
importance o f (public service) broadcasting in promoting citizenship, and which 
represents a key justification for public funding to offset market failure.
3.1.3 Equality o f Education
In general it could be said that social collective rights predominated in Europe by grace 
of the Keynesian or welfare state regimes. However in the sphere of education in 
Britain, individual rights were given priority over collective rights from the early 1940s. 
Rather than having to compete in a lottery for secondary and higher education, there 
were moves to have 'selection and distribution into appropriate places, sufficient in 
number to accommodate all, at least at the secondary school level' (Marshall 1950:63). 
Education according to different ages, abilities and aptitudes - representing absolute 
priority for individual rights - was to be provided through an extension o f the social 
right. One positive result o f the United Irishmen’s struggle for independence was to 
highlight the need for free Catholic education on the political agenda. The British 
conceded and an Education Act was introduced in Ireland in the 19th century.
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Marshall’s right to ‘be educated’ falls on the government, and he classes this as a social 
right for the citizens (p62). Marshall identifies two strands o f education rights -  the 
right of the citizen to be educated, and secondly, the need of the government to have an 
educated public. It is possible however that not all governments favour this idea, and 
they actively prefer their people to be, and remain ignorant.
Marshall argues that the education of children is essential to the perpetration of 
citizenship because the State, when guaranteeing that all children should be educated, is 
trying to stimulate the growth of ‘citizens in the making’. The right to education is a 
social right of citizenship because the aim of education during childhood is to shape the 
future adult. It should be regarded as the right not of the child to go to school but as the 
right of the adult citizen to have been educated. Without education, people cannot 
exercise their civil rights - for civil rights are "designed for use by reasonable and 
intelligent persons who have learned to read and write. Education is a necessary right of 
civil freedom" (p26). Education was the first of the 20th century's social rights.
The central tenet of the republican citizenship model of proportionate equality, social 
equality and redistributive equality was a key reason why liberals had to reject 
republicanism. The liberalist emphasis on equality of freedom translates as no 
individual should be subject to coercion or use by another (particularly by the state) for 
others’ benefit. This foundational principle is phrased in the American Constitution by 
“The state shall not pass laws that would abridge...personal liberties”.
If one of the reasons liberalism could not accept republicanism was because of the 
republican insistence on the use o f one man’s productivity or talent for the aggregate 
benefit through a system of social redistribution, in response, the republicans took the 
stance that liberalism lauded ‘economic man’, he who maximises his private interests, 
and does little else to serve the community. Historian Lance Banning believes classical 
republicanism views merely economic man as "less than fully human". (Sinopoli 
1992:13)
Marshall and Habermas both stress ‘equality’ in citizenship, a concept that is held in 
common by both American and French Declarations. However, it would appear that 
Habermas aligns himself more closely with the spirit of the French Declaration in
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qualifying the criteria of ‘equality’ with a communitarian -  universalistic -  
humanitarian vision of ‘equality o f humanity’.
In both American and European Declarations, the equality of rights of persons is 
established for the first time. Both communities specify both civil and political rights, 
though they differ from each other in assessing who should gamer which category of 
rights, and who should be included.
3.1.4 Right to Receive
The right to receive is a ‘positive liberty’. It seeks to actively use government 
mechanisms to meet people’s common basic needs through the intervention of the 
welfare state. Others focus on the rights to the provision of goods and services, in terms 
of social benefits provided in a public service:
Asa Briggs defines the welfare state:
MA 'welfare state' is a state in which organised power is deliberately used 
(through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play o f market 
forces in at least three directions: First, by guaranteeing individuals and families 
a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or their 
property; Second, by narrowing the extent o f insecurity by enabling individuals 
and families to meet certain 'social contingencies' (for example, sickness, old age 
and unemployment) which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and 
Third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction o f status or class are 
offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social 
services. " (Briggs 1961: 228-250)
Calabrese and Borchert (1996:249) and Feintuck (1999) argue that communication 
policy should be put centre stage in any meaningful discussions about the future of the 
modem welfare state. Calabrese and Borchert argue that a revitalization of the welfare 
state, including a fuller consideration given to communication policy within an 
expanded social policy is essential in order to mitigate against the shaping market 
imperatives of capital accumulation.
The authors focus on the state’s obligation to promoting civic competence and ensuring 
communication needs (as defined according to welfare state principles, which they 
uphold) are fulfilled so that people can actively partake as citizens. Calabrese argues for
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universal service, others (Raboy 2002; Preston and Flynn 1999) argue in favour of 
public service.
Hamelink explains that universal service as standard has been in existence and essential 
to the provision of telecommunication services since the beginning. He cites the 1934 
US Communications Act which provided "to make available, so far as possible, to all 
people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, nationwide and worldwide wire and radio 
communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges" (Hamlink 
1995:96).
But, the 1997 WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunication Services (signed by 70
countries) has implications for the governance of the basic infrastructures of
communications. On universal service it says
"Any member has the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it 
wishes to maintain. Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per 
se, provided they are administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and 
competitively neutral manner and are not more burdensome than necessary for 
the kind of universal service defined by the member." (Italics added)
The Basic Telecommunications Agreement’s "essential focus is on access to markets for 
telecommunication service providers, and not on public access to telecommunication 
services" argues Hamelink (1998:72). He concludes that the WTO approach to universal 
service favours the business interests of foreign corporations over the social interests of 
a nation's citizens.
Hamelink suggests that privatization and liberalization force universal service out of the 
picture. He is doubtful that private enterprises will make efforts to meet public 
obligations of universal service, or universal access. (p96)
Calabrese and Borchert (1996) also argue for universal service provisions. Previously, 
telecommunications companies in the USA were obliged to provide "common carrier" 
service. Common carrier service provided transmission capabilities to anyone who 
could pay the going rate (whereas, broadcasters on the other hand, do not have to 
provide access to anyone who can pay for access). However, recent shifts in
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terminology have been from the action o f providing “universal service from the telecom 
network” to the state of “universal access to the network”.
Hills (1989) explains in (Hamelink 1995) that,
"The argument adopted by consumer groups in the USA is that access is not 
universal service - that the telephone should be priced at a level which makes it 
possible for disadvantaged groups to use it for social reasons rather than simply 
as an emergency service" (Hills, 1989:141)
Hamelink argues that “The Court (of Human Rights) has in its opinions over the past 
years judged that the human right to receive (in Article 10 of the 1950 Convention) 
should be interpreted in a democratic society as “the right to be properly informed about 
matters of public interest””, (source: personal correspondence)
Article 10 relating to Freedom of Expression o f the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television 
or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection o f the reputation or rights o f others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.
The essential points to remember about the ECHR is that firstly, Article 10 applies to 
‘everyone’ and that means as well as a private individual, a limited company, or a 
journalist, newspaper, book publisher or broadcasting organisation. The commercial 
nature or character of the applicant is not relevant and does not deprive the individual 
from protection of rights under the Convention. (Merrills and Robertson 2001:169) 
Corporate persons under the Convention have as much rights as individual persons. 
Secondly, with regard to the nature of the ‘information and ideas’ that should be freely 
expressed and received, there is no restriction on the nature of the content. That is, 
although case law has not as yet provided a precise definition o f the terms ‘ideas’ and 
‘information’, the Court (in Groppera Radio AG case) decided that broadcasting and
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retransmission of programmes were covered by the right enshrined in the first two 
sentences of Article 1 “without there being any need to make distinctions according to 
the content of the programmes”. (Series A, No. 173, para.55)
According to Merrills and Robertson (2001:169) case law on the right to receive 
information is thin on the ground, although some indications have been established as to 
how this ought to be interpreted. Note above Hamelink’s argument that case law has led 
the European Court o f Human Rights to interpret this ‘human right to receive’ 
information and ideas as “the right to be properly informed about matters o f public 
interest”.
According to a Court judgement (Dichand and others V. Austria, 2002) “the press plays 
an essential role in a democratic society. Although it must not overstep certain bounds, 
in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to 
impart -  in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities -  information 
and ideas on all matters of public interest (De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium judgment of 
24 February 1997, Reports 1997-1, p 233-234, § 37). Not only does it have the task of 
imparting such information and ideas, the public also has a right to receive them. Were 
it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of “public watchdog” 
(Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland judgment of 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239, p28, § 
63; Bladet Tromso andStensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 62, ECHR 1999-III)”.
In three cases (the Leander case, Series A, No. 116, para. 74; the Gaskin case, Series A, 
No. 160; and the Guerra case, judgement of 19 February 1998), the issue arose of 
obligations of government to provide information to a claimant. Merrills and Robertson 
report that ‘The Court rejected the claim under Article 10, holding that freedom to 
receive information did not involve a positive obligation to collect and disseminate the 
information in question. It is clear therefore that the right to receive information does 
not entail a corresponding obligation on the part of government to provide it. However, 
if a person is prevented from obtaining information from other sources, Article 10 will 
be relevant.”(Ibid, 2001:170)
The second part o f Article 10 details the authorised limitations in order to facilitate the 
‘duties and responsibilities’ that accompanies the exercise of freedoms in the first 
paragraph. In some cases, the Court has emphasised the responsibilities of publishers
99
(not to publish obscene magazines for children in the Handyside case) or the duty o f the 
Press to “impart information and ideas on political issues” (Lingens case, Series A, No. 
103, para.41). The Court in this case emphasised the necessity o f Press freedom and the 
concept o f the Press as playing an essential part in a democratic society and the 
reasoning of individuals. The principle also that restrictions on the Convention’s rights 
and freedoms should not be encouraged, implying therefore that it is rather freedom of 
publication that is more important, and restriction should only be exercised in 
exceptional circumstances.
So, in conclusion, this author’s reading of the interpretation by the Court o f ECHR Art 
10 has led to decisions indicating that the right to receive information and ideas is not 
the obligation o f governments (to provide and disseminate that information), but there is 
a duty on the shoulders o f the Press and publishers to distribute as widely as possible 
information and ideas on political issues, without restriction and only then in 
exceptional circumstances, and thus play an essential part in the reasoning of 
individuals within a democratic society. According to the ECHR, there exists no duty 
on government to provide certain types of information, yet the responsibility to provide 
information necessary for democratic involvement lies with the Press and publishers.
A caveat however to the above -  the EU is not a signatoiy to the ECHR, and this is one 
reason why it developed its own EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this, the ECHR 
Article 10 has lost some of its potency, for the Article on Freedom of Expression and 
Information (Article 11) in the EU Charter states:
1. “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
2. The freedom and pluralism o f the media shall be respected”.
Thus, the EU does not recognise corresponding duties and responsibilities (as in the 
ECHR) for either States or the Press. While the European Commission therefore is due 
to respect the rights incorporated in the Charter, these provisions are in relative terms, 
weak. What must be remembered about the EU is that it is not a state, and it only has 
the extent of powers that are transferred upon it by member states. Therefore, it can only
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protect citizens’ fundamental rights in the areas where EU law applies. (In the area of 
culture, and social policy the EU does not have competence, and thus cannot protect 
citizens’ rights in these spheres.) And since the Charter for Fundamental Rights is a 
political agreement without being legally binding, the extent of the Charter’s force may 
be only that it will be taken into account by the ECJ in its decisions. However, because 
the ECHR goes further in many areas than the EU Charter, it could be that the ECJ will 
continue to take inspiration from the ECHR.
As Feintuck (1999:8) points out, "In the interests of understanding how systems of 
media regulation operate and the roles that the law plays, it will be necessary to examine 
the range of constitutional fundamentals that inform systems for media regulation in 
different jurisdictions under different constitutional arrangements". Judicial decisions 
and administrative law in the area of media regulation (e.g. Broadcasting Acts) are 
informed and guided by normative principles, formulated according to diverse 
constitutional contexts, historical backgrounds and traditions. The Constitutional 
obligations regarding citizen rights and freedoms are value-laden, and provide the 
framework of expectations and values that should inform an area such as media 
regulation. The important feature of these institutional dimensions is that they are 
stabilised by fundamental legal rights (Dahlgren 1995:127). They are a fundamental 
organising principle, and for any democratic right, they must be vigorously defended 
and expanded. Yet Feintuck is adamant that when considering media regulation in other 
jurisdictions, it must be viewed within the different constitutional contexts, backgrounds 
and traditions to regulatory activitiy. Different constitutions will give rise to different 
competencies. (1999:35)
The Irish Constitution (Kelly J. M., 1994) provides for the right to communicate in 
Article 40.3, the right to Freedom of Expression (Art. 40.6.l.i) and in Article 45 the 
Constitution gives guidelines on Directive Principles of Social Policy.
Art. 45.2.iii provides that “The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards 
securing... That, especially, the operation of free competition shall not be allowed so to 
develop as to result in the concentration of the ownership or control of essential 
commodities in a few individuals to the common detriment.” Mr de Valera had stated in
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the Dail debate on the Article that it should serve to be ‘a constant reminder to the 
legislature of the direction in which it should work’.
Although views within the Constitutional Review Group in 1996 were divided as to 
whether Article 45 should be deleted altogether, or retained in an amended (more 
modem form), some objections against deletion were raised. In particular, it was 
reasoned that the Article asserts principles of continuing relevance and importance in a 
democratic society, and to abandon them altogether after almost 60 years in force might 
suggest that the principles set out were deemed to be no longer useful, even if renewed 
in a different wording in the context of EU membership (1996:392).
The principles of continued relevance included that of concern for the distribution of 
ownership and control of material resources so as best to serve the common good, and 
that of retaining primary concern for the interests of all the people (i.e. for social 
inclusiveness) over sectoral interests, however powerful their political influence.
The Irish Constitution’s protection of freedom of expression is set out in Article 
40.6.l.i. states:
“The State guarantees liberty for the exercise, subject to public order and morality, of 
the right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions. The education 
of public opinion being, however, a matter of such grave import to the common good, 
the State shall endeavour to ensure that organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the 
press, the cinema, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including 
criticism of Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality 
or the authority of the State. The publication or utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or 
indecent matter is an offence which shall be punishable in accordance with law.”
According to the Constitution Review Group (1996), the current Irish Article protecting 
freedom of expression should be replaced by a new clause protecting the right of free 
speech modelled on the Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
While, according to Kelly (1994), Article 40 of the Irish Constitution could be 
interpreted by the courts as not extending to the dissemination of factual information 
(p924), Article 10 ECHR “explicitly recognises the right of citizens to receive and 
impart information” regardless of frontiers and subject only to other “legitimate 
interests deserving of legal protection” (EC Directive on Conditional Access (EC 
Directive 98/84/EC of 20 Nov. 1998).
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The Constitutional Review Group raised the question of whether the media (organs of 
public opinion) should have a constitutional obligation to afford access for the 
expression of a widely representative range of views in the interests of democracy. 
(1996:293). The media, they argue, should not only have the freedom, but also the 
responsibility for upholding democratic principles. An indication of a similar manner of 
thinking was demonstrated in America by former President Clinton between 1997-1998. 
Clinton announced the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Public Interest 
Obligations o f Digital Television Broadcasters. The Committee was expected to study 
and recommend “what public interest responsibilities should accompany the 
broadcasters’ receipt of digital television licenses”3 On the other hand, the Review 
Group opined, “No private medium of expression can be compelled to express 
particular opinions or even a representative range of opinions without infringing the 
right of free speech.” (1996:295)
3.1.5 Social rights
Social rights according to Marshall amounted to "the whole range from the right to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social 
heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in 
the society" (1950:11). The education system and social services developed out of 20th 
century social rights.
These social rights were to guarantee a minimum income, an elementary school 
education in basic literacy, and a provision of ‘essential goods and services’. Marshall 
included shelter and medical goods and services. Others argue that communication 
services also form part of this package.
Habermas (1995:268) comments that social rights from a functionalist point of view 
signify the installation of a welfare bureaucracy, and from a normative viewpoint, they 
grant the compensatory claims individuals make to a supposedly just distribution of 
social wealth. It appears that Habermas doesn’t think they will achieve equality in the 
sense envisaged by Marshall.
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3.1.6 Social rights in GATT, (General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs)
For France, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) acted as a kind of social policy. 
France’s original deal with Germany in the 1950s when the EEC Treaty was drawn up 
was a bi-lateral understanding between the two that “that Germany was going to have to 
pay for the benefits of the common market, because they would benefit in the industrial 
area and France was going to have to be recompensed in the agricultural area” (D/ENT- 
EMP 1, interview).
France, like Ireland, needed to find a solution to its problem of large regional 
populations and the maintenance of them. France favoured the retention of an image of 
rural antiquity on the land, an element respected as an aspect of French national identity, 
and the CAP helped them to maintain that. In Ireland, “Politically [agriculture remains 
supremely important] because it’s an important value in Ireland and the people hold to 
that value -  the life of the land, the life of rural Ireland, there is a need for things to be 
done to maintain the standard of that life in rural Ireland. Things are changing of course 
in terms of Europe, and things will change with the next Enlargement.” (D/ENT-EMP 
1, interview, Dublin)
Despite the strong farm lobbies in Ireland, the problems with rural counties like Mayo, 
Leitrim, Roscommon and Donegal, and the heavy presence of representatives from the 
department of Agriculture located in Brussels and Geneva, it remains an issue in which 
Ireland is a small player. France has always been the most vocal supporter of 
agricultural subsidies, and the greatest defender of the maintenance of the CAP. For 
Irish interests too, the CAP remains an issue close to the heart of the Irish government, 
and in Council meetings, Ireland would tend to row in behind the French stance on CAP 
and would tend to support a slower progression towards liberalisation of trade in the 
farming and agricultural sector.
Therefore, France and Ireland followed the same thinking with regard to agricultural 
trade rights, cultural heritage and social welfare rights. According to this view, it is 
valid to perceive farming, agriculture and rural landscaping as a ‘cultural objective’, and 
it is acceptable to provide large support subsidies for the preservation and continuation 
of a traditional ‘cultural activity’ or the sustenance of a cultural dimension of the
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landscape. Akin to the idea of CAP as a social policy, France was instrumental in the 
proposal and push for a ‘social clause’ within GATT, to protect the social rights of 
citizens, and of farmers or agricultural producers. This was proposed firstly in 1986 
before the Uruguay Round of GATT commenced and again in late 1994 when all 
members wished to see the Uruguay Round speedily and successfully concluded. The 
EU was always resistant to the inclusion of a ‘social clause’ in GATT, and the French 
proposal didn’t get very far. When the suggestion was raised once again, at the point at 
the end of 1994 when negotiations on difficult sectors were getting stickier, it was 
wholeheartedly regarded as an “aunt sally” proposal. The French pushed hard for the 
social clause, but relinquished this demand later for a real concession on agriculture. 
Once France had secured a respite on the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products, 
they dropped their hardened stance on the social clause. The Irish negotiator in Geneva 
suggested, “We think we’ve got problems with Mayo and Leitrim and Roscommon and 
Donegal and so forth, but France has got massive problems in terms of its regional 
populations and how to maintain them.”(D/ENT-EMP 1, interview). The key aspect of 
this issue is employment, and sustaining populations in rural areas.
In later years the European Parliament took up the banner for a ‘social clause in trade 
agreements’, the Socialists in particular arguing that there should be ‘no global market 
without a social dimension’. However, although this gained widespread support within 
the European Parliament, it was never supported by the European Commission and was 
not pursued as a demand at the 1996 Singapore review of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO)4. It was viewed to be a demand that would never be supported by the supporters 
of the free market within the EU of member states (Britain and Germany particularly) 
nor by the ASEAN nations in the WTO.
This is an example of a Socialist -  European Parliament - French attempt to insert 
‘social rights’ into trade agreements. This represents a failed vision by those parties, yet 
they maintain the ‘social rights’ pressure on the WTO. Could CAP be articulated as a 
cultural objective? As creation of audiovisual production is a cultural objective, 
protecting the traditions of the rural community could also possibly be viewed as a 
cultural objective related to the cultural identity of rural communities.
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3. 2 Access and Restricted Access
“The public sphere of civil society stood or fell with the principle of universal 
access. A public sphere from which specific groups would be eo ipso excluded 
was less than merely incomplete; it was not a public sphere at all. “ (Habermas 
1989:85)
For Habermas (1989), equality of access (to political participation) was primary. For 
Habermas, the communitarian model of citizenship within the realm of communication 
facilitated the participation of all (i.e. readers) to engage in critical public debate. In 
practice, notes Habermas, only property owners and the educated were ‘full citizens’.
Habermas outlines the ‘ideal’ bourgeois public sphere (or, public civic life) as being 
ruled by three principles: firstly, the law of equality of ‘common humanity’. Discussion 
was to disregard status, the better argument possessed the potential to assert itself 
against the ranks of social hierarchy. Even the lowliest participant could assert himself 
through the means of reason thereby establishing the equality or parity of ‘common 
humanity’ (Habermas 1989:36). Secondly, discussion centred on ‘issues of common 
concern’ which had previously received uncritical treatment by the authorities of 
Church or State but which were now of critical importance to the activities of a 
capitalist class. Thirdly, the discursive public represented an inclusive public, open 
access being the central tenet: “Everyone had to be able to participate, and the groups 
established the public as in principle inclusive” (1989:36).
Venturelli (1998a) posits that Habermas draws on Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. His 
attempts to formulate a theory of public communication draw on a neo-Aristotelian 
theory of public freedom -  i.e. participation in public space on equal terms (p91). 
Habermas also attempts to rework the moral liberalist Kant and his principle of 
publicity which asserts that for democracy to be valid, “there must exist fully public 
communicative processes unconstrained by unequal and distorted social and economic 
forces” (Venturelli 1998a: 33). Additionally, argues Venturelli, Habermas draws on the 
thought of Hegel and his approach that public freedom is dependent on the 
démocratisation of the institutional organisation of civil society. This results in an 
assertion that, by combining neo-Aristotelian communitarian principles with Kantian 
liberalist theories, in order to provide public spaces capable of producing valid social
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outcomes there must exist: “first, fully public communicative processes unconstrained 
by political or economic force; and secondly, public space must be public in terms of 
universal access in order for all those possibly affected to be admitted.” (Yenturelli 
1998a: 92)
Venturelli’s own thesis asserts Kant’s principle of publicity as providing the standard by 
which democratic governments and rights can be judged as promoting (or not, as the 
case may be) public participation in public space. Kant’s key point is the exercise of 
reason and basing judgement on reasons. Freedom for Kant is participation in public 
space where citizens can deliberate and be ‘convinced by reason’ (1998a. 14). Venturelli 
posits communication rights as political and moral rights, asserting a Kantian right to 
publicity. This differs to the right of freedom of expression, in that the right to publicity 
denotes “right of public freedom of speech, knowledge, information, and participation”. 
This researcher concurs with Venturelli that Habermas’s argument is also based on the 
Kant definition.
Habermas’ insistence that everyone should be able to participate in civic ruling is 
complemented by Marshall’s drive to provide the practical necessities (particularly 
education) to make use of this institutional right. Habermas identifies the Deutsche 
Gesellschaften (Germany reading societies) as those that made the first moves towards 
social inclusiveness. Later, the French constitution was formulated, and private people 
were from that moment on characterised as citizens of the Constitutional state. While 
the notion of a Constitution was novel in France, written constitutions were a political 
tradition in the New England colonies. Rousseau followed the American Declaration 
almost by word. Fundamental principles included the notion that all human beings were 
in principle included in its public sphere, being bom free and equal.
Habermas identified a second barrier to equal participation in society. If the first was the 
illiteracy of the masses that precluded their entry to the public sphere, the second was 
their lack of financial resources that prevented them from paying for the reading matter 
under discussion. Between the literate and non-literate public lay a wide gap of income 
inequality. Habermas notes: “They did not have at their disposal the buying power 
needed for even the most modest participation in the market of cultural goods” 
(Habermas 1989:38, italics added).
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Cost, for many media communication theorists is the key problematic with regard to 
modem day access to the public sphere.
There is concern about the price of access to new media too. Public service broadcasting 
prided itself on being available at low cost to the entire nation, and of its status as a non­
profit making organisation. Ireland’s licence fee now costs 150 Euro, following an 
increase of 40% in 2002. Former president of the American Library Association, 
Patricia Schuman is one of those concerned that “we are rapidly moving into an era 
when we will pay an increasingly expensive fee for information that in the past 
was...provided free” (Pavlik 1998:306). Since the costs of original production are ever 
increasing, profit can only be garnered from the repeated distribution of product which 
has already recouped its costs.
Venturelli (1998a), Mowlana (1997) and Calabrese & Borchert (1996) all debate the 
issues of concentration of media institutions, their power of monopoly over access to 
their products and services, and the commercial market pricing of their goods.
In response to this requirement for fulfilment of citizenship rights to participate, 
Marshall called for a universal (social) right to minimum income to be incorporated into 
citizenship rights so that everyone could enjoy the standard of the norm in society. 
Marshall was particularly focused on the material well-being of each person in the 
community, and the level of economic welfare needed to be able to fully participate in 
citizenship. Marshall makes the valid point that the fair level required for ‘decent’ living 
is according to the prevalent standards of the day.
Common concerns between Habennas and Marshall include the fact that Marshall is 
preoccupied with allowing citizens to participate in full membership of the community 
through the acquisition of civil, political and social rights. His is a sociological pursuit 
of a broader relationship between the citizen and society as a whole. Habermas is 
meantime focused on the importance of the public sphere as a mode of societal 
integration, analysing the social conditions necessary to stimulate a rational critical 
debate about public issues (Calhoun 1992:5). Habermas’ citizenship is more akin to the 
stricter political definition of a citizen and his or her relationship with the State.5
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3.2.1 Universal access in m ed ia-th e  public service tradition
Raymond Williams traces the notion of a broadcasting system operating as a public 
service back to the Victorians’ sense of social duty on behalf of the community and 
those most in need of reform, especially with regard to their cultural and educational 
needs (Williams 1961:313-317 in Scannell 1990:22). According to Williams it was this 
Victorian idea of public service and education of the poorer classes which helped 
formulate the public service ideals of broadcasting in its early era from the 1920’s to the 
1950’s.
Jean Seaton (1988:120) argues instead that, rather than a prevalent Victorian ethos of 
public service, it was the socio-political environment in Britain in the 1920s that helped 
to formulate opinion and gamer acceptance for a public broadcasting service. The 
population by the end of the First World War were well accustomed to (although not 
entirely in favour of) the centralisation of all services under government control in the 
‘national interest’. Broadcasting was developed in this mould because of the acceptance 
of both government and population that centralised distribution and control of resources 
in the best interests of the security and welfare of the public.
On the other hand Beveridge, like Marshall, was opposed to the social consequences of 
industrial competition, and the restriction of consumer choice in favour of the profit- 
generating product that accompanies free market forces (Beveridge 1934 cited in Seaton 
1988: 120). Reith also was of the commonly held view in that era (according to 
Seaton), that capitalist competition could be inefficient in its management of resources. 
Raymond Williams argues that it was possible to develop a concept of ‘public service’ 
in Britain in the 1920s because of the general social-political shunning of market 
competition in favour of state regulated protection. (Ibid, 1988: 134)
Reith’s main objective in serving the national public interest was to provide a service 
that would be accessible to all people of the nation. This was possible to procure 
because the British Broadcasting Corporation was motivated by social not financial 
reasons. The BBC did not aim to make profit, all revenue was redirected into 
programme making and so the extent of transmission reception was not limited to
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profitable urban areas. Paddy Scannell illustrates how the BBC, in its effort to make its 
services available to all “has meant an investment out of all proportion to the returns in 
order to reach those regions that strictly economic considerations would simply neglect” 
(1990: 25). This meant installing sixty-five new transmitting stations in order to extend 
its reach of the population by 0.1% to the 99.1% it now reaches with good quality 
reception. Socialist writers, remarks Seaton, were particularly approving of this modus 
operandi (Seaton 1988: 120).
McQuail lists the main features as found in fully-fledged public service broadcasting 
systems as the following: provision of a universal service; democratically accountable 
to the national public; independent from vested interests and state control; financed by 
payments from all citizens (and not only from advertisers); and seeking to provide a 
high quality service (McQuail 1994: 172). However, he also acknowledges that “There 
has never been a generally accepted version of the theory of “public service 
broadcasting” and the diversity of forms is now greater than ever before” (McQuail 
1994:126).
The idea that broadcasting should be operated as a public service is an extension of the 
idea of social responsibility of the media (which itself was an add-on to the fundamental 
right of the Freedom of the Press). According to the 1947 U.S. theory of social 
responsibility (McQuail 1994: 24) media have certain obligations to society because 
media ownership is a privilege, held in public trust. Such obligations include 
truthfulness, and objectivity in reporting news while operating according to agreed 
codes of ethics and professional standards. The 1947 US Social responsibility theory 
admits that while in general social responsibility should be self-regulating, under some 
circumstances, intervention and limitation of media freedoms can be necessary in the 
public interest. Though, McQuail notes that media ‘freedoms’ are referred to in the 
1947 Social Responsibility theory, while UNESCO emphasises “responsibilities”.
Up until 1977 (when the Annan report broke with tradition and took the libertarian 
model as an ideal) successive reports in Britain had defined broadcasting as a public 
service -  defined as “catering for all sections of the community, reaching all parts of the 
country regardless of cost, seeking to educate, inform, and improve and prepared to lead 
public opinion rather than follow it”, according to Seaton. (1988: 263)
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In contrast to the altruistic motives of the British public broadcasting service, Ireland’s 
first national broadcasting service was, according to Gorham, “regarded primarily as a 
means of selling wireless sets” (Gorham 1967:6). Yet, once Dail Eireann recommended 
in 1926 that broadcasting should be a State service, with responsibility to government, 
an intention to serve the public interest was limited to providing a service to the whole 
nation.
The Annan Committee of 1977 overturned years of philosophical tradition in Britain 
supporting the ideals of public service broadcasting. Although a later report in 1986 by 
the Peacock Committee re-established the value of public service in broadcasting for the 
greater good of democratic information, one of its members (Samuel Brittan, a 
monetarist theorist) was of the view that “the goal of British broadcasting should move 
towards a sophisticated market system based on consumer sovereignty” (Seaton 
1988:264).
Annan ruled in favour of a libertarian ideology of media. According to McQuail 
(1994:122), “ the libertarian view is that media social theory and media policy are both 
inconsistent with media freedom”. Media freedom (as defined according to the principal 
of Freedom of Communication enshrined in the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution) is incompatible with legal, government or public interference. The 
resulting report proposed that broadcasting -  a product like any other - should be 
encouraged to develop in the free competitive environment of a deregulated 
marketplace, arguing that the market was capable of achieving balance and pluralism 
without restrictive regulation controls. An increase in broadcast channels would provide 
a multiplicity of voices, and would respond to consumer demands for increased choice. 
The libertarian theory of the market posits that media create a free marketplace of ideas 
- free expression is encouraged - in which the best are recognised and the worst fail. 
(Ibid pi28) On the other hand, FCC chairman Newton Minnow -  someone who has had 
considerable experience of the libertarian model of broadcasting -  has suggested that 
the new media landscape free-for-all will become nothing but a cultural wasteland 
exploited for commercial profit. (Pavlik 1998: 126)
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The Annan report recommended that “broadcasting should cater for the full range of 
groups and interests in society, rather than seek to offer moral leadership” (Seaton 1988: 
263). Annan’s definition of “good broadcasting” was that which reflected the pluralist 
and multi-racial society, which Britain was increasingly becoming. The best way that 
this could be achieved, it was argued, was through unregulated competition -  for 
audiences, revenue and programmes. The 1983 Government White Paper on the 
introduction of cable admitted that it was not necessary to stipulate what kind of service 
cable operators should provide, (other than must-carry rules as outlined by the Hunt 
Report) because following libertarian theory “cable’s success will depend on people’s 
readiness to pay for it and recognition that it offers value for money”, or not (Hollins 
1984: 283). Diversity and quality of service would be determined, the White Paper 
maintained, by leaving such matters to the market.
In 1986, the Peacock Report of the British government-appointed Committee of the 
same name provided eight principles of the “public service idea”. In addition to the 
above commonalties, Peacock added some specifications regarding the nature of content 
transmitted. Namely, it should provide for all tastes and interests; cater for minorities, 
and have a concern for national identity and community. With regard to the increased 
competitiveness of the broadcasting market in Britain at the time, he also included the 
notion that the principle of public service should encourage competition in programmes 
(and not just audiences), and should encourage the freedom of broadcasters (McQuail 
1994: 126).
The issue of universal access to new technologies is of central importance to policy 
makers. Pavlik (1998) reports that members of the Telecommunications Policy Round 
Table are concerned that a market-driven information highway will bypass the poor and 
poorly educated. Guaranteeing access to all citizens is of fundamental priority. Pavlik 
argues that “the implications of universal access are profound for the democratic 
process, which rests on the principle of a government responsive to and in touch with 
the people. To be responsive, the government must communicate with the people”6. 
Thus all people must have access to the principal mode of communication, increasingly 
through new media technologies. Otherwise, not only will global society be fragmented 
into minority audiences, but also only a minority of audiences will have knowledge of 
the global society.
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3 .2 .2  R ig h t  o f  A c c e s s
Those communication theorists who argue for a ‘right to access the public sphere’ 
include Hamelink, proposing equal access to the means of public expression of 
opinions. This researcher aligns her reasoning with this interpretation. The right to 
universal and equitable access to the public sphere or public realm is advocated by 
Habermas (1989), Raboy (1998), UNESCO (1980), UN Article 19 of Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), Murdock & Golding (1989) and Calabrese & Borchert (1996).
Access to the means of expression and distribution of opinions means inevitably 
purchasing the products and services of ‘media markets’. This term was coined by 
Ireland’s Department of Public Enterprise in the development of a 1998 Bill, Public 
Right of Access and Diversity o f Ownership in Relation to Broadcasting and Other 
Media. Media markets were identified as “including newspapers and magazines; 
broadcasting and terrestrial television; satellite and digital television; cable and MMDS 
services; and internet services.” 7 Engaging with the economic (jonsumption of media 
products and services offered in media markets inevitably means engaging with the 
economic rules that govern the World Trade Organisation, presently operating 
according to a predominantly American -Western capitalistic ethos.
Hamelink suggests that because not everyone in every society has already the freedom 
of expression, "therefore, the right to freedom of expression would have to rather focus 
on the provision of access to the public expression of opinions than on the prevention of 
restricting opinions. Equal access to the means of expression is not guaranteed by the 
liberal right to freedom of expression.” ((Hamelink 1999:85) Habermas also argued that 
many are excluded from the public sphere arena simply because they do not have the 
necessary funds in order to purchase the products and services available, at increasing 
cost, in the media markets.
In a similar way, the human right of every person to the highest attainable standard of 
health (as outlined in the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
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Rights) is in conflict with the market demands of unlimited price freedom. Negotiations 
within the TRIPS Trade in Intellectual Property Agreement have focused heavily to date 
on health and medecine. The TRIPS agreement focus is on the payment of royalties to 
intellectual copyright holders. Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary 
Robinson, recently highlighted the plight of the poor vis a vis their ability to take 
advantage of medicinal intelligence that is currently so highly priced that only the rich 
can afford the patented drugs essential for survival in some of the poorest HIV-infected 
countries in the world. With respect to accessing the privately protected and expensively 
licensed intellectual property that creates medicines, Robinson has suggested that 
“further improvement to the TRIPS agreement on intellectual property rights might be 
needed, if the deal fails to deliver on the key goal agreed at Doha of protecting public 
health and promoting access to medicines for all”. (Irish Times, 12/09/03)
Just before the WTO trade round negotiations were due to start at Cancún, there was a 
last-minute deal struck (30/08/03) after years of negotiations that would permit poor 
countries to import cheaper generic versions of anti-AIDS drugs. Hamelink argues that 
the proposal for ‘global and equitable access to knowledge’ is restricted and blocked by 
the development of a ‘strict regime for the protection of intellectual property rights in 
WTO negotiations’. In the same way as access to life-saving medicines has been 
facilitated by the WTO after years of pressure, access to information and knowledge 
could keep democratic societies breathing and in good health will require alterations to 
the present American-led WTO rules of engagement in the marketplace.
UNESCO / MacBride (1980) and Murdock & Golding (1989) propose a right to equal 
access to new and old channels of communication and information facilities. They 
suggest imposing responsibilities of guaranteeing universal access, diversity of content, 
and provision for feedback, interactivity and participation by the users. Murdock & 
Golding (1989:183) set out the three communications needs for effective citizenship. 
Firstly, access to information, advice, and analysis on their rights in other spheres. The 
second communication need for effective citizenship is access to information, 
interpretation and debate that involves political choices, and ability to use their 
communication faculties in order to criticise, bppose, or propose alternative courses of 
action. Finally, good citizenship depends on the communication of their opinions
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represented within the central communication sectors and they must be able to 
contribute to developing those representations.
In the next section this research tests the quality of citizenship exercised by the Irish, 
French and American modem models of citizenship through the lens of Murdock and 
Golding, and their insistence that the second communication need for effective 
citizenship is ‘access to information, interpretation and debate that involves political 
choices, and ability to use their communication faculties in order to criticise, oppose, or 
propose alternative courses of action’ (1989: 183).
3.2.3 Right o f  Input o f  Public Opinion / Right to participate
Venturelli goes beyond ‘right of access’, to demands for a right to participation in 
public space, or rights of inclusion in public deliberation. Venturelli (1998a) and 
Habermas (1990, 1987) both take a lead from the moral liberalism of Kant, and classic 
Aristotelianism. This researcher asks - how are you to enforce or police rights of 
participation or inclusion?
Venturelli argues that citizenship is dependent upon the ‘fundamental rights’ of right of 
knowledge and public participation in public space, and critically -  following a line of 
thinking developed by Kant -  a right to publicity. Venturelli’s interpretation of Kant’s 
right to publicity guarantees public freedom of speech, knowledge, information and 
participation. Essentially it requires all members of political society to make public use 
of their reason in all matters of public policy and law by which they should be 
governed. (The Kantian right to publicity differs from JS Mill’s freedom of expression.) 
Venturelli’s use of Kant is a strong concept -  the right to participate in public space -  
however; I find it difficult to align myself with a right that has little or no chance of 
being able to be guaranteed as yet in the 21st centuiy.
Venturelli’s suggested solution is that “provisions to ensure that the public and 
constitutional information rights of citizens to expression and information are given 
priority over the private rights of the information industries to be free from obligations 
to the public-opinion-formation process, to cultural diversity, education, and other 
constitutional functions of public space." (1998a: 103) How does Venturelli suggest that
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the ‘right to participate’ -  facilitated through broad access to the public realm, and to 
suitably informative content - might be guaranteed?
Raboy (1994) illustrates how the tradition of a Canadian public authority with a 
statutory obligation to hold public hearings and to consult the public over changes to 
Canadian broadcasting policy has encouraged the strong voicing of public opinion and 
debate over the way Canadians see the role of their broadcasting systems.
He argues if broadcasting is still deemed to be of some importance to public life, then 
the public cannot and should not be absent from the debates that determine its shape and 
future. However, ’’the point is that if broadcasting is still deemed to be of some 
importance to public life, the public cannot be absent from the debates and struggles 
that make it what it is.” (1994: 5)
Yet, Raboy is coming from a Canadian perspective where CRTC -  the independent 
public authority and state agency -  is required by law to hold public hearings on matters 
of public interest. It also provides an important space (what amounts to a public sphere) 
for public debate on broadcasting matters, and the general orientation of Canadian 
(private / public) broadcasters. The critical aspect of this situation is that it has statutory 
responsibility to enable public participation in broadcasting decision-making. The 
CRTC is required by law to hold a public hearing in connection with the issuing, 
suspension or revocation of a licence, as well as in the case of amendment or renewal of 
a license, unless it is (in the case of a revocation, for example) satisfied that such a 
hearing is not required in the public interest. It may also hold a public hearing in 
connection with any other matter under its jurisdiction, if it thinks that it would be in the 
public interest to do so.
Raboy holds up the Canadian model as demonstrating how public participation in the 
sphere of broadcasting policy-making and regulation is legitimate, legalized and should 
be encouraged. However, Canada may be a unique and unrepeatable case, as there is a 
strong history in Canada of multi-racial pressure lobby groups pressuring government 
during the policymaking process, and setting up their own community-based alternative 
networked public spaces, unlike in Ireland.
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The process culminated in a new Broadcasting Act 1991 which explicitly recognised 
broadcasting as “a public service essential to the maintenance and enhancement of 
national identity and cultural sovereignty”.
The Broadcasting Forum (2002) in Ireland sought to create the same type of public 
input. Access was organized via regional country meetings hosted by the national public 
service broadcaster, RTE, as well as Internet sites dedicated to the forum of experts 
meeting to discuss the future national broadcasting policy.
Arising from the Irish Broadcasting Forum was a large increase in licence fee payable 
by the public television set owners, that was to be divided unequally between the 
national public service broadcaster, and commercial channels that broadcast a specific 
‘public service type’ of programme. This is the first time in Irish broadcasting policy 
history that the licence fee has been divided between the national public service 
broadcaster and commercial stations. The rationale behind it lies on the nature of the 
programming offered that can be funded. On this issue, the Minister for 
Communications, Ahem did not reputedly listen to the advice of his civil servants.
Raboy (1998) and Hamelink suggest civil society must be more aggressive in 
formulating the agenda for world communication policy, and with the CRIS campaign 
in Geneva, they are working towards their legitimate inclusion. It is their ambition to 
increase the social space (that is, the public sphere or realm) in which non-state, non­
commercial actors seek to influence decisions regarding the orientation and regulation 
of broadcasting systems.
Hamelink also suggests that civil society groups take their grievances to loci of decision 
making like the WTO, ITU and so others. Communication that facilitates self­
empowerment, argues Hamelink, must not be state-centric or market-centric.
"It has to be inspired by civil democracy. Civil society does not only entail rights 
for its citizens, it also implies duties. The duty to revolt against the worlds of 
Orwell and Huxley is essential to the democratic process. Only the revolt of civil 
society can change the disempowerment world communication causes" 
((Hamelink 1995: 145)
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In the next section, this thesis addresses how, and to what degree, civil society 
influenced the formulation of broadcasting policy and trade policy relating to 
audiovisual services in Ireland, with a comparative regard to France and the US, during 
the years 1982-2002.
3.2.4 Modem Irish, American and French approaches to public 
opinion consultation
With respect to this primary research, this researcher sought to answer the following
empirical questions: Who participates in government, and to what extent does the
government take account of public opinion? On what basis does government policy lie?
Who does government consult with -  the public, or corporations? What
recommendations or grievances have Irish citizens voiced? If it can be assumed on the
basis of this evidence that policy decisions affecting Ireland’s communications and
audiovisual and cultural sectors are initiated by the European Commission, within
which discussions Ireland often plays a small part, it must be asked: who is pushing the
government into putting forward particular policy proposals, or amendments to
Commission proposals? Consultations held by the D/AHGI did not become
“fashionable” until about seven years ago (1995).
“Currently, consultation is -  you don’t do anything without consultation, but the 
environment was quite different 7 or 8 years ago. The audiovisual sector
wouldn’t have been as strong and relatively cohesive and coherent as it is now. 
You might not have had a representative voice to talk to.” (D/AHGI 2, 
interview, Dublin)
Before Britain’s Channel 4 there were very few independent producers, or for that
matter, independent television production. Prior to that, there was not the vogue for
consulting anyone other than the national broadcaster RTE.
“There wouldn’t have been a whole lot of people to consult with outside of RTE. 
We would have consulted with anybody who was around, and RTE”. (D/AHGI 
1, interview, Dublin)
Policy will also be derived from consultations with the industrial sector based in 
Ireland.
“We would look at what proposals the Commission are coming forward with. 
Because you can appreciate that in the Common Commercial policy areas, the 
Commission are the people that make proposals, and the Member States advise
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and consult with them. A lot of our action would be reaction to Commission 
proposals and when the Commission comes forward with proposals in that area 
as in any other area, we would be taking consultations with all interested parties 
and coming to a conclusion as to what our appropriate position was.” (D/ENT- 
EMP 3, trade official, Dublin)
The Department of Trade, Enterprise and Employment attempted to gamer some public
opinion on the matter of trade and Irish exporters in 1984 as GATT (1985) loomed onto
the horizon. An Irish Geneva representative recalls:
“We made efforts to consult people -  representative groups, and that didn’t give 
rise to anything useful. And then we tried a mail shot to the 300 biggest 
companies in Ireland to see if that would get us information. And in the end 
really we came to the conclusion that, for most manufacturing companies, they 
were too small to spend time worrying about why they weren’t getting into a 
market. They’d just look around for a market they could get into, and they’d 
work on that.” (D/ENT-EMP 2, Geneva negotiator to GATT, Interview)
Another viewpoint from the D/ ENT-EMP was:
“They (Irish industry) were regarding themselves as being small players from a 
small country and how could they move this enormous mountain that was in 
their way in the form of Indian regulations as there may have been, so they 
decided -  well the thing to do is to steer a course around this regulation, and 
they probably did that, and managed to live with it. But they weren’t coming out 
in the Irish government so that we’d negotiate something.” (D/ENT-EMP 1, 
Interview, Geneva negotiator to GATT)
While other Member States were influenced by very well organised lobbies on goods 
and services, Ireland didn’t have well organised lobbying, other than on agriculture. In 
1984, other key Irish products were textiles and clothing. Irish companies preferred on 
the whole to find alternative ways around trade barriers, rather than aim to crack, for 
example, the Japanese market and find out what barriers they were coming up against. 
The foreign companies based in Ireland on the other hand did lobby government: 
“they’d come in and say Took, you know that we came here to sell to these markets’ but 
since most of the foreign companies were selling to Europe and wider Europe out of 
here, that was for the most part taken care of.” (D/ENT-EMP 1, Geneva negotiator) 
Evident here is the difference in approach from American companies. The French 
model is more inclined towards public debate (as illustrated in a letter to D/ AHGI).
Reacting to the dearth of response from companies in Ireland, this official said, “At 
home, (policy development) things were driven by civil servants. It was us thinking
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things out. That was typical of the way things were done. It was really civil servants, the 
old ‘de Valera style’, looking into their hearts, on the basis of what they knew, guessing 
what was in the national interest, as much as anything”. (D/ENT-EMP 2, interview) The 
national interest in the 1984 period was “agriculture, textiles”. These remained the 
priority even until 1995, evident from a Dail Question posed to Enda Kenny, Minister 
for Tourism and Trade that stated that while the department agreed on the EU position, 
and agreed that further liberalisation measures should be implemented, “adverse effects 
on sensitive industries like agriculture and the textile sector should be minimised.” 
(October 5, 1995)
These therefore - agricultural trade, and trade in textiles - formed the basis of trade 
rights in the years 1984-85.
For the most recent trade round consultation, the D/ ENTEMP is
“consulting widely: from representative bodies in the industry such as IBEC, our 
Exporters Association, Small Business Association -  those sorts of people. We 
have a standing arrangement with the non-governmental organisations, the 
umbrella group called Comhlambh which represents Concern, Trocaire...We 
use Forfas, the economic analyst. We operate it as wide as possible, the 
consultation system, on a continuing basis, to give us the view on how to 
respond to Commission proposals, and also to raise issues which we feel might 
be important for us. They also come to us in the context of putting forward their 
own points of view, particularly the NGO’s and particularly the industry 
representative organisation. We have a continuing dialogue with all these people 
which pretty' much, works very well. We would be very interested in talking to 
multinational firms established here, in getting their point of view in relation to 
trade issues, and how they’re affected. And we would be reflecting that in our 
national position that we would be putting in to Brussels” (D/ENT-EMP 3, 
interview)
Further to outside advice, the department chairs a Standing Committee on a weekly 
basis, comprising members of other departments as appropriate in addition to 
representatives from the department of Foreign Affairs. These departments offer input. 
This researcher’s conclusion is that there is a lack of public opinion input regarding 
trade rights and trade policy in Ireland.
The awareness and consultation campaign in association with Forfas was run to “stir up 
a bit of interest” in the currently on-going Doha Millennium Trade round. The 
consultation process was launched at the end of 2001, particularly targeting both foreign 
operations and locally owned indigenous companies. From the launch of an interactive
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website, 15 to 20 companies replied. No replies were submitted from any ‘Services’ 
companies or telecommunications companies.
IBEC (Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation) admitted that the General 
Agreement on Services (GATS) was not something that “inspires our members’ 
imagination”. IBEC represents the Audiovisual Federation and Telecommunications 
Councils, amounting to the principal audiovisual, broadcasting producers and 
distributors in Ireland, as well as the telecomms council members. With such a poor 
response, it was impossible to discover “from as many interests as possible what sort of 
issues would be of interest to Ireland and the Irish economic sector, what sorts of points 
of view they might want to put forward, what offensive interests they have, what 
defensive interests they have” (D/ENT-EMP 3, trade official, interview, Dublin) as the 
D/ENT-EMP hoped. It is worth noting that, in a further attempt to secure companies’ 
opinions and positions on WTO trade-related issues, a series of workshops were 
organised with the assistance of IBEC, Enterprise Ireland and the IDA. The sectoral- 
specific workshops illuminate the key areas of strategic Irish economic interests for the 
Doha trade round.
1) Electronics and engineering;
2) Agri-business;
3) Chemicals and pharmaceuticals;
4) Computer services and software -  these are, it was noted, “huge for Ireland”;
5) Audiovisual services -  believed to be a ‘growing industry’ comprising the film, 
music and digital content producers and distributors; and
6) The clothing and textile sector (Forfas, interview, March 2002, Dublin).
Enterprise Ireland’s opinion is that “There will never be a cinema industry in Ireland”, 
and admitted that it is their intention to actively promote sectors involved in games and 
animation production; films made for television; technology for cinema distribution and 
digital music. These are the trade strengths of Ireland, and interests of current Irish trade 
negotiators, and they will be seeking greater exploitation of those areas. (Interview, 
National Informatics Director, Enterprise Ireland, October 2002, Dublin)
From Forfas’ point of view, the consultation process for the Doha Round was “pseudo- 
democratic”, to be enacted in the event that a civil society group lodged complaints
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afterwards. Yet the interest from the public and the newspapers was minimal regarding 
the Doha Round and the public consultation. Irish businesses themselves - those that 
stand to lose or gain most in trade negotiations - paid little attention. In reality, 
companies find WTO too ‘long-term’ a commitment. WTO is not, as a result, business- 
driven, even though “exporters have well tested channels of communication to put 
forward their case” (Enda Kenny, Answer to Dail Question, 5 October 1995). Forfas 
believes that government officials or NGOs effect greater influence over issues 
discussed in WTO than businesses. Businesses, focused on the smaller picture do not 
make World Trade Organisation business their priority. They expect and assume 
government agencies (i.e. Forfas) to make decisions in this area for them. The national 
public service broadcaster, RTE, expects the D/AHGI and at a European level, EBU 
(European Broadcasting Union) to lobby on their behalf and activate strategies. Ireland, 
along with other Member States were due to submit a list of their trade interests and key 
markets to which they are requesting access, their offensive and defensive interests, to 
the European Commission by June 2002, in the context of formulating a Common 
Negotiating Position within the EC 133 Committee.
Forfas has since reported the results of its trade round consultation in Ireland and 
outlined its trade priorities for the Doha Round. As part of an overall Irish government 
strategy to develop both Ireland’s creativity as well as its electronic network into a 
global ‘hub’ for the distribution of digital content and audiovisual services, Forfas 
recommends that Ireland should support greater liberalisation of the trade sector of 
audiovisual services. While recognising that it may not be possible to reach agreement 
for greater liberalisation on all audiovisual services, Forfas suggests that above all, 
“Ireland should concentrate on securing the widespread application of GATS disciplines 
to the music recording and distribution industry.” (2003:40)
How do policy-formation practices today relate to American, European or Irish models 
of citizenship? In what ways do public policy consultations differ in the US and in 
France, for example?
American business interests possess none of the Irish reticence when it comes to making 
their views known on requesting access to certain foreign markets. Often multinationals 
formulate most of their policy and approach towards multi-lateral negotiations within
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their headquarters in the US. Likewise, American government policy derives from the 
USTR offices located in Washington and Geneva and is relayed by the US Trade 
Representative who “does whatever she needs to do with the European Commission”. 
(USTR representative, interview, Brussels)
Representatives from foreign multinationals located in Ireland, and the American 
Embassy “talk to us very regularly on all of the issues that come up, in relation to major 
disputes between the EU and the US”. (D/ENT-EMP official, interview, Dublin) 
Multinationals are strongly influenced by the HQ position taken on global trade disputes 
between the EU and the US. Often these reflect tensions between multinationals 
operating in Ireland or within the EU, and the multinational’s parents.
US international trade policy is devised firstly through private sector advisors on 
sectoral negotiations that represent industry, rather than companies. These advise on 
‘best future’ options. Following this there are open solicitations and public hearings, 
from the NGO community and individual citizens, as well as trade associations. Then 
there is the congressional process. Before the proposed trade policy can be enacted, the 
US Administration has to consult with Congress in order to obtain official approval and 
a mandate to negotiate. It is argued that the Bush government is much more 
protectionist of their national industries than with the previous Clinton administration. 
Unilateral American foreign policy is intensified by blatant national rights protection for 
national industries. Bush is not reluctant to donate massive subsidies to its own 
American industries when hit by financial or terrorist crises. Most recently, indigenous 
steel producers, and airline industries were financially supported following the 
September 11th attacks and earlier in the 20th century, the American administration 
protected its own movie industry with the Fin Sym rules.
For audiovisual, issues that are important for industry are important for the US 
government. While the US Trade Representative may claim that the Motion Picture 
Alliance (MPA) “doesn’t define our position”, interviewees often recommended that 
this author speak directly to industry representative bodies, with the purpose of 
‘working it out yourself as regards the future American trade strategy. (USTR 
representatives, US mission to the EU, Interview, Brussels)
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Thus, the list as divulged of industry representatives which directly lobby the US 
representatives in Brussels, Geneva and Dublin are: MPA (Motion Pictures Alliance); 
Business Software Alliance (viewed as “very active” in Brussels, representing computer 
hardware and software giants IBM, Bell, Apple, Intel and Microsoft); AOL Time 
Warner Amazon; European Competitive Telecoms Association; US Chamber of 
Commerce; European Telecom Networks Organisation (ETNO); International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) representing sound recorders, and the 
recording industry association RIAA.
In a not dissimilar fashion, Irish government agency Forfas admitted that “ Microsoft’s 
view becomes “our view” if Forfas accepts their proposal”. (Forfas official, interview, 
Dublin).
This leads this researcher to ask if Irish government tactics are having the effect of 
protecting the trade rights of US corporate entities? Does Forfas encourage the seeking 
of US or foreign opinion more than from Irish companies? Or is it simply the case that 
Irish traders and civil society are not as vocal as they were in the 18th century?
The stark contrast between the Irish and American models of consultation and that
employed by the French is highlighted in a letter to D/AHGI from the French Embassy
in Dublin. In relation to the discussions of revising the EC Directive Television Without
Frontiers, the French Cultural Ambassador asked firstly,
“Whether public debate exists on the promotion of European audiovisual work 
and in particular the diffusion of European and national works, investment 
quotas and other promotional means”.
The French cultural section also wished to be advised of “the position of different 
regulatory bodies, public and private radio stations, producers (including independents), 
writers, artistic and intellectual milieus”. (Letter from French Embassy in Ireland to 
D/AHGI, 18 July 2001). This is an indication of the French fervour of protecting French 
culture.
To such an enquiry, the D/AHGI was obliged to reply:
“ To my knowledge there has been no organised public debate underway in 
Ireland in connection with the promotion of European audiovisual work. A 
number of workshops were held earlier this year on (revision of Articles 4 and
5) aspects of the Directive which were attended by a representative of this 
Department and a wide range of interested organisations.” (emphasis added)
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The department could not identify for this researcher who these ‘interested 
organisations’ were, attending on behalf of Ireland’s audiovisual interests. It is evident 
to this researcher that few other opinions are sought by D/AHGI on broadcasting policy 
other than those of RTE and consultants. However, it would not be mistaken to assume 
that ‘public consultation’ (which amounted to asking RTE for its input) in Ireland has 
been replaced almost entirely by ‘consultations with consultants’.
The reply to the French Cultural Ambassador reveals that
“Ireland supported the provision of Articles 4 and 5 concerning European works 
and independent productions. It remains to be seen whether the Consultants 
(contracted by the European Commission) consider these Articles as continuing 
to serve a useful purpose and whether they are recommending their retention or 
amendment.” (Letter from French Embassy to Ireland D/AHGI, 18 July 2001).
An official from D/PE acknowledged that government policy is very much increasingly 
reliant on consultants’ reports. They are the basis of government these days: one 
government department commissions one consultants’ report, another department 
commissions another consultant’s report, and then there might be a consultant’s report 
commissioned to report on one of the first consultants’ reports. The reliance on 
consultants is compounded by the tendency within some departments (though not in the 
case of personnel dealing with broadcasting issues) to move civil servants around 
between unrelated departments and unrelated portfolios. These consultants accrue a 
considerable amount of public expenditure. “It gets very expensive,” the D/PE official 
admitted.
Input into EU decision making by Irish public opinion is limited in the case of the Irish 
broadcasting industry, particularly the national public service broadcaster, who 
ostensibly has a responsibility to draw attention to the public interest nature of its 
service. It may be argued that it has a duty to represent the wishes of its public owners, 
the citizens who access it? Could it not be said that RTE is a public opinion 
representative of the citizens of the public sphere in which it broadcasts, and therefore 
should represent those opinions to the real decision-makers, the EC? The issue of ‘duty’ 
and on whose shoulders it lies remains a key dispute between communication theorists -  
some of whom argue it is the government’s duty to provide for its citizens, others who
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argue it is the duty of civil society to voice their objections and opinions -  and 
communication providers. US telecommunications corporations argue that there is no 
obligation on them to provide for citizens’ welfare or rights.
RTE is an outstanding example of a national public service broadcaster that does not 
lobby in Brussels, assuming that lobbying done on its behalf by EBU (European 
Broadcasting Union) will be sufficient. The EBU is an organisation widely held to be 
“probably the least dynamic organisation in Europe” according to Banotti MEP. All 
other national or European-wide broadcasters, private and public, are directly 
represented in Brussels-located offices through lobbying and administrative personnel.
The Irish audiovisual representatives of the current industry are public service 
broadcasters RTE and TnaG; commercial national broadcaster TV3; Film makers 
Ireland representing the film production industry; the Music Board; and IBEC’s 
Audiovisual Federation members. Most of these organisations do not input at EU level.
3. 3 Freedoms and liberties
Enlightenment conceptualisations of rights emphasised ‘freedom’ from traditional ways 
of thinking. Self-empowerment was advocated using reason, mind and intelligence 
(Kant). Garnham (1990a) suggests two concepts of the notion of human freedom: 
economic freedom and political freedom.
Warner (1990) argues that in 18th century America freedom was represented by 
“liberality”. Liberality was a key gentlemanlike quality meaning freedom from poverty, 
freedom from servile subjection or slavery and freedom from subordination arising from 
lack of material independence. Finally, most pertinent to the discussion of print and 
social authority, "it was associated with freedom to elevate the mind by application to 
the authoritative books that contained the higher learning". Liberality meant access to 
knowledge and information that enables individuals to form an opinion and come to 
independent decisions. This researcher finds value in Warner’s definition of freedom. 
With regard to the media regulation sphere, this researcher argues that this implication
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of freedom to knowledge, information and higher learning has the potential to be 
integrated into a possible form of civil right.
According to Warner liberality touched on wealth, independence and learning. It 
allowed the gentleman a higher exalted status above the locals. His identity was based 
upon "freedom from the kinds of private interest that would compromise his public 
commitment" (1990:29). All these ’freedoms from' amounted to a disposition to 
undertake important responsibilities in the wider community. (Ibid p28)
3.3.1 Right to Express
Raymond Williams (1961) in Sparks (1993) made the distinction between the right to 
speak or ‘transmit’, and the right to receive. This distinction between the right to 
express and the right to receive continues to be a key issue in current discussion. This 
researcher holds the opinion that both the right to receive and the right to express are 
essential in true democratic communication. In addition, media theorists suggest highly 
nuanced versions of the right to access and participate in the public sphere, and the right 
to receive audiovisual content of a certain genre, even interpreting these as social goods, 
guaranteed to be received as part of a public service in the overall social policy of a 
government.
Debate is prevalent as to whether this is a negative liberty or a positive liberty. For 
Williams, both the (negative liberty) right to express, and the (positive liberty) right to 
receive achieved through government support need to be guaranteed in a ‘truly 
democratic system of communication’ (Sparks 1993:81), though exactly how is left 
vague and unanswered by Williams.
Isaiah Berlin (1969) discussed in Calabrese & Borchert (1996)) also gives preference to 
the classification of freedom of expression as a ‘negative liberty’ -  that is, obstacles that 
may impede the pursuit of individual interests are removed, particularly where 
government control may be excessive, and individuals are left to define and satisfy their 
own needs as they choose.
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Whereas, positive liberty is put forward by welfare state proponents who maintain that 
everyone has common needs in society and that these should be collectively defined and 
met through government intervention and/or mechanisms. These are traditionally 
interpreted as social rights. For example, Marshall argues that the civil right to freedom 
of speech has little real substance if, from lack of education, you have nothing to say 
that is worth saying, and no means of making yourself heard if you say it. But these 
blatant inequalities, he says, are not due to defects in civil rights, but to lack of social 
rights, which in the mid 19th century were in the doldrums.
The right to free expression is classified as a cultural right by many communication 
theorists (Venturelli 1998a, UNESCO, Feintuck 1999:85, Higgins 1999), because media 
systems can disseminate cultural images and elements that play into the formation of a 
cultural identity which is then linked mistakenly with the nation.
Those who advocate rights of expression include Hamelink. Hamelink’s concept is the 
right to the public expression of opinions. Those who suggest a right to communicate 
include Hamelink, MacBride, and Raymond Williams. Me Caffrey, in developing a 
theory of good political communication also recommends a right to communicate. 
(McCaffrey 1991).
Freedom of Expression is protected in Article 19 of the UN 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and in Article 10 of European Convention on Human Rights &
Fundamental Freedoms. The ECHR Article 10 states that:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers"
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this article, says Hamelink as 
meaning a right to receive information and ideas, not just broadcast signals and it 
imposes upon broadcasters the duty to accommodate this receivers' right. (1995:133). 
He cites the European Court of Human Rights, which has stated that "not only do the 
mass media have a right to impart information, they have the task 'to impart information 
and ideas on matters of public interest' and the public has a right to receive such 
information and ideas."(1995:133) Thus, argues Hamelink, the media are purveyors of 
information and public watchdogs, according to the European Court of Human Rights.
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Hamelink suggests a Communication Charter (1995:155) that consists of the elements 
of the fundamental right to communicate. He has recently updated this in the context of 
the UN Communication Rights in the Information Society CRIS campaign.9
3.3.2 Right to Communicate
It should be noted at this stage that there is no prior existence of an internationally 
recognized ‘human right to communicate’. It is this which Hamelink hopes the WSIS 
will establish, in an initial form as a ‘Universal Declaration on the Right to 
Communicate’ in Geneva, December 2003.
The ‘right to communicate’ was defined as ‘a new concept’ by a UNESCO commission 
for the study of communication problems (1980, see Hamelink 1999) and this was 
specified as providing “the right to be informed, the right to inform, the right to privacy, 
the right to participate in public communication - all elements of a new concept, the 
right to communicate” (UNESCO 1980). 10 It is noted however that Jean D’Arcy 
(1969:14-18)11 first elaborated on the vision that “the time will come when the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights will have to encompass a more extensive right 
than man’s right to information... This is the right of men to communicate.”
The UNESCO definition of the ‘right to communicate’ was allegedly based on Article 
19 of the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights providing for freedom of expression 
and opinion, and interpreted by UNESCO as the ‘right to communicate’ and the ‘right 
to have access to communication channels’ (Hamelink 1999 detailing MacBride 
Report). The report proposed further development of the ‘right to communicate’ -  
essentially, communication should be considered as a basic human right, in order to 
help achieve social equity through communication. Hamelink concludes that the 
recommendations have not been effective (1999:85).
Raboy argues that communication rights were originally basic social and political 
rights.
"From the early beginnings of parliamentary institutions, communication 
rights were framed as basic social and political rights. Media were used by
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social actors as sources of empowerment, as well as for mobilisation and 
persuasion. Typical of the modem state was the creation of institutions such as 
public service broadcasting, public telephone and telegraph monopolies, and 
public regulatory agencies. Today, the emergence of a global media regime is at 
once symptomatic of a new type of society in emergence, and a challenge to 
shaping that society towards a new phase of social progress" (Raboy 1998:66).
The many and multiplying declarations protecting rights and freedoms -  to cultural 
expression, freedom of expression, involvement and participation in communication -  
often secure the judicial principles of rights, but provide no duty, or responsibility for 
implementation. Declarations12 can hold as much political weight as 
‘recommendations’. However, they lack ‘legal teeth’, and stand as little more than 
‘pious statements’ (Corcoran 2001). Hamelink (1999) argues on the other hand that 
these declarations however are often the predecessor to binding treaties or an evolution 
into international law, and are as such, valuable.
It is most likely that the Irish government would find any right to communicate 
immensely problematic if it were to be legally binding. This author can present an 
example of the opposition of the Irish government to the recent EU Charter on Human 
Rights that was signed as part of the Nice Treaty in December 2000. The key issue 
under discussion at the Nice IGC was the status of the Charter: whether the Charter 
would be signed as a political declaration, or a legally binding document, or whether it 
should have political status initially with the possibility of acquiring legal status (either 
through judicial interpretation or through subsequent treaty amendments).
Ireland foresaw difficulties with a legal status, because a legally binding charter could 
conflict with the Irish Constitution, and if this was the case in relation to an as yet 
unforeseen issue, then a referendum would be required to pass the Charter into Irish 
law. The issue of a legal Charter also brought difficulties regarding the supremecy of 
the European Court of Justice over the Irish courts. For these political, judicial and 
constitutional reasons therefore, Ireland was not in favour of an EU Charter for 
Fundamental Rights becoming anything more than a political declaration. In it, the Irish 
position on the drafting of the Charter Article on Freedom of Expression strove to go no 
further than the rights as declared in the European Convention on Human Rights.
The question of the legal status of the Charter raises questions as to the ability of 
individuals to challenge infringement of their rights by the European Community,
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where they are directly and individually concerned by those decisions. In this instance, 
the individual must pass through the national court system to challenge Community 
decisions or regulations, yet there is growing consensus that direct access to the 
European Court of Justice must be widened. A recent submission by the Council of the 
Bars and Law Societies o f the European Union to the discussions of the Charter for 
Fundamental Rights relating to Article 230 EC argued that the EC Treaty limits the 
possibilities of individuals to adequate remedy in the eventuality of infringement of 
their rights by Community institusions. (source: Cathryn Costello, Irish centre for 
European Law). A German judge, Udo di Fabio of the German Constitutional Court 
has further argued that the monitoring of rights under the Charter should rather be 
entrusted to a specific (new) human rights court, operating in tandem with a binding 
Charter, rather than be entrusted to the ECJ. (see Udo di Fabio, “Fuer eine 
Grundrechtsdebatte ist es Zeit”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 November 1999, 
pll).
A drawback with many legal declarations is that in asserting standards of human rights 
and freedoms relating to the question of culture, information, and expression, they speak 
or refer primarily to true minority cultures.
Corcoran concedes that "it is clear that culture is being used in these texts (i.e. the UN 
(1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27, 22; and UNESCO 
conventions and declarations, such as the UNESCO (1995) World Commission on 
Culture and Development) in the anthropological sense, to include a society’s material 
as well as its symbolic culture, (however) there is still a suggestion that the underlying 
concern is mainly for minority cultures"(2001:18). Corcoran suggests that these rights 
(UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Articles 22 and 27) 13 which traditionally 
protected the rights of minority cultures should have their remit widened so as they 
apply to majority ethnic or linguistic groups.
In effect, he proposes that the ‘national’ culture becomes as protected in laws and 
practice as hereto ‘minority ethnic’ cultures were. He is suggesting that in globalisation 
trends, the nation state comes to appear like a linguistic and ethnic minority, with the 
need for national minority cultural rights.
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3.4 Theories and Arguments in favour o f rights protection
In the following section, this thesis examines the concept of ‘cultural rights’. The 
research outlines the theories behind the concept of cultural imperialism. Then it 
outlines and critically examines the evidence given by the European broadcasters and 
key figures in the European audiovisual arena as to why communication should be 
classified as a cultural right.
These arguments are ostensibly founded on the assumptions that there is a European 
culture; that audiovisual is a cultural service; that there exists a European audiovisual 
model; and that the European Union has a right to cultural diversity.
3.4.1 Fear o f  Cultural or Economic imperialism?
The theory of cultural imperialism as defined by Tomlinson (1991 in McQuail 1994: 
114) refers to a threat to national identity as a result of a communication flow 
imbalance. The general direction of effect is a weakening followed by displacement of 
the indigenous culture, which is overthrown in favour of the penetrating model. This is 
part and parcel of the growth of modernity bringing with it a consumerist capitalist 
ideological system which challenges and changes older traditional culture. Elihu Katz 
supports the belief that modernisation tows in its wake “a standardisation and 
secularisation of culture, such that the traditional values and arts, those that give <a 
culture its character, are being overwhelmed by the influx of western popular culture” 
(Katz 1977:108). The idea that Europe is currently threatened by cultural dominance 
frqm American media product is very much in vogue with those, like France, who 
favour quotas and media or cultural policies which place limits on US cultural invasion 
whilst encouraging national cultural production.
McQuail (1994:114) argues that the cultural imperialism argument does not withstand 
close scrutiny. Firstly because that which nations are attempting to protect -  i.e. national 
identity however it is defined -  is, as noted above, a set of cultural criteria often 
dependent on newly established geographical borders and with a very recent history. He 
notes that it was only in the 19th and early 20th centuries that national independence
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movements all around the world redrew their national boundaries, rediscovered 
distinctive national cultural traditions and invented a sum total teijned “the national 
identity”. Ireland, Greece and Finland are some examples.
The strongest cultural identities are those based on language, religion and nationhood 
according to McQuail, while the weakest, and least likely to survive are those whose 
basis is founded on taste, fashion and style. He argues that international media content 
affects only “superficial and short-term cultural phenomena”. (1994:117)
Eoin G. Cassidy concedes on the other hand that,
“In large part, the media are shaping a transnational western popular culture 
which exerts a stronger influence on young people than their local national 
culture. Within the context of such acculturation, the protection and promotion 
of national culture has become an important issue". (Cassidy quoted in Corcoran 
2001:5)
This researcher questions this the present author argues that cultural identity is shaped 
in person-to-person contact, and television plays a minor part in the formation of 
cultural identity, but plays a major part in information, debate and political awareness.
Regarding European Union cultural identity, McQuail doubts whether such a weak 
concept will grow in strength without policy measures to support it, whereas strong 
national European identities with historical bases may well survive the present and 
future ‘Americanisation’ of media product. Some hope within the European Union that 
the day may come when, for example, a person may call him or herself ‘European, of 
French origin’. The term cultural imperialism has more relevance for developing Third 
World countries that are more vulnerable to the alien invasion of Americanisation 
because of the immediate attraction of material benefits which accompany it.
JB Thompson (1995: 164) disagrees with the cultural imperialist thesis. He maintains 
that no culture was ‘pure, untainted, authentic’ before the introduction of broadcasting. 
Even non-western developing countries are hybrid cultures - the result of many 
centuries of invasions, imposition of foreign cultural traditions, colonial power struggles 
and so on. According to Thompson, cultures adapt land survive, changing in the process. 
Fundamentally, Thompson disagrees with Schiller’s notion that like the discredited 
model of mass communications effects known as the ‘hypodermic syringe’, the process
m
of reception is one-way from which “individuals orientated towards personal 
consumption supposedly emerge”. (Ibid, p i72)
From the entire heated debate surrounding protection of the national culture, it would 
seem that economic logic -  the protectionism of national industries that are threatened 
by American media or cultural products - is principally the underlying rationale for all 
this cultural imperialist posturing. Thompson is of the opinion that Herbert Schiller’s14 
(1969) original thesis of cultural imperialism was “effectively an argument about the 
extension and consolidation at the level of communications and information of a power 
that was fundamentally economic in character”. (Thompson 1995:167, but see also 
Mowlana 1997). This researcher tends to support Thompson’s view.
McQuail argues that the proliferation of transnational media channels involves a 
“downgrading of cultural specificity in themes and settings, and a preference for 
formats and genres which are thought to be more universal” (McQuail 1994: 111), 
transnational content being generally North American in character.
Yet Thompson makes the interesting observation that despite the indisputable evidence 
of American culture and media products dominating the global mass communication 
arena, the economic power of these media institutions is no longer predominantly 
American. He notes the increasing levels of investment, ownership and control in the 
American market by foreign companies. Thus while Hollywood remains one of the 
most important production centres of film and television entertainment, a growing 
number of studios are owned by transnational corporations. The economic basis of 
media domination has been internationalised, investment capital for media.production 
being drawn from a global range of sources (Thompson 1995: 169). Sony in Hollywood 
is illustrative of this argument. While the economic capital may no longer be American, 
the media product remains distinctly resonant of the American cultural tradition, and it 
is argued is the least expensive and most widely available on the media products 
market, although South American television product in the form of soap operas is 
increasingly popular on a global scale.
Katz addresses the dilemma posed by the suggestion for more indigenous programming 
(to counteract foreign cultural influx). Firstly, he is unsure whether the media are
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capable of answering the call since most indigenous commercial programming merely 
mimics a successful international formula* thus contributing nothing to the shoring up of 
national culture. And secondly, the question is posed: which indigenous tradition should 
be promoted? He gives the example of Algerian culture, where both French and Arab 
elements co-exist, and asks which should be emphasised? (1977: 112) Ireland similarly 
will need to address this question, having become multi-racial over a short span of 
recent years.
Hamelink (1995) argues that decisions regarding local cultural expression are decided 
by global policies in multi-national fora such as the WTO where decisions are taken on 
trade in services (in the GATS agreement) or on intellectual property rights (by the 
TRIPS agreement) (1995:122). He argues that subsequently people are made powerless, 
without the capacity to control the decisions that affect their lives. They are 
‘disempowered” and culturally dominated.
"World communication furthers people's disempowerment since the major technological 
trend (digitization) creates new forms of dependency and vulnerability. The trends 
towards consolidation and deregulation reinforce censored access to information and 
limit use of knowledge resources, the trend towards globalization creates a cultural 
environment that victimizes people, spreads compulsive consumerism and reduces local 
cultural space." (1995:127)
This last section, to all intents and purposes, is identical to theories of cultural 
imperialism. Hamelink argues that if a community is not in control of its own local 
cultural space, there is no forum in which people can develop their own cultural 
identity, "to empower itself culturally" (1995:131). Communities need common cultural 
space in order to define their identity autonomously. Thus, there is a battle for 'local 
cultural space'. The greatest threat is the process of cultural globalization, according to 
Hamelink.
3.4.2 Audiovisual is a cultural service
The position of European broadcasters, independent producers, directors and 
distributors (represented by CEPI, EUROCINEMA, FI AD, CICCE, FEITIS, GESAC, 
EBU, FERA, UNIC) lobbying the Irish Minister for Arts, Culture, Gaeltacht and the 
Islands de Valera advocated a defensive approach in negotiations, They argued for the
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retention of cultural sovereignty for the reason that the measures (like MEDIA, 
Eurimages, and national incentives) are “aimed at offsetting the competitive advantage 
of the American industry, and the monopoly from which it benefits”. The reasons are 
here stated in American market monopoly terms rather than cultural or nationalistic. 
However, the demands for cultural sovereignty are implying, as in the words of Wolfe 
Tone and the Young Irelanders, a separate cultural nation.
Also, it is argued that “the creation and production of audiovisual works are actually 
aimed primarily at meeting objectives of pluralism and cultural diversity, and the public 
funding granted by Member States in various forms ..is actually a reflection of this”. (9 
July 1999:4 position paper prior to Seattle negotiations)
The only film lobby in Ireland -  Film Makers Ireland, established in 1993 to represent 
Ireland’s producers of television drama, feature films, documentaries and animation -  is 
represented at the European level by CEPI, CEAP and FIPF.
The European Audiovisual Observatory, ARD German television public service 
channel, EBU (European Broadcasting Union), DG Culture, Canada and France also 
define audiovisual services as a ‘cultural service’ in policy documentation and debate.
3.4.3 The EU Audiovisual Model
The European audiovisual model is according to EBU15 “consisting of European and 
national regulation, as well as support schemes”. This model is defined as “built on the 
coexistence of a dynamic public sector and the private sector, combining the concern for 
pluralism (of content and information) with audience satisfaction, defending access to 
culture, linguistic diversity and the various political, ethnic and religious sensitivies”16, 
according to French audiovisual producer / distributor lobbyists.
For the D/AHGI the European audiovisual model facilitates the expression of Irish and 
European identity.
“We want to have an expression of Irish identity in the audiovisual sector, hence 
our support for the local industry. We are European; we want to have our 
European identity expressed in the European audiovisual sector. Apart from that, 
once the space is there to enable Europe and Ireland to express itself, we have no
great hang-ups about what material comes in to Ireland.” (D/AHGI 2, interview, 
Dublin)
From the same interviewee, no expansion was given on how much space is required to 
ensure this expression, nor the extent to which this space is representatively Irish, 
expressing uniquely Irish identity. This researcher argues that much of the content 
classified as ‘European’ is of British or Irish in origin, and the remainder of the content 
on screen is often imported American product.
3.4.4 Cultural rights
Corcoran’s key question asks: "Are there cultural preconditions which underpin the 
liberal value of freedom of individual choice and can issues of cultural membership be 
incorporated into liberal principles of human rights? The notion of cultural, as opposed 
to individual, rights is crucial here". (Corcoran 2001:19)
“It is increasingly difficult to assert "cultural exceptions" in transnational trade 
negotiations and insert a non-economic recognition into the meaning of communication. 
The paradox here is that this seismic shift of power away from democratically 
controlled institutions is being brought about by the actions of nation states themselves 
as governments confer unprecedented power of governance on a range of supranational 
agencies with no democratic accountability. For true believers in market liberalisation, 
the driving vision is to restore competition "to its natural state" and push back the power 
of the state to its proper minimal terrain, guaranteeing law and order and property 
rights". ((Corcoran 2001: 26-27)
Corcoran defines “cultural rights of persons belonging to national minorities include the 
rights to preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity, 
freely use their national language, create and maintain their own educational and 
cultural institutions, maintain contact with persons of common ethnic origin within and 
outside their country and take part in public affairs". (Corcoran 2001:16) He suggests 
widening the remit of 'cultural rights' previously reserved for ethnic, linguistic and other 
minorities, and suggesting that these rights too apply to majority groups.
Corcoran admits that the area of cultural rights is a relatively under-defined category of 
human rights, and has usually pertained to minority ethnic or linguistic groups. 
However, he finds it might be useful for a theory of cultural rights to underpin national 
laws, international agreements and inform professional ethics and practices in all
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cultural industries, especially broadcasting. This is he claims because of the power of 
media and broadcasting for the cohesion of society.
In Ireland, former Minister Higgins (Labour) was guided by Corcoran amongst others in 
his deliberations on broadcasting policy.
During his time in office as Culture Minister, active within the European Union fora, 
Higgins challenged the ECOFIN Council, and those Ministers who politically were 
‘right of centre’. According to Higgins, their market thinking dogma rested on the belief 
that “we can return to cultural issues when the marketplace is more buoyant and the 
economy recovers”. For Higgins, it was a question of an egalitarian model, a residual 
model, or a rights model. Many EU Ministers operated according to a ‘residual model’ 
of culture.
In 1995, Minister Higgins produced his Green Paper on the Future of Irish 
Broadcasting. The academic-natured proposals contained within were refined into the 
‘Clear Focus ’ Heads of Bill (1996). The Clear Focus government proposals for 
broadcast legislation foundered in July 1997 when a new Fianna Fail-Progressive 
Democrat government came to power. His predominant thinking behind these policy 
documents was the desire to define a ‘cultural space for citizens’. Being familiar with 
both academic literature and media industry publications, Higgins formulated the Green 
Paper (1995) by drawing on Raymond Williams, Thomas Paine’s theories of the rights 
of man, the notion of collective cultural rights, devised within a public sphere model 
based on Habermasian thinking. His principal advisor during this time was Colm 
O’Briain. Advice relative to the Canadian position on broadcasting and cultural policy 
was sought from Prof. Farrel Corcoran of Dublin City University. The policy issue from 
a trade and communications point of view was that Ireland was trying to preserve space 
for the national voice, and needed to legislate for broadcasting from a citizenship not a 
market model.
The main concept that Higgins wished to argue was the “new concept of the cultural 
space...citizenship applied to cultural space”. One of his main challenges was to 
address the public’s perception of broadcasting as a ‘cultural issue’. The Minister’s 
argument centred on the rights of those who are excluded from the market - those
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unemployed, with low consumer consumption patterns who nonetheless still possessed 
“communication rights”. Habermas identifies access to the marketplace in order to avail 
of the published public opinion, news, and information -  i.e. goods available on the 
market -  as a key democratic right. (1989:38)
At his starting point in the years 1993 and 1994 as Irish Minister for Culture, Higgins 
posits that he had found himself in a minority in Europe of two or three taking an 
opposing view to the other twelve Culture ministers in the Council of Ministers who 
took a market-based approach to culture. In 1996, Ireland held the Presidency of the EU 
for the latter six months. An informal meeting of EU Culture Ministers was convened in 
Galway in the Autumn. By the time of the Galway Culture Ministers’ meeting, a 
majority of Ministers had come over to the approach that Higgins espoused, and had 
accepted that audiovisual was a cultural aspect of citizenship, rather than a commodity 
product. However, despite a majority of EU Culture Ministers coming round to his 
approach, Higgins admits this had little or no effect on the standpoint of the European 
Commission. Although he acquired influence within the European Parliament and 
amongst other Member States’ Ministers of Audiovisual and Culture during in his time 
in office, he hadn’t managed to change the Commission’s thinking. (Interview with MD 
Higgins, Dublin)
Higgins’ work prior to rising to fame as Culture Minister focused on human rights. In 
his view, rights are “indivisible”; they “cannot be recovered in a piecemeal way”. For 
Higgins, civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights are all of one family that 
hold equal standing. They cannot be divided into primary and secondary rights. The 
model of citizenship that he admired offered the full round of rights. In Higgins’ 
opinion, “There is no way that the market model can deliver cultural rights or 
communication rights”. This author considers that the cultural rights of minorities to 
expression are well protected legally. However, traditionally, civil and political rights 
have held greater weight than social or cultural rights.
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3.5 The Right to Cultural Diversity
The issue of ‘cultural diversity’ remains, within the Council of Ministers, an 
“unresolved issue”. It was noted in the EU Draft Council Conclusions in preparation of 
the third WTO Ministerial Council (6 October 1999) that on issues of cultural diversity, 
there was little agreement between Member States. It remained an outstanding issue, 
indicating that further discussions were necessary to come to agreement during the 
forthcoming WTO (Seattle) negotiations.
The classic opposition argument to that of free and liberal trade in audiovisual services 
has been based on the assumption that national governments should be capable of 
drafting and enforcing national regulations for the audiovisual or ‘cultural’ industries, 
for the promotion of ‘cultural diversity’ in addition to ‘national culture’ and ‘national 
cultural expression’. The argument for ‘cultural diversity’ is based on the leeway 
allowed to national governments to remain nationally sovereign, autonomous and to 
enact national policy strategies. This thesis suggests that Culture Ministers utilise the 
‘cultural diversity’ and ‘national cultural autonomy’ argument to disguise the 
underlying desire for the retention of an independent commercial and trade policy. 
Despite the desire for independence in these matters - autonomy of the Irish tax regime 
being the new line of defence against the encroachment of the EU - the Irish Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Brian Cowen, recently argued in the context of the Nice Treaty 
Referendum II that “sovereignty means shared sovereignty, to be used with others” 
(RTE radio 1 panellists discussion, 12 October 2002).
This thesis’ empirical findings suggest that Ireland’s autonomy in cultural policy is 
extremely limited. Further, evidence reveals that, in the totality of trade strategies since 
the Tokyo Round of 1979 (and possibly before, although this period is not under 
research), Ireland’s interests in protecting or safeguarding the culture aspect of trade in 
cultural goods and services has been low priority, save for the period duñng which 
Minister Higgins highlighted its importance in 1994. One reason for this may be that 
American audiovisual dominance of screens was not so pronounced in Ireland prior to 
the development of an independent commercial broadcasting sector.
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Part II: Human Rights in the Public Spheres of Markets
Chapter 4.
The Introduction of liberal economic principles
In Part 2, this thesis argues that expression of a nationalistic determination of a separate 
‘culture’ and national citizenship in Ireland first surfaced as an awareness and demand 
for trading rights and autonomous trade policy. I seek to demonstrate that a defence of 
public sphere rights as cultural rights have firstly, no basis in historical truth in Ireland’s 
case, and secondly, are no longer applicable to multi-cultural societies.
Separate Irish nationhood and the foundation of an independent Irish nation state was 
built upon a cultural revivalist strategy devised by Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen 
(1791) that elevated pre-colonial pagan Celtic myths of the Irish motherland (see 
Kearney, McBride 2000) and exalted a cultural republican model of citizenship 
(Rousseau, Malby, Babeuf, Marechal, Millar (2000)) that stated cultural difference was 
a strong enough reason for independence from Britain and a separate, distinct 
nationhood.
In the final stages, Ireland’s demands for inclusion of Catholics in citizenship were 
bolstered by a cultural argument. This was reinforced by the 19th c. Young Irelander 
movement. However, it is my thesis that the beginnings of this demand for citizenship 
status originated in discontent with Britain’s policy on Ireland’s trade, publicised and 
politicised through republican newsprint and pamphlets that stimulated public opinion 
and debate.
My understanding is that the beginnings of an awareness of ‘human rights’ appeared 
approximately 30 years earlier within the marketplace community, where discussions 
first surfaced regarding unfair and restrictive regulation of trading and international 
trade.
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Britain’s restriction of the independent trade policy of American colonists started 
creating unrest from the 1720 Tobacco Law, and exploded with the imposition of the 
1765 Stamp Act. Irish Catholics expressed dissent about their trading terms and 
conditions with America as dictated by Great Britain from 1774 onwards when Irish 
commercial interests became subject to American-British tension and continued to be a 
cause of great concern until 1782 when Ireland gained autonomy and independence 
from Britain in foreign trade policy.
Whelan (1996) suggests that political discussions were located in the 17th and 18th 
centuries (and still are....) mainly in the press, pamphlets and the 'coffee houses' of 
Dublin -  i.e. the multitude of pubs and public houses - following the influx of 
Enlightenment influence. I suggest that the public sphere of illiterate people (that is, the 
majority) was located in the fairs, markets and trading centres of the small towns and 
countryside. (Randall (1996) suggests that markets in 18th and 19th centuries were the 
principal locus of community identity.)
Therefore, this thesis argues that the development of print and spread of newspaper 
literature placed the oral discontent to be found in the loci of marketplaces and trading 
ports (see also Whelan (1996)) into the written expression of public opinion which 
called for independent nationhood for reasons of a different cultural identity to that of 
Great Britain. This culture was based on a different religious identity, and associated 
customs. Yet it is this thesis’ argument that the beginning of the demand for citizenship 
rights was founded on economic rationales. The economic and civil rights of the 
majority of Irish people were violated under British rule.
McLoughlin (1999) confirms my hypothesis that British colonial trade policy was key 
to the development of an independent Ireland. It derived from firstly, the sense of 
injustice in return for their loyalty to the British crown, and secondly in 1782, combined 
with demands for independence in trade and commercial policy and other areas of 
legislature. This created the development of a sense of distinct Irish identity, and an 
imagined independent country, that then led on to the sense of Irish nationalism and the 
creation of a myth of Irish culture and cultural heritage.
Locke’s concept of a social contract amongst men to form a society and act sovereignly 
and independently was in direct contrast to Coke’s concept of feudal allegiance and
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subservience to a divine king. Locke published Two Treatises of Government in 1690, 
the Second Treatise being his key work. The Lockean theoiy of individual rights to life, 
expression, press freedom and property overturned and replaced Coke’s theory of 
collective rights. Locke’s utilitarian plan of individual civil and political rights won out 
in the rebellious American colonies seeking independence and liberty from Britain.
In Ireland, the United Irishmen led by Wolfe Tone were greatly inspired by Thomas 
Paine’s work, The rights of man. Paine’s theory of natural rights, deriving from the 
historical models of Rome and Greece, applied only to individuals, not to cultures 
(according to Gibbons (1998)). Therefore Paine was writing on natural rights of the 
individual man in a similar vein to Locke’s theory of individual rights. Political debate 
focused on rights that were designed to protect the individual’s freedom from state 
repression. These are classed as ‘negative’ Utilitarian rights.
In practice, the United Irishmen’s demands for citizenship rights in the 18th century 
focused on demands for civil participation, political enfranchisement and sovereignty, 
and a redistribution of confiscated land back to the Catholic community, with individual 
property rights to share in its wealth. (Cullen 1972, Whelan 1996) They demanded the 
enfranchisement of Catholics into the citizenry; parliamentary reform to include self- 
government; a redistribution of property, and the right to independent trade relations 
with America.
Unlike the United Irishmen, Burke took a stance that was anti-Locke. Burke was a 
disbeliever of Locke’s theory of a pre-social man with abstract natural rights, and he 
was similarly opposed to the idea of free individuals. In the same way as he opposed 
free individuals, Burke conceptualised the function of rights as being for the purpose of 
gluing society together, not for the protection of the individual person. Burke’s view 
was strictly pro-community and in favour of cohesive society. Burke’s concept of rights 
was historical, passed on through tradition, history, and the nation. (Pappin III 1997) 
National citizenship, as espoused by Rousseau, Herder, Hegel and Burke is legally 
bound to protect nationally based rights. Closa argues that nationality became the 
essential determining factor for citizens’ rights, when citizenship became linked to a 
territorial boundary, within which public space citizenship and rights could be 
guaranteed and protected.
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Who is responsible for the duty reciprocating the right to freedom of expression, the 
right to reception of information and communication and the right to participation in 
public debate?
Can it still be correctly assumed that it is the duty of the nation state to protect its 
citizens’ rights if the normal operation of market activities fails to adequately supply 
public goods? (Corcoran 2001, Keynes, MD Higgins, Ward 2001, Calabrese & Borchert 
1996 all think so, as did Roosevelt’s 1930’s New Deal policies)
Some theorists (Raboy, Hamelink, Corcoran 2001) argue that the nation state has 
willingly ceded authority and power in a range of policy areas to international 
intergovernmental institutions and organisations. This thesis’ empirical research appears 
to support that claim.
While traditionally, in other areas or spheres of activity, a violation of rights can result 
in compensation for the victimised, this is not yet an active practice with relation to 
rights of the public sphere, although Murdock and Golding (1989) suggest it is the 
responsibility and duty of the communication and information systems to meet the 
demands and needs of citizens in relation to communication. Is it possible to extract 
compensation for the violation of individual rights from that private sector which avidly 
avoids stringent adherence to legislation, both national and international? It might be 
possible within the WTO like in the NAFTA Canadian agreement.
In the following section, I outline the trading environment of Ireland with America and 
Great Britain in the 17th and 18th centuries. I show how demands for human rights first 
originated within the context of trade, and trading rights within communities. These 
were initially demanded by American colonists, then Irish Catholics in rebellion against 
the colonial oppressor of human rights of that era, Great Britain. This thesis argues that 
demands for national autonomy in trade and commercial matters took precedence over 
demands for cultural separatism, and that the former was the basis of Irish demands for 
sovereign citizenship.
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4. 1 The liberal market, protested
Kerridge suggests that the prominence of the market, and its remedy to all problems 
came at a specific historical time, "at the intersection of the old and the new, at the 
junction between patterns of trading relationships and controls which dated back into 
the early modem period and the new vibrant 19th century economy of the "Workshop of 
the World." ( B. L. Anderson and A.J. Latham 1984:4 )
A combination of factors: the Enlightenment forces of progress, a developing free 
liberal market and the political economy of Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations 1776) all 
helped to create an unsubstantiated belief in the self-regulating power of the market.
The capitalist market is the hallmark of utilitarian liberal thought. The liberal political 
community promotes a route from bourgeois economic principles to potential sources of 
wealth. (Adam Smith, Utilitarians) In the 18th century, civilisations lived or perished 
depending on the land. The most dramatic impact of the French and Industrial 
Revolutions was on landed property, land tenure and agriculture.
Despite a common goal -  freeing the link between peasant and land so that labour could 
move freely from village to village or from village to town, and in order that the wealth 
of the land could be exploited more efficiently and to greater profit -  America took to 
capitalistic entrepreneurship with much greater enthusiasm than in Europe. It was a 
common belief that the main source of wealth in the 17th and 18th centuries -  land -  
should be transformed capitalistically in order to promote the economic development of 
the country. Three things had to take place -  firstly, land had to be transformed into a 
commodity, for private ownership and sale. (Britain, which had never experienced 
feudalism in the European sense, had already put all land into private holdings with the 
1760 Enclosure Acts.) Secondly, land had to pass into the hands of those enlightened, 
profit-motivated and self-interested men who would develop its potential and 
productivity for the market much more efficiently than a forced labourer. And thirdly, 
great masses of agrarian peasants had to become the new mobile labour-force for the
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industrial and agricultural economies. (Hobsbawm 1962) This had different results in a 
variety of countries.
Rather than turning into the owner-occupier small commercial farmer of the American 
system (who was encouraged to ‘move up the social scale’ by in turn employing labour 
workers on his private enterprise), the French farm-workers developed into a nation of 
small-scale peasant proprietors. They were satisfied with what they had, made an 
agreeable life on the land without too much hardship, and resisted pressures to move to 
the towns, thus slowing the growth of French industrial development.
This was not adopted wholesale or without protest in many parts of England, in 
particular when the local civic authorities resisted this dogma of the market in favour of 
continuing local stability and peace and order. In France, the vast bulk of the rural 
population (from the largest feudal lord down to the most poverty-stricken shepherd) 
vehemently opposed any introduction of bourgeois-individualist rationalism on the land. 
Between 1789 and 1848 feudalism and oaths of allegiance to their landlord were 
abolished, the poor were forced off their land and the peasantry were set free to move 
about for work or buy back their land.
In Europe, the ideals of collective land ownership had been retained, even past the 
abolition of feudalism. Resistance came from both the traditional peasantry, and the pre­
capitalist landlords. While the European peasants were keen for land, they did not want 
the bourgeois agrarian economy that went with it.
‘The introduction of liberalism on the land shattered the social structure the 
peasant had always inhabited and relied upon: in its place it left nothing but the 
rich, and 'freedom' felt like solitude.’ (Hobsbawm 1962:194)
Nonetheless, in Britain as well as in France, public confidence in the self-regulating 
powers of the liberal market was weak. Many towns in 18th century Britain, for 
example, Oxford and Coventry, shared an emphasis and insistence on traditional forms 
of regulation and control. Randall et al. (Randall, Charlesworth et al. 1996) suggest that 
despite the Parliamentary push for a national market economy, "Even those cities most 
committed to free markets in the 18th c. were not prepared to push ideology before 
public order” (pi 1). Randall et al. note that "Even those most concerned to maintain
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free trade did not shrink from market intervention to safeguard social welfare and social 
and political order” (pi2) especially regarding low bread prices.
Marshall, for one who promotes social rights so strongly, favours the precedence of the 
market system over any rights allowances, stipulating that “measures designed to raise 
the general level of civilisation of the workers must not interfere with the freedom of the 
market. If they did, they might become indistinguishable from socialism”. (Marshall 
1950:80)
Marshall believed that a free market was not incompatible with communitarian 
redistributive rights, although they might lessen its competitiveness. He hoped that the 
expansion of social rights could modify the capitalist system so as to bring about 
equality in the realm of both class distinctions and economic well-being. Marshall must 
have assumed that the modem industrial community would eventually stabilise. 
However, the conflict between the free market and measures to provide equality in the 
modem age is still raging. We see this particularly in the concentrations of corporations, 
a limited number of dominant players within the marketplace, and a burgeoning rich- 
poor divide in the 21st century.
It was the British Parliament that led the way towards a free market - it repealed the old 
statutes concerning forestalling and regrating in 1772, and central government also 
acted in ways which distorted the market in grain.
However, the free market rhetoric could always be subdued when occasions demanded
market manipulation, for example, during times of continental food crisis, which
instigated food riots in Britain and Ireland.
"Advocates of the free market in the later 18th c. were concerned to argue that 
the removal of regulation would ensure regularity of supply and could not play 
into the hands of speculators and monopolists. Popular opinion was by no means 
assured and the ancient distrust of the middleman continued to inform crowd 
and paternalist thinking alike." (Randall 1996:9)
There were many who had little enthusiasm for “the free market and unfettered 
capitalist world order they foresaw. " (Ibid, 1996:24)
The free market flew in the face of a long-established tradition of collective rights and 
collective customs. Peasants were still accustomed to receiving help from their
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landlords in times of high prices or scarcity. This made them continue to expect a 
heavily interventionist and 'paternalist economy' market model. For example, peasants 
held the right to low priced bread, the right to gather fuel from the landlord's forest, and 
other collective rights that had roots in a peasant-landlord-king feudal regime. Randal et 
al suggest that there was "a deep-rooted community determination to uphold a popular 
market culture in marked contrast to the free market culture of the Classical 
Economists" (pi5)
In the new free-market economy, the power of the public lay in the collective power of 
public protest, riot and revolution which the authorities feared and sought to avoid.
"Change in market provisioning and market practices was a much contested 
arena of conflict between the older models of regulation and control and new 
forces of market freedom and autonomy". (Randall, Charlesworth et al. 1996:5)
Food markets, the provision and exchange and trading of foodstuffs is suggested by 
Randal et al. as one of the main arenas where tensions were played out - there was the 
attempt at the rise of a national market in grain, prices increased, availability of 
foodstuffs fluctuated, and there was much popular unrest and riots caused by anger over 
food controls during the 18th century. The real power to control prices is ascertained to 
be the buyers and consumers who kept an active check and unashamedly reported unfair 
trading behaviour to local middlemen. Anomalies were often reported in the press and 
newssheets.
While the action was centred on the marketplace, the incitement and organization of 
popular protests (against deviance in the marketplace, against unfair prices and price 
fixing, against dishonest dealers and stockpilers of goods, against illicit taxes) was 
stimulated by the growing presence of the press and the formulation of public opinion in 
printed debate.
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4.2 The 18th century marketplace as locus o f  community and 
public sphere
Habermas argues that the practice of critiquing State actions had its roots in the private 
(meaning, within the locality of the private conjugal family) criticism of literary works 
-  what Habermas distinguishes as the ‘literary public sphere’. From this base, and with 
the move to more public locations of discussion like the coffee houses in Great Britain 
in the late 17th to early 18th centuries criticism transmuted from literary to political 
topics. Although the blossoming number of coffee houses in Great Britain in the early 
18th century were theoretically more open to a wider strata of the middle classes, the 
drinks themselves (tea, coffee, chocolate) served in these houses were the drinks of the 
‘well to do’ classes. Although these seats of discussion were in principle less formal in 
manner than French literary salons, the growing number of participants still remained 
among the exclusively male landed gentry, moneyed capitalist and aristocratic nobility, 
professionals and merchant classes.
Randall et al. suggest rather that the marketplace and the market is an interesting 
location by which to identify changing social, economic and political relationships in 
the period of the long 18th century (taken as stretching from the mid 1600s to the early 
part of the 19th century).
The markets (rather than coffee houses as Habermas posits) are suggested as being the 
locus of the community identity. This was the place where news was exchanged and the 
locality came together, sometimes to organise collective protests to protect then- 
collective rights and customary rights coming under pressure by the new free market 
economy. These authors suggest that the market place, not the church or public house, 
was the centre of community.
They argue that in Britain,
"The market and the marketplace [also] formed a concrete physical location and 
the centre for community interchange, not only economic but also social and 
political. The market was the principal focus of community identity. It was a 
place where relationships were made and developed, where news and gossip 
were exchanged, where values, attitudes and opinions were disseminated,
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acquired or debated. Much more than the church or the public house...the market 
was the one place where all classes would meet, where all groups in a highly 
socially stratified society could mingle cheek by jowl. Here was the lifeblood of 
community. In that community, the values and the culture of the market of the 
majority remained, in the 18th century in many respects firmly fixed in the 
regulatory economy of the past. " (Randall, Charlesworth et al. 1996:12)
Cullen (1972) concurs that this was also the case in Ireland from the late 18th to mid 19th 
centuries. Cullen argues that Irish communities formed around the marketplace. 
Ireland's towns and villages could not have grown and developed without commercial 
activity, and these social arenas centred around markets. This model of development is 
akin to the development of city states (e.g. Geneva, Florence, Athens). In 1725, eight of 
the ten major towns in Ireland were ports. Dublin, trading predominantly with Britain 
and Cork, whose main trade was with European maritime nations and the colonies of 
the Atlantic economy were the two largest ports.
"The towns could not have grown except in the context of expanding trade. 
Trade itself could not have increased unless transport facilities improved. All the 
larger towns were deeply involved in trade, a fact highlighted by most of the 
major towns being seaports." (Cullen 1972:86)
One of the first objectives of an improving landlord in Ireland was to establish markets 
and fairs and often to erect a market-house. Many insignificant villages also grew 
rapidly in the second half of the 18th century, expanding around a market for livestock, 
produce or cloth produced in the surrounding district. Some villages grew up around 
fairs for cattle and products of the cloth industry.
Recent academic research has re-focused on the "role of the market and its power to 
modernize and to transform". Some authors have a concept of the market as "agency" 
and of the market as "ideological impetus" and who posit the market as a force for 
social and political change. These authors include Anderson and Latham (1984) and 
Hont and Ignatieff (1983).
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4. 3 The blossoming o f the critical public sphere - 
- the politicisation o f  media, press and public opinion
The changes brought about in the realm of enfranchisement of the lower classes in 
Ireland during the late 1780s was largely due to the démocratisation of the press and the 
large propaganda distribution machine of the United Irishmen, despite severe legal and 
political restrictions on public discourse imposed at a time of international war and 
domestic unrest, particularly during the 1790s.
Paine’s Rights of Man was a leading inspiration to the United Irishmen. Paine managed 
to write about complex theories in an accessible manner, comprehensible to the non- 
literary public. It was through Paine and Wolfe Tone, and their use of vernacular 
(English) language that the majority of Irish disenfranchised Catholics were able to 
comprehend, and thus participate in the vernacular (as opposed to high literary) public 
sphere. (Whelan 1996)
in Britain, the public sphere grew within coffeehouses and journals; in France, debate 
flourished within literary salons held in private aristocratic homes; in Germany at table 
societies hosted by academics; and in Ireland, in the location of markets, fairs, public 
houses, press and pamphlets.
Catholic, illiterate non-citizens first became ‘citizens’ of the oral public sphere through 
listening to the recitation of newspapers in public places and watching politicised 
popular theatre, and hearing songs and poems, and the public opinions in the public 
sphere. (Gibbons 1998) ‘Oral culture’, and the politicisation of these methods of 
spreading news helped the illiterate Catholics integrate into the public sphere. They 
stimulated public opinion towards a demand to change the laws.
The United Irishmen -  who led the politicisation of popular vernacular cultural forms -  
wanted citizenship rights for the Catholic population, representing four-fifths of the 
entire nation. They could only legally print in Belfast, and there, the Northern Star 
paper was their chief vehicle for radical politics. They tried to outline the benefits to the 
populace of following parliamentary reform, and the movement fighting for it.
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McBride explains that,
"In their attempts to communicate with a constituency which had little 
experience of political debate, the United Irishmen highlighted the tangible 
benefits which would follow from parliamentary reform, with the abolition or 
reduction of tithes, church rates, hearth money, excise taxes and the county cess 
all high on the agenda". (McBride 2000:163)
The English described the situation as “peasants being led by intelligent treason”. 
(Whelan 1996)
McBride suggests that the roots of the 1798 Irish Rebellion lay with economic and 
social changes that had started in the 1750s and 1760s with the beginnings of sustained 
commercial and agricultural growth in an expansionist 18th century economy. 
However, while these factors created the social conditions for politicization, McBride 
suggests it was the "unprecedented explosion of print culture that converted discontent 
into disaffection" (McBride 2000: 173), first in the northern province, then Leinster and 
Munster.
The new lower-class literature had subversive effects. The handbills that were 
distributed at “every village, fair and market” were teaching people that they were the 
most wretched, oppressed, abused people, and that "all their miseries could be attributed 
to one political cause, namely, the radically bad government under which they lived”. 
(McBride 2000: 176)
The United Irishmen are said to have made every man a politician. It was the United 
Irishmen’s task to use the vernacular common-day language in writing, and the oral 
forms of entertainment familiar to them, to create an “accessible, democratic language 
of politics” which would enable the common people to become citizens and voice a 
public opinion. Gibbons (1998) notes that the concentration on vernacular media meant 
that all people could take part in the Revolution against British Rule in 1798. It was 
through oral (and the politicisation of oral culture) that the 'public sphere' was brought 
and adopted by the illiterate. Often these handbills and public newssheets were sold in 
markets and village fairs, making this arena the principal locus of the public sphere for 
the non-elitist non-reading public.
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Whelan (1996) acknowledges the politicisation of popular culture and the stimulation of 
public opinion, yet does not address the issue of trade in Ireland as a factor of the 
development of the public sphere.
Hampsher-Monk argues that Burke was in great favour of public opinion -  but preferred
not to listen to it himself, or to take account of it in Bristol, which was his constituency.
"Opinion was the great support of the state, thought Burke, and the politician's 
art was in managing and concerting opinion amongst the politically aware 
community - necessarily, he thought, a small proportion of the population. The 
statesman must pay attention to the nature of opinion and the social forces and 
institutions which shape and support it. Americans asked for their traditional 
English rights without disturbing the social structure of their colonial society; 
the French were inspired by abstract rights; and as the revolution wore on 
undermined more and more of the social institutions of traditional French 
society - the aristocracy, local government, the administration of law, the 
Church, the economy. In the absence of these institutional supports, public 
opinion was easy prey to abstract radical ideas, which, he thought, dissociated 
from experience and lacking a deep foundation in the minds of the people, were 
easily manipulated for ultimately terrifying purposes. “ (Hampshpr-Monk 
1987:41) Burke feared a Hobbesian state of nature.
However, it is noted earlier by Hampsher-Monk (1987) that Burke was only tolerant to 
a limited degree of the public opinion that was expressed to him as an MP. It is said that 
one of the reasons why he lost his office in Bristol is partly due to his attitude that while 
an MP should listen carefully to his constituents, he should reserve actions pending on 
making his own mind up about what would be in the constituency’s best interests, or the 
common public good.
Marshall argues that the awakening of public opinion in Britain along with a growing 
national consciousness produced sensations of 'community membership' and 'common 
heritage'. However they had no effect whatever on social inequality or class structure, 
because of the lack of political enfranchisement or utility of that political voting power 
by the masses of working people.
4.4 The Public Sphere o f  the Market and Expression o f  Public 
Opinion
The press and pamphlets of the day helped to organise local protest if needed, and were 
the shapers of public opinion with regard to the market economy, prices and trading 
regulations. (Randall, Charlesworth et al. 1996) They were often the ones also who 
were “quick to condemn the activities of those who were deemed to have deprived the 
local market of food supplies or to have artificially inflated prices. This might even be 
seen to encourage crowd action". (Randall, Charlesworth et al. 1996:14) 
Demonstrations of public opinion took the form of peaceable demonstrations, minor 
fracas, or full-blown food riots disguising a political agenda. Riots often started over 
food, but they might reflect long-held grievances about other subjects. The riots were 
focused on food or drink, but really they were social protests with a wider agenda. The 
most striking aspect of the 18th century protests is their acceptability -  it represented and 
augmented a ‘tradition of protest’, and their community nature. Although all the public 
might not get involved, all members of the society usually held an opinion.
Usually it was the weavers, textile workers, miners, and lower classes who were 
involved in food riots. The middle ranks were often not prepared to take an active part 
in market disturbances, however they might use their real powers to express hostility 
towards the authorities themselves, or use their powers within the corporation. The 
Middling sort (acknowledged as those ’propertied' or those 'citizens’ like artisans and 
urban tradespeople) supported a moral economic stance. They might not approve of the 
riotous form of much popular protest and the collective strength of the rioters, but they 
had an ethic of the sort which embodied "A deep commitment to a world view 
structured by a discourse of rights and entitlements, in which communities had 
obligations to protect their weaker and poorer members from the ill-effects of both 
natural and man-made disasters, was required to make them behave in this way". 
(Renton, quoted in Randal et al 1996:21)
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The press hovered at times between endorsing public forms of protest and yet 
acknowledging the need to maintain social order.
However, public opinion in 18th century Britain was formed not only in the press, but 
also in the open through politicised theatrical displays conveyed in symbolic puppetry 
or messages to an illiterate public, often at election times. "Theatre of the streets was a 
highly effective means of reinforcing political messages to a largely sub-literate 
populace". (Ibid p22)
This is an important point -  oral distribution of news also played an important role in 
the formation of public opinion amongst the illiterate, non-reading public. The reading 
public sphere of literate people represented only a minute percentage of the general 
public. Meantime, the vast majority of the non-reading public availed themselves of 
news, and news of disturbances at public readings of broadsheets, and in Ireland in 
particular, it is noted that through satire and verse that were sung or performed wholly 
in the vernacular language of common-day use many poor Catholics became aware of 
their political and civil rights.
4.5 Human rights in trade: The Empire and Colony in the 18th 
century
I wish to highlight the role of trade and trading practices in the development of an 
awareness of rights, the notion of citizen, and citizenship in the psyche of the member 
of the public. I argue that trade barriers were recognized as the first act of oppression of 
human rights. It was in the marketplace, within the perspective of the marketplace 
society, that the first members became aware of their rights, and demanded them from a 
‘human’ and ‘natural’ rights perspective. This differs from some theorists and 
philosophers who argue the volk, the culture, the identity and the nation was the driving 
force behind the demand for rights -  which the nation state could then protect.
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4.6 Irish -  US trade factor in rights’ claims
Between 1760 and the early 1770s, Ireland’s trade with the American colony was strong 
and profitable. However, Ireland as a colony of the British Empire was adversely 
affected by the numerous and various Acts introduced by Britain that provoked 
American political dissent leading to rebellion and independence. Burke never viewed 
the American war as a revolution, but as a civil war within the Empire. The difference 
between the French and the American revolutions was this: American revolution was 
never a social revolution, while the French was from the start infused with radical 
political ideas, according to Hampsher-Monk (1987),
Ireland and its trade with America was inadvertently penalised by Britain's moves to 
contain the American revolution, and the colony of Ireland repeatedly played piggy-in- 
the-middle in between a British-American war. In Ireland, there was strong sympathy 
for the American cause against the British -  they were being penalized by the same 
British Parliamentary Acts, and experiencing their own rights suppression.
September 1759 has been identified by Stanlis (1997) as the start of the change in 
relations between America and Britain. French Canada was surrendered to the British, 
and Americans realised they no longer needed the military might and protection of 
Great Britain against the Spaniards to the South and the French to the north. They felt 
they were no longer under threat of war from external enemies, better able to defend 
themselves on home ground, and therefore, much more self-reliant. (p30)
However, in terms of internal aggressions, Acts prohibited the export of American 
goods to anywhere other than Britain, giving the British Empire a monopoly over the 
sale of American goods. Acts also imposed external taxes on certain American items 
and products, and it is maintained that the fact of external taxation was the weakest link 
of the colonies’ tolerance with the mother country’s methods of control.
The 1764 Sugar Act was the first in a series of parliamentary measures that externally 
taxed the American colonies. For Irish philosopher Edmund Burke, also MP for Bristol, 
an important port and trading community, 1764 was the "turning point in Britain's 
policy towards her American colonies, because in that year, for the first time,
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Parliament was not content to control America through commercial regulations, but 
instead sought to secure revenue through taxation.” 1764 was a key date for a change in 
British policy towards her colonies, through enacting bad economic policy that caused 
severe discontent and ever-increasing public disturbances. According to Burke, there 
was already evidence of internal government in America and colonial self-rule.
For Stanlis (1997), the discontent between America and Britain was centred on the issue 
of sovereign rights. This is indicative that oppression within trade leads to an awareness 
and rebellion for rights. This came to the fore when policy changes were introduced by 
Britain relating to trade, commerce, the trading environment and the regulation and 
governance of that environment. Britain’s policies in these Acts raised issues of 
"taxation and representation, revenue and regulation, freedom and subordination". 
Taxation issues created avid discontent, and gave rise to the stimulation of political 
public opinion. Americans protested, saying that a British gentleman’s right was ‘no 
taxation without representation’. America was effectively querying: are we subject or 
are we independent? Stanlis suggests that "The American revolutionaries appealed to 
abstract slogans about 'rights' in order to justify exempting themselves from taxes under 
British sovereignty. "(Stanlis 1997: 30)
In American eyes, governments in America were 'perfect states' and in 'no way subject' 
to Great Britain. In British eyes, the American governments were 'corporations 
empowered to make byelaws’. (Stanlis 1997:24)
It is clear then that the outcry over the regulation of trade stimulated debate on rights 
and citizenship. Ireland came to be caught up in this because of her geographical 
location as an important port for American goods en route to the British Isles. The 
contest was between Great Britain’s right to tax vis a vis the right of American colonies 
to th e ir  in d e p e n d e n t e c o n o m ic  p o licy . To b e  ta x a b le , th e  A m e ric a n s  re a so n e d , w a rra n te d  
political rights, and a right to political input.
In Burke's eyes Britain’s role was to supervise, not supersede colonial governments. 
Trying to rule territories on 'mere abstract principles of government' was ludicrous, he 
thought. To insist on an 'abstract right' to tax the colonies, was fatal. Burke saw that the 
attempt by the ministry to enforce its 'rights' of sovereignty in America would result in 
the loss of the colonies. His advice to the British Parliament was:
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"Leave America, if she has taxable matter in her, to tax herself." (Stanlis 
(1997:35)
He considered his warnings for Britain on the American issue had relevance for 
Britain’s other colonies -  his home country Ireland in particular.
Burke wished to help his fellow Irishmen. This put him in a difficult political dilemma:
how to help Ireland without ruining his own credibility. He voiced opposition to
Britain’s handling of the American situation, in the hope that the advice would also
benefit Ireland. Hampsher-Monk illustrates how Burke pushed for free trade, as did
Marshall. Both on the other hand argued the case for national culture and national
heritage and identity.
"Through championing imperial free trade in the case of America, he (Burke) 
sought to alleviate restrictions on Irish trade too. More generally he sought to 
link the cases of America and Ireland and to use the loss of the American 
colonies as a warning less Ireland should go the same way. This ploy proved 
successful - substantial trading concessions were made". (Hampsher-Monk 
1987:27)
Burke changed his opinion during the course of the American revolution (or civil war 
within the British colony, as he called it) from first defending Britain’s right to 
sovereignty in policy making, to subsequently calling for the American colonies to be 
granted separate nationhood -  once he saw that in many policy areas, they had governed 
themselves.
In response, Britain’s insistence on its sovereign rights (employing the concepts of 
Blackstone) to issue whatever policy it deemed reasonable in the areas of taxes, trade, 
and regulation of commerce angered American colonists so much that they in return 
insisted on their individual human rights. (Frohnen 1997, Stanlis 1997, McBride 2000)
The 1764 Sugar Act was followed in 1765 by the Stamp Act, which caused such a 
furore that it was repealed within a year, in March 1766. By 1765 print been elevated to 
the status of "indispensable to political life" and was seen by some as the primary agent 
of world emancipation. (Warner 1990:31)
The American colony would have been quite happy to continue as a British subject in a 
colony-empire relationship, had it not been for the heavy imposition of external taxes on 
transatlantic trade between America and the rest of the world.
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The American founders like James Madison and Hamilton started to publicly scrutinise 
and rationally debate many years of disagreeable laws like the Navigation Acts, 
imposed on the American colonies by the mother country, governing trade and 
commerce and the sale or re-sale of indigenous goods to other countries. In this 
researcher’s interpretation, international trade gives rise to awareness of human rights, 
and demands for sovereign rights over commercial activities and financial autonomy. 
Anglo-American arguments sailing across the Atlantic focused on the colonists seeking 
rationales for the imposition of objectionable Parliamentary acts on the colony. Burke in 
particular chastised the British government for its insistence on the ‘abstract right to 
tax’, and instead urged caution and compromise. Further attempts by King George III 
to impose tighter controls on the British Empire led to a backlash, and the gradual 
unleashing of years of festering malcontent.
4.7 Restriction o f Free Expression in Published Opinion
The press has historically been regulated for political purposes through fiscal taxes. 
Repression of human rights to freedom of expression via The Stamp Act (1765) was the 
final straw for American colonists. For them it represented a violation against the right 
to free expression by imposing taxes on all printed material and dangerously aggrieving 
the most educated and literate in American society. By raising the price of previously 
inexpensive press, the Stamp Act also restricted the right of the reading public to 
receive public information at low cost. The subject caused a furore in press and printed 
pamphlets of the time (particularly in the Virginia Gazette). At the same time as he was 
sending the British navy to attack colonists’ ships, King George III shut down the local 
justice system, so the colonists complained they had no legal means of redressing any 
infringements of their natural rights. They also were aggrieved that as subjects, they 
were being taxed without proper political representation in the British Parliament. ‘No 
taxation without representation’ was their riposte. Americans’ unhappiness and 
frustration at the failure of the king to protect their natural and common law rights and 
freedoms aroused a strong desire to break with the past. In essence, as subjects, they 
owed him no further allegiance because as king he had ‘deposed himself by failing to 
protect their natural freedoms.
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The Stamp duty was the principal tax on newspapers, designed to limit the proliferation 
of the clandestine radical press in Britain. Yet Stamp duty evasion was rampant in the 
early 1830’s and government powers of clampdown were increased. The Stamp duty 
itself was increased by 75% to limit widespread smuggling. To be found even in 
possession of an unstamped newspaper carried severe penalties. Strict enforcement of 
press stamp duties succeeded in eradicating opportunities of expression by undesirable 
political adversaries to the ruling government by 1837. However, Victorian middle- 
class reformers adopted resistance against press taxes, arguing that the Stamp duty law 
was so openly and widely flouted it should be repealed. Their campaign was efficiently 
organised, and by 1855 the Stamp duty had been abolished. Other legislation governing 
the taxing of newspapers was finally removed by the late 19th century -  with the 
abolition of the advertisement duty in 1853 and the security system in 1869 (Curran 
1988: 27).
Curran (Curran and Seaton 1988) argues that it was not the admirable ideals of a 
pluralist press market that stoked the fire of the campaign for a free press. More 
accurately, it was the “growing conviction that free trade and normative controls were a 
morally preferable and more efficient control system than direct controls administered 
by the state”17. In other words, given a more libertarian market environment, the 
increasingly confident Victorian middle class could then be free to use the expanding 
press for the advancement of their own interests -  the press would be used to substitute 
one dominant social order by another.
It is an argument advanced in today’s media climate -  powerful media conglomerates 
eager to reduce and eliminate state regulation of broadcasting, not for any utopian ideals 
of commitment to diversity of expression (although their most common argument is that 
increased channels give greater “consumer choice”) but really for their own powerful 
interests of profit and greater market concentration. In the global media environment, 
where information is a key product, this has serious implications for political and 
democratic control of societies.
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4.8 Repression o f Human Rights in Trade
The 1765 Stamp Act was repealed within a year, in March 1766, but was replaced by 
the 1766 American Act. The American Act prohibited the export of any American 
goods to any port in Europe north of Finisterre (NW Spain) other than Great Britain. 
This was going to have great consequence for the export of flaxseed to Ireland. Linen 
and flax seed was the main business between Ireland and the American colonies. 
Between the years 1770-71 there was a dramatic shift in the structure of Irish-American 
trade, principally in the trade of linen shipped direct to America. The quantities rose 
from 800,000 yards in 1770 to 3 million yards in the following year. America exported 
flax seed to Ireland, and Ireland re-exported it as linen to America.
Ireland protested at the limitations in her trade with America following the 1766 
American Act, and although the British response to exclude Ireland from the ruling was 
swift, "the ...crisis underscored the vulnerability of (Ireland’s) trade to the actions of a 
distant parliament. Across the Atlantic, it was further proof of the inability of the British 
parliament to manage the trade of the empire in the interest of the American colonies”. 
(Truxes 1988:234)
It didn’t take Ireland long to realise that it was repeatedly getting embroiled in wars 
between Britain and the British colonies of America. Ireland was penalized for being a 
colonially ruled country, caught physically in the trans-Atlantic marketplace. The 
greatest concern was the feared demise of the linen industry because of the disallowed 
access of American products into Ireland, in particular the much-prized flax seed.
Likewise, America valued Ireland for its role as an intermediary stationing point for its 
re-exports to Great Britain, especially during the 1776 Revolution when American ships 
could not land there. Commerce with Ireland was one of the few channels available to 
the farmers of the northern colonies whereby their produce could move directly into the 
British Isles.
After the 1766 American Act, Parliament enforced the 1767 Townsend Acts. These 
required the collection of duties on some, selected British goods in American ports. The
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intention was to raise revenue in America for the Empire. In response, the colonies 
exercised a limited boycott of British goods, designed to hurt the trade of the mother 
Empire. However, an exception was made by the British to favour Ireland.
Ireland’s main export to America between 1768 and 1771 was linen and wool. Irish 
linen was a big import to American colonies. Cork was very active in provisioning for 
the crews of trans-atlantic vessels in meat and wheat. This demand for wheat, despite 
the superiority of American wheat, was particularly strong again during the American 
Revolution.
In 1773 the British Parliament came to the rescue of the East India Tea Company in the 
shape of the Tea Act. The company was near bankruptcy, and Parliament's interference 
gave it huge concessions, and thus "unassailable competitive advantage" in the colonies. 
(Truxes 1988:236)
The 1774 Coercive Acts came following the disorders in America, and their 
unambiguous opposition to the actions of the Mother Empire. The British ministry 
clamped harsh restrictive measures on colonial commerce and government. These 
resulted in stimulating bad relations between America and Britain once again, and 
helped lead to a full-scale revolutionary war. American colonists again tried to restrict 
British commerce, this time without excepting Ireland.
American defiance to the Coercive Acts became official on 17 September 1774. Irish 
interests became affected by the British colonial Acts after the first move by Americans 
to insist on their rights with the 1774 American Congress on trading rights. The First 
Continental Congress of the Suffolk Resolves were “a radically defiant statement of 
American rights and prerogatives.” That document recommended withholding "all 
commercial intercourse with Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies" until the full 
restoration of American rights. No Irish imports could enter colonial ports after 1st 
December 1774, and exports were to end on 10th September 1775. It meant that Ireland 
couldn't export linen, flaxseed or flour to America, which had implications for a 
slowdown in the linen-manufacturing sector, eventually leading to decay.
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The Americans sympathised with the Irish predicament of proclaimed innocence in a 
statement saying: "If we continued our commerce with you, our agreement not to import 
from Britain would be fruitless. " (First Continental Congress of the Suffolk Reserves, 
17 September 1774 quoted in Truxes 1988:248)
In July 1775, despite the dangers, Ireland’s Protestants and Dissenters remained 
supportive of the American cause. In October 1776, there was discussion within the 
Continental Congress regarding the possibility of re-opening trade with the Irish only.
Finally, one of the most celebrated events in Irish commercial history (Truxes 
1988:238) occurred between February 1776 and December 1778. The British imposed a 
total embargo on Irish exports to America. This was potentially devastating: if Irish 
linen trade to America was embargoed, then the manufacture of it was likely to be 
depressed. The Belfast merchants formally petitioned the British parliament for relief 
citing "the decay of their linen manufacture, occasioned by the unhappy differences 
between Great Britain and her colonies". (p242)
The embargo only raised more hackles in Ireland against the British. According to 
Truxes, it "focused the discontent in Ireland over English commercial regulation that lay 
just beneath the veneer of Anglo-Irish harmony. Although the impact of the embargo 
upon the provisioning trades was greatly exaggerated in both the liberal press and on the 
floor of the House of Commons, there was some basis for discontent". (Truxes 1988: 
238)
The American Revolution commenced in 1776. Between February 1776 and December 
1778 Great Britain banned all Irish exports to the rebelling American colonies, and 
effectively Irish-US trade was cut off. However, despite this situation, military demand 
from both the British armies and the American rebels combined to create a demand for 
Irish goods that was unparalleled. “During the years of the American Revolution, 
Ireland produced a significant surplus of those articles upon which the fate of 18th 
century armies depended. The British Army relied upon supplies purchased in Ireland 
during its American campaign, and in a much narrower sense, so did the Continental 
Army.” (Truxes 1988:248)
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On the one hand, British military ships stopped at Cork for provisions, supplies and 
victuals (mainly in beef, wheat, butter) before setting off on their trans-Atlantic voyage 
with the intention to subdue the American revolutionaries.
On the other hand, in October 1776 the Continental Congress re-opened the channel of 
clandestine trade between the colonies and Ireland, and it was from the Northern ports 
(Lame, Belfast, Newry -  those that most helped the American cause) that vessels filled 
with gunpowder, linen and woollen produce for army use departed in transit for the 
American armies. Because of the build-up of British Navy ships patrolling the North 
American coast, it was safer for contraband Irish goods intended for the rebel army to 
be transferred to France whereupon they were loaded upon neutral ships of European 
nations destined for those French and Dutch West Indies ports in the Caribbean that 
were considered neutral.
Ireland gained by the increase in demand for her products as well as the high prices paid 
in war-time colonies. There was a great demand for Irish pork, butter, biscuits, herring 
and linen during the war and this was further boosted throughout the 1700s by a 
succession of poor crops in England. All flour producers in Ireland also knew that 
American flour was superior and likely to be in great demand once the American 
dispute was settled. However, due to the ban on importation of American flour, the Irish 
flour mills profited. Two years into the war, some products, especially linen and wool 
experienced inflated prices of between 600 % and 1000 % above 1772-1774 levels. 
There were similar price rises in beef and pork. Military demand in war-time put up 
prices on both sides of the Atlantic, and while Ireland’s producers did good business, 
much of the poorer classes throughout the country suffered through scarcity and price 
increases.
4.9 The beginnings o f the demands for rights
Why did trading or trade rights come to the fore when they did? McBride (2000:173) 
and Whelan suggest that from the 1750s and 1760s there was growth in overseas trade 
and agricultural production in Ireland. There were also the beginnings o f agrarian
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insurgency among farmers and craftsmen adversely affected by shifts in the new market 
economy. Higher demands during the American Revolution also made peasants suffer.
Whelan (1996) asserts that an expansionist 18th century economy between 1760 and 
1840 -  namely, the modernizing commercial exploitation of property rents, of 
commonage lands, of cattle and milk products -  resulted in political, cultural and 
linguistic changes in Ireland during those years. This meant that some Catholic farmers 
nurtured large commercial farms, entered politics and helped to push Catholic rights 
discourses to the fore o f domestic politics. Property owners, although unusually 
Catholic, pushed for citizenship rights. Their property ownership gave them leverage to 
demand political rights.
During this economic and commercial growth period, largely as a result o f British 
intermediary expertise and assistance in marketing and financial services, as Truxes 
(1988) asserts, only one fifth of the population had full civil and political rights. 
Exclusion, says Cullen was based on sex and religion and means.
"The 1841 census divided the population into four categories according to their 
means. The division depended on substance, also in rural areas on the size of 
holdings. The first category included property owners, also farmers of more than 
50 acres. The second included artisans, and farmers with from 5 to 50 acres, the 
third category included labourers and smallholders up to 5 acres. For the rural 
districts of the country at large, the first two categories accounted for 30 % or 
the families. Seventy per cent of the rural population o f Ireland as a whole 
therefore consisted of labourers, smallholders with less than five acres and the 
less prosperous artisans. However, what is more significant is the contrast 
between the two broad divisions in the different regions within the country. The 
first two categories combined ranged from as high as 40 - 42 % in the eastern 
counties to as low as 15 % in Mayo". (Cullen 1972: 111)
Catholics were excluded from government. The one fifth of the population with full 
civil and political rights belonged to the Irish Church and was in communion with the 
Church of England. "These people controlled the country's Parliament and had a duty to 
make laws consistent with the needs o f the whole Irish people." (Frohnen 1997:134)
This combination of disenfranchised masses -  encompassing merchants, tradespeople, 
sellers, buyers, producers, businessmen -  with the rich pickings to be h^d in an
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expanding economy came together to force the issue of trade rights in the late 1700s -  
early 1800s.
Simultaneously, during the late 1790s, The United Irishmen continued to imagine the 
Irish nation in civic and territorial terms rather than as an ethnic or cultural entity. While 
nationalists feared cultural imperialism, what they really wanted was self-government 
and control over commercial affairs. The nationalist cultural revival was in an effort to 
prove Gaelic civility and so gain civil and political status in British parliamentary eyes. 
They linked the rights to cultural expression with trade rights, the right to independent 
commercial policy and ‘free trade’.
The United Irishmen were opposed to social revolution per se, but they did want a 
redistribution o f property, abolition of tithes and hearth money, lower indirect taxes, the 
abolition of excise laws, and reform of the legal process. Truxes suggests that "Behind 
the demand for ‘national government’ there lay a complex set o f political notions." 
Wolfe Tone was in favour of:
1. Separatism (although he repeated in public the classic view of the Anglo-Irish 
connection as a dual monarchy)
2. Independent foreign policy (why should Ireland continue to fight Britains’ battles, he 
asked?)
3. A separate navy (to trade with, as well as to police the sea coast for smuggling and 
contraband)
4. A national flag.
To recap, this thesis argues that trade restrictions on Ireland in 1774 stimulated 
discontent firstly in the marketplace. This discontent (in England, about market 
corruption and price hikes; in France, about the end of the feudal support system; and in 
Ireland, relating to restrictions on her trade with America) focused on the economic and 
political issues of the day. They were publicised orally and in print, to spread dissent. 
The propertied classes were the first to express discontent in Ireland, France and 
America. In Ireland, a few Catholic but principally Protestant property owners 
demanded free trade with America. Freedom to determine her own international trade 
policy was finally granted to Ireland in 1782.
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Independent Trade, Sovereign Citizenship
C h a p t e r  5 .
In this chapter the thesis wishes to emphasise the critical importance of the notion of 
autonomy in trade for those volk who desired independence. This researcher stresses 
that national independence, and a separate nation state status developed from the 
frustration of Irish traders with British infringement of their rights to free trade.
This chapter will outline the history of the Irish struggle for independence in trade 
policy in the late 18th century -  once independent trade had been granted in 1782- and 
the significance of autonomous trade for citizenship and citizens’ human rights.
The latter section of this chapter takes a closer look at the modem day situation that 
Ireland finds itself in with regard to free and autonomous trade. It is the intention to 
illustrate the present day restrictions on Ireland’s free trade, with respect to Ireland’s 
membership of the European Union. As EU member states negotiate with one voice in 
the World Trade Organization forum, this chapter examines the extent to which Ireland, 
member state of the EU, can or does exercise an independent trade policy.
The issue of trade autonomy raises questions for the ability of the nation state (Ireland) 
to fully protect its citizens’ rights.
5.1 Irish trade autonomy in 18th c. foreign commercial activities
In this section, the thesis will outline the influence of the American War of 
Independence on the development of independent Irish trade autonomy in its foreign 
commercial activities. America launched the War of Independence in 1776 with the 
Declaration o f Independence by the United States o f America. Between 1778 and 1782, 
Ireland fought her own separate revolution against Britain, ostensibly demanding ‘free 
trade rights’, in the light of difficulties in Irish-American trade relations as a direct 
result of being a British colony.
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This took its most clarified form after the 1798 Irish revolution, led by the Irish 
Volunteer Movement. In the following years, the Irish Commons demanded free trade. 
The Volunteers and the reform-minded Irish parliament proposed sweeping changes in 
the summer of 1782 by ’’giving the Irish Parliament broad powers to manage foreign 
commerce as well as internal domestic affairs. Thus, when trade resumed in 1783 
between Ireland and America, now the United States of America, it did so on a 
significantly different footing." (Truxes 1988:249) Free trade allowed "trade between 
Ireland and the British colonies and Plantations in America and the West Indies to be 
carried on in a like manner as it is now carried on between Great Britain and the said 
Colonies and Settlements". (Ibid) By 1782, Ireland’s demands to be autonomous in her 
foreign trade and commercial activities were granted.
The 1783 Act for Facilitating the Trade and Intercourse between this Kingdom and the 
United States o f America was passed by Parliament in Dublin. The Irish parliament 
wanted to stimulate foreign commerce and keep Irish trade under Irish control. This 
"reflected the wishes of Patriots both to stimulate foreign commerce and to keep Irish 
trade under Irish control". (Truxes, 1988:249) The Act made Irish-American trade more 
free than it had ever been between 1662 and 1775. After the Revolution, Ireland was 
one of the few European markets to open its doors to American products (particularly to 
the new trade in tobacco) as well as flaxseed and lumber exports to America. In the 
post-Revolution period, Irish trade was on a more stable basis. Ireland had an individual 
relationship with America, rather than through Great Britain.
However, Truxes argues that the benefits were short-lived, and that independent trade 
did not bed down in Ireland. He maintains "Ireland's freedom from commercial 
regulation from across the Irish Sea did not outlive the 18th century. Likewise, the 
constitutional gains of 1782 proved largely specious when tested by crisis, particularly 
that faced by the Irish government after the spread o f French revolutionary ideas to 
Ireland in the 1790s." (1988:251) However, the main advantage gained was that "Irish 
trade emerged from the period of the American Revolution less confined than it had 
been in nearly a century and a half, and it was never again forced into a restrictive 
mould to serve the narrow interests of Great Britain." (p251)
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Stimulated in this way by American demands of freedom from British external taxation, 
Ireland had demanded and won human rights in trade by 1782. Ireland had gained the 
control of its independence, autonomy and rights in foreign commercial activities.
5.2 Theorists’ approaches towards national state autonomy
Hamelink (1995) suggests that in the 21st century, even governments are not fully 
autonomous in their trade policy actions, because they are pressured into changing their 
position o f independence because of threats o f sanctions from Western (US / EU) 
trading partners. He adds that frequently these real policy decisions are not made in the 
GATT forum, but in bi-lateral encounters on the fringes, whereby countries are forced 
to accommodate to US interests (and in return, avoid trade sanctions). This researcher 
concurs with the situation as described by Hamelink within the WTO sphere.
In relation to the EU sphere, Ward (2001) on the other hand argues that the conclusions 
reached by Kaitatzi Whitlock (1996) and Venturelli (1998a), suggesting that the EU has 
done nothing else but deregulate the audiovisual arena using "a blanket application of 
competition policy”, eroding all principles o f broadcasting policy that have been in 
existence since the WWII are ‘overstating the case’. (2001:82) Ward disagrees strongly 
with 'The Orthodoxy" as he calls it, that is, those who believe the driving force of 
European policy is an economic, industrial, liberalisation logic. Ward therefore disputes 
the suggestion that member states are said to be 'disempowered' in the sphere of 
television regulation.
Ward maintains that these erroneous arguments themselves stem from an 'unhelpful' 
distinction elaborated by Richard Collins (1993) in approaches to audio-visual policy 
termed the dirigiste (i.e. the cultural concerns put forward by certain sections of the EC 
and the EP) and the free market approach. The proponents of this ‘orthodoxy’ reject the 
latter approach that has been favoured by the stronger Commission DGs with 
responsibility for Competition, Trade or Information Society, and which is assumed to 
dominate the EP’s cultural concerns.
Ward’s spirited defense of the policy approach by the European Commission rests on a 
declaration by the EC that with regard to state aid, anti-competitive funding, and public
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service broadcasters, it has always emphasised that "the philosophy of public service 
broadcasting is something that lies outside the competition rules and the strict terms of 
the European Treaty". Ward argues that the EC always defers to the interpretation of 
public service broadcasting as given by the European Court o f Justice in the context of 
the Treaty, and thus the EC manages to 'circumvent any direct involvement in defining, 
either the remit o f public service broadcasting or the nature of funding that these 
broadcasters receive". (2001: 85)
The evidence unearthed by this researcher leads her to disagree with Ward’s view of, in 
the first instance, the autonomony of the nation state with regard to public service 
broadcasting’s definition and funding. Secondly, this researcher does not accept Ward’s 
argument that the EC distances itself from involvement in this sphere. In the following 
section of this chapter, evidence from internal documents to government suggests that 
EC opinion was not as non-existent as Ward appears to suggest. At the same time, 
certain civil servants within the Irish government, particularly within the department 
with responsibility for broadcasting issues prefer to dispute an overpowering EC role. 
Despite this protestation, it is clear from documentation that a power struggle does exist 
between the nation state Ireland, and the EC with respect to Ireland’s autonomous 
policy decisions, both in trade and in audiovisual.
5.3 Modem restrictions on Ireland’s trade autonomy
5.3.1 Ireland in EU negotiations
One of the key questions guiding this research was the enquiry: to what extent is Ireland 
autonomous and / or influential in decisions taken over broadcasting or communications 
policy within multi-national fora? Further, to what extent is Ireland’s trade policy 
independent (since gaining autonomous independence from British colonial rule in trade 
and commerce issues in 1782)?
It was decided in 1985 that the European Commission would act on behalf of the
Member States in WTO negotiations.
“It was agreed in 1985 that the Commission would negotiate on behalf of the 
Union and on behalf of the Member States, and that there would be a co-
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coordinated position agreed in advance, which would be presented by the 
Commission. Obviously once the agreement was made, it would have to be 
approved at EU level, but also approved at the level of each Member State, at 
national level as well. So, whatever came out of the Round had to be agreed by 
the EU Council, - I’m not sure about the Parliament at the time, but it also had to 
be approved through the approval mechanism of each o f the individual Member 
States, including Ireland”. (D/ENT-EMP 4, Services negotiator, D/ENT-EMP)
Hence, the importance of agreement between the states o f the EU in the formulation o f a 
EU ‘common position’ which the EU can bring to the WTO table for negotiation. 
Agreement between Member States is the key factor in policy-decision making, but 
since the weighting of votes within the Council is calculated according to the population 
size of a Member State, Ireland is not in the strongest negotiating position at the EU 
table.
“EU negotiations are about ‘weight’. Ireland in European Union negotiations 
tends to support the French. Ireland won’t be a ‘demandeur’ of anything because 
they’ll only have to ‘pay’ in other areas, that area possibly being concessions on 
agriculture. So they’re more inclined to let others fight battles for them, avoid 
losing brownie points, and remember -  since Ireland only has 3 votes (within the 
Council of Ministers), they are fully aware that as a small state, Ireland carries 
very little ‘weight’. We do only have 3 votes after all, and more and more stuff 
is coming through qualified majority voting, so we’re not as vital to get on board 
as say, Spain would be, or Britain, Germany or Italy, or even the Dutch. The 
French, some others, the Italians took up a defensive position against 
liberalisation in Uruguay Round discussions. I would have thought that Ireland 
just sat there and didn’t have to take much of a position because the French and 
others were taking the position for them. Ireland probably wouldn’t have come 
forward to try and find a resolution on that because, a) we were insignificant in 
terms o f the business compared to the other countries and you have to have a 
notion of just where you stand in these matters, and b) we would have been 
afraid that if we became ‘demandeur’ for that, we would have to pay for it, and 
that the payment might be in agriculture. ‘Demandeurs’ have to pay.” (D/ENT- 
EMP 1 interview, chief Irish negotiator to the GATT, 1980-1986)
In direct opposition to Ward’s suggestion of national sovereignty vis a vis the EC, and
contradicting much government rhetoric, civil servants within the broadcasting division
of D/ AHGI are realistic about Ireland’s position within Council Ministerial meetings.
“If people (in the Council o f Ministers) don’t go along with you on a point, if  
you’re isolated on a point, you know you’re going to lose. If you bring two or 
three with you, other countries take more notice. They think, “let’s not alienate 
that lot”. If it’s just France, or just Germany, or just Ireland (pushing a certain 
position), people think -  ‘Oh, it’s just that bunch again trying to get something 
special for themselves.’ You get very little sympathy when you’re on your own.
171
It’s very rare there’s an issue where you really find yourself on your own. 
Ireland would always try to get support from one or two others. There is a 
concern at times that the initiative for everything rests with the Commission, but 
if you pay enough significant attention to it, you can influence that too.” 
(Interview, D/AHGI 1, Dublin)
Similarly, an official from D/ Public Enterprise emphasised the necessity for Ireland to
be seen to be taking the ‘winning side’. It was emphasised on many occasions by
different departments (D/AHGI, D/PE, D/ENT-EMP) how the national Irish stance on
issues is so affected by the weighting o f votes in the Council.
“Unless it was an issue you’re feeling reasonably strong about, if you’re in a 
strong minority, not a blocking minority, Council can out-vote you. From a 
political perspective it doesn’t happen very often. Council doesn’t like to back a 
country into a comer. Everyone at Council meetings makes a huge effort to 
compromise. The over-riding rationale is “If they’re going to outvote us, we’ll 
get the political kudos of agreement with other Member States” “ (D/PE 1, 
telephone interview, 19/12/2001).
Directives in their final form are largely a result of political horse-trading. There is huge 
and overwhelming motivation to create consensus and agreement between the member 
governments. Therefore, no national EU government can be wholly autonomous, other 
than the biggest states with strong veto power, and who are willing to use it. Small 
states like Ireland have little effectual autonomy in trade matters, though are trying to 
hold on to retain autonomy over the enticing tax based incentives system designed to 
lure foreign trade and foreign direct investment.
Ireland could be influential within Europe, despite its small state status, argues another 
D/AHGI civil servant. However, much depends on the physical presence o f Irish 
Ministers at the negotiating table. Minister Sile de Valera attended few Brussels 
Cultural Ministerial meetings, and for others sent civil servants in her place. The signal 
that this sends to other Member States is this: “if  you’re not around the table in Europe, 
you’re not a player.” If the Minister doesn’t attend, then it is assumed that Ireland is not 
interested in the issues. It is understood that it doesn’t matter to Ireland. For years, 
Europe wasn’t important to Ireland, and Irish Ministers looked too much to their own 
local constituency, and local government issues, because that’s where they get elected 
and can retain power.
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This researcher argues that the evidence is irrefutable - Ireland is not a big player at the 
EU negotiating table, and is unlikely to force an issue that will not find support with 
other (larger and more powerful) Member States. (The only occasion on which Ireland 
notably took a different stance on an audiovisual issue was in relation to the definition 
o f ‘independent producer’ within discussions on EC Directive Television without 
Frontiers. 18) Until the passing o f the Nice Referendum on 19 October 2002 Ireland had 
3 votes in the Council of Ministers (compared to larger states like France and Germany 
holding 10 votes). With the passing o f the Nice Treaty, Ireland’s voting power increases 
to 7 votes (along similar weighting with other small countries) while the larger states 
increase their votes to 29.
Further, it has often been repeated by civil servants that concern for the outcome of 
negotiations on audiovisual services have to be balanced with the other sectoral trade 
priorities for Ireland, viewed within the bigger picture. In previous negotiation rounds 
of GATT and WTO (Tokyo 1979, Uruguay 1994, Seattle 1999) Ireland’s priorities lay 
in a defensive protection o f their agriculture, textiles and transport industries. 
Audiovisual and the vehement defence of culture has usually been strongly led by the 
French, and it is evident that the Irish would prefer to save political kudos for other 
arguments and other days if the French are prepared to put themselves on the front line 
for the purposes of cultural defence. France, more than any other EU country, strongly 
defends its national culture, and is quick to threaten the power o f its veto.
Many civil servants interviewed spoke of the policy-making process as “reacting to” 
European Commission proposals. Both Corcoran and Hamelink have suggested similar. 
Reluctantly, it is acknowledged by civil servants that the Commission takes the 
initiative to propose legislation or policy in a certain area. Eventually, often through a 
co-decision procedure with the European Parliament, or by qualified majority voting in 
the Council of Ministers, a European ‘common position’ is reached. The procedure of 
proposals usually start with a Commission ‘non-paper’ raising either the Commission’s 
own ideas, formulated often with the help of consultants, or alternatively, the proposal 
could be based on the ideas of one or other of the Member States. These circulated non­
papers are usually so extreme that Member States disagree violently and vocally to 
them. A game of to and fro then follows, between the Commission and the Member 
States until their own College of Commissioners (described as “a government
m
department almost”) clears the proposal, and a formal policy proposal is issued from the
Commission. As one civil servant remarked:
“At EU level, it’s -  the EU and the Member States negotiate together, as a 
group, and there are some things that are within the competence of the EU and 
some other things that are the competence of the Member States, and it's not
always clear which is which, quite frankly .” ((D/ENT-EMP 4, Services GATT 
negotiator).
A key broadcasting official o f D/AHGI gave a less accusatory view of the
Commission’s influence, keen to dispel persistent testimonies that initiative for policy
rests with the Commission. He said:
“I’d disagree with your concept of the Europeanisation of broadcasting policy. 
No matter what one thinks of the Commission, they haven’t interfered up until 
quite recently -  they haven’t interfered even up until now, and we don’t know to 
what extent they will interfere in broadcasting policy and in the programming of 
broadcasting.” (Interview, D/AHGI 1, Dublin)
What has happened instead, he insists, is a national liberalisation of audiovisual
infrastructure, transmission platforms and satellite by individual countries, including
Ireland, which marked the end of the era of state monopolies in these sectors. Barbrook
(1992) suggested that Ireland jettisoned many other democratic concerns from the
1960s, when economic regeneration became an imperative. Rather, it is claimed,
“Ours is state funded, but not state controlled [as in other European 
environments], but it was a monopoly until the 80s, so with the advent of the 
new technology you’ve had this great burst of provision of new services, many 
of them pay services, many driven by advertising revenue, and that is what has 
brought the European Commission into the frame.” (D/AHGI 2, Interview, 
Dublin)
This civil servant argues that Ireland made the choice independently to liberalise its 
communications industries nationally, and this has brought EC rulings to bear. 
However, this researcher would point out that discussions within the EC on transfrontier 
broadcasting were taking place in the early 1980s when Ireland was still struggling to 
introduce an alternative commercial broadcaster. Rather, this researcher posits that 
evidence suggests it was EC initiatives and activities in this sector which led the way for 
Ireland’s change in broadcasting from the early 1980s, and not vice versa.
One trade official (D/ ENTEMP) suggested that agreement with Commission proposals 
depends to the extent of their alignment with national policy strategies already in place.
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Theorists who suggest that the EC policy initiatives particularly with regard to
liberalisation and de-regulation only mirror what is already happening in the individual
Member states echo this view. In the eventuality that the shift towards liberalisation in
national policy has not already taken place in the individual nation state, then it is
conceded that the process of formulating a national position (offensive or defensive) on
a particular trade sector will be derived from consultations within the government
ministries concerned on a particular Commission proposal:
“If we don’t have a situation where we have particular defensive or offensive 
interests, we will be looking at Commission proposals in say, the particular 
areas, to see how it fits in with the overall approach -  our overall approach to the 
WTO -  and we seek to see whether what the Commission is proposing fits in 
with the way in which we have developed a policy towards trade liberalization 
generally, and a policy towards in particular development of the economies of 
developing countries. So that would give us the opportunity to look at them from 
that point o f view, rather than from a specific interest in the topic, say.”(D/ENT- 
EMP 3, trade official, Dublin)
5.3.2 Ireland in World Trade Organisation negotiations
GATT was an American idea for post war Europe, a provisional agreement between 
war-weary countries for an intergovernmental agreement, then a legal organisation, 
which would regulate what governments did in the arena of trade and tariffs. The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade became the World Trade Organisation, on a 
legal standing and with a wider remit on 1 st January 1995 at the strong instigation from 
the US. When it comes to negotiations within GATT, the concept of ‘critical mass’ 
comes strongly into play. For a proposal to be agreed, there needs to exist a certain 
minimum of countries willing to agree. For example, the US might not wish to liberalise 
a particular good or service until at least 90% of the world market is liberalised. A 
critical mass of countries need to agree to liberalise in the particular sector before the 
US, for example, would open up their own markets. In intra-WTO negotiations, the 
discussions are headed for failure unless the discussion centralises upon something that 
most countries will agree to. In the case of audiovisual, everyone knew it would be 
difficult because key states did not agree on the option of either full liberalisation o f this 
sector nor the alternative of excluding cultural goods and services completely from the 
GATT agreement. This lack of critical mass support for total liberalisation or total 
annexation of audiovisual services or ‘cultural products’ meant it was one of the sectors
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left towards the end, in the hope that a last minute deal could be reached. (D/ENT-EMP 
4; MD Higgins)
Notwithstanding the claim by certain officials (particularly within the D/AHGI) that 
Ireland is in control of its own audiovisual policy, and is legally free to make a decision 
more stringent than the global accord reached with regard to audiovisual imports onto 
national television screens (D/ENT-EMP 4, Services), it is evident that in today’s 
situation, Ireland cannot act autonomously -  even in the case o f supporting the 
protection of the ideal of cultural diversity. In November 1999, when approached by the 
Canadian ambassadors prior to the Seattle negotiations, Ireland refused to offer formal 
support. While it was agreed that Ireland might “sympathise” with the Canadian ideal of 
creating a separate footnote with WTO negotiations or external to WTO, an 
international instrument for cultural trade matters, the D/AHGI said that Ireland, being a 
member state of the EU, could not act uni-laterally in relation to Canada’s request. (12 
Nov. 1999, minutes of meeting between D/AHGI and Canadian embassy)
This position is indicative o f the power structures o f multi-lateral negotiations over 
trade issues. The real locus of power and decision-making is Geneva, not Brussels. 
While the European Commission has right of authority to propose EU internal policy, 
much of the nitty gritty decision-making o f GATT / WTO negotiations is formulated on 
a daily basis within the Article 133 (formerly 113) Committee. The weekly meeting of 
the EC 133 Committee is held in Brussels, but “in Geneva it meets on a daily basis to 
deal with current issues, and that’s where the nuts and bolts of trade policy are worked 
out. The overall direction for it is done through the 133 Committee in Brussels, and 
Geneva based people would go to Brussels for the 133 usually.” (D/ENT-EMP 1, 
interview, Dublin) The D/AHGI are acutely aware that the EU negotiating mandate for 
the trade rounds are determined within the Article 133 Committee (which develops a 
Common Commercial Policy), attended by officials from the D/ENT-EMP principally, 
with occasional inputs from officials from the D/AHGI when audiovisual is under 
discussion. Ireland stations representatives from the D/ Trade and the D/ Foreign Affairs 
in their Geneva office, the Irish representation to the WTO. Through their presence 
here through the 133 Committee, Ireland has an opportunity to influence the European 
agenda on all of the issues that come forward. There is daily reporting back to Dublin
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following each morning’s 133 Committee meeting (of EU Member States
representatives) and further meetings in GATT / WTO.
“The person in Geneva was really quite influential. They were directly feeding 
the Irish position into the EU position. We had tended to have good people in 
Geneva who were influential, really beyond Ireland’s significance. Partly 
because we supported France on agriculture, it gave us a weight we mightn’t 
otherwise have had. Still, the fact that our man in Geneva held attention with 
other Member States and the EC then would carry weight with the politicians at 
home. Things tended to get decided in Geneva rather than in Brussels. 
Resultingly, the person in Geneva was more directly influential”. (D/ENT-EMP 
2, interview, Geneva official 1986)
5.4 Ireland’s autonomy in broadcasting challenged by EC 
DG Competition
In this section, I examine the development and defence of the Amsterdam Treaty’s 
Protocol on Public Service Broadcasting -  aiming to protect public service 
broadcasting’s existence and continued funding -  and the subsequent challenge to this 
declaration on national autonomy in broadcasting by the EC Directorate General 
Competition, using its subsequently drafted response to the Protocol -  a Council 
Resolution on Public Service Broadcasting (PSB). The conclusion reached by this 
researcher is that DG Competition (formerly DG-IV) controls national autonomy over 
cultural sovereignty in Ireland, according to the basis of ‘open and fair trade’.
5.5 The Amsterdam Treaty Protocol on Public Service 
Broadcasting Vs. The Council Resolution on Public Service 
Broadcasting
5.5.1 The Protocol to the EC Amsterdam Treaty on Public Service 
Broadcasting
At the European level, 1998 saw considerable activity between Member States wishing 
to secure the rationale and financial support for public service broadcasting, following 
several complaints from commercial operations accusing governments o f unfairly 
filtering public State funds to a singular State-chosen broadcasting entity in an
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uncompetitive fashion. The concerted efforts of Member State governments led to the 
addition of a Protocol prefacing the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), and the devising of a 
Council Resolution on ‘Public Service Broadcasting and the legitimate use of State aid 
for the furtherance o f democratic objectives’.
The October 1997 Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States 
declares that :
Public service broadcasting systems in the EU Member States are “directly related to 
the democratic, social and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve 
media pluralism”. The provisions agreed between the Member States agreed that:
“The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall be 
without prejudice to the competence of Member States to provide for the 
funding of public service broadcasting insofar as such funding is granted to 
broadcasting organisations for the fulfilment of the public service remit as 
conferred, defined and organised by each Member State, and insofar as such 
funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to 
an extent which would be contrary to the common interest, while the realisation 
of the remit of that public service shall be taken into account.” (EC Amsterdam 
Treaty, Protocol on PSB, 1997)
While it is thus left to the Member state to define, fund and organise public service 
broadcasting and its remit, - national autonomy is here implied - it is left undefined at 
Community level what is meant when reference is made to “the public interest”. 
Further, it is not clearly specified what trade might be affected -  trade in audiovisual 
services, trade in telecommunications services or trade in e- commerce.
The Protocol came about following complaints by private broadcasters regarding state 
aid to public service broadcasters to the Commission. The European Commission sat on 
these for years, realising it was a “political hornet’s nest”. One or two complainants (for 
example, by Portugal) brought the Commission to court and the Commission got a 
“sound thrashing from the Courts”. There was a movement towards making a decision. 
The Commission approach was, according to D/AHGI “very blunt”, the “vibes from 
DG IV, the boot boys of the Commission” gave “cause for concerns”, i.e. their approach 
was -  if you put money into programming, it’s illegal. You can fund public service 
programming, but not public service broadcasting. DG IV had quite extensive powers 
and very little responsibility to the Council of Ministers. There was an attempt by many
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countries to dampen the more extreme end of the Commission (i.e. DG Competition’s) 
approach.
Public service broadcasting represents in this context the putting together o f a schedule. 
It is the editorial policy under scrutiny. In the opinion of D/AHGI, the DG IV approach 
was very biased towards the private broadcasters’ approach. The criticism of the 
Commission approach by D/ACG was that while broadcasters like BBC have £2 billion 
yearly to spend, and they don’t need advertising funding, it is taken that the BBC 
doesn’t interfere with the market. The Irish government’s approach would be that this is 
a narrow view -  in Ireland, the BBC does affect the market because it draws viewers 
away from other Irish, local channels.
Ireland’s funding system is different again from France and Spain. In these countries 
there is no limit put on their aid to public service broadcasting. The governments make 
up the difference between advertising revenue and programme production costs, and the 
balance is given to them. Ireland has a discrete fund from the TV licence fee, but it’s 
quite different, because the message to RTE is “That’s all you’re getting guys! Do your 
best with that!” 19
Hence, public service broadcasting was “on the line”. The first idea of putting the 
Protocol into the Amsterdam Treaty -  and thus representing the EC wish to safeguard 
the television licence fee - derived from this problem with the private broadcasters 
taking the Commission to court, and DG IV’s hard line stance. Ireland supported the 
creation of a Protocol. (D/AHGI 1, interview, Dublin)
The main issues involved in discussions were the critical concepts of ‘public service
broadcasting’ and ‘public service programming’. The intention by those supporting the
Protocol was to protect the entity or activity known as ‘public service broadcasting’ (i.e.
the putting together of a schedule).
“It (the Protocol) came up fairly late in the day. We were doing it more in hope 
than in expectation. We wanted to be seen to show that it was a good idea, that 
public service broadcasting should have some special status even within 
competition law. That was the political will at the time. The Protocol only came 
to light very late at the eleventh hour. We thought the jig was over by then, but 
we wanted it to happen. Whoever had proposed it initially were fairly small-fry, 
and we ourselves were small”. (D/AHGI 1, interview)
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But, it was Helmut Kohl’s attention that made it happen.
“What swung it (the Protocol) in the end was Helmut Kohl said -  “That’s a great 
idea! I want to see that in (the Treaty), and all of a sudden people began to take 
real notice of it. The Commission nearly died! This was the last thing they 
wanted. That’s why the language at the end of it adds, “providing it doesn’t 
distort competition”. There was no such language when the Member States were 
proposing it. The Commission realised that once Germany20 backs it, it might 
well be carried, and we’d better start developing alternative wording ourselves!” 
(D/AGHI 1, interview)
While no country could publicly disagree with the language devised by DG IV in 
relation to proportionate funding, and distortion o f competition, “All of that, you can’t 
object to. At the same time, you know that what they’re really saying is “We don’t 
really want this here. We want control of it”. And the issue remains -  who’s in control 
here?” (D/AHGI 1, interview) This view of DG IV and the European Commission is 
commonly held by a number of government servants.
5.5.2 The Council Resolution on Public Service Broadcasting
RTE’s response to the drafting of a subsequent Council Resolution on Public Service 
Broadcasting (1998) initiative by the Austrian Presidency in November 1998 stated its 
guiding principles. RTE argued that “the single most important principle to adopt is that 
public service broadcasting serves the needs o f community and citizenship in preference 
to the claims o f markets and consumerism. It follows that public service broadcasting 
must be distinguished from blanket categories such as “information industries”, or “new 
communications technologies” on the grounds that it creates and conveys meanings 
(social, political, cultural, ethical as well as economic) in the democracies of the 
Member States. Recognition of those distinctive characteristics o f public service 
broadcasting should form the foundation of broadcast and communications regulation in 
Member States.”21 (Letter from RTE to D/ AHGI, 20 August 1998)
The Draft Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the governments of 
the Member States (14 October 1998) meeting within the Council concerning Public 
Service Broadcasting encountered difficulties with DG Competition by 20 October 
1998. DG Competition had raised issues in relation to two sections of the Draft Council 
resolution. They were in effect questioning:
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a) The sole competence of the Member States to define, confer, organise and 
finance the public service mission, as confirmed by the Protocol on Public 
Service Broadcasting, and
b) The appropriateness o f the section stating “Transparent funding o f systems of 
public service broadcasting constitutes a fundamental precondition for fair 
competition among broadcasting enterprises in the digital age” 22
These two sections relating to the funding and financing of public service broadcasting
services underwent substantial changes over the following weeks. In a Proposal of
Ireland submitted to the Draft Council Resolution Working Group, Ireland had
suggested that a new paragraph should be inserted, to read:
“Each member state has exclusive competence to provide for the form and level 
of the funding of public service broadcasters in accordance with the Protocol of 
the Amsterdam Treaty”23 (Proposal of Ireland, Draft Council Resolution 
concerning public service broadcasting, emphasis added)
Essentially the main areas of negotiation at the EU Council Working Group related to 
the competence (‘exclusive’, ‘sole’ or otherwise) in the area o f public service 
broadcasting remit and funding. Critically, Ireland’s attempt for independence was 
thwarted by DG Competition.
The Council Legal Service took issue with the insistence o f “sole Member state 
competence” on the issue o f funding, arguing in fact “No such provision was to be 
found in the Protocol. This was apparently an attempt to interpret the Protocol, which 
should be avoided because it overstepped the boundaries of a Resolution as defined.” 
Reminding the Working Group on Audiovisual Services that negotiation of the Public 
Service Broadcasting Protocol had been “an extremely laborious process”, the Council 
legal service advised against any loose interpretation or summarising o f the Protocol, 
and instead that any reference to it should be a direct quotation. 24
By 28 October, the Draft Council Resolution stated rather that “The systems of funding 
for public service broadcasters are matters for the Member States and have to be 
open” .25
The words “are matters for the Member States” were subsequently deleted, and the new 
paragraph 8 read:
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“The systems of funding for public service broadcasting have to apply financial 
openness (to ensure that such funding does not affect trading conditions and 
competition in the Community to an extent which would be contrary to the 
common interest, while the realisation of the remit of that public service shall be 
taken into account) ” 26
The Draft Resolution as drafted in the light of discussions at the meeting of the Council 
Audiovisual Working Party on 29 October addressed the difficult paragraph 8 as 
follows:
“The systems of funding for public service broadcasting have to apply financial 
openness, ( 1 ) to ensure that such funding does not affect trading conditions and 
competition in the Community to an extent which would be contrary to the 
common interest, while the realisation of the remit of that public service shall be 
taken into account (2)”. 27
Both the Irish and German delegations entered “reservations” on the discussions 
surrounding the wording o f Paragraph 8 relating to funding competence and the 
transparency of public service funding. Meeting Document 1 of the Council Member 
States representatives of 28 October 1998 had inserted a new paragraph (D) in the 
preamble, recalling “the affirmation of competence of the Member States concerning 
remit and funding set out in the Protocol on the system of public service broadcasting to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam” (which was in the process o f ratification at the time).
The EU Council Draft Resolution disagreements eventually reached a compromise 
between on the one hand the assertion by Ireland and Germany of ‘exclusive 
competence’ for Member States (for the setting of the public service remit and the level 
o f funding) and on the other hand, those Member States (UK, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, Portugal) that favoured explicit references to financial 
transparency.28 The Irish Minister de Valera remarked that overall the text was 
acceptable to Ireland; it would serve as a useful addition in Community policy to the 
Protocol, but that,
“It would appear (despite the Protocol’s provision for Member State competence 
in these matters) that the European Commission would contend that it has a 
shared competence with the Member States at least in respect of determining the 
proportionality of the funding”. (Ibid 13, paragraph 3)
The first part of the Protocol aims to define public service broadcasting, and the nature 
o f its funding. The second part says, “providing it doesn’t distort competition to an
18?
unwarranted degree”. Effectively DG IV is saying -  “that’s our job”. DG IV is 
asserting that they want control over the funding issue, and patrolling its effect on 
competition. An Irish broadcasting official from the D/AHGI is explicit: “The issue 
remains -  who’s in control here?” DG IV is going to have the final say on the nature 
and extent of national funding, and if it’s acceptable according to their criteria.
This is a second example o f the Member state’s ability to define and fund its own 
audiovisual broadcasting services being challenged by DG Competition. This would 
appear to be confirmed by an Irish official of the Broadcasting division of D/AHGI.
This researcher asked a key official in D/AHGI if he thought Ireland retained
sovereignty over the broadcasting sector? He replied.
“To a degree. The (TVWF) Directive says we can impose more stringent rules 
on broadcasters if we want, but only on our own one. We get a lot o f regulation 
from Brussels. Everything we do fits into the framework of the Union. But we 
have a part to play there.” (D/AHGI 1 )
There has been a dispute going on about this ever since. DG IV’s initial attempts - a set 
o f guidelines in the late 1990’s - to deal with this issue were met with “very virulent 
objection” by Member States. DG IV produced what amounted to a non-paper that took 
a very extreme market driven view that Ireland allegedly objected to. DG IV may 
appear to have softened their arguments over the years, but only because “the language 
they use now is more sophisticated.”
The compromise amounted to a re-statement and re-affirmation of paragraphs directly 
quoted from the Protocol. The problematic Paragraph 8 was deleted. The intention of 
Paragraph 3 relating to ‘new audiovisual and information services’ has some presence, 
but only in so far as it is ‘noted and reaffirmed’ that public service broadcasting must 
continue to benefit from technological progress (Para 3), and must be able to continue to 
offer services that include the development and diversification of activities in the digital 
age (Para 6 ).29
The loss of Ireland’s sovereignty over State competence in funding its audiovisual 
services using the licence fee is further stressed by the conclusions of a Multilateral 
Meeting on State Aid (20 October 1998) chaired by DG Competition. By the end of the
m
meeting, the choice for the Member State representatives was stark: “the DG IV 
chairman stated that the choice for Member States is between co-operating with DG IV 
on the adoption of guidelines for general application or the adoption by DG IV of a case 
by case approach.” (Ibid 13, paragraph 5)
Why was Ireland’s autonomy so weakened by DG Competition on the issue o f 
sovereignty of provision and means o f national rights to expression and reception?
In MD Higgins’ opinion, the EC Culture Commissioner, Mario Monti was a chief
culprit. According to Higgins, he “played second fiddle to the Commissioner
responsible for market completion”. Higgins challenged the EC Director-General of DG
Culture, Monti to take a stronger stance against the European commercial industry
monopolies that were threatening media pluralism, and rebuked him when Monti failed
to take account of the European Parliament decision on Public Service Broadcasting (as
demonstrated by the adoption of the Tongue Report by the EP on 16 September 1996)
Commissioner Monti was encouraged to take a stronger position against the prevailing
and dominant approach of the EC that was based on the assumptions of competition in
the marketplace, and the notion of audiovisual product being a marketable ‘commodity’.
Commissioner Monti, according to Higgins, “behaved disgracefully”. His policy of
promoting competition has created monopoly.
“In the name of assuring competition and completing the market, Monti was 
dismantling state monopolies but allowing market monopolies to emerge. He 
was talking about removing state subsidies for broadcasting, but doing nothing 
about the emergence of monopolies in relation to Bertelsmann, Kirch, Murdoch 
and the others. This was very, very dangerous”. (Interview, MD Higgins, 
Dublin)
Commissioner Monti further enraged those parliamentarians pursuing democratic 
citizens’ rights within the European Parliament by ignoring the EP Resolution on Public 
Service Broadcasting, further to an EP debate and vote on the Carole Tongue MEP 
Report on Public Service Broadcasting. This EP resolution had been passed with 
sufficient majority, expressing the opinion of the members of the European Parliament. 
Monti failed to take the EP’s opinion into account. Later Jacques Delors stated that 
essentially, matters relating to public service broadcasting must be left up to the 
Commissioner with responsibility for the internal marketplace. The EP was incensed
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that constitutionally, their level pegging with the European Commission in co-decision 
procedure had been ignored. The European Commission is legally bound to take 
account of European Parliament opinion in formulating policy. In acting contrary to the 
will of the EP, the Commission followed their own “myopic notion o f a single market 
vision”.
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Part III:
Irish International Audiovisual and Trade Policy, and the 
protection of Irish citizenship rights
Chapter 6
Irish trade policy on audiovisual and broadcasting services 
(1982-2002)
This is the first of two historical empirical research chapters detailing Irish trade policy, 
and modem human rights in trade as exercised within the WTO forum.
This chapter starts with the beginning of trade in services within GATT in the early 
1980s, and the growth in legislation on broadcasting initiated at EU level from the 
perspective of past and present Irish government members. This past retrospective is 
then brought up to date until the present day, and Ireland’s input into late 1990’s EU 
legislation on trade / audiovisual policy.
6.1 The Beginning o f Trade in Services
Services (financial, communications, transport, insurance, financial) became a subject 
o f GATT scmtiny in the early 1980s. A GATT official, Jacques Nussbaulmer first 
raised the issue of how to internationally regulate the trade in services between nations. 
On this basis, services were worked up as an official GATT Work Programme in the 
early 1980s. At that time, there was not much transmitted over telephone wires and the 
issues weren’t easily comprehended by many officials. One Irish GATT negotiator 
recalled, “It wasn’t clear what we were talking about. The services trade was only just 
beginning, and people didn’t have an insight” (Interview D/ENT-EMP 1, chief Irish 
negotiator to GATT 1980-1986)
Ireland, like most countries in the early 1980s, still had a system of nationalised 
transport, and nationalised communications and telephone structures that operated as a
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monopoly. It was gradually realised that nationalised communications structures were a 
part of the problem on the road to free competition. This was recognised as a problem 
that had to be resolved in Ireland, where communications was a state owned sector, and 
as such, a protected monopoly. It is not possible to have free and liberal trade within a 
monopoly sector. Compared to other developing countries, hostile to a future American 
giant cleaning up on credit and banking services in their home country, Ireland was 
already theoretically open to global competition, before it knew the real meaning o f the 
word.
“ Ireland came from a situation from the 1930s on to the early 60s of total 
protection, and in the 50s and 60s Ken Whittaker, and then in the 60s, we moved 
into sort of being ‘open and global’ before we knew the meaning of the word. 
Both with regards investment into Ireland and activities in Ireland, and the 
impact, the logic o f that carried it forward to a situation whereby in the 1980s 
you had a situation where our protected services sector, particularly the state- 
owned ones, had problems and we realised that the world was changing, and that 
we couldn’t maintain something that wasn’t going to be efficient or effective, 
and secondly, we were generally supportive of moves to strengthen and extend 
the world trading system, so we were generally open. There would have been 
fears in Ireland that to do this we’ll have to compensate those who don’t want it, 
and they’ll be looking for compensation in agriculture. There were fears of that 
sort. But in fact in the Uruguay Round that didn’t really arise. The MacSharry 
outcome and his deals on world trade have been to make minimal commitments 
in the sector of agriculture and to make a very big commitment that ‘next time’ 
there would be a negotiation on agriculture. So in fact we did make concessions 
in return for broadening the trade system.” (Interview, chief Irish GATT 
negotiator 1980-1986, Dublin)
Others from the department of trade (D/ENT-EMP 4, Services negotiator) confirm the 
key date o f the 1960s as the moment when Ireland opened its market to the world. 
These were the years o f discussion prior to Ireland joining the European Community in 
1973. In 1958, the Fianna Fail government accepted the recommendations of the 
Whitaker Report on Economic Development. Whittaker recommended that the Irish 
state should adopt an economic plan for the rapid urbanization and industrialization of 
the country. This was to be done by attracting foreign multinational investment, 
investing in infrastructure projects and constructing a plan to develop the nationalized 
industries.
The specific policy turned away from that of a state-controlled monopoly and state 
assistance towards one of welcoming and attracting inward investment, welcoming
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liberalisation and trade that allows various producers to sell their products to Europe or 
further, and the formation o f Irish industries that could produce goods for the European 
or world market, and not solely for the Irish market. By 1972, economic regeneration 
was more important to the Irish nation than the perpetuation of some 'lost' old-style 
national identity based on strict Catholic codes and mores, according to Barbrook 
(1992). This ‘opening up’ of Irish mentality and economy has led to the policy now 
dominant in the year 2 0 0 2  of encouraging further liberalisation of trade, and fostering a 
very liberal regime towards inward investment. (D/ENT-EMP 3; D/ENT-EMP 4, 
services).
From the point of view of a civil servant from the Broadcasting division (D/ 
Communications), GATT wasn’t an issue in relation to communications or broadcasting 
services, notwithstanding the discussions inaugurated by Nussbaulmer in the early 
1980s. The conceptual thinking surrounding broadcasting in government in those years 
wrestled principally with the question of the necessity for the State to be involved in the 
provision of certain communications services, and was marked by the increasing desire 
by the State to legalise private sector broadcasting services. Additionally, Ireland has 
always operated to some extent in a competitive television service market, due to its 
proximity to and reception o f British broadcast services.
“ In the circles that I mixed in, that (i.e. discussions on services within GATT 
from 1983 onwards) was not an issue. On the other hand, I also moved in trade 
circles, y ’know the liberalisation of trade, it may well have been an issue. I have 
no recollection of that being an issue; whether we were ever consulted when the 
precedent of the WTO (GATT) decided that broadcasting would be embraced. 
I’m surprised if it would have been allowed to be uninhibitively embraced as a 
service to be traded, because certainly within Europe, there was always going to 
be some degree o f recognition that broadcast services were more than just 
commodities, that there is a public interest dimension to broadcasting. They 
were never going to be allowed to classify it as solely as a service. It was never, 
not going to be the case that broadcasting would be allowed to be thought of as 
exactly the same as a commodity.” (Interview, D/AHGI 4, Broadcasting 
division, Dublin)
The Tokyo Trade Round that was signed in 1979 had failed to reach agreement on 
agricultural negotiations. Agriculture was regarded as ‘unfinished business’ when 
Ireland began to build up a small team of negotiators based in Geneva with specific 
competence for GATT issues. Multi-national trade increased in importance, and
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Ireland’s desire to have input grew accordingly, although in the early 1980s, Ireland
didn’t look far beyond the EU markets, and didn’t push the doors o f any foreign
markets that weren’t already open.
“When I went out (in January 1980) there was some doubt as to whether there 
was really substantial interest in the GATT from Ireland’s point of view in terms 
of requiring someone to be full time on it. But it quickly emerged that it was 
very important for Ireland and we built up from a one man position to now there 
are four people out there, but I started just on my own. We built it up over the 
period because it (multi - national trade) became more and more important. 
Obviously it was o f big importance -  of defensive importance -  in terms of 
agriculture, and agricultural trade.” (D/ENT-EMP 1, interview, GATT 
negotiator in Geneva 1980-1986, Dublin)
Ireland’s principle priority in the early 1980s at the level of multi-lateral trade was 
agriculture. According to a key negotiating official, agriculture had a huge economic 
import for the country. Government tended to give a “very high priority to agriculture”. 
The numbers involved in agriculture in Ireland have diminished since the 1930s when 
approximately 600,000 people were involved in the sector which represented at least 
one third of national output. This number fell to about 300,000 in the 1960s who 
claimed to be employed in agricultural activities when Ireland was discussing joining 
the European Union. For Ireland, agriculture has traditionally represented a very large 
part of exports and trade. This was evident by the fact that in 1984, the year of Ireland’s 
Presidency of the European Union, discussions within GATT according to an official 
based in Geneva, fell into two categories -  ‘agriculture’, and then there was ‘everything 
else that isn’t ‘agriculture’. The department of Agriculture looks after agriculture -  for 
that department, according to an official from the department of Trade, Enterprise and 
Employment, “they don’t mind if there’s no success in multinational trade negotiations 
outside of agriculture, but you can’t have a successful round without success in 
agriculture, because it’s key for the developing countries. And it was always that way”. 
(D/ENT-EMP 1, interview)
Another official posted to Geneva for the Irish Presidency period confirms “that 
(agriculture) was the biggie from Ireland’s point o f view through all that period. Trade 
in goods and services were the “Cinderella” in terms of importance in policymaking”. 
(D/ENT-EMP 2, Geneva assistant negotiator, 1984, interview, Dublin) Ireland was 
principally concerned in early multi-national trade rounds in the defence of its
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agricultural interests, its export subsidies and the preservation of a romantic image of 
rural Ireland.
Audiovisual services were, as noted previously, brought into the international realm of 
trade in 1983 when the European Court of Justice classified ‘broadcasts’ as ‘services’.
Hamelink draws attention to the dangers of defining broadcasting as a ’service', and then 
applying the competition or classic trade rules to this (commercial) activity. 
"Commercialization implies that increasingly citizens are required to pay for 
information services rendered by public bodies". (Hamelink 1995:101) Deregulatory 
policies that reinforce commercialization (e.g. the charging for information by 
government departments) will tend to relate access to the affordability of the service. 
The price, not the public interest becomes the decisive factor in commercialization 
ethos. This, Hamelink fears “ may lead to the peculiar phenomenon of more and more 
people disconnecting from the ’information society' as they can no longer afford the 
charges.” (Ibid, plO l)
The audiovisual sector was discussed formally for the first time within the context of 
the Uruguay Round multi-lateral negotiations on the occasion of members o f the Group 
of Negotiations on Services (GNS) meeting in August of 1990 30. The Uruguay Round 
of GATT was originally meant to have finished by the end of 1990. Agriculture, and 
audiovisual services remained sensitive issues, without conclusive agreement. In 1990 
then, the discussions on audiovisual services centred around the question of including 
an Annex on audiovisual services to be added to the agreement on trade in services. The 
trading countries had managed to agree on an Annex for air transport, but there was 
clear indication from the US and Japan and others that an Annex excluding the 
audiovisual sector from liberalised trade was not an option. The critical mass of world 
political support was not there. Why did states reach agreement to annex air transport 
from more liberal trade, but not the audiovisual sector?
In the words of one Irish negotiator for services, this was “because there was a separate 
regime operating air transport that they decided to leave well alone. Audiovisual was 
different because the market was dominated by the US and there were fears by the US 
that something would be done to disturb that, i.e. something would happen to reduce the
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amount of product that they could sell abroad, so they had defensive interests from the 
point of view of audiovisual. They wouldn’t be happy to leave audiovisual totally out of 
the WTO agreement because that would still leave them exposed to the threat that they 
saw, that the French or Irish might reduce the sales of American TV programmes or the 
distribution o f American films in those countries. If total exclusion of audiovisual 
products had been decided, you could have had an Annex that said that, similar to the 
one for air transport, and if all countries agreed, that would have been the end of the 
matter. However, not all countries agreed.” (D/ENT-EMP 4, Irish negotiator on 
services, interview)
6.2 Start o f EC law on television market-driven
The years 1982 to 1987 were crucial for the broadcasting policy world for a variety of 
reasons. These years represent the evolution period of current EU legislation providing 
for trans-frontier broadcasting. During the then Minister for Communications Jim 
Mitchell’s term in office, discussions on the feasibility and approaches towards a pan- 
European law on trans-border broadcasting were bubbling away in Brussels, within the 
European Commission and European Parliament, and in Strasbourg at the Council of 
Europe.
Firstly in 1982, the European Parliament had produced the Hahn Report on the 
Feasibility o f a pan-European TV channel. This led the European Commission to issue 
a non-paper in 1983 forming a basis for discussion. (The-pan European channel 
“Europa” which led from the Hahn recommendations was not a success, did not attract 
advertising, and was scrapped shortly after its launch). The EC non-paper Realities and 
Tendencies in European TV came at the same time as the European Court of Justice in 
Strasbourg was in the process o f developing case law on trans-border broadcasting for 
the provision of legal certainties within a European market. The ECJ came to the 
conclusion that ‘broadcasts’ would be classified as ‘services’. By the following year, 
1984, the then EEC (European Economic Community) were holding serious discussions 
on communications, with the intention o f proposing a policy initiative.
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The Council of Europe took the initiative by convening a Convention on Transfrontier 
Television between its Members. Interest from the Commission followed the Council of 
Europe, and the 1989 EC Directive on Television Without Frontiers to which all 
discussions led in the end largely mirrors the conclusions arising from the Council of 
Europe Convention. The Convention was not binding; its recommendations are not 
mandatory, the Council of Europe being composed of members who act as a “group of 
friends”. Ireland has signed the Council of Europe Convention, though the Dail has 
never formally ratified it. For some in the D/ AHGI, this bears “no great significance -  
ratification just went down the list of priorities, once the [EC] Directive was there”. 
(Interview with D/AHGI 1, Dublin) Following the Convention in 1984, the EEC 
published an EEC Green Paper on The Establishment o f  a Common Market in 
Broadcasting. Debate on this Green Paper followed, until July 1986 when the European 
Commission first proposed that a Broadcast Directive should be created.
The initial Commission proposal for a Broadcast Directive suggested that quota limits 
for European works would be set at a minimum of 30%, rising to a minimum o f 60% by 
the third year thereafter. The Council of Europe decided that with a Commission 
Directive on the horizon, wide-ranging discussions should be held. One civil servant 
suggested that the relationship between the Council o f Europe and the European 
Commission was so close, and at times in competition, that it was possible to force 
change in the Commission’s approach through voicing opposition via the Council 
Convention. The Council o f  Europe subsequently organised the first Council o f Europe 
European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy in Vienna, December 1986. By 
the end of Minister Mitchell’s term as Minister for Communications, the single 
European Act had been passed (1 January 1987), and a few weeks later the European 
Commission had made a formal Proposal fo r  an EC Council Directive on certain 
Broadcasting Matters. This proposal eventually made its way to becoming the 1989 
Directive Television Without Frontiers.
6.3 RTE’s monopoly and commercial broadcasting
While Europe was discussing trans-frontier commercial broadcasting, on Irish soil the 
Minister Mitchell (Fine Gael party) was caught in the legal irons of an RTE monopoly,
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with illegal private broadcasting in his back yard, and the non-negotiable approach by 
his government partners. The Minister was caught in a rash o f private illegal radio 
broadcasting stations that were re-opening as fast as the government could shut them 
down, and simultaneously embroiled in aggravated discussions with his Labour 
coalition partners about the conceptual nature o f broadcasting.
The Fine Gael party were very much in favour of establishing the playing field for 
independent private broadcasting. They were trying to take account o f the clear public 
demand for an alternative to the State broadcaster, RTE. Since the 1960s and throughout 
the 1970s there had been a general movement in Britain and on the Continent towards 
greater liberalisation of the airwaves and the introduction of independent broadcasting. 
Ireland retained the system of one State-funded monopoly broadcaster until 1988. The 
policy driver during the 1980s was to a large degree recognition of the public’s demand 
for ‘choice’ in broadcasting services.
“In the earlier years the policy driver was the demand for choice, that demand 
was manifested through the emergence of the pirate radio broadcasting and it 
was manifested as well by the increasing liberalisation of the broadcast media. 
The UK did it first, but continental Europe also began to go the road of not 
having national state monopolies, and again that was in line with the feeling of 
the time, the thinking o f the time, even the economic theory o f the time which 
tends to be articulated as a form of Thatcherism or Reaganism, but there is 
actually an economic principle underneath about the State, that there isn’t any 
critical imperative on the State to deliver, for example, broadcasting services. 
(The present author argues that this statement implies a rejection o f social 
rights delivered by the state, and a rejection o f the Victorian or mid-20th century 
ethos o f public service provided by national governments). That tied in with the 
cultural change that was taking place, it manifested in these demands. Ireland 
and the administration and government were no more immune to that kind of 
pressure or sense of change than was any other administration. So, you had the 
demand for choice throughout the 1980s”. (D/AHGI 4, Principal Officer, 
Communications)
The critical philosophical split which became evident was the absolute antagonism of 
the Labour coalition partners to the notion of ‘commercial broadcasting’. The Labour 
element of the coalition Government pressed for stronger public service broadcasting, 
and a strengthened RTE, and a greater emphasis on the ‘community’ aspect of radio 
broadcasting in the proposed legislation. They had “ideological reservations about
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commercial sector involvement in broadcasting and wanted the RTE role substantially 
strengthened”. (Interview, D/AHGI 4)
Conceptually under discussion were the questions o f the role o f the media in society, the 
philosophy of public service broadcasting and the warnings o f popular output aiming 
for mass audiences delivering programmes of the lowest common denominator.
This opposition from the public broadcaster and its supporters effectively “stymied the 
private broadcasting for much o f that coalition.” (until 1987).
The government’s inability to reach consensus meant that no legislation was passed 
until a new government took office in March 1987 -  six years after the Independent 
Local Radio Authority Bill was originally proposed by Fianna Fail, and following five 
years of contentious discussion to no avail.
European discussions in the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of Europe 
were pushing forward on the concept of a ‘common market’ in broadcasting services 
while Ireland struggled to gain control of its illegal broadcasting problem, and lay some 
ground rules for the liberalisation of the airwaves. It took a new government and an 
eradication of the Labour element before the public service monopoly that ‘the public’ 
had clearly grown weary of was able to be broken.
6.4 Ireland’s perspective on TVWF in market not cultural terms
During the summer of 1989, the details of the EC Directive Television Without 
Frontiers were hammered out between the Member States in the Council of Ministers. 
Carla Hills, the USTR representative arranged a lobbying tour of the European capitals 
to present the American position. To many, the US position was too forcefully 
represented, and EU Member States did not welcome the visit. According to Hirsch and 
Petersen (1992) the situation as of mid 1989 was this: Denmark and Belgium firmly 
against the Directive, and following the lead of these two states, Netherlands, Greece, 
France and West Germany also declared they too would vote ‘Against’.
For Ireland, the Television Without Frontiers Directive was seen by key civil servants in 
the Department o f Communications as a measure to promote a single market in
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European audiovisual services, through the removal o f barriers to a cross-border flow of
programmes. The EC hoped this would help stimulate European audiovisual production.
The Directive was not viewed as a cultural measure in Ireland.
“The debate raised no issues for Ireland. We agreed with the basic tenet, which 
was that once a broadcaster was regulated in another Member State, then no 
other country could regulate them or put any barrier in the way of cross-border 
reception. For example, Germany couldn’t stop me from reaching their viewer, 
and I would be regulated in Ireland. This country had never done anything -  
why would you? -  to try to prevent the reception of UK services. But now that 
there was a Directive telling us we couldn’t do anything about it didn’t really 
cause us that much grief or difficulty. In practical terms, it would have been 
impossible to do, and people would have just laughed at you if you tried to do 
anything, once that was the basic tenet.” (Interview, D/AHGI 1, Assistant 
Principal, Department of Communications, Dublin)
6.5 The Revision o f EC Directive Television Without Frontiers 
and its relation to GATT
Both the discussions within the Uruguay Round of GATT in the closing months of 
1994, and the early 1995 prospect of opening discussions on the revision of the 1989 
EC Directive Television Without Frontiers revolved around the issue of market access 
(or trade rights). The issue at stake here is the possible result of limiting and restricting 
market access for cultural and national identity purposes when national markets are 
liberalised and opened up for free trade purposes. In this dilemma, some would argue 
that there could be implications for national identity and national citizenship sentiments.
From the view of the USTR, the Television without Frontiers Directive -  in particular 
its local content rules that provide for a ‘majority’ of transmission time to be reserved 
for European product ‘where practicable’ -  represented an unfair market access barrier 
to US audiovisual products, with the consequence of depriving US producers potential 
export income. For the US, programme quotas acting in Europe’s favour are “blatantly 
protectionist and unjustifiable”, and “an enemy of free trade”. In Ireland’s opinion, the 
EC TVWF Directive was not designed as a cultural instrument but as a measure to both 
increase intra-EU cross-border trade and restrict the entry o f non-EU audiovisual 
product. This perspective differs markedly from the resolutely cultural protectionist 
stance.
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One trade services negotiator can sum up Ireland’s perspective on trade rights in 
markets:
“You can look at TVWF as a liberalising instrument or a restricting instrument. 
But each member state would be free to do whatever they like, before the EU 
was there. The TV Directive showed that there was cross-border trade, and 
commercial interest in TV, and that the market would be open to some degree, 
and you could insist on 50 % European content. On the other hand that meant 
you weren’t free to insist on more than 50%, so by definition, 50 % was open to 
the non-EU world to compete. De facto that 50% was filled by American. In 
reality, even though you could insist on 50% European, nobody did that, and if 
you looked at the position in Ireland in 1992, for cinema probably 95 % of films 
shown were US produced, and on TV (leaving aside news and current affairs) it 
was probably above 50 % as well. So, the TV Directive determined the basis on 
which the market would be open and it put limits on what somebody like France 
could do to outlaw American content. On the other hand, it allowed them some 
latitude to set a limit on American content, and that obviously would be a 
concern for the US and they wouldn’t have wanted to agree to something at 
world level that would have allowed countries to close them off to that extent. 
Because de facto, the US were dominating those markets, so it wouldn’t have 
been in their commercial interest if countries were to cut back.” (D/ENT-EMP 4, 
Services, interview, Dublin)
The fraught last six months of the Uruguay Round negotiations coincided with intra- 
European discussions on the revision o f the Directive Television Without Frontiers. 
Within the EC Directive, a majority of member states within the EU wished to protect 
Europeans’ rights to view national and European audiovisual content. The two are 
inextricably linked, both attempting to deal with issues o f market access or the limiting 
of that access to the European market against foreign (generally American) audiovisual 
product. The debate is dominated by the question o f between cultural rights and market 
access rights. This was additionally a period when Franco-Irish relations with regard to 
the audiovisual sector turned sour.
The issues of cultural space and cultural identity that were restricting to some extent the 
influx of foreign, non-EU, more often than not American, audiovisual product onto TV 
screens were important at this time. They were informing not only Irish national debate 
in relation to the role of RTE the public broadcaster and its licence fee but also at the 
EU level, the discussions being held in relation to the revision of the EC Directive on 
Television without Frontiers.
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According to former Minister for Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht MD Higgins, it was 
the extreme and unwavering French position of protecting their own culture, identity, 
language, and audiovisual, particularly film industries that led to the complete 
breakdown in negotiations over the audiovisual sector at the end of 1994. Audiovisual 
was the second largest export earner for the US, and they angled that it should be 
slipped in, unnoticed, at the end. However, this strategy backfired badly when chief US 
negotiator, Micky Kantor became irritated late in the negotiations, and late at night 
specifically over the French cinema-seat tax. French cinema patrons are effectively 
required to pay a tax while seeing an American movie, and the benefits o f the tax goes 
to the French film industry. The Americans saw this as a discrimination against 
American (and any other non-French) films. This argument was apparently enough to 
provoke the French delegation into a total non-negotiable mode, and as a direct 
consequence, there was a complete impasse on the issue and effectively, culture got left 
to one side at the very end o f the Uruguay Round. Ostensibly, Higgins suggests that the 
negotiations on audiovisual failed because of the French insistence to fund and support 
their national film and cinema industry in whatever way they chose.
When the following question was asked o f the Irish chief negotiator in Geneva to the 
GATT (1980-1986): “Do you think it (the AV / film sector) was at all important to Irish 
trade interests?” the answer came back “No”. Another official from the D/ ENT-EMP 
echoed, “Audiovisual left such a faint trace, it didn’t matter whatsoever. AV didn’t 
figure in Ireland’s position -  Ireland’s protectionist stance was on the issues of 
agriculture, and textiles to a lesser extent because of the Irish government’s interests 
with Fruit of the Loom in Donegal. Ireland was not in the least bothered with AV 
services, although Ireland would have supported France, aligned with France in the 
wider EU debate on AV services. In general, Ireland was pro and very much in favour 
of liberalising and cutting tariffs because Ireland’s trade exports were so important to 
the economy. Services (in 1995, 1996) were only a developing area in the WTO at the 
time.” (D/ENT-EMP 6 , former principal of EU/WTO unit in dept o f Tourism and 
Trade, 1995-96)
An official from the D/AHGI repeats this view,
“The Uruguay Trade round was a can o f worms. There was no sense of importance of 
audiovisual. There was no permanent representative for Culture or Audiovisual affairs
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over in the Brussels Irish Permanent Representation to the EU, whereas the department 
of Agriculture has three or four reps, permanently stationed over there.” (Interview, 
D/AHGI 3, Broadcasting division, Dublin)
6.6 Audio Visual Services Defined
An audiovisual Service is associated with an individual (and therefore, potential scope 
exists for the enforcement of individual rights).
An ‘audiovisual service’ for the Broadcasting department o f AHGI is something you 
“elect to go to, or do, or see. For cinema (an audiovisual service), you elect to go. You 
buy a ticket, and you go in. Streaming video on the Internet is seen via individual 
selection. On the Internet, you can move to a different website, or with VOD (Video on 
Demand) you can select a specific programme at a specific time. Streaming video onto 
the Internet is not broadcasting. TV is available to all.”
The distinction thus made is that individually selected services (cinema, video, 
WebPages, web-broadcast) are ‘audiovisual services’. Broadcasting is viewed as 
different because it is theoretically available simultaneously to everyone. With 
broadcasting, there is a limited selection of programmes. This researcher disagrees with 
his concept of public service broadcasting as the ‘whole schedule of programmes’. Not 
all programmes are of a public service nature.
“ Individual demand is different. Maybe as technology changes, the concept of 
broadcasting will have to change too. For example, when a different set of 
adverts are targeted to the uniquely addressable individual consumer, admittedly 
the definition of broadcasting begins to fray at the edges and you’d have to think 
carefully with regulation what you want to call broadcasting and what’s not.” 
(D/AHGI 1, interview, Dublin)
Audiovisual services are defined by the European Community and its Member States in 
trade negotiations as film and video production, distribution, and projection. They 
include television activities and studios for sound. Multimedia products and services are 
not however classified as audiovisual services, these being included under a separate 
category. Effectively, audiovisual services as defined by the US lists on e-commerce as
198
‘supplementary telecommunications services’. These were included in America’s 
Telecommunications, not Audiovisual proposal to the WTO.
The WTO Secretariat and Council will continue to use the CPC classification system of 
Audiovisual products and services or any other system of classification that a member 
country wishes to be guided by, although privately the Counsellor for AV services 
admitted that the “current classification is obsolete. It would be a good idea to revise it, 
but difficult from a technical point of view. It would be difficult to get consensus to start 
the revision and classification” .31 The counsellor remarked that it would be very 
difficult to get agreement between 144 trading nations on revising classification, and it 
would become obsolete for technical reasons before the ink was dry. She did not think 
there was much scope for work in this area, partly because such major trading blocks as 
Canada and the EU would be very much in opposition to the suggestion. The problem 
lies with the area of technical neutrality, i.e. to mix telecoms and AV services is “a 
taboo subject”. Instead, it was indicated that in future negotiations, what might happen 
instead is that other areas of negotiation might impact on AV if other sectors are re­
negotiated. There may consequently be a domino effect on audiovisual.
However, the Counsellor for Audiovisual Services repeatedly insisted that the WTO 
Secretariat maintains strict neutrality o f opinion and action. While she admitted that 
“The Secretariat will do its own research” (and much of what originates from the 
Secretariat in terms of ‘Background papers’ draws heavily on OECD research 
documents), the role o f the WTO Secretariat in devising a new audiovisual 
classification system is theoretically, nil. Proposals will come from member countries 
within trading negotiations, and papers are put on the table. Classification is decided at 
the highest political level by and amongst the member countries. It was stressed that the 
most the Secretariat can do is “mediate” .32 This position as put forward by WTO 
counsellors is contested by both a Senior Economist within Forfas, and by members of 
the Irish permanent representation to the WTO -  both insist that the WTO panel is 
increasingly formulating policy, particularly relating to trade in services.
The EC utilises the definition of the audiovisual sector as defined in UN 1991 MTN 
/120 category list, and uses the deñnition of “European” as outlined in the MEDIA and 
Eurimages programmes. In these senses, ‘European’ extends outside of EU Member
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States. This has implications for the definition of ‘European identity’. If media grants 
and support aids are meant for the ‘European Audiovisual sector’ in order to preserve 
‘European identity’, and ‘European’ means 15 member states but including ‘non-EU’ 
states like Turkey, and those o f the former Eastern bloc, then it bears repercussions for 
the solidity o f EU arguments about the European public sphere, European culture and 
European identity.
EC DG Trade is of the WTO-opinion that the CPC classification is outdated. While the 
UN CPC list is provisional rather than mandatory, DG Trade recognises that there is no 
internationally recognised classification. Classification can be decided by the member 
country. DG Trade is ‘undecided’ on the definition of an audiovisual service. The 
audiovisual industry itself is divided on the issue o f software. This is a category that 
includes recreational software, video games and music. Because computer services are 
now approaching audiovisual, there is a need to find a solution. Because no consensus is 
yet reached, it will possibly be clarified through negotiations at the Doha Round.
EC DG Culture takes a defensive approach to the definition of audiovisual services. A
representative argued that the EC doesn’t feel it has to match the trade classification
system as followed by the WTO, yet is concerned that the US proposal for
reclassification of audiovisual services is the only one on the table, thus determining the
parameters for discussion. Head of EC DG Culture, Viviane Reding, asked:
“What do we have to gain from negotiations in which we are asked to further 
open a European market that is already largely dominated by non-European 
programmes, when no significant access is to be expected for European works, 
for example in the United States market? “ (Statement, 2 August 1999)
The European audiovisual industry lobbying group agreed in principle with the EC DG 
Culture approach. They argued on 9 July 1999 that the EU should have defensive 
interests only, with no offensive interests. They recommended that the EC should not 
even consider making liberalisation commitments on new distribution technology 
(especially electronic) o f audiovisual works, and it should prevent part of the issue from 
being drawn into the field of e- commerce. Extra care must be taken with questions of 
electronic distribution - it may be a back door to av. The stance of the European 
audiovisual producers, filmmakers and distributors is that “There is no tactical interest 
for the Europeans in obtaining complete liberalisation of electronic distribution
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(computer networks, electronic commerce) for audiovisual works, because in exchange 
Europe would have to offer this option to its partners.” 33(pl4)
A different opinion was put forward by the European Broadcasting Union, who 
suggested that “simply to defend the status quo would not be an adequate response. 
Instead, a stable solution should be sought that would prevent the European audiovisual 
model -  consisting of European and national regulation, as well as support schemes -  
from being challenged in every subsequent round of trade negotiations” . (September 
2 0 0 1 )
It is important to recognise that whichever member country first puts forward a proposal 
for negotiation remains, until other proposals are submitted, the initiator. In the case of 
‘audiovisual services’, the United States has been one of the first (along with Japan, 
Brazil and Switzerland) with offensive interests in the audiovisual market, which they 
would wish to push. Thus, the fact that the proposal from the United States puts forward 
a suggestion of a reclassification and re-definition o f ‘audiovisual services’ is a strong 
indication of how future GATS trade negotiations in this area will proceed. The US 
proposal becomes the basis of future negotiations, until other counter-proposals are 
offered. The European Community and its Member States in the area o f audiovisual 
services has only defensive interests, thus are keen to keep quiet and stay low, with the 
intention of trying to maintain the status quo as it was left at the end of the Uruguay 
Round o f GATT. They will not be putting forward a proposal for a revision of the 
definition o f ‘audiovisual services’.
6.7 Irish Trade policy
The Irish government’s 1998 Trade Policy Statement details the implications of a global 
free-trade arena arising from a neo-liberalisation trade trend. In this scenario, the role of 
the State would be limited to assisting industries to become more competitive; strictly 
curtailing State aid and supports; and ensuring that tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, 
such as subsidies, are eliminated entirely.
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The Uruguay Round “saw further significant reductions in tariffs; a strengthening of 
the provisions on non-tariff barriers; creation of a more effective system for settling 
disputes; an extension of the WTO system to cover trade in services, intellectual 
property and agricultural trade; and the creation o f the WTO itself as a permanent forum 
for trade negotiations.” (1998: para 2.8.1)
Under the WTO plans for the Millennium Round negotiations, the Irish government 
expects the furthering of progressive liberalisation of trade through the reduction of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers on a global or sectoral basis.
“In the global free-trade scenario, State supports in general, including those 
targeted at exporters, would be strictly curtailed. The focus o f Government 
activity would rather be on measures to enhance the competitive environment, 
including a reduction of regulatory and other burdens on business. It would also 
be essential to ensure coherence between economic/trade policy and policy 
objectives in related areas, (for example on audiovisual or cultural matters) 
Close contact between Government and business through organs such as the 
Trade Advisory Forum and the Competitiveness Council would be essential to 
ensure continued responsiveness of Government to the needs o f business.” 
(Paragraph 3.8.1 M)
While accepting that a global free trade arena will mean “further limits on State 
intervention”, it is allowed that “State supports for exporters (would be) concentrated on 
those companies which demonstrate a capacity for sustainable export growth and for 
whom such State support can make an appreciable contribution to their success in this 
respect.” (Ibid, Para 3.8.2) Enterprise Ireland have identified the key sectors of games, 
animation, film for television (not cinema), cinema distribution and the technology for 
that distribution as those worthy of “active promotion”. Enterprise Ireland, like Forfas 
is under the auspices of the D/ENT-EMP, which regulates ‘technology’ rather than 
‘culture’, which is the remit of the new D/Arts, Sport and Tourism. In the new Fianna 
Fail-Progressive Democrat government of 2002, the Broadcasting section of the former 
D/AHGI moved under the umbrella o f the re-structured Department of 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources.
The Irish government’s strategy, as outlined in the 1998 Statement o f National Trade 
Policy (Para 3.10) is to: plan on the assumption that the trend towards further 
liberalisation of trade and investment flows will continue, with the likelihood of further
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curbs on non-tariff barriers including subsidies and the possibility that already-low tariff 
levels may be eliminated entirely. The Irish government is also planning to prepare for a 
more liberal trading environment, enhance the competitive environment by reducing 
regulatory and other burdens on business and ensure coherence between 
economic/trade policy and policy objectives in related areas.
6.8 Irish trade potential in the audiovisual industry
As a potential growth industry, Ireland has many advantages if it is compared to its 
European neighbours. Firstly, films and television product and multimedia content are 
produced in English, and have thus a potentially global distribution net. English 
language content can cross international borders more easily, and can penetrate US 
markets much more readily that those films that must be dubbed or sub-titled in movie 
theatres. Secondly, DG Information Society has identified that in the field of digitally 
produced, compressed and distributed audiovisual content, Ireland has many strengths. 
By building on the existing skills in software, IT, computer and telecommunications, 
Ireland has theoretically a lead start on the development of internationally traded 
audiovisual, multimedia, digital media, interactive products and services. Thirdly, 
Ireland is well placed to take advantage o f the designated focus of the new MEDIA III 
aid-programme that is concentrating on assisting the development and distribution of 
television and multimedia content. The 1999 Final report o f the Film Industry Strategic 
Review Group remarks that “It is important to ensure that Ireland is not treated less 
favourably than other EU States. Even more important is the need to ensure that the 
Irish (and the European industry) is not handicapped relative to non-EU states that 
heavily support their film industries.” (p43)
The 1999 Final report o f the Film Industry Strategic Review Group provides a number 
of reasons why State aid is important to a developing Irish film and television industry, 
(i.e.) for strategic, cultural, and competitive arguments (p74), but concludes that “The 
case for substantial and continuing State backing is conclusive. At issue ....is the form, 
magnitude and the strategic and economic effectiveness of different types of support, 
not the existence of the support itself’. (p70)
This compares with the 1992 Report o f the Special Working Group on the Film 
Production Industry 35 where the principal battle royale was between the Department of 
Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht (then Minister, Michael D. Higgins) and the Department 
of Finance whose representative refused to acknowledge that the film and television 
industry in Ireland warranted any special treatment. Likewise, the opinion o f the 
Department of Industry and Commerce (now Enterprise, Trade and Employment) was 
that the film industry was an industry like any other and had therefore to fight for 
Government Exchequer funds just like any other industry sector.
Both the IDA and An Bord Trachtala expressed a like opinion that the development of 
the audiovisual ‘service’ industry in Ireland merited State intervention and continued 
support (p2 1 ).
The two departments - Department of Finance and the Department of Industry & 
Commerce - were in unison by questioning whether the outcome o f financial State 
assistance would be worth the considerable investment. Both were adamant that “the 
film industry should not be treated as an industry which, because of ill-defined cultural 
or artistic characteristics, should be given significantly more generous State aid than 
other sectors o f the economy” (p22). The Department of Finance further warned against 
the dangers o f State subsidies -  it its opinion, excess support can “stifle initiative” 
(p32). In contrast, the Review Group argued that support for the growing film industry 
was warranted because of its future economic potential, its role in promoting national 
culture both at home and abroad, and its activity o f helping to avoid cultural domination 
by foreign influences (p28).
The significant shift in film policy was the transfer of responsibility for film matters and 
administration of funds to assist the film industry from the Arts Council, which since 
the 1973 Arts Act, looked after film as an ‘art form’, to the Irish Film Board in 1980. 
The Irish Film Board was established by the Oireachtas to ‘deal with the industry and to 
administer a film production fund’ (p28). Section 35 special tax incentives were 
introduced in the 1987 Finance Act, but are currently under threat of extinction by the 
present Minister McCreevy.
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Modern human rights in trade
C h a p t e r  7
In this, the second empirical research chapter the researcher explores the options 
currently available to the Irish government, or any EU member state, to enforce human 
rights within the marketplace (WTO). In detailing the current trade rules open to 
negotiation, this chapter examines the current protectionist rhetoric that colours the EU 
and Irish approach, and the arguments put forward against their approach.
In the next, and final chapter, this researcher will draw conclusions as to the relative 
protection for Irish citizens’ communication rights afforded by Irish governmental 
decisions, and this thesis will propose an alternative approach.
7.1 Trade Rights and Trade Rules
The author recalls at this point that national autonomy and sovereignty was traditionally 
(in the 18th - 19th centuries) secured in the first instance, by trade rules regulating 
independent commercial and international trade policy.
In theory, the use of trade rules to safeguard national or EU sovereignty in decision­
making in relation to audiovisual services guarantee the following ‘rights’: the right to 
impose trade barriers; the right to limit or restrict market access; the right to restrict 
foreign investment; the right to retain autonomy of national or EU audiovisual policy; 
the to right to impose content quotas; and the right to retain state support measures and 
state subsidies to the sector. Additionally, each EU negotiating member state retains the 
right to impose greater limitations on market access to foreigners, and retains the right 
to list additional state support measures as exemptions to the MFN (Most Favoured 
Nation) rule.
This research suggests that Ireland has not exercised these rights. Ireland has refrained, 
for political reasons, from going beyond the basic minimum agreed by the Community 
member states as stated by the common position.
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7.2 The Trade Rules: Commitments, Exemptions, and Most 
Favoured National Treatment
7.2.1 Commitments
The GATT trade rules focus on a trading nation making a commitment to open and 
liberalise their national market to outside and foreign competitors. Commitments bind 
countries to adopting no new measures or import rules more restrictive than current 
laws restricting entry into their markets for these services. Once countries have made 
commitments under the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) to liberalise 
sectors o f their economies, they must ‘refrain from introducing any new measures that 
may inhibit trade’, and they cannot ‘un-commit’.
The Uruguay Round was the one and only opportunity available to trading nations to 
exclude a sector from free and liberal trade. Very few WTO members took 
commitments on audiovisual services. Some that did from the Asia Pacific region were 
fully expecting to be targeted by USTR (United States Trade Representative) trade 
negotiators in the Seattle Round (1999) with the intention of pressurising them to 
“commit to removing cultural safeguard measures in their audiovisual services 
sectors”36.
Lobby groups and representatives o f European broadcasters, independent producers, 
directors and distributors - CEPI, EUROCINEMA, FIAD, CICCE, FEITIS, GESAC, 
EBU, FERA, and UNIC 37 - petitioned Minister de Valera (9 July 1999) prior to an EC 
Culture Ministerial Council meeting where the situation on WTO negotiations on the 
audiovisual sector was to be reviewed in readiness for the end of 1999 Seattle trade 
meeting. For this group, the implications of taking commitments to liberalise the 
European audiovisual sector would, it was argued:
“jeopardise future and foreseen policies and measures including,
a) making new forms of e-distribution of audiovisual works subject to obligations to 
invest in national production;
b) a future financial instrument to be adopted by Council of Ministers to attract private 
capital into European production;
c) measures to transpose existing regulation for traditional audiovisual services to new 
audiovisual services;
d) incentives to promote multilingual content,
e) measures to digitise audiovisual heritage,
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f) financial or tax incentives for the circulation of EU audiovisual works in Europe,
g) extension of the public service broadcasting mission to new services,
h) creation of means o f financing the public service broadcasting service or other 
public interest activities,
i) the regulation of digital access gateway points;
j) the extension of safeguards on pluralism in the media particularly cultural and 
linguistic diversity, to include new services.”
The European Community and its Member States therefore made no commitments to
open up the market on audiovisual products and services. As an Irish negotiator
explains, the real outcome was a result of time restrictions and lack of consensus.
“When it came to Market Access, the EU had to ask -do we list AV as one of 
the sectors in our schedule that we were prepared to liberalise? You can write it 
in, some argue, and then insert some restrictions, i.e. you can partly liberalise it 
and that would have been quite possible. But the US already had 95 % of the 
cinema market, and 50% of the TV market, probably more, so if you were 
willing to accept the status quo you could have written something along those 
lines in the schedule, saying American companies can have access to our TV and 
cinema, but they can never have market share because of x, or y, depending on 
what sector you were talking about. That kind of idea would have been in 
negotiation. But it came to the end and nothing had been agreed on that, so in 
the end, the EU got to the stage where everyone said: this Uruguay Round is two 
years over-running already, we’ve already tried to conclude it at the end of 1990 
and failed, at the end of ‘91, similarly, and it’s now the end of ‘93. So, if we’re 
ever going to conclude it, we’d better conclude. So, the EU had to take a 
decision then whether to put AV services in the schedule or not, and the decision 
was to leave it out.” (D/ENT-EMP 4, Services negotiator, interview)
In official statements from the EU, it was explained that the dominant thinking behind 
this strategic approach in refraining from taking commitments on the audiovisual sector 
was the belief that the EC and its Member States should ‘retain room for manoeuvre’ 
with relation to future possible cultural and audiovisual policies, measures or 
instruments that it might be desirable to implement either at a national or Community 
level for the purposes of preserving cultural diversity. The EC position remains the 
“wish to retain the option of taking any national or Community measures we feel are 
justified and appropriate in order to preserve and promote true diversity in audiovisual 
content for the people of Europe. Freedom of action is at the heart of the negotiating 
mandate.” (Statement by Viviane Reding, EC DG Culture, 2 August 1999)
At the Irish national level, Minister Higgins expressed concern that it was possible to 
foresee, but impossible to predict, the situation o f devising a policy that might be in
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breach of GATT rules. The EU states came to agreement that nothing should be signed 
and committed to at GATT level that might “tie our hands”. This left the 
implementation of policy open, to be decided at EU or national level. Countries that did 
not make commitments -  and this included about 80% of countries targeted as lucrative 
foreign markets by the US - “reserve the right to impose new or more burdensome 
measures that may have a trade limiting affect without penalty” whereas countries that 
have already included audiovisual services in their commitment schedules will be 
expected to undertake further liberalisation o f markets for these services. The Asia 
Pacific governments expected the US to put particular pressure on the elimination of 
measures that “aim to promote and enhance national culture”. There are similarities 
between the measures put in place by various Asia Pacific governments, and those by 
the European Community. They include local television content quota or content 
regulations; restrictions on foreign advertisements; restrictions on foreign ownership 
and control; tax incentives or government subsidies; and any limits or caps on foreign 
investment.
7.2.2 Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Exemptions
The second strategic trade rule to deploy to a nation state’s advantage is the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment, or exemptions to that. MFN Treatment means that 
all foreign entrants to a sector opened up to liberalisation must be given an equal chance 
to compete. There should be no discrimination. It is currently termed by the US as 
“normal trading relations”. The MFN treatment clause means that when a Member 
country makes a commitment to liberalise part of a sector, and has not explicitly 
exempted that part of the sector from the application of Most Favoured Nation 
treatment, then every one of that country’s trading partners is entitled to benefit from 
that liberalising commitment. National treatment of foreign services or service suppliers 
entitles them to treatment no less favourable than domestic services or suppliers, for 
example in the receipt of state funding for comparable activities in a sector. WTO 
Members may grant national treatment, or enter limitations. It is within the limits of the 
MFN rule that individual nation states can in theory, exercise national autonomy.
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Thus, Ireland in the devising o f its own cultural, audiovisual or international trade 
policy is at liberty to further restrict access to foreign market entrants or to favour 
indigenous suppliers, even within the coniines of finding agreement within a European 
Community Common Commercial Policy. On National Treatment therefore, Ireland has 
the freedom to grant support subsidies to its own local audiovisual industry, and exclude 
this support to outside foreign competitors.
What came out of the Uruguay Round was “carte blanche to do whatever we like in 
terms o f limiting US access to our market. The upshot of the Uruguay Round was that 
the culture voice had its way, in that nothing was put in the WTO agreements that limit 
our freedom of action. De facto, though, they (Ireland) haven’t actually done very much 
in terms o f limiting the US. In theory we’re still free at EU level to make any decision 
we like, subject to whatever is agreed at the EU level. The Irish authorities are free to 
make whatever decision they might like to make in relation to Ireland. De facto, what 
was the position? The position that all Irish cinema screens at the moment are filled 
with American films, at least 90 % - will we ever do anything to change that? Is there 
any point in doing anything to change that? We insist on having Irish in schools, are we 
going to insist on having Irish films on screen? Personally I doubt it. Similarly with TV 
-  we could in theory insist on having considerably higher percentage of Irish production 
on TV. Have we done that? No.” (D/ENT-EMP 4, services, interview)
However, the GATS rules dictate that the MFN obligation applies automatically unless 
it is specifically excluded for listed policies or support system, e.g. Section 481 for film. 
If a particular subsidy is not listed and exempted, it becomes automatically open to all 
market players. It remains doubtful however, whether Ireland takes advantage of this 
national right to limit foreign material on screens.
The EC and its Member States took exemptions on MFN for the audiovisual sector, 
under Article 12 and Article 5 o f GATS38.
If no exemptions were entered, according to a senior civil servant in D/AHGI,
“ We would be obliged to give the same treatment to any signatory to the GATS 
as an Irish person gets in Ireland. Everybody that has signed up to this gets the 
same treatment as the national of any country. We didn’t want to do that for two 
reasons: a) we didn’t want the subsidies -  that’s too strong a word -  the aid 
systems particularly the aid systems that exist in Europe; we did not want them 
to be stopped. That’s what we could have done. Europe could have said ‘fine, 
we’ll dispense with all of these programs that assist the European industry and
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let everybody fend for themselves’. The European audiovisual industry, if it ever 
becomes self-supporting -  that’s another day’s work, but at the moment, it’s a 
very fragile little animal -  and so we said no, we’re not prepared to dismantle 
these systems, and also we’re not prepared to give you MFN treatment in 
relation to access to these systems. So, we’re just plain selfish. But selfish in the 
interests of the European AV sector”. (D/AHGI 2, interview)
Here, the D/AHGI projects an argument in defence of the audiovisual production 
industry. Both industry, and culture (by former Ministers de Valera, and MD Higgins) 
are employed in the defence of subsidies to the audiovisual sector.
The contentious point about exemptions from MFN obligations is that they should, in 
principle, only last for ten years. The EC argues that MFN exemptions can remain in 
place as a ‘structural and indefinite policy’ in line with the present EC position of 
operating according to a principle of precaution (DG Culture, interview, Brussels), 
while the US and others pushing to open up the audiovisual sector would demand their 
phasing out and permanent elimination, once the exemptions ‘expire’ in 2005. 
Exemptions taken by the EC on MFN allows for the development of national AV 
policies, and preferential treatment for European audiovisual industries for cultural 
diversity objectives. In a formal statement on behalf of the EC, it was clarified that 
exemptions to the GATS MFN obligation were taken “in order to preserve works of 
European origin, to preserve the possibility to maintain bilateral or plurilateral 
agreements on the co-production of audiovisual works in relation to distribution and 
access to funding; and to preserve European support programmes such as the action 
plan for advanced television services, MEDIA or Eurimages.” (Reply o f Sir Leon 
Brittan to written question by PPE group in European Parliament, 12 November 1997) 
Exemptions taken by the EC were explicitly listed in the GATS schedule to cover (a) 
Co-production agreements, (b) MEDIA Programme (c) EC Directive TVWF (d) 
National Aid Exemptions and (e) the Council of Europe ‘Eurimages’ support scheme.
Through the processes of taking firstly, no commitments to liberalise, and secondly 
using the exemptions to MFN treatment, member states could orchestrate a situation 
whereby the audiovisual sector would arrive at a status not dissimilar to the effects of a 
total exclusion annex, as had been reached on air transport by all the GATT members. A 
broad application of the market access schedules and the MFN exemption options could 
mean that an individual country could effectively exclude the audiovisual sector from
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liberalised trade and from MFN treatment on audiovisual tariffs. This would represent a
clear statement that free trade does not apply to audiovisual services.
“The effect of the MFN exemptions that were taken by the EU and they were 
taken to cover all the then EU member states could be interpreted as meaning 
that really the MFN principle didn’t apply. If you take latitude to allow us to do 
things in the future, that would be contrary to MFN, the effect o f those 
exemptions is to ‘carve audiovisual out’. So, the EU put in some fairly widely 
drafted MFN exemptions, with a broad coverage to say, “If we need to do 
something that infringes MFN, then so be it, we’ll do it”. And the effect is 
radically the same as if it were an Annex.” (D/ENT-EMP 4, services negotiator, 
Dublin, interview)
In August 2000 in the preparations to the Seattle Round it appears that a new Irish 
Culture Minister, de Valera, desired to take a stronger position than that agreed by the 
European Community member states. The minister’s stronger stance aims to defend 
support for the industry on a cultural rights basis. In response to the recommendations 
circulated by the French audiovisual industry lobby group outlined previously, the 
Minister officially outlined Ireland government policy. In line with EU common 
cultural policy, and with the position agreed in the EU General Affairs Council 
conclusions (22 October 1999) relating to a new round of trade negotiations (Seattle), it 
was stated that Ireland:
a) ‘strongly supported’ the principle of protecting cultural diversity
b) advocated strong support for the development o f audiovisual projects at national 
and EU level for the promotion of cultural diversity in the audiovisual media 
within Europe
c) was not willing to agree to a reduction in the level o f investment in development 
relative to the MEDIA II programme
Additionally, the Minister added that,
“We are also sympathetic to the view that international trade law should 
recognise the special nature of intellectual and creative works avoiding any rules 
that would have the effect o f  applying raw competition criteria to works of 
culture and the fostering of cultural diversity and creativity” . [Italics added]
This last paragraph was reworked by the D/ENT-EMP. Following discussions and input 
the last paragraph softened Minister de Valera’s robust stance on the extension of “raw 
competition criteria” to cultural works. The final version instead saw the final paragraph
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go no further than the already familiar common EU approach to trade negotiations on 
audiovisual.
The department of Trade, Enterprise and Employment suggested the following wording:
“We are also sympathetic to the view that international law, including trade law, 
should recognise the special nature of intellectual and creative works. Ireland 
supported the recognition of this fact in the EU General Affairs Council 
conclusions o f 22 October 1999 on a New Round of Trade negotiations within 
the WTO. In dealing with cultural issues, these conclusions state: “During the 
forthcoming WTO negotiations the Union will ensure, as in the Uruguay Round, 
that the Community and its Member States maintain the possibility to preserve 
and develop their capacity to define and implement their cultural and 
audiovisual policies for the purpose of preserving their cultural diversity”.
It is noted that when negotiations on GATS audiovisual appeared as if they were getting 
serious (possibly the following year, in 2001) “the EU Member States might tiy to get 
an interpretation of what the conclusion actually means”. (Letter from D/ENT-EMP to 
D/AHGI in response to European audiovisual lobby, 30 August 2000).
In the event, the Seattle trade round talks lacked American political will, and they 
failed. The agenda for the Doha / Millennium Round was agreed in November 2001, 
and the round was launched. Member States were expected to formally list their 
offensive interests by June 2001 -  in Ireland’s case, this was done after the D/ENT- 
EMP -  Forfas consultation period.
The researcher draws the conclusion that in trade negotiations, the D/ ENT-EMP holds 
the upper hand. While the D/AHGI might try to negotiate for a stronger defence o f Irish 
national ‘cultural’ rights which involve the funding and support of national broadcasting 
and production systems, the D/ ENT-EMP does not entertain any suggestion of limiting 
foreign access to the national audiovisual market.
MD Higgins appears to concur with this -  he maintains that there was no attempt by the 
D/ ENT-EMP to consult with him over trade matters. Higgins argues that in his period 
of office, trade policy just ‘drifted along’ without detailed objectives.
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7.3 State aid for cultural objectives
The Uruguay Round of GATT started in 1986, and was due to conclude at the end of 
1990. Agreement was not reached on a number of issues. By 1993, after failing a 
second time to draw an end to the talks at the end of 1991, everyone participating was 
eager to reach agreement. A general cultural exception was considered in the 
negotiations and rejected. The European Community’s official stance was that “a 
cultural exception would go too far and allow abuses, and proposed that the unique 
character of the audiovisual sector be preserved by means of a cultural specificity 
clause” which would allow special treatment for the sector, rather than exempting it 
from the rules of international trade. The European Commission preferred the ‘cultural 
specificity’ approach for several reasons. One o f these was the obvious difficulty with 
the negotiation o f a cultural exception.
When there was no agreement on a cultural annex, compromise between the Member 
States of the European Community in negotiation with the main trading nations in 
opposition (US, Japan, Brazil) had to focus on using the existing trade rules (i.e. No 
commitments, and Most Favoured Nation Treatment, and Exemptions) to accommodate 
the national interests of the French, Irish and Southern European countries as expressed 
in cultural terms
The opinion o f the European Commission (DG Culture) with regard to State Aids to the
cinema sector explicitly outline that
“Aid for cinematographic production has a purely cultural aspect and an 
industrial aspect. In respect of the industrial aspect, it is noted that this aid for a 
product (i.e. a film) has for effect that the audiovisual sector will benefit from 
support necessary to achieve the cultural objective, namely that of audiovisual 
creation (or production). With regard to this aid to industry, it can be argued that 
the necessary operational structure has to exist within the country to make 
cultural creation possible” .39 
This researcher queries whether all audiovisual creation or production is cultural? This
researcher does not agree that it is, particularly with relation to the vast quantjties of
entertainment or fictional audiovisual product that fills television schedules.
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With the above, the European Commission has defined the ‘cultural objectives’ of State 
Aid to cinema and audiovisual industries as “audiovisual creation” or production, and 
for this production to take place, there must be in place the necessary “operational 
structures’. This communication from the Commission was augmented by a 
Communication from the Commission on the application o f  State A id rules to public 
service broadcasting (November 2001). “Cultural objectives” are also defined as “the 
safeguarding of the European cultural values and our cultural diversity”. (Commission 
Staff Working Paper, April 2001:7)
According to a trade official from D/ENT-EMP, “We’re relatively free on what we do 
on subsidies in relation to any service including AV. Officially, we have MFN 
exemptions on audiovisual. So if it was a question of subsidizing audiovisual, it doesn’t 
have to be done on the basis of MFN, because the exemption is there.” (D/ENT-EMP 4, 
services)
Subsidies for anything other than free to air (broadcasting) services are not under 
consideration. New audiovisual or digital services are unlikely to be given extra Irish 
government assistance to aid their development and provision to or reception by the 
public. D/ AHGI’s definition of ‘broadcasting service’ is that it is public, and available 
to all, all the time. Non-payment o f the licence fee does not withdraw your right to the 
broadcasting service, but it does mean that you must defend your reasons for non­
payment in court. Recent reports would appear to conflict with the department’s 
apparent benevolence. An Post, the organisation which collects the licence fee on 
behalf of RTE has acknowledged (Irish Times 27/09/03) that there is an “intensive drive 
to prosecute television licence defaulters”, leading to court prosecutions and fines of up 
to 634 euro. Those claimants who have argued from a social welfare perspective have 
not been granted special circumstances. Instead, those on low income have been faced 
with small fines plus costs. There are only a certain section o f the population entitled to 
a free television licence, among those are the over-70s or those in care40.
On the other hand, D/ AHGI defines ‘audiovisual service’ as individual and on private 
demand.
In the opinion of an Irish broadcasting government official,
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“To the extent that RTE wants to develop digital services that are in the public 
service mode, which is free to air, then maybe the government is prepared to 
give them an increase in licence fee to contribute towards the cost of those 
services. But in general at the present time, there is no sense that there would be 
any subsidy to anybody other than the licence fee payment to RTE for the 
provision of free to air services. It’s not excluded at present, certainly, the EC 
wouldn’t raise too many difficulties over a Member State wishing to subsidize 
the driving forward of new services but that subsidy would have to be available 
to all. At the present time, we’re not thinking about subsidizing the provision of 
broadcasting services in the traditional sense, and I don’t think the D/ENT-EMP 
is thinking o f subsidizing the e-commerce type services. Market forces - if  the 
market will support the services, and if people have the entrepreneurial spirit to 
provide the services, they can be provided. (D/AHGI 2, interview, Dublin)
All subsidies and state support systems are included in this broad category of 
uncompetitive state aids by the US. The WTO Article XV of GATS dealing with 
subsidies suggests that “subsidies may cause trade distortions”. 41
The 1995 Irish Green Paper on Broadcasting addresses head on the demands of “US 
audiovisual industries”42. European private broadcasters and telecommunications 
conglomerates’ demands are not mentioned. The villain depicted is the US who “has 
argued against state support for the audiovisual sector in the European Union and press 
for the removal of quotas and subsidies designed to protect and develop the European 
cultural industries. Negotiations on these issues, stalled at the end of the Uruguay 
Round, will no doubt have to resume, the objective being, from an American (not to 
mention an Irish D/ENT-EMP) perspective, to clear away all remaining trade barriers”. 
(1995:133)
“It was agreed that there would be negotiations on subsidies for services prior to 
the Services agreement coming into effect in 1995. On the goods side, there was 
an extensive agreement on subsidies already, and there’s a second agreement on 
agriculture subsidies, but there’s nothing much agreed in relation to services. So 
negotiations on subsidies for Services at WTO level were due to start in 2001. I 
presume that very little has happened -  they’re part of the Millennium Round. 
So, subsidies are an issue in the (next) Round.” (D/ENT-EMP 4, services)
EC DG Competition, the leading European-wide voice on subsidies, operates according 
to stringent regulations with regard to aids and support measures for the (European) 
audiovisual industry. Existing and emerging rules governing aids for the sector scheme 
must be transparent and proportional to the objectives. There are specifications that not 
more than 50% of the production cost can be met by State aid, and no cumulative effect
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of State aid should exceed the 50% limit. Supports are to be based on objective cultural 
criteria.
7.3.1 EU MEDIA programme
European-wide support systems, that can be availed of by “European” (and this is a 
loose definition) productions include Council of Europe initiatives and European Union 
assistance programmes. The Council o f Europe controls the purse strings of Eurimages, 
a fund for coproductions (its budget for 1992 alone was £13 million), while the EU’s 
MEDIA Programme, initiated in 1990 and now in its third phase called MEDIA III, is 
expected to run from 2001 to 2005, with a budget of EURO 500 million. MEDIA II’s 
budget for the previous five years was 200 million EURO. With both these pan- 
European initiatives, funds are available for film production, training, development of 
projects and companies, and distribution.
Rather naively, the D/AHGI does not think Ireland’s support systems will be challenged 
under the WTO and the GATS agreement, because the funding is modest. It is estimated 
that the bigger issue is the MEDIA PLUS programme and the French levy on cinema 
seats. In Ireland, this idea from de Valera’s Think Tank was thrown out, principally 
because it was argued that “it’s a tax on poor man’s entertainment. Now, while going to 
a multi-plex is not exactly cheap, but it’s an additional tax, and our government policy 
is to try and reduce the taxes and also reduce the number of tax efficient schemes, so 
that the whole thing becomes more neutral” (D/AHGI 2). It is the department’s view 
that “people are entitled to be entertained” (D/ AHGI 1).
In arguing from a taxation point o f view, the D/AHGI seeks a type o f ‘equality’, as 
explained by Habermas and Marshall, in the public sphere. The desire not to levy taxes 
supports human (rather than “propertied”, above averagely wealthy) citizens, and their 
human rights. However, if one was to take the view that citizens are taxable members of 
a society or community, then it is within reason to suggest that a tax which enables the 
proliferation of representation (in audiovisual terms) of ‘their’ culture could be 
exercised. The department’s lack of desire to tax sits uneasily with the other and 
opposing argument suggesting cumulative benefit in terms o f audiovisual production.
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It is financially proven that the French film industry benefits enormously from the 
cinema tax levy, which taxes all films shown in French cinemas, and these contributions 
(from both foreign and French films) are put towards supporting the home film industry.
7.3.2 Irish financial support systems
According to the D/AHGI, “We fund the public b/caster, all of the other broadcasters 
are regulated through the Broadcasting Commission of Ireland which is under our aegis. 
The film industry has legislation which is purely supportive in terms of funding through 
the Film Board -  that is under our auspices. The tax relief schemes, the tax incentive 
schemes for the film industry, Section 481 which used to be Section 35, and then the 
BSE scheme for the music industry and quite recently we’ve set up a non-statutory 
music board. At the moment it’s purely non-statutory. Those are the legislative planks 
through which we must operate.’’(D/AHGI 2) 43
The August 1999 Final report o f the Film Industry Strategic Review Group 
commissioned by the Minister for Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands (/U-IGI) 
remarks that “State incentives and support systems exist in almost every country in the 
world apart from the United States”. (1999:37) (There are many, including this author, 
who argue that the US is well used to employing state aid support systems for its own 
industries.) Some reasons offered for the lack of US state aids to their flourishing 
industry are suggested: “A number of historical reasons account for the American 
experience, including its large and affluent home market, its relative hegemonic 
economic and cultural position during most of the 2 0 th century, its early development of 
large and integrated companies and its magnetic attraction of film talent from all over 
the world. All of these factors were crucial to success in an industry where economies of 
scale in marketing, distribution and research and development are among the important 
keys to mass market success”. (p69)
As listed in this report, Irish State aids range from tax-based incentives, soft loans, 
grants, guarantee funds and so-called automatic systems. Most of these aids are aimed at 
production. (p41) These state support systems are divided into two categories, either
(a) “ direct subsidies (which can be either automatic or selective), usually related to 
cultural or artistic criteria, or
(b) supports (such as tax incentives, equity and loan systems) designed to foster a 
more commercially structured and market driven industry.”
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The report remarks that the latter type, most evidently employed in Australia, Canada, 
the UK (from the mid-1980s onward) and Ireland are more successful in creating a self- 
sustaining industry while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls evident in the ‘direct’ 
type A. Direct subsidies have a tendency to “mask and aggravate fundamental structural 
problems, lack market orientation and create an excessive bias in favour o f art films” . 44 
It is suggested by the report authors that France, Italy and Germany are the main 
culprits in excessively using this schema, to the detriment of their indigenous industry. 
While recognising the faults of a direct subsidy system, the report highlights the great 
advantages of Ireland’s membership of the EU, and the crucial role the MEDIA support 
system in place at EU wide level has played in the development of the Irish industry.
The February 1999 report The Bigger Picture, commissioned by Ireland’s only film 
lobbying group, FilmMakers Ireland on the prospects o f growth of the Irish film and 
television industry identifies continuing and increased government support as critical to 
the survival of the indigenous industry.45 The report acknowledges that “There has been 
some discussion of late as to why the government should support the industry at all” 
(p25), yet provides evidence that “all countries support their industries in some shape or 
form (with the exception of the US)” (p27). While the US provides no funding of any 
sort to its second largest export business, the countries listed as providing national 
funding include Australia, Canada, UK, Germany, France and Ireland. O f the countries 
listed, France supports its film industry with the widest variety of systems -  tax relief, 
tax credit, regional and national funding, investment funding, as well as a cinema tax. 
Ireland in contrast offers three models o f support -  tax relief, tax credit and national 
funding.
Film Makers Ireland comments that compared with other countries, in particular with 
the UK, Ireland’s major competitor in the market of audiovisual services, “the Irish 
State’s involvement is quite modest...Compared to the support Ireland gives its 
manufacturing sector and the distortions it creates, it could be argued that the State 
gives the film industry the cold shoulder.” (p27)
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FMI’s demands for greater governmental support (in particular 100 % tax relief base to 
Section 481) are based on the rationale that an industry in its infancy, as they describe 
the Irish film industry, should deserve more support than other relatively mature 
industries. Section 481 financing is regarded by FMI to be a key support in the 
attainment of a critical industry mass. It is recommended by this industry representative 
body that tax relief on Section 481 should be increased (from 80 %) to 100% in order to 
ensure continuing growth of the film industry in Ireland. FMI also suggests that this 
policy move would help “prevent its replacement with a more dirigiste grant-based 
system which would mean that the industry will never innovate financially” (p32). FMI 
seek government support on a par or comparable to direct support as received by the 
film industries in Australia (100% tax relief), France (investment financing), or the UK 
(that uses other incentives like Lottery funds finance). Similarly, the Review Group46 
also recommended an extension in legislation of the time frame of the Section 481, 
which would give a clear signal to the national and international film and investment 
communities that the Irish government is committed in the long-term (and not just 
subject to renewed approval every three years) to building up the film and television 
production industries. Section 481 was recently renewed for a further five years.
However, an interview with an Enterprise Ireland (El) official (October 2002) who 
inputs into WTO negotiation preparations revealed that El does not envisage a true Irish 
film industry ever existing.
7.3.3 Irish Section 481 Tax Incentives and Irish Film Board Loans
From the time of the establishment of the D/ACG by Minister Higgins, it became 
“government policy to assist the audiovisual sector”. At the national level, the Film 
Board that had been allowed to go into abeyance in the mid 1980’s due to funding 
squeezes was reconstituted. A small Section 35 had been put in its place at that time.
“When the new department was created in 1993, it became government policy to 
try and develop an ‘Irish Film Industry’, and the Film Board was reconstituted 
and given increased resources to develop the indigenous sector and then the 
Section 35 was reinvented to both assist the indigenous sector and to attract in 
investment into the country by way of outside producers coming in to produce 
either or part of films here...the objective being to try and create all the time a
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self-sustaining audiovisual sector and concurrently with that, there was 
amending legislation that impacted on the broadcaster in that for the first time, it 
was statutorily decreed that a certain amount of the broadcasters’ financial 
resources should be used for independent commissioning from the audiovisual 
sector, also contributing to the development o f the AV industry. Prior to 1993 
RTE was free to produce everything in-house if they wanted to. So, nationally 
over the past 9, 10 years there has been an incredible leap in the amount of 
resources diverted into the AV sector here.” (D/AHGI 2)
This official pinpoints the new department in 1993 as the starting point o f a government 
policy to develop and help an ‘audiovisual industry’.
In 2002, there exist a number of sources of State funding in Ireland (e.g. loans from the 
Irish Film Board; commissions from RTE and TG4; grants from The Arts Council, 
other types of (for example, marketing) assistance from the IDA, Enterprise Ireland or 
Udaras na Gaeltachta. Finally, there are the Section 481 tax incentives (or what used to 
be known as Section 35 of the 1987 Finance Act). Of these, “the primary modes of State 
support to the Irish film industry take the form of tax incentives administered through 
the Department of Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands, and soft loans administered 
through the Irish Film Board”47. Section 481 (of the 1996 Finance Act) provides for tax 
relief up to 80% o f investment, while finance from the Irish Film Board amounts to 
recoupable loans of between 10  to 15% of the budget of small to medium sized films.
In the hopes of a D/AHGI official, the section 481 entices foreign filmmakers and 
producers to produce in Ireland. He is aware that this will only continue so long as 
“the bottom line is that if they (the US or Australians) can make the scenery look like 
where it’s supposed to be, and if it comes in at the cheapest price, that’s where they will 
film if they’re going on location. At the end of the day, the film is cheaper to make in 
Ireland as a result of section 481 than anywhere else.”
This may no longer be the case. There are numerous examples of films and 
advertisements being filmed and post-produced abroad because of the current high rates 
of Irish film crews. It is not, in 2002, cheaper to make in Ireland than anywhere else, 
and many within the industry believe that Irish film production companies and workers 
have priced themselves out of the market.
“Section 481 is not available to non-Irish, non-European citizens, but the way it 
operates effectively doesn’t make much difference if they’re an American film
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company comes in, Irish investors invest, and the tax relief is granted. In 
practice, Section 481 is available to anybody yet the tax benefits are for Irish 
citizens. (This is one indication o f employing human rights in trade to assist the 
rights protection o f Irish citizens) The Film Board is definitely indigenous, it’s 
meant only to assist Irish, but under European legislation, it has to be any EU 
citizen. In practice, most o f the funds do go to the Irish. And the amounts 
involved are not something to make an issue of.” (D/AHGI 2)
7.3.4 Direct funding for public service broadcasting and the 
Licence Fee
The former Minister for Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht proposed a fundamental shift in 
managing broadcasting services funding in Ireland in the 1997 document Heads o f Bill: 
Clear Focus which followed on from his 1995 Green Paper. Michael D. Higgins’ 
underlying premise was that the development of digital compression of television 
signals and the facilitation of digital transmission would increase the number, quality 
and availability of audiovisual services available to Irish viewers. However, “the vast 
majority of the new services will be commercial activities, driven ultimately by the 
profit imperative, and funded by means of advertising, subscription and pay-per-view 
arrangements. These commercially funded services, given their trans-national nature, 
will be very lightly regulated, if..at all, and can be expected to limit their investment in 
programming to what the commercial market will support” (p42). BSKYB is always 
one of those corporations hopeful of broadcasting services trans-continentally, yet of 
being lightly-regulated without prosecution and in accordance with British law owing 
to BskyB’s operational jurisdiction.
Minister Higgins wished to “copper-fasten the concept o f licence-fee funding of RTE as 
a reasonable payment for a national broadcasting service, rather than a State subsidy” 
(p45). The Minister proposed that the licence fee level would be adjustable in line with 
annual rises in the CPI Price Index, subject to review at least every five years or more 
frequently if deemed desirable or necessaiy. Increases in the licence fee would be a 
matter between the Department of Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht and the newly 
formulated Irish Broadcasting Commission, and would not be subject to Government 
approval (p65).
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“Michael D. Higgins envisaged a single regulatory authority -  the Broadcasting 
Commission -  with full time members, fairly heavy weight, with considerable 
powers of interrogation over broadcasters and the meeting of their legal and 
other requirements. All RTE licence fee money was to be channelled through 
them. The Broadcasting Commission usurped the authority role of the RTE 
authority, but the authority represented the concept of a single broadcasting 
authority for the country. Essentially, MD Higgins’ concept was that the 
Broadcasting Commission would pay RTE the full licence fee, but it would also 
pass judgement on RTE’s performance as a public service broadcaster and report 
to government. But they wouldn’t have had any other powers other than telling 
tales to government.” (D/AHGI 1, interview)
However, this proposal was not popular, neither among the radio operators, the private 
broadcasters, not RTE. It was too much like “Soviet control”. Nor did the following 
government (FF/ PD partnership) take up Higgins’ idea. The 1997 FF / PD government 
didn’t feel that a central heavyweight department was the way to go. They had opposed 
it from the beginning.
Government subsidies to national broadcasters had in those years o f the late 1990s been 
coming under intense pressure in the European sphere by private commercial 
broadcasters, keen to get their slice of the funding cake. In response to this international 
pressure, Minister Higgins acknowledged that “There are many competing demands for 
public funding of the public service programming that is provided by independent 
broadcasters”, but expressed that he “is of the view that the division o f licence fee 
revenue among broadcasters according to the type of programming provided would be a 
virtually impossible task; would lead to an administrative nightmare; would dilute 
RTE’s effectiveness as the national broadcaster, and would generally lead to a situation 
where programming might be produced simply because it might qualify for a funding 
subsidy from the licence fee.” (p44) (See and compare De Valera’s baking cake analogy 
and ingredients / separate pricing policy below.)
This is the updated situation in Ireland as of 2003, following the raise in licence fee and 
associated stipulations for receipt of public service funding. For the first time in Irish 
broadcasting history, part of the licence fee will be given to commercial broadcasters for 
public service type programming.
I l l
It was acknowledged in the 1995 Green Paper on Broadcasting that “The independent 
broadcasting sector has put forward the proposition that, as they believe that some of the 
statutory obligations placed on them constitute public service broadcasting, they should 
be entitled to a share of licence fee revenue” (p i84). Thus, Minster Dermot Ahem (of 
the Department of Communications, Natural Resources and the Marine) has listened to 
the commercial broadcasters’ argument, and implemented some of their proposals. In 
this policy issue, the Minister reputedly did not take the advice of his senior civil 
servants. The argument was made that certain programmes are made (in relation to the 
performing arts and particular public service responsibilities) that “cannot be sustained 
solely through the generation of advertising or sponsorship revenues” (p i85) and that 
“clearly can be funded only by licence fee revenue or other Government sources” 
(p i85). However, it is also admitted that Irish broadcasting is now underpinned 
principally from advertising revenue (Para 8.9, p i 8 6 ), and there is the acknowledgement 
by staff within the Broadcasting division that changes in advertising have a direct effect 
on the nature and definition of ‘broadcasting services’.
The distinction as drawn by the then Minister Higgins for qualification for State funding 
/ subsidy was the following: ‘public service broadcasting’ was equal to a “broadcasting 
service provided by a publicly owned broadcaster”, that broadcasting service being “a 
service provided by a broadcaster or broadcasters in the public service, as distinct from 
the concept of segments of public service programming within a commercially run 
broadcasting service” (p43). (See the revised definition o f a broadcasting service in De 
Valera’s 1999 Broadcasting Act.)
The constraints of economic and financial policies pursued by the Government would 
affect future funding o f broadcasting and the options available were described in the 
Green Paper as limited to receipts from either television licence fees or by direct funds 
from the Exchequer. However, none of this proposed legislation came into effect 
because the Minister in question lost office with the change of Irish government in 
1997. Government policy has now (2003) shifted in the opposite direction to Higgins’ 
policy.
The Irish desire to implement its own licence fee policy was strongly contested by DG 
IV in 1998. DG Competition insisted on RTE’s financial openness and accountability.
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On its part, former Minister de Valera insisted that the licence fee did not constitute 
state aid.
7.3.5 Ireland and DG Competition (IV) licence fee dispute
In preparing for a meeting of the Audiovisual / Culture Council on 17 November 1998, 
at which the Irish culture Minister de Valera was present, Ireland suggested the 
following addition to the 29 October draft of the Council Resolution on Public Service 
Broadcasting of paragraph 8 : “The systems of funding for public service broadcasting in 
respect of new audiovisual and information services which are provided on a 
commercial basis and outside the public service remit have to apply financial openness 
to ensure that such funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in the 
Community to an extent which would be contrary to the common interest, while the 
realisation of the remit of that public service shall be taken into account”. Is it to be 
understood that de Valera was suggesting RTE’s new AV services must be financially 
transparent -  but not its public broadcasting services?
The clues to Ireland’s formal Ministerial reservations on Paragraph 8 lie in a Briefing 
for COREPER (i.e., those Irish representatives who attend daily or weekly committee 
meetings on EU business, stationed within the Permanent Representation of Ireland to 
the EU) for the 17 November 1998 Audiovisual / Culture Council meeting. In a 
fundamental clash with DG Competition and their heavy-handed involvement in public 
service funding arrangements 48 the Department of Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the 
Islands stated that:
“In a nutshell, we think that it is not possible to apply analytical accounting to 
the public service activity without disrupting that activity to an extent which 
deprives it of its essential characteristics, in particular, the editorial 
independence of the broadcaster.”
This researcher asks why not? This researcher argues that this is in the public interest, to 
know where the public funding goes. Just as much as it is legitimate for the public to 
know how much is spent on star presenters -  it’s the public money and a publicly 
owned station, thus the public are the shareholders in RTE’s financial accounting 
practices. It is this researcher’s conclusion that RTE have a tradition of unwillingness to 
reveal their financial spending and costs, although has come under pressure within the
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recent past to be more transparent with both. Under this pressure, RTE has gradually 
acquiesced.
Ireland’s concern lay with the assessment that DG Competition had failed to adequately 
take account o f the Irish system for funding public service broadcasting, since Ireland 
did not accept that the licence fee was a State aid.
DG Competition’s discussion document proposed that “the costs o f only certain types o f 
programming net o f  associated advertising revenue would be regarded as meeting the 
criteria o f  public service and be eligible to attract state aid in the form o f licence fee 
income compatible with the common market” 49 DG Competition proposed that public 
service broadcasters “would implement separate accounting systems able to identify 
with the necessary precision the assets, resources, costs and revenues attributable to the 
public service area from the commercial area.”
It is my opinion that the Department’s argument is flawed. The Irish public service 
broadcaster is not a wholly publicly funded public service broadcasting model. RTE 
derives up to / more than 50 % o f  its revenue from advertising and / or commercial 
sponsorship. RTE has a considerable staffing problem. (2000 staff, compared to 
commercial broadcaster TV 3’s staff o f  250 as well as other heavy expenses, such as 
orchestras.) This, and RTE’s other non-essential expenditures were mentioned in the 
1992 Report o f  the Special Working Group on the F ilm  Production Industry in Ireland’ 
but these issues that were brought to light were not addressed by RTE. Like any good 
business, and unless the Irish Exchequer seeks to pour public funds into a black hole 
this researcher holds that RTE should be capable o f  accounting accurately for its 
expenditure, especially when operating to a public service remit with the use o f  public 
funds.
Ironically, the Department was prepared to accept that it was possible to apply 
analytical accounting to “new audiovisual and information services” that are provided 
on a commercial, not public service remit. In order to safeguard this position, Ireland’s 
Proposal to the Draft Council Resolution had suggested that Paragraph 3 (reading as o f 
the 11 November draft “The fulfilment o f  the public service broadcasting’s mission 
must continue to benefit from technological progress”) should be altered to read instead:
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“Public service broadcasters have an important role in bringing the benefits o f  the new 
(insert “audiovisual and”) information services to the public” .50
Subsequent to the DG Competition discussion document, Ireland had produced an 
analogy o f ‘baking a cake’, which was designed to represent the variety o f  processes 
(ingredients) involved in producing public service programming and a public service 
broadcasting schedule. The Irish “Baking a Cake” Public Service Accounting model is 
worth quoting in its entirety:
“Ireland sees the system o f public service broadcasting... like baking a cake. You 
have the ingredients: eggs, flour, milk, fruit and so on. You have the cook who 
mixes the ingredients and bakes the cake. The cake is there for anyone who 
wants cake. If  a person wants an egg he can go to the grocery and ask for an egg. 
A person does not go to the bakery, demand the cake and expect to pay for an 
egg on the basis that an egg is all he wants. DG IV (Competition) would have us 
believe that it is perfectly reasonable to have one’s cake for the price o f  an egg. 
Not only that, DG IV would have us believe that it can take a slide rule and 
work out how much o f the time, experience and creativity o f  the cook relates to 
the egg in the cake. Not even the cook knows this.”si
To continue the analogy, this researcher is o f the opinion that the cook should know, if  
the cook wishes to sell his cake in order to cover his costs, to ensure that he is not going 
to lose money on his cake, leaving aside a cook’s wish to make a profit i f  he so desires.
It was argued,
“DG IV proposes that public service broadcasters would implement separate 
accounting systems able to identify with the necessary precision the assets, 
resources, costs and revenues attributable to the public service area from the 
commercial area. To continue with the baking analogy we accept the view that if  
the baker wishes to bake cakes other than the public service cake that this should 
be a transparently separate operation. These other cakes would include services 
such as pay television, video-on-demand, retransmission services and so on. To 
have it any other way would poison the public service cake in the same way as 
the DG IV proposals would. In the light o f this we ask DG IV to ...p lace at the 
centre o f its thoughts the fact that the Protocol allows each M ember State to 
employ the cook and to give him the financial means to bake a cake which suits 
us. The cake may not be to the taste o f  the Commission, however, that is the 
point o f the Protocol” , [ibid 11, paragraph 6]
DG Competition is accused by the Department as exercising the role o f  “content
police”. DG Competition, it is suggested, is stabbing “a knife in the heart o f  the system
52o f public service broadcasting” .
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It is this author’s view that emotive arguments which have so pervaded and controlled 
any and all discussion o f  public service broadcasting, cultural diversity and national 
control o f  audiovisual services require a rational re-think.
7.3.6 Quotas
The concept o f quotas started to be employed at the European level in November 1987. 
This date saw the Council o f  Europe’s Second M inisterial Conference on Mass Media 
Policy convened in Stockholm. At this meeting, the ‘group o f friends’ reached a non­
binding agreement on the extent o f  quotas for European works to be included in the 
developing European Commission Directive. The French government were the principal 
instigators and the most insistent on retaining the original 1988 proposal o f  60% 
European content on European screens. This desire for a high fixed quota, which was 
not favoured by some other EU M ember States, was partly a reflection o f  French 
national cultural policy and in addition the fact that French artists and producers put 
strong pressure on the government to protect French culture from American ‘cultural 
imperialism’. French MEPs were the main driving force for 60% quotas in Brussels, 
much to the alarm o f the US Trade Representative and the M otion Picture Association 
o f  America.
Between January and June o f  1989 it became obvious to the European Commission and 
the Council o f Europe that there existed strong opposition to the issue o f  European 
content quotas amongst many EU M ember States. The European Commission suggested 
that the Directive could be so arranged so that the article relating to quotas would be 
‘politically’, not ‘legally’ binding. Effectively, this would mean that the EC would not 
bring the M ember State to court for breach o f the Directive if  the country didn’t m eet its 
quota goals. (Hirsch & Petersen, 1992)
The French proposal o f  60% European content quota had been revised by Autumn 
1989, following objections from M ember States and the USTR. Article 4 in the final 
proposal stipulated a quota aim o f “a majority o f European works”, and this was 
caveated by the ruinous escape clause “where practicable” . It is believed that the words
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‘where practicable’ were requested to be inserted by Prime M inister Thatcher, at the 
behest o f President Reagan. It suited Rupert M urdoch too, operating out his British 
base. This eleventh hour insertion was to cause the Commission many headaches in 
later years. By the time o f  the first TVWF ‘monitoring report’ in 1994, the Commission 
realised Article 4 needed urgent clarification, following approximately 31 complaints to 
the Commission relating to non-compliance and problems o f  interpretation for TV 
operators and national governments.
In 1989, Ireland did not object to the quota obligations. If  there was any reaction to be 
recorded, it was only that Ireland was sceptical that the quota obligations would lead to 
the creation, as the Commission were hoping, o f  a European market for ‘European 
output product’. Given the language barriers within the European Union o f  Member 
States, it was unlikely -  and time has been witness to this -  that Member State nationals 
would watch much else other than their own indigenous production, plus dubbed 
American imports. “The Italians watch Italian and American; the French watch French 
and American; the Germans watch German and American; and we watch a lot o f  UK, 
American, and our own” . (Interview, D/AHGI 1, Department o f Communications, 
Dublin)
On 3 October 1989, a qualified majority adopted the EC Directive Television Without 
Frontiers in the Council o f Ministers. Denmark and Belgium voted against it. France 
only supported it in the end o f  the day because the day before -  2 October -  had seen 
the successful resolution o f  a two-day discussion and planning session, ‘Les Assises de 
l ’Audiovisuel’ led by President Mitterand, and a battalion o f  audiovisual professionals 
and experts. The closing declaration, signed by 26 Ministers and the President of the 
European Commission officially established the support scheme for audiovisual 
productions, Eureka. M itterand had first pushed this agenda the year before, at a 
December 1988 European Council meeting in Rhodes. The formal establishment o f 
such a subsidy package for European audiovisual productions meant that France could 
give its official backing to the TVWF Directive and vote ‘yes’. By signing the TVWF 
Directive, they approved the free and liberal intra-European market in audiovisual 
products and services. Eureka was to be the new addition to the late 1980s batteiy o f 
EC and Council o f Europe support schemes to boost trans-European audiovisual 
production, none o f which were that well-financed. 1987 had seen the inauguration o f
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the EC’s MEDIA 2 programme, followed in 1990 by M EDIA 95, while the Council o f 
Europe had launched Eurimages in 1988.
Throughout the 1980s, Irish governments had struggled to emulate the neo-liberal 
economic theories prevailing in America, the UK, and France. During the time o f 
Minister Burke’s tenure o f office, Ireland had smashed the monopoly o f  the public 
service broadcaster and its unions, and the European Union had eradicated national 
autonomy for the regulation o f broadcast services. The EU had established the ground 
rules for a common market in multi-European transmission and sale o f  audiovisual 
product. By the late 1980s, the Fianna Fail government and M inister for 
Communications Ray Burke had also voluntarily entered into this market by way o f  the 
liberalisation o f its own broadcasting system towards a mix o f private commercial and 
public service radio and TV broadcasters. This echoes Hamelink and Raboy, who both 
argue that it is national governments that liberalise their national public spheres, and run 
the risk o f then not being in a controlling position o f the operators within that sphere.
Five years on from the adoption o f the 1989 original Directive, it was expected that the 
European Commission would submit a report on the application o f  the Directive, and 
make proposals for any revisions i f  deemed necessary in light o f the rapidly changing 
audiovisual field and new technological evolutions. In November o f  1994 the European 
Parliament had officially called for the proposed revision o f the TVWF Directive to be 
submitted without delay. The main problem over those five years was the lack o f clarity 
o f the wording ‘where practicable’ in Article 4, and the lack o f rigidity o f enforcement 
by the Commission on the issue o f  quotas. Discussions on the TVWF revision were 
delayed, it appears for reasons other than a full Uruguay Round agenda. The European 
Commission itself was due for revision -  President o f  the EC, Jacques Delors was to be 
replaced by a new incoming President, Santer in early 1995. This also entailed a 
‘cabinet reshuffle’. The old College o f Commissioners were due to finish their term at 
the same time, which m eant that in audiovisual affairs, Commissioner Pinheiro was to 
be replaced by Commissioner Oreja (by many accounts, a weak Spanish figure) as head 
o f the DG for Culture and Audiovisual.
This change o f personnel on 25 January 1995 had a marked effect. In general, the main 
areas o f contention over the revised Directive were, firstly whether the Directive’s remit
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should be expanded to cover ‘new audiovisual services’ (and apply the 50% quotas to 
them), and secondly, whether the quota system needed reinforcing. Interestingly, 
Pinheiro had suggested towards the end o f his term in office at the end o f  1994 that any 
revised TVWF Directive should extend the application o f  the legislation to include 
point-to-point services (i.e., one o f  the on-demand type services), as well as point-to- 
multipoint, including Video on Demand -  a critical ‘new audiovisual service’ under 
pressurised discussion at that time. The US, having failed to secure their demands on 
audiovisual in the Uruguay Round were at the beginning o f 1995, in phase one o f  a new 
stronger offensive strategy in US-EU negotiations on the audiovisual issue. A G7 
Summit was also coming up in February 1995, and it was the American’s strategy to 
ensure that the then situation would not be made more restrictive, either by tightening 
the levels o f restriction or by expanding restriction to new communication technologies. 
It was o f key importance that quotas would not be extended to new audiovisual services, 
such as point-to-point services like Video on Demand. Failure to assuage American 
concerns on these issues was threatening to damage transatlantic relations in the 
Summit. Pinheiro’s proposal for the extension o f a revised Directive was rejected. The 
incoming Commissioner for Culture, Oreja, suggested that a forthcoming Green Paper 
(on new Audiovisual Services) should address the issue o f  Video on Demand, and in the 
meantime a revised TVWF should row back on the protectionist approach. Oreja 
considered that the Article 5 containing the ‘where practicable’ clause should be 
eliminated altogether - due to excessive legal problems - and minimum European 
content levels should be targeted to the recorded levels in 1989.
By the time the new College o f Commissioners debated the TVWF revision in March 
1995, thirteen votes to four (with one abstention) voted in favour o f  an unchanged text. 
When the Commission unveiled its ‘new ’ proposal for a ‘revised’ TVWF at the end o f 
March 1995, it was the turn o f the European Parliament to give its official opinion, 
which under the co-decision procedure, is due to be taken account o f  However, 
Parliamentarians remember this particular case o f  the TVWF revision for the 
unconstitutional abuse o f  their rights in the co-decision procedure. Article 3.4 
establishes the Code o f Conduct between the EC and the European Parliament, stating 
that “The Commission shall ensure that the Council bodies are reminded in good time 
not to reach a political agreement on its proposals before the EP has given its opinion” .
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However, before the EP had considered the Commission proposal and given its official 
opinion on a revised TVWF text (eventually doing so during First Reading on 14 
February 1996, and Second Reading in November later that year), the Council o f 
Ministers representing the 15 M ember States had reached a ‘political agreem ent’ (20 
November 1995). Their conclusion was that there should be ‘no change’ over the 
proposed revision o f the Directive. The political agreement between the M ember States 
effectively did not take into account any recommendations from the EP, particularly 
their desire to widen the scope o f  a revised Directive to include new audiovisual 
services. The EP had also recommended that the clause ‘where practicable’ should be 
deleted, thus closing the loophole whereby many commercial broadcasters, and in 
particular Sky in the UK, avoided their obligations to show 50% European content.
The Council o f  M inisters’ political agreement deserves greater scrutiny. Once again, 
division o f  opinion between the M ember States was clear cut - the French wished to 
tighten the quota requirements, while France’s usual adversaries, the German and the 
British wanted to scrap them altogether. According to an Irish official involved in the 
negotiations, by the time o f  the TVWF revision, there were two schools o f  thought on 
the European quota revision. One school maintained that quotas were not tough enough. 
Heavier quota provisions were needed. The French led this position to an “extreme 
degree” (and were supported by four other states. In the final vote, only five countries, 
o f  15, defended quotas). The French wanted to m atch the showing o f  one Hollywood 
movie with one European produced programme, or a European, preferably French, 
movie. The French proposal, argues the official, would have had implications for 
Ireland. “We would have said goodbye to indigenous production, because we couldn’t 
have afforded it. RTE can’t afford to make a high-quality film  to match a Hollywood 
movie, and if  there was no American movie as part o f  a schedule, nobody would be 
watching it. In his opinion, the French proposal for strengthened quotas would have put 
“an unbearable burden on the sector here”, because “There is a reality. RTE have their 
revenue o f  £120 million a year. They have two TV stations, radio stations, orchestras 
and performing groups to run as well. It w asn’t practically possible to do that” (D/AHGI 
1). The French position appeared in a non-paper and was so vehemently disagreed with, 
it never appeared as a formal proposal.
9^1
“The other school o f  thought at that time said that quotas had been a complete 
waste o f time. They should be got rid o f  altogether, but Minister Higgins was 
not o f this view. O f the countries round the table, several times France and 
Ireland were alone on standing for quotas and independent production matters.” 
(D/AHGI 1)
The elimination o f quotas was supported by up to six M ember States (including Britain 
and Germany). As eleven o f  the fifteen refused to support a tighter version o f  the 1989 
Directive, the compromise as suggested by Spain, clearly in the driving seat -  Spanish 
Cultural minister Alborch led the Council discussions during the 1995 Spanish 
presidency o f  the EU and Oreja was the Spanish Commissioner o f DG Culture -  was 
‘no change’. Ireland’s position, as put forward by M inister Higgins “supported the 
tightening o f the loophole “where practicable” , supported maintaining quotas and 
making it more difficult to elude them. RTE didn’t object to the compromise reached at 
the end o f pre-TVWF revision discussions -  i.e. a maintenance o f  the status quo -  but 
they wouldn’t have wanted the proposal within the French non-paper.” (D/AHGI 1, 
interview, D/AHGI) Unofficially, RTE (representing ‘public opinion’) would prefer not 
to have to fulfil obligations to quotas.
While in the European forum, Higgins supported the wholesale evasion o f quota 
obligations and sided with France, in Ireland he stated that he did not favour the 
employment o f  quotas for particular types o f programming (for example for cultural 
broadcasting productions, for Irish artistic recordings, for the promotion o f  Irish culture, 
or for productions originating in Ireland). The minister argued against quotas as a policy 
option in the 1995 Green Paper on Broadcasting. He argued that “experience elsewhere 
with the use o f statutory quotas for specific programme categories would not encourage 
Government to go down this road”. Effectively, the use o f statutory quotas is ruled out -  
“The mechanism is a blunt, inflexible instrument. If it is enshrined in legislation the 
quota must be met. Therefore, quantity rather than quality becomes the criterion. 
Mediocrity may become the norm if  artists and composers are guaranteed airplay. 
Programming as a consequence could become dull and unimaginative and will probably 
fail to reflect the needs and wishes o f the audience to be served.” (p227)
It was suggested in the 1992 Report o f  the Special Working Group on the Film  
Production Industry in Ire land  that these quotas stipulations have had the reverse effect
o f their intention because “There are grounds for believing that terminology such as “a 
reasonable proportion”, “as far as is practicable” , and “where practicable and by 
appropriate means” in these texts (i.e. TVWF and Section 5 o f the 1990 Broadcasting 
Act) affords RTE too much discretion with regard to the commissioning o f  independent 
productions, given the importance o f  the independent production sector (while) RTE 
has indicated that it conforms to the letter o f  the Directive” . (p41)
Broadcast programming quotas as stipulated by the EC Directive Television Without 
Frontiers at present are enshrined in Irish law by means o f  Statutory instrument No. 
251. Articles 4 and 5 o f the Broadcast Directive hold the relevant stipulations as to the 
minimum quantity o f European productions that are to be shown on television. The 
articles stipulate a minimum o f 50% European content to be shown on screen, when 
practicable. In the recent Broadcasting Act 2001, the Irish government has imposed a 
positive quota to screen more Irish-produced programmes. RTE is now required to 
invest 15 million Euro in independently produced programmes in the year 2001. The 
Irish Broadcasting Act 2001 orders that RTE spending should be invested in a) the 
commissioning o f the making o f  independent television programmes, b) the procuring 
the formulation by persons or proposals for the commissioning by RTE or the making 
o f independent television programmes; and c) the assisting in the completion o f 
independent television programmes, the making o f  which has not been commissioned 
by RTE.
This researcher interprets this move as representing a positive shift towards the local 
territorial expression o f  its culture, although the terms in which this provision has been 
drafted indicate a Ministerial desire for that cultural expression to be ‘Irish’ and 
‘national’, o f ‘Irish’ and ‘regional’ in character.
8.1 Conclusions
C h a p t e r  8
Does Irish policy protect rights according to the communitarian approach to citizenship, 
to which this thesis subscribes? Does the Irish model o f policy-making align itself with 
Habermas’ ideal deliberative democracy? To what extent does Ireland protect its 
‘cultural right’ to expression, in the traditional way in which this right is articulated? To 
what extent are the rights to express and receive (i.e. ‘com m unicate’) upheld in policy­
making? This research has chosen to address the question to what extent, and in what 
way, Ireland protects Irish human rights to communicate within a post-national public 
sphere? In the sphere o f  the international marketplace, which trade rights does Ireland 
defend, and to what extent is it successful?
This researcher concludes that Ireland, unlike France has not elevated audiovisual 
concerns as a priority since the integration o f the economy into the global market (via 
the EU), and does not choose when led by Fianna Fail policies to protect Irish citizens’ 
rights beyond the minimum proposed by the EU.
On the other hand, this researcher argues that in so doing, some Irish governments have 
protected the trade rights o f  other countries, those establishing business in the Irish 
jurisdiction, rather than the communication rights o f their own citizens. Others who 
classify communication as a ‘cultural right’ would argue that Ireland fails to protect 
Irish citizens’ ‘cultural’ rights.
The Irish government has frequently failed, yet there is scope to give better protection 
than the minimum set at EU level, if  Ireland so chose. In relation to MFN (Most 
Favoured Nation) treatment, Ireland in the devising o f its own cultural, audiovisual or 
international trade policy is at liberty to further restrict access to foreign market entrants 
or to favour indigenous suppliers, even within the confines o f  finding agreement within 
a European Community Common Commercial Policy. On National Treatment therefore, 
Ireland has the freedom to grant support subsidies to its own local audiovisual industry, 
and exclude this support to outside foreign competitors. However, the GATS rules 
dictate that the MFN obligation applies automatically unless it is specifically excluded
for listed policies or support systems, e.g. Section 481 for film. If  a particular subsidy is 
not listed and exempted, it becomes automatically open to all market players. The issue 
remains however -  did Ireland take advantage o f  this national right to limit foreign 
material on screens?
One Irish negotiator underlined the theoretical freedom o f action that Ireland gained 
following the agreement at the Uruguay Round -  technically, it is possible for Ireland to 
do one thing, and for the UK and France to do another. While this might not be 
politically desirable, given the overwhelming desire for common EU action amongst 
Member states, the provisions are in place at the global GATS level for Ireland to take a 
stricter policy line on the quantity o f  foreign, non-EU content.
However, as is evident from interviews with government officials with responsibility 
for trade, there was no sense o f  imperative on the part o f the Irish government to restrict 
the quantity o f foreign audiovisual imports despite possessing the ability to utilise 
regulatory instruments put in place as part o f the Uruguay Round process that could 
have facilitated the same. Some civil servants are on record in this thesis (see p204) as 
cataloguing a failure o f  the government to guarantee future indigenous Irish production.
Yet, this goes further. When asked if  the audiovisual sector had played an important 
factor in the negotiations orchestrated in Geneva, a lead negotiator indicated that the 
sector had made no significant impact on the m anner o f devising the Irish negotiating 
position. The issues that had received the most serious attention and protection were 
agriculture and textiles, rather than audiovisual. This is true both o f  the early 1995/96 
years o f GATT negotiations, as well as o f later years. Unmistakably clear comments 
from officials from both departments -  o f  Trade, Enterprise and Employment, and o f 
the department o f Arts, Heritage, the Gaeltacht and the Islands -  illustrate that 
audiovisual did not feature as a priority in trade negotiations; the sector was not well 
represented within Irish Representations in Brussels or Geneva; and that no importance 
was given to the issue o f restricting non-Irish content to the Irish audiovisual market.
Despite the fact that the Irish M inister for Culture and Audiovisual was Michael D 
Higgins at the critical period o f the last six months o f  Uruguay Round discussions, he 
too remarked that “within the two principal departments controlling external trade
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affairs (i.e. D/ ENT-EM P and D/ Foreign Affairs), there is “no sensibility” to culture. 
Essentially, Higgins argues, “We are already Americans with attitude”. (Interview, MD 
Higgins, Dublin) This researcher argues that Ireland is protecting Americans’ rights to 
expression in the national public sphere, rather than those o f Irish or EU citizens. It is 
the present author’s opinion that Ireland protects American trade rights. Lack o f  public 
awareness o f  the relevance o f  WTO trade rounds for Irish citizens and their rights helps 
lead to a dominance o f  opinion and input from American and other foreign companies.
While audiovisual services were a very sensitive trade issue, principally because o f  the 
insistence by the French (and southern European countries to a lesser degree) o f the 
right to protect their national cultural identity, there were other issues that had also 
failed to reach agreement at the end o f  1990, and on which talks had been extended. 
Those sectors that tended to cause difficulties naturally then filtered to the end o f the 
talks -  agriculture, audiovisual, but also financial services, telecommunications, 
maritime transport, air transport and movement o f persons (this latter issue had 
immigration implications).
While it was stressed on the one hand that in trade rounds, what was being signed was 
‘the whole package’, and ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, there was some 
dispute amongst interviewees as to how a balance might be struck between the demands 
o f  competing difficult sectors. For example, was there any chance that a good 
concession on agriculture might be more important for Irish interests than forcing a 
break up in talks over the audiovisual issue?
Several D/ENT-EMP officials negated this possibility -  for them, there was no trade o ff 
between agriculture and audiovisual. Both were sensitive areas, but for different 
reasons, and according to the predominant D/ ENT-EMP opinion those sectors were 
negotiated separately, without a trade-off between one area and the other. However, 
remarks by one o f the current trade officials in D/ENT-EMP appear to contradict this 
view.
He says:
“The position on audiovisual would have been adopted by the D/ Arts. As part
o f an overall package, there would have been negotiations on many areas.
Obviously there would have been competing interests. There would have been a
process o f  conceding on some other area, when agriculture took precedence and
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we needed to gain support for our position on that.” (D/ENT-EMP 5, Irish 
negotiator on Services, 133 Committee member, interview, Dublin)
While not suggesting that audiovisual would have suffered at the hands o f agriculture -  
and on both these issues, Ireland was France’s staunchest supporter -th e  implication 
here is that audiovisual and the cultural protection issue is low priority in the greater 
scale o f agreeing a whole package o f  liberalisation on many different areas and sectors 
o f  greater economic importance to Ireland than a small indigenous audiovisual sector.
Undoubtedly, it was the French at least initially who highlighted most strongly the 
cultural concerns surrounding the idea o f space for national culture and European 
culture in the audiovisual media. Former M inister Higgins proclaims that his role 
became more pronounced and it was he that led the argument demanding a cultural 
exception clause in GATT when the Community o f  M ember States had rejected the idea 
o f a total Annex on cultural goods and services. At the point where M inister Higgins 
took up the French baton, there had been a ‘significant retreat’ on the original strong 
stance o f the French position taken by M inister for Culture, Toubon, because o f  a 
change in the cultural minister to D ’ouste Blazy. Higgins felt he had to take up a 
stronger position to compensate for the weakening o f  the French defences. (Interview, 
MD Higgins TD, Dublin) For Higgins and the interests o f  the fledgling Irish film 
industry, there were economic reasons for supporting the ‘cultural exception’. While the 
French film industry was largely financed by a highly controversial cinema seat levy 
system which amounted to a tax on non-French films shown in French cinemas, 
Minister Higgins had by 1994 established the new government department o f  the Arts, 
Culture and the Gaeltacht and had put in place a significant directional policy to 
promote the growth o f  an indigenous film industry, riding on the back o f  selling Ireland 
as a location for foreign film production and shooting. MEP Banotti, through her 
dialogue with the US movie industry majors and their representatives in the EU/US 
Audiovisual Round Table hoped to attract inward investment to Ireland by luring US 
production houses to shoot on location in Ireland, and as a by-product o f that, create 
opportunities for hands-on training for the young Irish film-makers. The French did not 
at all support the EU / US Roundtable, arguing that it compromised independence o f  EU 
decision-making.
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However, from the point o f view o f a key civil servant o f the D/ AHGI broadcasting 
division:
“In fairness, it w asn’t any great philosophical debate -  there was, led by the 
French particularly. One way or another, the French would have been leading 
very strongly on this -  the French point o f  view was one our M inister (Higgins) 
fully sympathised with and supported. It w ouldn’t have made any difference 
which M inister or whose persuasion it was, there was a view that the European 
audiovisual industry was important to Europe, and that it should be supported 
and that the domination by America o f  the European industry. I have no problem 
with the way it is . . .I t’s a fact! But, there was no great soul-searching. It was 
determined that Ireland and the other M ember States were determined to protect 
the assistance to the European industry, and there was unanimity and the 
Commission was quite happy to maintain that Common Position. We all 
recognised that it could have been, to an extent, a high-risk strategy. And it still 
might be a high-risk strategy, but at the moment, Europe is o f  that frame o f 
mind, and you w on’t find large files in this department arguing the pros and cons 
o f what we should or shouldn’t do -  we (i.e. the department and the M inister o f 
the day) just took a view that that was the right way to go. Our attitude would be 
-  what are the French thinking? and can we think similarly? The French for 
example are passionate about this, but..it is also worth bearing in mind that we 
are a small nation; the resources we have to ‘think’ are quite limited. So our 
resources are very limited - 5 or 6 people in the Broadcasting division, another 5 
or 6 people in the Film Division- and on issues like this we tend to be pragmatic. 
We take a position, but you w on’t find normally long large detailed 
philosophical treatises o f  pros and cons.” (Interview, D/AHGI 2, Broadcasting 
division, Dublin)
To think like the French, this researcher recommends the Irish government requires 
greater policy-input from the artistic and academic sector, and encourage wider public 
debate.
While it might be argued that the Irish position ‘pragm atically’ attempts to emulate the 
French ‘philosophy’, no effort was spared by either former M inister Higgins or MEP 
Banotti in puncturing the French façade. The impression given to other M ember States 
by the French is an “incredible pride in their language and in their culture. They are just 
absolutely fanatical about protecting the European audiovisual sector, and nothing will 
change them. Even i f  the rest o f  Europe would change its mind, you wouldn’t get 
agreement on a Common Position. The French would use their veto.” (D/AHGI 2, 
Interview, Dublin)
The right o f veto o f any EU member state (the Luxembourg Compromise) is based on 
the ‘protection o f vital national interest’. While a member state might believe that a 
particular issue is o f great national importance, the veto is only accepted by other
Member states -  and thus a common decision is blocked -  i f  the country, or the lobby
that that country has amalgamated carries sufficient ‘w eight’ within the Council o f
Ministers. Ireland is not in that league o f strong and weighty nations. France is.
“Ireland would never be able to block something on its own. If  the Irish were to 
take a Luxembourg Compromise position on something being negotiated in 
multi-national trade, I don’t think anybody would recognise it. If  the French, the 
Germans, and the Italians were to take a similar position on it, I think the 
weighting changes so drastically that maybe people would actually have to take 
a more political view on it. See Europe is all about weight. And they will 
recognise vital national interests, but it has to balance really in terms o f  how it 
leaves the rest o f Europe and whether your particular difficulty weighs in that 
balance.’’(Interview, D/ENT-EM P 1)
While a nation might deem protection o f its national culture o f  vital national interest, no 
nation could block a decision being taken against this national interest unless it is 
sufficiently weighty, like France, or it uses the combined weight o f  many nations, 
thinking in a similar manner.
Thus, some in the Irish broadcasting policy environment would like to think like the 
French, but yet they cannot, for a num ber o f given reasons -  resources, lack o f  veto or a 
‘small state’ status. Another obstacle might be that simply Ireland doesn’t and will 
never be able to match the passion and pride in their culture that colours the French 
position.
8.2 An alternative proposal
The approach advocated by those in favour o f cultural rights discourses that tie 
collective rights o f a community exclusively with 19th century historical Romantic 
ideals o f  a national community is not appropriate for the challenges that European 
citizenship and global markets present.
This researcher suggests that the inequalities that are clearly inherent in the differences 
in personal wealth between citizens should be counteracted by argument with an 
emphasis on human trading rights to property. Property in this case is interpreted to 
mean knowledge, information, skill, labour, craft, art and education as proposed by 
Mowlana (1997) above, and others (W arner 1990), Habermas (1989), Marshall (1950),
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William Cobbett (1763-1835) in Williams (1990:13-17) and by an extrapolation o f  the 
continual and continued association o f  acquisition o f  property with learning, education, 
and literature as put forward by the United Irishmen.
The rationale behind this suggestion that rights relating to communication, public 
opinion and freedom to participate in public spheres should be strengthened within legal 
guarantees for ‘property rights’ is that property rights hold much greater weight than 
any conceptualisation o f ‘cultural rights’ or ‘social rights’ in fora o f  international 
policymaking such as the World Trade Organisation where rules regulating trade and 
commerce o f communication products and services are established for the global 
marketplace. Additionally, audiovisual services are defined, at least by the Irish 
governm ent’s Broadcasting division, as ‘individual’ services -  therefore, individual 
rights could be argued to apply. Further, all citizens have the civil right to procure 
property, and this right ought to be enforced in the marketplace where trade takes place, 
by way o f individual trade or trading rights.
I suggest a redefinition o f  civil property rights, related to the public sphere: the civil 
rights to access the means o f  communication, and the right to the knowledge (individual 
property) necessary for democratic involvement (political input) and political 
participation.
Citizenship, both in America and in France grew up in the debate surrounding taxes, 
and taxable citizens. This researcher recognises that American citizenship was initially 
exclusively reserved for white male tax-paying owners o f private property. In France, 
the ‘active’ politically involved citizens (as opposed to passive ‘civil’ citizens) were 
determined by selecting those who paid taxes. France was more advanced than America 
through the opening o f  the debate on citizenship to discussion o f widening access to 
citizenship, the status o f  citizens, and citizens’ rights. France discussed the inclusion o f 
slaves and women. The fact was that there were many more women becoming 
politically involved in order to insist on their rights, particularly the safeguarding o f 
their property.
Marx 1878 (in Calabrese & Burgelman 1999:3) claims that citizenship following the 
French Revolution was entirely dependent on property ownership, not on the
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universalism o f humans. He noted that "the franchise o f political power came as a right 
o f  property ownership and that in this context man was defined as bourgeois man, "not 
man as a citizen" (1978:43), and thus the idea o f  citizenship was grounded on conditions 
o f  economic inequality. The issues o f taxes and property were also made prominent by 
the United Irishmen trying to move the people towards political revolution (McBride 
2000). Gamham (1990) suggests the key to property rights is that voting citizens live 
with the consequences o f  their political decisions.
Calabrese and Burgelman (1999:4) suggest that citizenship continues to be influenced 
by the wealth and economic stature o f individuals, despite formal full political 
enfranchisement. Studies o f local democratic involvement (“e-democracy projects”) by 
an urban public using interactive electronic democratic forums in Bologna, Amsterdam, 
Manchester, and Santa Monica (see Tsagarousianou 1998:170) seem to bear witness to 
Calabrese & Burgelman’s suggestion. Tsagarousianou concedes that financial 
restrictions o f  citizens are a factor for the experim ents’ lack o f success in getting the 
local citizenry more involved. However other reasons were also put forward to explain 
why the full potential for interactivity inherent in new technologies had not been 
explored, namely: lack o f citizen access to the necessary technology, citizens' negative 
predisposition to the technologies utilized, technical limitations, lack o f  political will 
and factors related to political culture.
Venturelli suggests that “commercial expression has been gaining larger protections in 
liberal jurisprudence and public policy than the political - expression rights o f  citizens". 
(1998:97) This is because, she argues (1998:92) the principle o f freedom o f expression, 
while enshrined in legally justiciable declarations on human rights, is frequently 
subordinate to a class o f  rights concerning property. Venturelli, for example, "traces the 
emergence o f information liberalisation, which invokes a vision o f unprecedented 
transfers o f knowledge through m odem  communication networks to individuals 
worldwide, to the ideological revi val o f  John Locke's late 17th century theory o f  limited 
government, justifying political authority based on proprietary (as against divine or 
democratic) power." (Corcoran 2001:27) This is what Habermas (1989) calls a 
concentration o f expression under proprietary governance on a scale not encountered 
since the passing o f  feudal society.
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Many communication theorists ask - if  the infrastructure on which communication via 
the Internet relies is increasingly operated and owned by commercial vendors, what is at 
stake for democracy in the ownership o f its component parts? Calabrese and Borchert 
(1996, April) ask whether the ownership o f the communication system is becoming the 
sole indicator o f the publicness or democratic nature o f  a communication infrastructure. 
Does the ownership o f  the space in which communication occurs determine the "public" 
or "non-publicness" o f  the communication? The issue o f  ownership is sometimes 
considered by contemporary progressives to be the primary, i f  not the sole, criterion for 
judging the publicness o f a communications infrastructure. Can commercial ownership 
contradict the possibility o f undistorted public communication? (1996:260) Does 
commercialisation o f an infrastructure mean it becomes undemocratic?
Hamelink (1995:127) argues that the trend towards privatization and commercialization 
o f the production o f  knowledge has made knowledge and information created and 
controlled as private property. He argues that the notion o f knowledge as a 'common 
good' has been almost wiped out.
‘Property’ rights are currently discussed within the framework o f either
a) the ownership o f  communication systems, that is, whether they are 
publicly or privately owned. (See Calabrese 1996), or
b) the protection o f  intellectual property, in the form o f  patents, copyrights or 
trademarks (this is ‘common heritage’ in Ham elink’s 1995 view)
The discussion over ‘property’ seems to be taking two strands here: on the one hand, 
property is used in relation to knowledge, learning, acquisition o f  news for the 
formation o f  autonomous and independent opinion. This thesis propose a definition o f 
property in the communication sphere as knowledge and learning or skill, or 
employable activity. Cobbett (in Williams 1990:13, see also Williams 1983) defended 
poor people’s rights to property. He interpreted property as a m an’s labour or skill or 
craft, and demanded the same rights for that, as for other forms o f property such as for 
land. In Cobbett’s eyes, a person was a slave unless he had rights to do what he chose 
with the only property available to him, his labour. In today’s terms, that interpretation 
could include knowledge, learning and education.
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On the other hand, property is used in relation to the m edia institutions and transmission 
networks that previously used to be publicly owned (public service broadcasters etc.) 
but are increasingly owned by private corporations. Thus, the transmission network is 
‘their’ private property. (Calabrese & Borchert 1996, Venturelli 1998a).
M owlana (1997) suggests that the definition o f property is no longer restricted to land 
or capital. In the periods o f  the Agrarian and Industrial revolutions, land and capital 
were the source o f  people’s wealth, prosperity, and autonomy o f action. These resources 
were taxed, and the owners o f these forms o f  property were politically active citizens as 
a consequence.
Mowlana (1997) suggests that the transition from information as a by-product o f  the 
trade and economic process towards a global economy reliant on an ‘information-based 
econom y’ has made information a form o f wealth and a national resource in itself. This 
shift in the position o f  information (replacing to a degree the land and capital) to a 
central product o f  a nation’s economy has brought about new definitions o f  “property”. 
For example, ‘property’ can now be interpreted as covering that class o f  patents, 
copyrights and trademarks, and ‘property rights’ can refer to rights securing intellectual 
property rather than land (during the agricultural revolution) or capital (during the 
industrial revolution). Property in the ‘information revolution’ may also be, according 
to Mowlana, information, skills, and knowledge. For the wealth o f  nations, this form o f 
property is increasingly their base source o f  wealth (rather than, in the past, 
manufacturing, or agriculture developed on the basis o f land property).
These can be privately owned and privately appropriated, but in classical liberal theory, 
everyone has the civil right to own property. Citizenship rights and liberties guaranteed 
by the American Constitution must not be infringed by the State. Therefore, the right to 
own property must also not be infringed by the powers that may have overtaken the 
State’s control o f  this area.
This researcher aligns herself with M owlana’s thinking, and proposes a way o f 
interpreting education, information and news as ‘property’-  i.e. that which allows the 
formation o f an autonomous opinion. As W arner (1990) argues, the benefits o f  property 
in 18th century America was that it provided the possibility o f  independence o f  thought
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and action. Property owners then were not physical slaves. New property owners now 
cannot be thought o f  as intellectual slaves. They are, rather, intellectually autonomous.
As Hamelink (Hamelink 1995:127) suggests, access to knowledge empowers: if  access 
to knowledge is restrained, people are disempowered. If  people are deprived o f 
information, they can be dominated.
Recalling that this thesis subscribes to a concept o f citizenship that is political, not 
cultural; and post-national not national; this researcher makes a distinction between 
information necessary for political citizenship and that entertainment content that some 
may argue contributes to ‘the whole public service broadcasting editorial selection’.
The thesis’ perspective on entertainment differs from the acceptance by Marshall and 
D/AHGI that there is a fundamental right to be entertained. Marshall suggested that 
"Common enjoyment is a common right" (1950:82), and this was related to the 
fundamental equality o f citizens. There are others (Katz 1977) who argue that 
“entertainment is anything but neutral, and is an active force in the communication o f  
values”53. He maintains that the value o f  entertainment needs to be taken more 
seriously, especially since m odem  broadcasting schedules devote a large chunk o f 
broadcast time to entertainment programmes. Yet, the majority o f  these are imported, 
not indigenous, thus this thesis does not subscribe to an abstract ‘right’ to be 
entertained. This thesis concerns itself with the post-national political integration and 
participation as citizens. However, this thesis works on the assumption that awareness, 
respect and appreciation o f other cultures is also desirable.
This thesis therefore argues that citizens critically require access to information which is 
related to policy initiatives and government activities (Murdock and Golding 1989) -  
i.e. news, current affairs, and investigative documentaries, and need to a lesser extent 
the right o f access to contemporary drama and entertainment - whether indigenously 
produced or from abroad.
This researcher concedes that there exists a natural tendency for the free market to 
dysfunction. For Marshall and Closa, this fact supports their demand for social rights. 
This researcher agrees that citizen’s rights to information and participation can be
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compromised if  the market is the sole provider o f  this information critical to involved 
citizenship.
Solutions put forward by Calabrese & Borchert (1996), Calabrese & Burgelman (1999) 
and the European Parliament, argue for the treatment o f communication policy as a 
welfare and social policy. Calabrese & Borchert employ a version o f Briggs’ (1961) 
definition o f  a ‘welfare state’: organised power is deliberately used through politics and 
administration in an effort to modify the play o f  market forces. However, Dahlgren as 
well as Marshall opposes this proposal. Despite presenting the case strongly for social 
rights, Marshall did not wish to see government intervention disrupt free market 
functioning. His social rights were designed to compensate for deficiencies left by free 
market operation.
However, the flaw in the argument for welfare rights to communication, and social 
policies to compensate for market inefficiencies is the following: due to the 
redistributive economic nature o f  social or welfare rights, this type o f  policy will 
necessarily be limited to the national sphere. (Laffan et al, 2001; Calabrese & 
Burgelman 1999). This type o f policy has difficulty with any forms o f citizenship that 
exist beyond the national state, and its possibilities for redistributive actions. The EU 
does not exercise competency over social policy.
The approach advocated by those in favour o f  ‘cultural rights’ discourses that tie 
collective rights o f  a welfare community with 19th century Romantic ideals o f  a national 
community is not appropriate for the challenges that European citizenship and global 
markets present.
Rather, this thesis suggests that the inequalities that are clearly implicated by 
differences in personal wealth between citizens should be counteracted by an argument 
with an emphasis on human rights to property enforced in trading marketplaces. 
Property in this case in interpreted to mean knowledge, information, skill, and education 
as proposed by Mowlana (1997), W arner (1990), Habermas (1989), Marshall (1950), 
Cobbett (in Williams, R. 1983, 1990), and through extrapolation o f the argument put 
forward by the United Irishmen when they associated property acquisition for would-be 
citizens with education, learning and literature.
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The reasoning behind this suggestion is the following. Rights related to communication, 
public opinion and freedom to participation in public spheres should be strengthened 
within legal guarantees for ‘property rights’, in fora o f  international policymaking such 
as the WTO where rules regulating trade and commerce o f communication products and 
services are established for the global marketplace. Further, all citizens have the civil 
right to property -  knowledge, information for democratic political participation -  and it 
is this researcher’s opinion that this right ought to be enforced in the marketplace where 
trade takes place.
While this researcher is aiming to safeguard property rights within the economic 
environment o f  the WTO, there exists already that class o f  rights known as intellectual 
property rights (IPR) that is regulated by the TRIPS agreement, and is principally 
concerned with medecine and health54. TRIPS relates to the payment o f  royalties, but 
many countries have not yet implemented two new WIPO (W orld Intellectual Property 
Organization) Treaties concerning copyright and neighbouring rights. While the EC 
adopted a Directive in 2001 (Copyright and Neighbouring Rights) in order to adapt EC 
law to the new intellectual property developments o f  WIPO, only 30 out o f 140 
countries have so far also done this. It is not envisaged then that the discussion will 
continue much further within the WTO until a critical mass o f  members have ratified 
the WIPO Treaties.
The principle o f intellectual property rights is based on exclusionary proprietary rights 
held by the property-owner, the benefit o f  which is not released to others unless for 
economic recompense determined by market competition. The UN Declaration o f 
Human Rights (Article 27) defends intellectual property as a human right: “Everyone 
has the right to the protection o f the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary, or artistic production o f which he is the author” . This article appears 
to protect the right o f  the property -ow ner over and above the right o f  others to the 
exercise o f  their (other) human rights. Therefore the access to property that may benefit 
and honour others’ individual or collective human rights is put in question. The 
economic argument for IPR is that it provides incentive to the inventor to invent 
knowing that he / she will receive compensatory reward. Thus, IPR encourages a 
process that promotes economic growth.
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A useful distinction is made by Ostergard (1999) when he argues that there ought to 
exist distinct categories o f  property rights, in a hierarchical structure o f necessity. As he 
points out, the UN Declaration does not recognise the different priority in property 
rights -  some being essential for intellectual or physical survival and others not.
If  there were to exist two types o f  property, i.e. that which is essential for well-being 
and health (e.g. medicine), and that which is non-essential (e.g. music) the critical 
distinction would be that “whatever property is needed to maintain an individual’s 
physical well-being must be accessible if  all human beings are to be permitted to 
achieve their potential.” (1999:170) In the case o f  audiovisual services, it could be 
argued that the information and knowledge and opinions necessary for the proper 
functioning o f  a democratic society must be accessible on an individual basis, for the 
benefit o f  the collective polity. Only i f  this is the case, are each individual’s basic civil 
and political rights being respected, and the polity can continue to function properly.
Intellectual property rights regulation should not, he argues, make a small section o f  the 
population (the copyright owners) monopoly owners, and the rest o f  the people worse 
o ff because they are not able to acquire the intellectual knowledge. The present author 
argues that the people who do not own the IP rights still have other rights (civil, 
political in particular) that must be met. IP rights supply one set o f  individuals the right 
to exclusionary ownership o f that property, while denying all others the right to benefit 
from that knowledge. The problem with IP rights as they stand is that the deal is giving 
exclusive control to one party, while simultaneously denying others’ their individual 
rights to acquire that property.
Ostergard (1999) suggests that in a situation o f competing rights -  those o f  the property 
owner vis a vis those who have civil and political rights, there needs to be a compromise 
or a prioritisation between competing demands for rights. A balance must be struck 
between private individuals’ control on the use o f  property, and - for public interest 
objectives - restrictions on the availability o f  that property for others’ well-being. It 
could also be proposed, as Anderson Q.C. suggests, that any ‘interference’ with 
property (i.e. in breach o f  Article 1 o f  the European Convention o f Human Rights), as 
determined by the European Court o f  Human Rights could be decided on “whether the 
interference at issue strikes a fair balance between the demands o f the general interest o f
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the community and the requirements o f  the protection o f an individual’s fundamental 
rights” . (Anderson 1999:549) Article 1 ECHR states:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment o f his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived o f  his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles o f  international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment o f taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.” (see Anderson, D. 1999)
Interference with property -  deprivations, controls on its use, restrictions and so on -  
brought before the European Court o f  Human Rights under Article 1 are usually, but not 
always, compensated in monetary terms. This could be a useful way to address the issue 
o f enforcing rights in the WTO, a body which operates according to economic benefits, 
and follows policies that endow economic advantage to its members. There is no 
express obligation to pay compensation for interferences, but it is an area that has been 
explored in case-law. The nature o f the interference, the extent o f that interference, and 
the degree o f  damage to the applicant are all factors that are taken into account in 
compensation cases. The crucial question, according to Anderson, is “does the 
interference infringe a legitimate expectation o f the applicant, upon which the applicant 
has relied?”( 1999:556). In the case o f  knowledge and information, this could be 
considerable. Much would depend on the expectation o f  the individual, or collective o f 
individuals to either the State’s or the m edia’s responsibility to provide the access to 
knowledge necessary for active participation and therefore full citizenship.
The debate splits on the issue o f responsibility for upholding human rights -  is it the 
role and responsibility o f  the media (as suggested by the Irish Constitution, and the 
European Convention on Human Rights). Is it the responsibility o f the state (as 
suggested by the European Court o f  Human Rights and Ostergard 1999), or should 
doctrines o f  human rights be included in international treaties such as the MAI 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, and the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the 
World Trade Organisation (1994), as McCorquodale and Fairbrother (1999:735-766) 
suggest. In this way, possibly the activities o f  international organisations as well as 
transnational corporations could be made to follow international human rights law, and 
they could be forced to pay compensation if  rights are violated as a result o f their 
policies. Alternatively, on the 50th anniversary o f  the UN Universal Declaration o f
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Human Rights, a committee have suggested that the EU should develop a human rights 
policy (see Leading by Example -  Human Rights agenda fo r  the European Union fo r  
the Year 2000).
Defending a right to property within the WTO is presently problematic for the following 
reasons. Firstly, property as I have defined it currently falls under the category o f 
audiovisual services and thus falls within the remit o f GATS, not TRIPS. It is not 
impossible that TRIPS and audiovisual will begin to overlap and converge in the future, 
but presently this is not the case. Secondly, since the WTO is dominated by economic 
concerns, my proposal that monetary compensation for interference with property is 
more in tune with the organisation than others’ suggestions. However, the WTO argues 
that they define and follow no policy, and it is the Member States o f that organisation 
wherein duties for human rights lie. Further, cases that are taken in breach o f the 
European Convention on Human Rights are usually against one o f  the member states o f 
the Council o f  Europe which have ratified the Convention, rather than against an 
international organisation. Thirdly, following the collapse o f  the Cancún trade round 
(September 2003), questions now loom large over the WTO both as an institution and as 
a viable arena in which to agree and enforce a multilateral trading system. The Cancún 
failure, repeating the disappointment o f Seattle, echoes the criticism laid at its door by 
Pascal Lamy, the EU Trade Commissioner. He accused the WTO -  which makes 
decisions by consensus rather than voting -  as a medieval organisation. “The procedures 
and rules o f this organisation have not supported the weight o f  the task.” (Lamy, quoted 
in Irish Times, 16 September 2003). It is therefore not impossible to envisage that 
serious questions will be raised in the immediate future about the WTO and the system 
o f agreeing international trade, and in this eventuality the author’s proposal for 
defending individual property rights to information may well find itself out o f date and 
not applicable to the scenario presented within the short-time future. Cancún’s failure 
may become the turning point for the WTO.
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Methodology of Research project
A p p e n d i x  A
This section illustrates the methodology o f the research undertaken to answer the main 
questions posed at the outset o f  this research project. The conclusions supporting this 
thesis’ arguments are based on qualitative research and qualitative empirical data.
The aim o f this research was to analyse the development o f  Irish audiovisual and 
communication policy with regard to the democratic communication rights o f  Irish 
citizens within the international European and multinational global policy-making 
context.
Policy is defined for the purposes o f this research project as the plan o f  action, strategic 
steps and measures, as adopted by a person or organisation. In the arena o f  political 
governance, policy is both a proposed action or programme, as well as the 
implementation o f  regulation or law-making.
This appendix is in the following order: firstly I outline an elaboration o f those research 
strategies and methods adopted, and the procedures followed in order to conduct the 
investigation and answer the main questions. Secondly, the primary resources unearthed 
by this plan are outlined. Thirdly, the diverse challenges encountered that led to changes 
in the initial procedural methods are explained. And fourthly, the main problems 
encountered with the eventually successful chosen procedures adopted are then 
outlined.
A. 1 Research strategies and methods adopted
The principal methods employed were firstly, the gathering o f  documentation from a 
variety o f  Irish government departments illustrating policy strategies relating to 
regulation or support o f  audiovisual industries, and policy actions relating to trade in 
audiovisual services. The principal departments petitioned were the Departments o f 
Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands; Department o f Enterprise, Trade, and 
Employment (Market Access Unit, E-business Unit) ; Department o f Public Enterprise
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(Telecommunications Regulation unit), and Department o f Foreign Affairs (EU Affairs 
section).
Secondly, potential interviewees, i.e. key policy players, were identified through 
informal discussions with the main Irish government departments, and personal contacts 
within the European Union arena, as well as the scouring o f  the Administration 
Yearbook for personnel from years past. It was intended that semi-structured interviews 
would involve the participation o f a representative selection o f  those key actors 
currently and previously involved in the policy process during the past twenty years 
from Irish government, EU institutions (European Commission and European 
Parliament), and World Trade Organisation counsellors and m em bers’ representatives. 
Additionally, interviews were sought with non-governmental lobby organisations that 
contributed the civic or public aspect to the policy debate.
A. 2 Primary resources unveiled and utilised
Primary resources used fell into two distinct categories:
(a) publicly available qualitative data, and
(b) data not generally available in the public domain, and hence secured using 
the Irish Freedom o f Information Act 1997. Transcripts o f interviews form 
an additional aspect o f this category o f non-publicly available data.
Publicly available policy strategies and recommendations were easily obtained. Non- 
publicly available records illustrating how policy positions altered or were changed in 
the course o f inter-departmental or intra-EU M ember State negotiations and discussions 
proved considerably more difficult to obtain. This author encountered serious and 
sustained difficulties with access to policy documentation that was not already in the 
public domain.
A.2.1 Public Documentation
Public documentation included legislative acts and regulatory laws (for example, 
official Bills, Heads o f Bills and Acts) and official and released reports (for example, 
Oireachtas Reports, European Parliament reports, reports by Forfas; foreign reports
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eminating from the United States and Canadian administrations, reports from 
conferences abroad; and reports by indigenous and European film production lobbyists.
Public documents examined also included Irish Parliamentary debates and speeches 
(e.g. Dail parliamentary questions and responses; M inister’s speeches and public 
statements; European Parliament working documents and speeches). These were 
supplemented by opinions and submissions from third-party representations (Oireachtas 
Parliament Committee o f  Foreign Affairs, International lobby networks, official 
conclusions from Council o f EU, General Affairs Council, EU Secretariat, WTO 
members).
In addition, newspaper articles on the legislative process augmented this wealth o f 
documentation.
A.2.2 Non-public documentation
Non-public documentation, released under the Freedom O f Information (FOI) Act 1997 
and request process unveiled data such as consultant’s and advisors’ reports 
commissioned by government departments (“the stuff o f government these days” 
remarked one civil servant). Opinions from external sources were among the released 
material.
The FOI process also facilitated access to reports o f  meetings held to discuss the issues 
raised and the observations and comments on the commissioned consultants’ reports. 
These government comments most frequently took the form o f intra and inter­
departmental letters, faxes and correspondence between departments and minutes o f 
inter-departmental hearings, and often including letters with advisory or 
recommendatory comments from government departments acting in an ‘advisory’ role 
to the principal government department formulating policy (the ‘lead’ department).
Non-governmental opinions relating to a legislative proposal were detailed in 
submissions and advice from Irish broadcasters, the Office o f  the Director o f 
Telecommunications (ODTR), the IRTC regulator, and responses from open public 
consultations.
In relation to the Irish governm ent’s input into the European Community legislative 
process, the FOI process unveiled government records detailing for example the Irish 
position on EC initiatives and Ireland’s response to and communication between the 
European Commission on relevant broadcasting or audiovisual issues.
This research also found detailed evidence o f the relation between the Irish government 
and the European Commission in correspondence between government departments and 
the Irish Permanent Representation to the EU, based in offices in Geneva and Brussels. 
For example, records forthcoming from the Irish department o f Foreign Affairs detailed 
EC / WTO discussions as reported from the Irish permanent representation located in 
Geneva. Other more official material included policy “non-papers” (e.g. EC Staff 
Working papers) and supplementary documentation from EC W orking Groups on 
Audiovisual Services; and material from Council o f  Europe conferences and 
committees.
No memos from government were released under FOI. All memos to and for 
government were classified as confidential, and were refused access under Section 19 o f  
FOI Act 1997. Section 19(l)(a) refers to a record that has been submitted to 
Government for their consideration. A Memo to Government falls within this category. 
It was explained that certain memos may be released under Sections 19(3)(a) and (b). 
These articles provide a level o f relief from the exemptions contained in Regulation 
19(1). The usual relief is that contained in 19(3)(b) where the record (Memo) relates to a 
decision o f the Government that was made 5 years before the receipt o f  the freedom o f 
information request. In such instances this usually means over 5 years after the actual 
Memo was produced. Often Memos are prepared for a particular meeting o f 
Government but subsequently they may not be discussed due to more pressing 
requirements. Also an actual decision o f  Government pursuant to the original Memo 
may not be made for some time.
In general, Memos for government were regarded as sacred, and were always classed as 
too confidential to release.
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A .2.3 Interviews
An offer o f compensation came from all the government departments to which FOI 
requests had been made. In the place o f  papers and written documentation, key civil 
servants with responsibility for the policy area in which this author’s interest lay, 
offered to make themselves freely and willingly available for in-depth interviews.
This researcher accepted the offer o f  interviewing the current civil servants in office 
with responsibility for relevant policy areas. In addition, with the assistance o f the 
Administration Yearbook, published by the Department o f  Finance -  previously 
annually, now every few years -  it was possible to identify the civil servants at Principal 
Officer and Assistant Principal Officer levels within the same or similarly titled 
departments over the past two decades. With the help o f  Press Officers and civil 
servants currently within departments, this author was able to track down and contact 
for interview the key civil servants involved in important policy decisions spanning the 
desired time frame o f this project -  early 1980’s to the present.
In this way, therefore, the primaiy empirical data deriving from public documents, and 
non-public government papers and files is heavily supplemented with material taken 
from informally structured interviews with those policy makers available and willing to 
participate in this research project. Unfortunately, and against former research strategic 
planning, it was sometimes the case that this author had received little or no 
documentation from the FOI process prior to the interview o f  a key policy-maker, 
principally because o f the extraordinary delays allowed in the FOI process -  
particularly, the four week period allotted to the departments before any reply is legally 
required by the Act.
In total, substantial evidence in this thesis relies on interviews carried out with 10-15 
civil servants o f  senior positions located in four government departments over a twenty 
year period. Additionally, this researcher interviewed those o f a senior position active 
within the European Union debate on audiovisual policy, and cultural or market issues - 
MEP Mary Banotti, and former M inister for Culture, Michael D Higgins. This 
researcher had also personally been centrally positioned within the EU debate on public 
service broadcasting at a critical period, between 1995 and 1997 when employed within 
a range o f European Union institutions -  the Council o f Europe, the European
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Commission, and the European Parliament. During these work contracts, this researcher 
was exposed to the main axis o f  EU debate on audiovisual policy.
In addition to 10-15 short telephone and long (1-2 hours) face-to-face interviews 
performed in Dublin, this research also benefits from interviews performed in Brussels 
with key personnel within the European Commission, Directorate General Culture and 
Directorate General Trade. Additionally, insights from key players located within the 
Secretariat o f the World Trade Organisation in Geneva (counsellors for e-commerce, 
and audiovisual services) as well as representatives from the United States Mission to 
the EU in Brussels add an extra dimension and perspective to this thesis’ research and 
conclusions.
Interviewees offering alternative perspectives included representatives from Film 
Makers Ireland (FMI), Ireland’s sole lobby organisation for film and television 
producers; IBEC Audiovisual and Telecoms Services Council representatives, and 
spokespersons from the government agencies Enterprise Ireland and Forfas. This 
researcher also took account o f the comments and contributions offered to the 
government initiative, Forum for Broadcasting, which was on-going during the period 
o f research.
While access to interviewees located within Irish government departments who had 
portfolios for audiovisual, trade or e-commerce policy dating from 1982 was freely 
offered, it was a different scenario when this author sought to interview current and 
former government Ministers. The timing o f the interviews in this instance played a 
critical part. Interviews were now taking place between January and March 2002, this 
author having been occupied with the making, processing and administration o f FOI 
requests and replies to four government departments between September 2001 and 
February 2002 -  D/ Arts Heritage Gaeltacht and the Islands, D/ Trade Enterprise and 
Employment, D/ Foreign Affairs, and D/ Public Enterprise. In Ireland in that year, a 
General Election was planned for May 2002. As a result, all representatives o f  Ireland’s 
political parties with seats in the Irish Parliament (TD ’s) were preoccupied with 
electioneering, and regrettably, time could often not be afforded by current and former 
Ministers.
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A.3 Challenges encountered forcing change of strategy
A.3.1 Access to and release of non-public documentation
The most significant problem encountered in the initial stages o f documentation 
sourcing and collection was the experience o f  lengthy delays in receiving any non­
public documentation from departments, particularly evident over the period o f the 
Summer o f 2001 when government activity slows considerably and many departments 
are short-staffed.
Following delays lasting weeks, and encroaching months, awaiting replies to small- 
scale requests for documents and papers relating to key policy proposals and 
deliberation at EU and WTO levels, this author reluctantly and in the last resort turned 
to the assistance o f the 1997 Freedom o f Information Act which authorises the release 
o f  non-public material relating to government policy in a standardised and rule-based 
manner, and subject to specific timeframes. Civil servants prefer to work within the 
confines o f  the FOI Act, rather than releasing material in an informal manner, and they 
thus can avoid releasing material in any way that might create a “dangerous precedent” .
The FOI Act allows therefore for the demand for release o f otherwise unobtainable 
material, however access to any non-public documentation originating from before the 
inauguration o f  the FOI Act o f 21 April 1998 is in practice effectively denied. There 
does exist a provision within the Act for the release o f papers and files dated before 21 
April 1998 -  the article 6 (5) (a) explains that there is a right o f  access to records 
“created before the commencement o f  this Act” when these are “necessary or expedient 
in order to understand records created after [such] commencement” o f  this Act. In 
theory, therefore, files dating before 21 April 1998 are accessible, if  the requester can 
prove that they are required for the greater understanding o f a record created after 21 
April 1998 - however, this is a lengthy, arduous and time-consuming argument to try 
and win.
A possible way-through the impasse frequently encountered in departments, i.e. their 
reluctance to release any file pre-dating 1998 because there was “no statutory legal basis 
by which to work by” is a method o f requesting a current file under FOI (e.g. for Trade 
policy, request to see current file on GATS 2000; for Arts/ Culture, ask to see current
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file on Television Without Frontiers Revision) and then hopefully, access may be 
permitted to pre-1998 files on those related matters by arguing that ‘in order to 
understand how this position was arrived at, I would need access to files dating back 
to... 1984 in the case o f  TVWF and 1989 in the case o f Trade in audiovisual / cultural 
services’. This researcher was advised to pursue this route in order that I could be ‘fast- 
tracked’ onto the historical files that were o f greater interest. However reasonable this 
may appear in theory, this method o f  accessing files dating from pre-1998 was not 
successful in practice, and was strongly resisted by departments.
In general, the rules o f release o f  all government papers are subject to the 30 years 
Archive Act or the 1998 Freedom o f Information Act, and papers relating to the time 
frame in between are effectively covered by the Official Secrets Act protecting papers 
from release until thirty years have passed. (It had been planned by government to 
change this rule, and release government papers after five years rather than thirty, but at 
the time o f writing (February 2003) this change is being contested by civil servants, and 
a Bill amending the FOI 1998 Act looks likely.)
The current framework o f  legislation governing the release o f  government papers 
carried implications for this research project, in that the timeframe o f policy under 
examination was initially planned to span 1982 to 2002. Hence, the unwillingness o f 
departments to release papers prior to 1998 created difficulties. In light o f  this 
declaration by departments, the empirical focus o f  the research had to be adjusted. 
Originally, this author had hoped to conduct an empirical in-depth case study o f the 
formation o f  EC Television Without Frontiers from the Irish perspective, first proposed 
in the early 1980s. This clearly was going to be impossible. Thus the focus shifted to 
more recent policy formation within the international and EU field, where Ireland’s 
position on broadcasting and audiovisual matters could still however be detected and 
examined.
A.3.2 Sensitive nature of in-field observation research
Qualitative in-field research as a participant observer did not materialise as hoped or 
planned, primarily due to the political and economic sensitivity o f  the potential 
information. As a result, this insight into current Irish roles in EU or WTO 
policymaking was dependent on acquiring access to meetings, which in the present role
K
o f academic researcher was not facilitated and evidence had to rely entirely on 
documents and interviews.
Three separate and distinct attempts were made by this researcher to incorporate an 
aspect o f in-field participant observation data into the project.
(a) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
These Tive policy’ case studies which were potentially relevant to my work were firstly, 
the work o f the European Parliament on the drafting and deliberation on the EU Charter 
for Fundamental Rights. In particular, this author was interested in the development and 
respective governmental / EU institutional inputs into the drafting o f  the Article on 
Freedom o f Expression. This work was ongoing during the year 2000, with many o f  the 
debates being held in Brussels or Strasbourg.
(b) EU Nice Treaty IG C  (Intergovernmental Conference)
The second policy event revolved around the week debate and signing o f the Nice 
Treaty, orchestrated by the French presidency o f  the European Union, which took place 
in Nice in December 2000. A key aspect o f  the Nice Treaty Intergovernmental 
convention was the final wording and agreement on the Charter for Fundamental 
Rights. As an example o f  political horse-trading in pressurised circumstances, this event 
would have been valuable to this research for the knowledge it would have provided on 
the role o f  Ireland within the arena o f the European Union with regard to policymaking 
affecting citizens’ rights to communication, information and expression.
(c) World Trade Organisation Doha Trade Round and Irish consultation process
The third ‘real-tim e’ policy process, located in Dublin at the initial stages o f the 
process, was the development and formulation o f the official Irish position on 
audiovisual services and industries with respect to a new World Trade Round (Doha 
Round 2001), appearing at the time o f  writing (February 2003) to be splitting apart due 
to lack o f agreement between USA on the one hand and EU and Japan on the other over 
the American proposals for the reduction o f tariffs and trade barriers.
This author was in regular and close contact with the government agency Forfas, 
assigned by the Department o f Trade, Enterprise and Employment to consult widely 
amongst industry and public and draw up a formal Irish policy position on trade in
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‘services’ (amongst other aspects) prior to this position being sent to the European 
Commission, and the subsequent development o f a Community Common position on 
the negotiation o f trade m les for services within the World Trade Organisation in 
Geneva. However, due to the commercial and political sensitivity o f  the information 
being gathered from individual firms located within Ireland and their official 
representatives, it was decided after lengthy deliberation with Forfas that while my offer 
o f  assistance might be welcomed in the consultative process, any information gathered 
by this researcher would be subject to copyright restrictions as well as severe 
censorship.
A.4 Problems encountered with final procedure chosen
As the empirical data search focus shifted to the recent present, and the FOI requests 
narrowed the scale o f  search to the years 1998 to the present, subsequently, the 
following problems were encountered.
A.4.1 Type of document sought did not exist
It was argued that many policy decisions made within the Irish government are not 
documented in copious pieces o f  paper, and changes in policy positions are not 
committed to paper. (The European Commission told a similar tale, arguing that any 
sensitive discussions are not minuted because they would immediately be leaked). 
While there exist documents relating to Dail debates and departmental discussion, 
decisions, this researcher was informed, are made by word o f mouth, over an informal 
working lunch, or over the telephone. The lack o f  written documentation was justified 
by the fact that this is the trademark o f  a small administration, the beauty o f  which is 
that personal meetings are the key to smooth government, the downside o f  which is that 
to commit policy changes and alterations to paper is considered to be ‘a considerable 
administrative burden’ for the departments, who are seemingly under-staffed. Any 
“sharp exchanges” or “robust debate” over, say, the conclusions o f a consultants’ report 
for example might sometimes be recorded in letter or annotated comment form.
Many departments (D/public enterprise, D/ enterprise trade employment) all intoned 
that prccise recordings o f  documents and policy decisions did not in fact exist.
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Bulletpoints, not copious notes detailing a change o f  policy, mark turning points. Things 
were moving way too fast in the E-business unit o f  D/ENT-EMP (in existence since 
1999) for policy decisions to be noted on paper. The favourite phrase in this unit was “ 
...ready, aim, fire ...”
A.4.2 Prohibitive estimates and charges for records
Often the departments petitioned sought to charge heavily for the ‘search and retrieval’ 
time involved in retrieving these documents from their variously located archives, in 
addition to charging for the photocopying (and time involved in) process. The average 
hourly cost o f  ‘search and retrieval’ was E20.95 / hour and E0.04 for each page o f 
photocopying. Initial costings for accessing those files o f  interest ranged between 
estimates o f  IR£66 to ‘thousands o f pounds’ (d/ public enterprise) or the popular 
estimate o f ‘at least £2000 plus £500 manhour costs’ (d/ ahgi, d/ entemp).
At this response, it was deemed a good idea to arrange a meeting with the departments 
in question to try and ascertain which records were relevant to my research, and thus 
narrow down the FOI request for files, some o f which were multi-volumed.
This researcher argued in response to excessive charging estimates that the files were 
critical to the “understanding o f  an issue o f national importance” as provided for in 
Section 47(b) (5) o f the 1997 Act, in which case, the FOI officer “may reduce the 
amount o f or waive a fee or deposit” .
It was the opinion o f D/AHGI Principal Officer Ciaran o ’Hobain that a charge o f  £66 to 
access three files would not be waived because it is “economic to collect [the fee] in this 
case”, and it was believed that the issues concerned were “not o f national importance” . 
He suggested that I formally submit an appeal case if  I so wished, although after two 
months o f the FOI process, no requested records had been released, and were held until 
a deposit was paid.
The final decision by D/ AHGI as verbally communicated was:
“The line I would be taking is that the Act imposes an obligation. It says that the 
fee shall be imposed providing it is economic to collect it, and in this case it would be. 
The only circumstances when it [the fee] would be waived is where the issue concerned
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would be o f national importance. I would be o f the view that that would require a very 
high test. While not questioning at all that it would be -  the research you’re conducting 
-  could be in the public interest or for the public good, that it wouldn’t pass that high 
test. It would be my decision if  you were to formally submit a case that I would take the 
view that the fee should not be waived.. “ (phone message left by Ciaran o ’Hobain, 
Principal Officer, Broadcasting Policy Division, 13 December 2001))
The FOI request and reply process in its entirety lasted six months -  i.e. the time taken 
between initial request to departments for documents relating to a particular field o f  
interest, to their obtainment. This author did not seek the route o f appealing decisions 
made by departments regarding files deemed as ‘non-releasable’, an action frequently 
defended by Section 19 o f  the Act. Appeals, it was advised by one o f  the co-authors o f  
the Act (Eithne Fitzgerald, former M inister o f  State, Department o f the Tanaiste) were 
unpopular amongst civil servants and time-consuming. Appeals would not act in the 
researcher’s favour if  at a later date, it was necessary to conduct interviews with the 
Principal Officer o f that department whose decision not to release documents I was 
appealing.
However, the basis on which departments were seeking to deter this researcher’s in- 
depth research and investigation into files by way o f excessive and exaggerated 
imaginative accounting was deemed to have ‘no legal standing’ according to Fitzgerald.
One o f the most critical aspects to making a successful request is the precise wording o f 
the in itial request. Departments are obliged to assist the requester to correctly and 
speedily identify relevant records, and eventually, through a detailed selection process, 
this researcher was given assistance by the department officials to narrow down the 
range o f files that were o f potential interest. This process o f selection o f files, and the 
precise wording o f  the initial FOI request is a high art. For example, the following 
phrases will prevent misunderstandings, and thus unwarranted delays, arising in the 
initial request:
“Under Section 7 o f  the FOI Act 1997, I request “all records relating to ... and any 
other records necessary to the understanding o f ....” . Alternatively, ask for a “list o f 
records they are pertinent to the area o f .. .” or “a schedule o f records, from which I can 
choose to view / access or ask “what documents / records are held in respect o f ..” .
1?
A.4.3 Release of some documents viewed as potentially damaging 
to Ireland’s international relations
Irish legislation is primarily driven by EU legislation, according to a d/ Public 
Enterprise official. Any input by Ireland generally predates 1998, and therefore is not 
subject to FOI. However, in order to track changes in Irish policy position, and the 
reasons for those shifts, it is useful to secure notes from Council Working Groups. 
Ireland’s position is noted, and maybe whether it has changed. Working Groups take 
their name from the EC Directive under debate (e.g. TVWF Working Group, USO 
Working Group etc.) Between Working Group meetings in Brussels, Ireland might have 
discussed the EC Directive within inter-departmental meetings in the pre-Directive 
process, and Ireland’s position might change during this process. However, there will 
not exist a continuous recording o f nuances, or changes in policy strategy.
The problem however with gaining access to documents relating to working groups 
discussions is that Working group or Council meetings indicate the positions o f  all 
Member States, and this creates problems with their release. Under FOI, officials were 
obliged to ask all the M ember States' individually for their consent to release a certain 
Working Group document. On many occasions, relevant records were not released, or 
released with sections blacked out precisely because they would reveal the positions o f 
other M ember States governments.
The most frequent reply that was returned by the department o f Foreign Affairs -  
ironically in relation to a request for files relating to the drafting, formulation and 
negotiation o f  Article 15 - “Freedom o f Expression” o f the EU Charter o f  Fundamental 
Rights - was that release o f this information could arguably adversely affect the 
international relations o f the State.
The D/FA refused access to all papers detailing the Irish position and discussion o f  the 
Charter for Fundamental Rights, on the basis that,
1. under section 24 (1) (c) o f  the FOI Act -  dealing with security, defence and 
international relations issues - access to these records could be expected to 
adversely affect the international relations o f  the State;
*
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2. they could disclose positions taken for the purposes o f negotiations carried on by 
or on behalf o f  the Government - s.21(l)(c).;
3. furthermore D/FAwas o f the opinion that as some material was obtained in 
confidence and on the understanding that it would be treated as confidential, to 
grant access to it would prejudice the giving o f further information - s.26(l)(a) 
o f the FOI Act.
4. they are records within the meaning o f  s. 19(6) o f  the FOI Act and have been, or 
are proposed to be submitted to the Government for their consideration - 
s .l9 (l)(a )  o f  the FOI Act. (e.g. briefings by Irish diplomatic representatives 
further to EU meetings)
In conclusion, the D/FA was o f  the opinion that the public interest would not, on 
balance, be better served by granting access to records relating to the article within the 
Charter for Fundamental Rights dealing with Freedom o f Expression.
Naturally, this researcher was invited to appeal the decision, and she did, in M arch 
2002. O f 40 records relating to “the drafting, formulation and negotiation o f Article 15 
(Freedom o f Expression) o f the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights” , the D/ FA made a 
decision to release only 6 o f them, for the above reasons. In particular, it was repeated 
that the ‘international relations o f  the State’ might be adversely effected , and it was 
deemed that ‘the public interest would not be served’ by granting their release. 
Following appeal some more papers were released, but only those giving the opinions 
and positions o f other EU countries, and none were eventually released relating to Irish 
discussions and opinions relating to the Charter article.
In a similar fashion, any records originating from European Community discussions 
were obliged to be only partially released, again because they “contained information 
communicated in confidence within an international organisation o f states” and since 
the record referred to the positions held by other EU members, it was opined that 
“damage to our international relations could reasonably be expected to arise by release 
o f  this record” (D/ ENT-EMP, Market access division, with responsibility for 
international trade negotiations, December 2001)
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A.4.4 Right of refusal of request by departments
Departments retain the right to refuse FOI requests i f  they are deemed to be too wide- 
ranging, and would take up too much staffing hours, and in general affect the day-to-day 
workings o f  the department. According to FOI Act drafter Fitzgerald, this shift in 
approach by the government departments towards refusing outrightly ‘trawling 
requests’ is as a result o f  several individuals who, since 1998, have for personal reasons, 
subjected certain departments to persistent and troublesome requests, an action that cost 
these departments much time and many man-hours. The lack o f  specific staff assigned 
to dealing with FOI requests was often put forward as a reason for delays in processing 
my request through the various stages. As a result, the manner in which requests are 
approached in the year 2003 is markedly different to the departmental approach o f 1998.
All departments, save the department o f  Public Enterprise and the e-business unit o f 
department o f  Enterprise Trade and Employment, refused my request as provided for in 
the Fol Act Section 12 (d) that access to the records may be provided through a 
opportunity to visit the department for inspection o f  records for selection purposes. All 
other units and departments insisted that documents would be listed, and selection 
would be on the basis o f sight unseen prior to photocopying. This choice made by 
departments usually resulted in vast quantities o f  documents irrelevant to my request 
being photocopied by valuable man-hours.
Certainly, this understaffing was identified as playing a major part in the delays with the 
FOI requests made by this researcher. This reasoning was additionally put forward to 
explain why I was not allowed to access the records, as suggested in the Act through a 
choice o f visit to the department and selection for photocopying. The D / AHGI and the 
D/FA were in particular against such visits, insisting that records would be photocopied 
and posted out. Again, the lack o f staff -  and the requirement that a member o f staff be 
present while files are looked through -  is blamed as the root o f  this non-adherence to 
the Act.
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Conclusions on the empirical research process
This author concludes that the operation o f the FOI Act in Ireland is grinding to 
inoperability, and is likely to worsen.
Recent reports (Irish Times, 05.02.2003) suggest that further restrictions are to be 
sought by civil servants by the presentation o f a Bill to amend the 1998 Act due to pass 
through the Oireachtas before Easter 2003. Civil servants are eager to avoid the 
potential scenario o f having to grant public access to Cabinet papers five years rather 
than thirty years after their creation, (i.e. those dated before January 1998.) Due to the 
large increase in number o f  FOI requests (almost 12,000 made between April and 
December o f  2001), and particularly in view o f the 18% o f requests that come from 
press and journalists (the civil servants here feel that they are the journalists’ 
researchers), this researcher can confirm that ‘many Government departments have 
taken an increasingly restrictive interpretation o f the Act’.
This current scenario is at odds with the experience o f previous users o f  the Act for 
research purposes - DIT PhD student Colm Murphy did not experience the same 
restrictions on access to papers by visiting the department, and was not obliged to pay 
costs. Reports suggest that the Bill to amend the 1998 FOI Act will aim to “offer 
departments even greater grounds for refusals and to make FOI applications more 
costly”. (IT, 05.02.2003)
In conclusion, the situation appears that more barriers will be erected by government in 
an attempt to deny the average citizens’ right o f  access and means to obtain information 
about current and future government policy affecting citizens.
Courtesy o f  DCU, this researcher was obliged to pay in total E 141,54 for the 
securement o f documentation from four departments, all papers received by March 
2002. [this sum broke down into E83,80 to D/ AHGI; E l 5,00 to D/ ENTEMP; and 
E42,74 to D/ foreign affairs. The department o f  Public Enterprise waived the fee “in 
recognition o f  the difficulties [you have] experienced in accessing relevant records”. 
(January 2002)
(See full text o f Freedom o f Information Act (1997) on www.irlgov.ie/finance)
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LETTER OF APPEAL FURTHER TO FOI DECISION OF D/ FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Ms. Emer Whelan / Ms. Sheila O ’Neill 
FOI Manager
Department o f  Foreign Affairs 
Iveagh House 
St. Stephen’s Green 
Dublin 2
14 March 2002
Dear Ms. Whelan, Ms O ’Neill,
I write in connection with a Freedom o f Information request submitted on 31 January 
2002 and further to correspondence between m yself and Mr. Tim Harrington, First 
Secretary o f  the Human Rights Unit at the Department o f  Foreign Affairs in relation to
same.
Mr. Harrington has gone through the records relevant to my request and has provided 
me with a schedule o f  documents deemed relevant, and the status as to their release / 
non-release.
O f 40 records relating to “the drafting, formulation and negotiation o f  Article 15 
(Freedom o f  Expression) o f  the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights” , he has made a 
decision to release only 6 o f them. Please find here attached a cheque for Euro 35.74 for 
the receipt o f photocopies o f these releasable documents.
With regard to the remaining 34 documents that Mr. Harrington has decided not to 
release, I wish to appeal this decision. In light o f the fact that I am performing doctoral 
research relating to ‘Citizenship, Information & Expression Rights o f  Citizens, and 
Irish, EU and global Media Policy ‘ I am o f the opinion that access to these records is 
vital not only to serve the academic community, but critically, the public interest.
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Please find here also attached a letter from my academic supervisor, Prof. Paschal 
Preston o f Dublin City University outlining the need for such documents, as well as an 
outline o f my academic doctoral research, which highlights the extent to which my PhD 
devotes to the theoretical foundations o f citizenship. To this end, the analysis o f  the 
formulation o f  the article on Freedom o f  Expression within the EU Charter for 
Fundamental Rights is fundamental to my research.
I would therefore request that these remaining documents relevant to my request be 
released to me with the shortest possible delay.
Yours sincerely,
NoelleAnne O ’Sullivan
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